Vol. XXIV ] JAN.—OCT., 1968 [Parts 1—4

# THE JOURNAL OF THE GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ALLAHABAD

## UMESHAMISHRA COMMEMORATION VOLUME

VOL. I (PARTS 1, 2 & 3)

## RULES RELATING TO MEMBERSHIP AND SUBSCRIPTION

3. The Institute shall consist of

(1) **Donors**, who shall be of four categories:

(i) *Patrons* shall be persons donating Rupees Twenty-five thousand or more, in cash or kind. (ii) *Vice-Patrons* shall be persons donating Rupees Five thousand or more, in cash or kind, but less than Rupees Twenty-five thousand. (iii) *Benefactors* shall be persons donating Rupees One thousand or more, in cash or kind, but less than Rupees Five thousand. (iv) *Associates* shall be those persons, who make gift of books, manuscripts or other articles approved by the Executive Committee.

(2) **Members**, who shall be of four categories:

(i) *Honorary Members*, who shall be elected from amongst distinguished scholars, by at least two-third majority of votes of the Executive Committee after being duly proposed and seconded by two members, provided that the number of such members shall not at any time be more than twenty-five.

(iv) *Ordinary Members* shall be those who pay an annual subscription of Rs. 15 a year, payable on the first day of January every year, which may be compounded by payment of Rupees One Hundred and Thirty-Five within the course of a year, and thus become Life-Members. *Provided* that persons desirous of becoming an Ordinary Member shall be nominated by one member and seconded by another, the nominating member shall address the Secretary in writing and give the candidate's name and address, occupation or status. The nomination will be considered by the Executive Committee and the election shall be by a majority of votes.

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(5) to get other publications of the Institute at such concession rates as may be fixed by the Executive Committee,

(6) to use the Library and Reading-room of the Institute on such conditions as the Executive Committee may lay down.

*All communications should be addressed to—*

Dr. JAYAKANTA MISHRA, M.A., D.Phil.
Honorary Secretary, Ganganatha Jha Research Institute
Motilal Nehru Park, Allahabad—2

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Published by
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# JOURNAL

## OF THE

# GANGANATHA JHA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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**January—October, 1968**

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महामहोपाध्याय-डाक्टर-उमेशमिश्रः
(१८९५-१९६७)

## PREFACE

Pandit Umesha Mishra joined the University of Allahabad as Lecturer in the Department of Sanskrit in 1923 and served the Department till his retirement in 1959 with considerable devotion. He was educated at Darbhanga and Varanasi and he studied Sanskrit under his own father Mahamahopadhyaya Pandit Jayadeva Mishra. Pandit Mishra obtained the degree of Doctor of Letters of the University of Allahabad in 1933 on a thesis dealing with Indian Philosophy. His researches continued up to the moment of his death and obtained universal appreciation and recognition. The Government awarded the title of 'Mahamahopadhyaya' in 1943 to him in recognition of his work.

Dr. Mishra was the Secretary of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute from its foundation and continued to be in that office up to his death. In the work of the Institute, he was mainly guided by Pandit Amaranatha Jha and in later days by Pandit Adityanatha Jha —two distinguished sons of the great Scholar, whose name is commemorated in this Institute. Dr. Mishra's devotion to this Institute was great and the progress that the Institute made, was mostly due to his efforts. It is, therefore, in the fitness of things that the Institute is honouring the memory of Dr. Mishra by bringing out the Commemoration Volume.

My personal association with Dr. Mishra was since his arrival in Allahabad in 1923 and continued up to the last. As a colleague in the University of Allahabad and as a neighbour in the city, I found Dr. Mishra a great friend and a loyal co-worker.

I hereby express my gratitude to the contributors to this Volume and to the members of the Editorial Board.

B. R. Saksena
*Chief Editor*
*Umesha Mishra Commemoration Volume*

*23-8-1969*

## IMPORTANT DATES IN THE LIFE OF MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA Dr. UMESHA MISHRA

(1895—1967)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| November 18, 1895 | .. | Birth at Binhī in the kingdom of Nepal, near Janakapur Dhām. |
| 1902 | .. | Death of mother Sūgā Devī. |
| 1903 | .. | Arrival at Varanasi with father Mahāmahopādhyāya Jayadeva Mishra. |
| 1914 | .. | Matriculation from Bengali Tola High School, Varanasi and won Shiromani Gold Medal for standing first in Sanskrit. |
| 1916 | .. | Madhyamā from Banaras Sanskrit College. |
| 1918 | .. | Intermediate from Central Hindu College, Varanasi. Married Shrimati Kumudinī. |
| 1920 | .. | B.A. from Banaras Hindu University. |
| 1922 | .. | M.A. in Sanskrit (Indian Philosophy group) from Banaras Hindu University. |
| 1923 | .. | Title Examination (Kāvyatīrtha) from Sanskrit Association, Calcutta and appointed Lecturer in Sanskrit Department Allahabad University. |
| 1926 | .. | Death of father. |
| 1929 | .. | Presided over a historic session of the All India Maithilī Sāhitya Parishad at Ghongharaḍīhā. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1932 .. | Obtained the degree of Doctor of Letters from the Allahabad University. Examiners were Dr. Brajendranath Seal, Dr. A. B. Keith, Dr. A. B. Dhruva, Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj and Mm. Dr. Sir Ganganatha Jha. |
| | 1934 .. | Built a house in village home at Gajaharā. |
| September | 1936 .. | Publication of *Conception of Matter according to Nyāya Vaiśeṣika.* |
| | 1938 .. | Publication of critical edition of Manabodha's *Kṛṣṇajanma* and a critical study of *Vidyāpati Ṭhākura.* |
| March | 1939 .. | Built a house at Allahabad. |
| | 1940 .. | Publication of *Nimbārka School of Vedānta* by the University of Allahabad. |
| | 1942 .. | Publication of *Critical Bibliography of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā,* Banaras Hindu University. |
| January 1, | 1943 .. | Awarded the title of Mahāmahopādhyāya by the Government of India. |
| | 1943 .. | Elected on the Committee for Reorganization of Sanskrit Studies in Bihar; presided over the Philosophy and Religion section of the All India Oriental Conference held at Varanasi; elected Secretary of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute; presided over the Maithilī Shailī Nirdhāraṇa Samiti, Muzaffarpur. |
| | 1946 .. | Published *Bhāratīya Tarkaśāstra*; presided over the Philosophy and Religion Section of the All India Oriental Conference at Nagpur. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1948 | .. | Organized the XIV All India Oriental Conference at Darbhanga as its Local Secretary. |
| | 1949 | .. | Joined the Mithila Research Institute at Darbhanga as Registrar-cum-Professor and later as Director. |
| | 1952 | .. | Left the Mithila Research Institute and rejoined the University of Allahabad. |
| | 1957 | .. | Published *History of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. I); *Maithila Saṁskṛti Sabhyatā* (2 parts), and *A Critical Study of Bhagawadgītā*. |
| | 1958 | .. | Published *Bhāratīya Darśana* by the Uttar Pradesh Government Hindi Samiti. |
| June | 1959 | .. | Retired from the University of Allahabad. |
| January 26, | 1961 | .. | Appointed Vice-Chancellor of Sanskrit University, Darbhanga. |
| February | 1964 | .. | Retired from Vice-Chancellorship of Sanskrit University, Darbhanga, and got dug a tank in his home village. |
| | 1966 | .. | Published *History of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. II) and got built a Śiva temple in memory of his parents in his village. |
| September | 1966 | .. | Awarded the title of *Sāhitya Vāridhi* by U.P. Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. |
| May 16, | 1967 | .. | Paralytic stroke while performing Aṣṭādaśa-Purāṇa-Pārāyaṇa Yajña in his home village Gajahara, District Darbhanga. |
| September 8, | 1967 | .. | Finalised the press copy of *History of Indian Philosophy* (Vol. III) and death after midnight in Allahabad. |

## SECTION I

# MESSAGES AND TRIBUTES

# MESSAGES AND TRIBUTES

2 A Sigra

Varanasi, 1–3–1969

I have been asked to write a few words, by way of reminiscense on the late Dr. Umesh Misra, who passed away on the 7th September 1967. When my mind goes back to the early days of our first acquaintance there shines before it the beaming face of a young man with a passionate desire for learning. He came to me first, in company with one or two fellow students, seeking as an enquiring student for a regular course of studies in the text of Jayanta's *Nyāya Mañjarī*. Though I did not know Umesh personally at that time I knew very well his illustrious father, the late lamented Mm. Pt. Jayadeva Misra, a distinguished grammarian of Varanasi school. Jayadeva Ji enjoyed reputation as a great Pandit and this reputation was based on his authorship of a commentary on the *Śekhara* as well as on his subtle dialectical intellect, one instance of which I had personally experienced in the controversy of a Paṇḍita Sabhā called by the late Mm. Dr. Ganga Nath Jha in his house at Varanasi.

Umesh in the beginning read with me Jayanta's classical work. But later on, he read many other works. When working at his Doctorate Thesis he regularly attended my class. My relation with Umesh Ji started as a teacher and a student. It developed later on into that of a fellow-worker when as the Principal of the Sanskrit College, Banaras, I was responsible for the chief editorial function of the *Saraswati Bhawan Texts*. In this field Umesh Ji was my fellow-worker. He was a versatile scholar interested in many subjects. He also worked on Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. He was a voracious reader and was specially interested in my written papers (in Bengali and in English) each of which I had to present to him personally. He laboured very hard in his later days and did not and could not take as much rest as his body and mind demanded. He could not sustain the strain in his body and nerves. In the later days he began to take deeper interest in Āgamas, but before he could make much progress he was taken away. The most notable achievement of his life was the acquisition of the *Mahā Kāla Saṁhitā* from Nepal (photostat

copy). It is unfortunate that he did not survive to see its publication. His labours in connection with the Gangā Nātha Jhā Research Institute and with the editorial supervision of its Journal told upon his health. His history of Indian philosophy shows the range of his studies and the nature of his intellectual activities. He worked for some days in Darbhanga but his real field of work was Allahabad.

Umesh Ji very often came to see me at Varanasi. Even a few days before his end, Umesh Ji came to see me and asked me for the explanation of a certain dream which he had had some days before. My relation with him which began as a teacher and pupil grew into a friendship of mature life which he valued as much I did. May he rest in peace on the lap of the Divine Mother in Heaven and look down with approbation on the intellectual activities of the Institute with which he was so long associated.

GOPINATH KAVIRAJ

"GIRIJA"
30, Edward Elliot Road
Mylapore, Madras-4

May 19, 1968

Dear Sri Saxena,

Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Umesha Mishra has to his credit valuable work in Indian philosophy. I hope all those interested in the work will find a good example in his endeavours.

*Yours sincerely*

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

RASHTRAPATI BHAVAN
NEW DELHI—4

August 17, 1968

I commend the Gangānātha Jhā Research Institute, Allahabad, on its decision to bring out a Commemoration Volume in honour of Dr. Umesh Mishra, through whose personal devotion, energy and scholarship the Institute has been built up. Dr. Mishra will be remembered for his distinguished contributions to Indian Philosophy and for its exposition through his eminent works which have received universal acclaim. I wish the volume all success.

ZAKIR HUSAIN

National Library Campus
Belvedere, Calcutta—27

July 26, 1968

I consider it to be a great honour and a privilege to associate myself with the Mm. Dr. Umesha Mishra Commemoration Volume by testifying to my highest regard for the scholarship and personal qualities of Dr. Mishra whose untimely death we all mourn as the passing away of a great scholar of present-day in India and of a man of fine character who had dedicated himself to learning and to the service of his people.

I knew Dr. Mishra for a long number of years, and from the very beginning I was attracted by his quiet and unassuming manners which was quite in consonance with the profundity of his learning in Sanskrit and other Indian lore. *Vidyā dadāti Vinayam*—True Learning brings in its train a sense of Humility as we have in the old Sanskrit adage. Dr. Mishra was well known all over the country as a most erudite teacher who had inspired two generations of students. In this he followed his great master, another illustrious son of India, coming from the same sacred land of Mithilā as Dr. Mishra himself, namely, Mm. Ganganath Jha of illustrious memory. Like his master, Prof. Mishra has done some work of important character in Indian

Philosophy, but he was a versatile scholar for whom no branch of Indology as it expressed itself in Sanskrit literature was outside his ken. It very frequently happens that our scholars neglect their mother-tongue—they are so very much wrapped in admiration of a great classical language like Sanskrit that they have no time to do any service to their mother-tongue. There have been some conspicuous examples to the contrary, and in Mithilā itself we have a number of fine scholars from medieval times, with the origin and establishment of the Maithil language, who have rendered service to both Maithil and Sanskrit, beginning with Halāyudha and Jyotirīshvara. Mm. Umesha Mishra presided over Maithil literary conferences, and he also edited some Old Maithili texts. By his living example he put heart in our young scholars of Mithilā drawing their attention to the rich treasures and to the beauty of their mother-tongue. From this point of view also the late Pandit Umesha Mishra may be looked upon as one of those who wanted to build up the culture of modern India through the help of the Modern Indian Languages, which were to develop to their fullest without being suppressed by some other language, and at the same time through the glorious heritage of Sanskrit which still continues to have a supreme value on the Indian scene.

I trust the Commemoration volume will be, by virtue of the various learned papers contributed to it (I have to express my greatest regret that owing to a number of circumstances beyond my control I could not find time for a suitable scholarly paper in his honour), a volume of scholarly content which will be "a possession for ever" for all students of Indian lore. I can only wish that the memory of such a great scholar and such a good man will for ever remain green in the minds and hearts of his countrymen.

SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI

"KAMALA SADAN"
Dharampeth, Nagpur—1

3rd August 1968

Dear Dr. Mishra,

Please refer to your letter dated the 26th July re contribution of a research article to Dr. Umesh Mishra Commemoration Volume. I have just now no research article ready, but I remember to have sent an appreciation of the late Dr. U. Mishra's contribution to scholarship several years ago. It may be lying somewhere in your file. This Volume has been awaiting publication for several years. I am glad to know that you intend to bring it out early. I send you again my message of appreciation for the Volume.

"The late Dr. Umesh Mishra rose to the highest academic post during his life time. He was Vice-Chancellor of the Darbhanga University for some years. But he will be remembered by future generations more for his valued contributions to our knowledge of Indian philosophy in general and to the Nyāya system of philosophy in particular. He gloriously maintained the high tradition of the Allahabad University."

*Yours sincerely*

V. V. MIRASHI

HINDSKA
38, Major Banks Road

Lucknow

5–8–68

I am very happy to learn that the 1968 volume of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute Journal will be the Dr. Umesh Misra Commemoration Volume. Dr. Misra, was a keen student of the Darśanas and made several valuable contributions to the study of Indian Philosophy. I have seen his *History of Indian Philosophy*. Even after the works of Das Gupta and Radhakrishnan, one can see many new features in it. I hope that proper arrangements will be made for the continuation of the G.J.R.I. Journal to which Dr. Misra had devoted a great deal of his time.

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

RAJ NIVAS
Delhi
28 August, 68

My Dear Jayakanta,

Herewith my tribute to Pandit Ji.

*Yours sincerely*
A. N. JHA

मिथिलायाँ दरभङ्गामण्डलावयव-गजहड़ाग्रामे लब्धजन्मा विश्वविश्रुत मत्पितृपाद-महामहोपाध्यायडॉ० सरगङ्गानाथझाशर्मगुरुवरमहामहोपाध्यायजयदेवमिश्रतनयस्तत्रभवान् सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्रो मिश्रपादोऽयं स्वकीयलोकोत्तरदर्शनपाण्डित्येन, निरुपमया भारतीय-संस्कृति-सेवया च विश्वस्मिन् संस्कृतविश्वे स्वीयां शारदनिशानिशाकरविजित्वरां कीर्त्तिं वितीर्य, तीर्थराजे प्रयागे 'गङ्गानाथझाशोधप्रतिष्ठाने' 'महाकालसंहितां' सम्पादयन्नेव परुद्देवभावङ्गतः ।

भारतीयधर्मदर्शनयोरमुष्य न केवलं विलक्षणं वैदुष्यमासीदपि तु व्यावहारिकी सर्वदुर्लभा निष्ठाऽप्यासीत् । प्रयागविश्वविद्यालयस्य दर्शनप्राध्यापकत्वेन, आधुनिकमिथिलाया राजधान्यां दरभङ्गायां सम्पन्नस्य प्राच्यविद्यामहासम्मेलन-विशेषाधिवेशनस्य स्वागतमन्त्रित्वेन, मिथिलासंस्कृतविद्यापीठस्य प्रथम-निदेशकत्वेन, कामेश्वरसिंहदरभङ्गा-संस्कृतविश्वविद्यालयस्य प्रथमोपकुलपतित्वेन, विविधभाषामय-नानाग्रन्थरत्न-लेखकत्वेन च सुरसरस्वतीसेवायामात्मानंसमर्प्यान्ते 'गङ्गानाथझाशोधप्रतिष्ठान'स्य समुचितविकासाय यावच्छक्ति योऽमुना चूड़ान्तप्रयासोऽकारि, तेन वयमेव न कृतज्ञाः, प्रत्युत समस्तं संस्कृतजगत् कृतज्ञम् ।

मैथिलीतिनाम्ना प्रसिद्धायाः परमरमणीयाया विद्यापति-गोविन्द-चन्द्र-हर्षनाथादिकाव्य-समलङ्कृताया मातृभाषाया आधुनिकसाहित्यिक-स्वरूप-निर्धारणाय तद्विकासाय च यः सरलो मञ्जुलश्च पन्था अनेनोपदिष्टः स एवेदानीं तत्सेवकानामस्माकमाधारः ।

अस्मान् प्रति योऽस्मिन् दार्शनिक-पुङ्गवे पुत्रवत्स्नेहः, मत्पितृपादान्प्रति याऽनन्य-विलक्षणा गुरुभक्तिश्च दरीदृश्यते स्म वचसा तन्निरूपणं कर्त्तुं न प्रभवो वयम् ।

अतो मिथिला-संस्कृतिमूर्त्ति महादार्शनिकं योगिजीवनं महनीयचरितं दिवङ्गतं मिश्रपादं प्रणतिश्रद्धाञ्जलिभिरभिनन्दामः ।

GOVERNOR'S CAMP
UTTAR PRADESH
Lucknow

April 5, 1968

I am happy to learn that the Quarterly Research Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, Allahabad is trying to bring out a Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Mishra Commemoration Volume, suspending the usual four numbers of 1968.

I am very happy you are perpetuating the memory of a savant in this manner. Dr. Umesha Mishra's services in the field of learning are well known and his learned treatise of India's Philosophy has won great recognition in our country and abroad. I am glad I could meet him when I visited the Gangānātha Jhā Research Institute in August last year. I could see in what esteem he was held by those who knew him personally.

I wish the Commemoration Volume every success and popularity.

B. Gopala Reddi

INDIA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE
40 Lodi Estate, New Delhi–3

August 6, 1968

Dear Shri Mishra,

I can only send my homage to the memory of the eminent Sanskrit Scholar, whose memory is being perpetuated by the commemoration volume. The dwindling number of those who take an interest in the promotion of Sanskrit in India will have increasingly to rely on the shining example set by our redoutable Sanskrit Scholars of a bygone age.

With best wishes.

*Yours sincerely*

C. D. Deshmukh

SENATE HOUSE
ALLAHABAD

October 17, 1968

I am very happy to know that the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute is bringing out a special number combining the four quarterly issues of 1968 as Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Umesha Mishra Commemoration Volume.

I came in touch with Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Umesha Mishra when I joined the staff of the University as a Lecturer in 1935. We met frequently at the residence of Dr. Amaranatha Jha who was not only a distinguished Professor and Vice-Chancellor of this University but also a patron of artists, scientists, scholars and researchers. Dr. Mishra had already built up at that time a reputation for profound scholarship. As the years passed, Dr. Mishra came to be recognized as a great authority on Indian Philosophy. He always believed in simple living and high thinking. He had a passionate devotion for research, and from himself and his students he demanded the highest standards in this field.

After the death of Dr. Ganganatha Jha it was decided to perpetuate his memory by establishing a research Institute in his name. Dr. Amaranatha Jha and other scholars decided that there will be no better person than Dr. Umesha Mishra to look after this Institute as its Secretary. It was mainly due to the efforts of Dr. Mishra that the Institute acquired reputation in India and abroad. Again it was Dr. Mishra who started and edited the Research Journal of the Institute.

Later Mahamahopadhyaya Ji was called upon to shoulder the office of Vice-Chancellor at the Sanskrit University at Darbhanga, but he always maintained his interest in the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute at Allahabad, and directed and guided the work of this institution right up to the end of his earthly career.

I heartily welcome this idea of devoting the four issues of 1968 to the memory of such an eminent scholar; and on this occasion I pay my homage to his scholarship and his achievements in the field of letters.

A. B. LAL

Nirman Bhavan

New Delhi

*October* 25, 1968

I am glad to know that the Gangānātha Jhā Research Institute is bringing out a commemoration volume in honour of Dr. Umesha Mishra.

Today as never before we need the services of people who have a scientific and highly objective outlook on matters and problems which affect the people and the country. The role of Indologists is particularly great in the present context of things in order to bring about, by their learning and by their interpretations, a greater sense of oneness and integration.

One thing, amongst many, which can bring about this sense of oneness is the acceptance and practice of the small family norm by our people irrespective of their language, caste or creed.

I wish the commemoration volume all success and I hope that it will undoubtedly be a fitting recognition of the great contribution made by Dr. Umesh Mishra.

S. N. Sinha

I first saw Dr. Umesh Mishra at the P-E-N Conference at Jaipur, some two decades back. His special Mahāmahopādhyāya Bihāri Turban attracted my notice. When I heard him speaking in English I was pleasantly surprised to find this old erudite Sanskrit Pandit able to use English for expressing his views.

I used to meet him somewhere almost annually in conferences. Thus I remember to have met him in the Vice-Chancellors' conference at Delhi, which was addressed both by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. Kothari, Chairman of the Grants Commission. Dr. Umesh Mishra took part in discussions and fervently pleaded for Sanskrit.

When I was appointed Chairman of the Central Sanskrit Board for the first time about 1962, Dr. Umesh Mishra was a member of this Board.

During this long association of mine with this old eminent Sanskrit Pandit I found Dr. Umesh Mishra a genial companion and a good friend. He always stood in the defence of Institutions in the north whenever some controversy between North and South took place.

The death of Dr. Umesh Mishra has removed from this world a great scholar and his loss to oriental learning will be deeply mourned by all.

Datto Vaman Potdar

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Department of Humanities

Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

November 16, 1968

Dear Dr. Umesha Mishra,

It is an honor to be able to join with scholars around the world in paying tribute to your distinguished life work. As Secretary of the Gangānātha Jhā Research Institute, Allahabad, you have built it into one of the world's leading Research Institutes of Indology, and developed its *Journal* comparably. If institutions stand as shadows of great men, these institutions are memorials to your impressive stature.

*Most sincerely yours,*

Huston Smith

## भारतीयसंस्कृति-दर्शनमूर्त्तिः

# महामहोपाध्यायडा० उमेशमिश्रमहाभागः

विश्वविख्यातपण्डितमण्डलपुण्डरीकमार्त्तण्डस्य पावकविजित्वरदेदीप्यमानकमनीय-तपःकान्तिमण्डितशरीरस्य शाब्दिकगुरोः श्रीमतो महामहिममैथिलमहामहोपाध्यायस्य प्रातस्स्मरणीयजयदेवमिश्रस्याऽग्रजत्वेन वर्त्तमानकालात् त्रिसप्ततिवर्षेभ्यः पूर्वं भारतीय-संस्कृतिसंस्कृतदर्शनकमलिनीभानुरयं परमरमणीये पुण्यतमे तस्मिन् मिथिलाप्रदेशे प्रादुर्बभूव यत्र दर्शनशास्त्रे चिन्ता, शारदार्च्चनेऽभिनिवेशः, पुण्यकर्मणि धनव्ययोऽति-थिवरिवस्यायामुत्तमर्णान्वेषणं, राजभवने मणिसंग्रहो, वसने रागः, कामिनीषु केशवेशो, यज्ञे हिंसा, काव्ये युद्धम्, नव्यन्यायचर्चायां कलहः, साहित्ये परकीयाग्रहणम्, धर्मशास्त्रेऽशुद्धपदप्रयोगो, दैनिकहोमधूमेषु मालिन्यम्, वाहीके जाड्यमासीत् । यत्र च भगवान् याज्ञवल्क्यः 'शतपथब्राह्मणं', गौतमो 'न्यायसूत्रं', गङ्गेश'श्चिन्तामणिं,' कुमारिलः 'श्लोक-वार्त्तिकं', मण्डनो 'विधिविवेकं, पक्षधर 'आलोकं', शङ्करमिश्रो 'वादिविनोदम्', उदयनो 'न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलिं', गोकुलनाथः 'पदवाक्यरत्नाकरं', चित्रधरः 'प्रमाणप्रमोदं', धर्मदत्तश्च 'गूढार्थतत्त्वालोकं व्यरचयन् । यत्र खलु विश्वविजयी श्रीजगद्गुरुशङ्कराचार्यपादोऽपि शास्त्रार्थे महिलया प्राक् पराजितो बभूव । यस्य सीता कृषिफलं, विदेहाश्चापि शासका अभूवन् ।

लोकोत्तरप्रतिभाकौमुदीकलाधरोऽसौ मिश्रपादः शैशवे बृहस्पतिकल्पात् पितृ-पादाद्, यौवने विश्वविश्रुत-महामहोपाध्याय डॉ० सर्-गङ्गानाथझा धर्मपण्डितराज-गोपीनाथकविराजाभ्यामामूलमाचूलं भारतीयदर्शनशास्त्रमधीत्य, यद्वैदुष्यमवाप; तेन 'आत्मा वै जायते पुत्र' इति श्रुतिरपि सर्वथा सार्थकताङ्गता ।

मनोविनोदाय न केवलमनेन विद्वद्वरेण्येन संस्कृतकाव्यसाहित्ययोर्ज्योतिषधर्म-शास्त्रयोश्च परिशीलनं कृतम् प्रत्युत पाश्चात्यभाषासाहित्य-दर्शनानामपि निरुपमन्तुल-नात्मकमध्ययनमकारि ।

'क्व भोगमाप्नोति न भाग्यभाग् जन' इति महाकविश्रीहर्षस्य सूक्तिरमुष्मिन् पण्डिततल्लजे साधु सङ्गता, यतोऽयं भारद्वाजाद्याश्रमादिपरिलसितेऽक्षयवटान्विते तीर्थ-राजे प्रयागे निवसन्नेव विश्वविद्यालय-दर्शनप्राध्यापकपदे नियुक्तः पारिवारिक-प्रमोदसन्दोह-मप्यनुबभूव ।

नानाग्रन्थरत्नं रत्नाकर इवार्पयन्नयं न केवलं भारतेऽपि तु विश्वस्मिन् विश्वे शारदसुधाकरधवलां स्वलोकोत्तर-पाण्डित्यप्रसूतां कीर्त्तिं व्यस्तारयत् । येन समाकृष्ट-चित्तस्तदानीन्तनो गौराङ्गभारतसर्वकारो महामहोपाध्यायोपाधिना सादरममुमलञ्चकार ।

इदमीयविद्याविनयतपोभिः समाकृष्टदृष्टिस्तत्रभवान् त्यागवीरो महामनीषी दरभङ्गामहाराजाधिराज-मिथिलेश-डॉ० सरकामेश्वरसिंहशर्माऽधिमिथिलं स्वराजधान्यां दरभङ्गानगरे प्राच्यविद्यामहासम्मेलनस्य विशेषाधिवेशनं सम्पादयितुमस्मै पञ्च-लक्षासन्नमुद्रात्मकधनराशिं प्रदाय संस्कृतजगतः कल्याणाय सर्वप्रथममेनं न्ययोजयत् ।

अथ दरभङ्गामहेशनगरे मिथिलासंस्कृतविद्यापीठाभिधं ज्ञानतीर्थमिव महा-शोधप्रतिष्ठानं स्थापयन् दरभङ्गामहाराजाधिराजो मिथिलायास्तदानीन्तनैकमात्रे महा-महोपाध्याये मिश्रमहाभागे निदेशकपदानुकूलामार्हन्तीं परिलक्ष्य, सादरमेनन्तत्पदे नियोज्य स्वकुलपरम्पराप्राप्तं नैसर्गिकवैदुष्यपक्षपातं प्राकटीत् । तद्विद्यापीठं सञ्चालन्नय संस्कृत-संसारस्य या निरुपमाः सेवा अकार्षीत् ता न केवलं विद्वद्गोष्ठ्याञ्चर्चाविषयः, अपि तु संस्कृतेतिहासस्य पर्याप्ताः सामग्र्यो विद्यन्ते ।

संस्कृतजगतः सर्वेषामस्माकं सुरभारतीसेवकानाञ्च सौभाग्येन चिरादखिल-भारतीय-संस्कृतसाहित्यसम्मेलनम्प्रत्यात्मनोऽन्तःकरुणां वहन्नप्ययं कामेश्वरसिंहदरभंगा-संस्कृतविश्वविद्यालयोपकुलपतिपदे विराजमान एवं सम्मेलनेन साकमात्मनः प्रत्यक्षं सम्बन्धं स्वीकृत्य जीवनान्तकालपर्य्यन्तन्तदुपाध्यक्षत्वेन संस्कृतहिताय यत्साहाय्यमकार्षीत् यञ्च स्नेहमस्मान् प्रति प्रादर्शयत्, तद्गणना गणनाथेनापि विधातुमशक्या ।

केन्द्रीयसंस्कृतमण्डलसदस्यत्वेन, भारतीयानेकविश्वविद्यालयशोधमहानिबन्धपरी-क्षकत्वेन, नानासंस्कृतमहाप्रतिष्ठानसञ्चालकत्वेन, भारतीयसंस्कृतिसंरक्षकत्वेन, विविध-भारतीयपाश्चात्यभाषामयानन्वयालङ्कारोदाहरणभूतदर्शनग्रन्थप्रणेतृत्वेन, सदाचारपालनो-पदेशकत्वेन गद्यपद्यात्मकस्फुटकाव्यलेखकत्वेन मैथिलीभाषासमुन्नायकत्वेन निर्भीकव्याख्या-तृत्वेन, निदेशकोपकुलपतित्वाभ्याञ्चासौ भारतभूभागस्य प्रतिकोणं सादरं साम्प्रतमपि जेगीयते ।

दार्शनिकचूडामणि-विश्वप्रसिद्ध-महामहोपाध्यायः प्रातःस्मरणीयः श्रीमान् डॉ० सरगङ्गानाथझा-महोदयः, योऽस्य पितुः शिष्येषु प्रमुखो गुरुश्चासीत् तत्स्मारकत्वेन तत्पु-त्ररत्नेन विश्वप्रसिद्धशिक्षाशास्त्रिणा श्रीमता डॉ०अमरनाथझामहाशयेन अन्यैश्च विद्वद्भिः संस्थापित प्रयागस्थं 'गङ्गानाथझाशोधप्रतिष्ठानं' सुरसरस्वतीसपर्याबुद्धया दिवङ्गतगुरु-कीर्तिविकाशभावनया चावैतनिक-निदेशकत्वेन सञ्चालयन्नसौ देशस्य प्रतिकोणं स्वयं पर्यट्य चूडान्तप्रयासेन दुर्लभानाममूल्यानां प्राचीनतमानां संस्कृतपाण्डुलिपीनां यं संग्रहमकार्षीत् सोऽधुना सुतरां विस्मयकरः संस्कृतसंसारस्य ।

गङ्गानाथझाशोधप्रतिष्ठानस्य विकाशाय मिथोविरुद्धं कर्मयोगित्वं ज्ञानयो-गित्वञ्चावहन्नयं जीवनस्यान्तिमक्षणं यावत् यम्प्रायासं कृतवान् न स कदाऽपि संस्कृतजगता विस्मर्तुं शक्यते ।

पुण्यश्लोकस्य महादार्शनिकस्य मिथिलाया अन्तिममहामहोपाध्यायस्यास्य भारतीय-संस्कृतौ या निष्ठा यश्च तत्पालनक्रमो दरीदृश्यते स्म तद्दर्शनमन्यत्र दुर्लभमेव । संस्कृत-

जगतः सेवायै भारतराजधान्यां मुहुर्मुहुरागतस्यास्य लोकोत्तरां जीवनपद्धतिम्पश्यतः कस्य चेतश्चित्रितं न बभूव ।

आजीवनमयं महात्मा कदाऽपि क्वचन नलिकानीरोपयोगं नाकार्षीत् । बहिः सदा फलदुग्धकूपजलाहारैरेव सर्वथा शरीरं कार्यक्षममनैषीत् । होरात्रयमेवास्य मनीषिणो नैशो निद्राकाल आसीत् । दिवास्वापस्तु रुग्णावस्थायामेव जातुचिद् दृश्यते स्म ।

इत्थं लोकोत्तरमहापुरुष महामहिममहामहोपाध्यायस्वर्गीयडा० उमेशमिश्रमहाभागो भारतीयसंस्कृतिदर्शनमूर्त्तिरिति निश्चिन्वन् अस्मै गतेऽब्दे देवभावङ्गतायलालबहादुरशास्त्रीराष्ट्रीयसंस्कृतविद्यापीठसंस्थापकेष्वन्यतमाय गुरुकल्पाय महात्मने सप्रणति श्रद्धाञ्जलिमर्पयामि ।

मण्डनमिश्रः

२२-८-६८

# महामहोपाध्याय डाक्टर उमेशमिश्र

**श्रीबुद्धिधारीसिंह 'रमाकर'**

हमर पिता सुरथचरित महाकाव्यादि अनेक ग्रन्थक रचयिता पं० क्षेमधारी सिंह म० म० जयदेव मिश्रक शिष्य छलाह । हुनक जेठ बालक म० म० उमेश मिश्रसँ स्वतः पूर्ण मैत्री छलन्हि । हिनक परिवारसँ हमरा परिवारकें गुरु-शिष्यक सम्बन्ध छल । म० म० उमेश मिश्रसँ कुलाचारानुसार हमरो पढ़बाक तथा अनेक उपदेश पएबाक अवसर भेल । जखन देश आवथि तखन भेट होइतहिँ छल आ शास्त्रीय विषय बुझबाक सौभाग्य प्राप्त होइत छल । अत्यन्त स्नेह छलन्हि—"बच्चा" कहि सम्बोधन करथि । प्रायः कोनो बेर एहन नहि होइत छल जे कोनो ने कोनो विशेष विषय नहि कहथि । १९२६ ई० सँ (जे हमरा स्मरण अछि) १९६७ धरि अर्थात् एकतालीस वर्ष हमरा हुनक सम्पर्क रहल । देहान्तसँ किछु दिन पूर्व भेंट भेल छल । कतेको गूढ़ विषय कहलन्हि । दौर्भाग्यवश ओतेक स्मरण नहि रहि सकल आ ने टिपिए सकलहुँ तथापि दुइ चारि प्रधान वस्तुक उल्लेख करबाक प्रयास करैत छी ।

(१) अन्तिम मैथिल महामहोपाध्याय छलाह । मिथिलाक माटि पानिक प्रभाव हिनकापर पूर्ण छल यद्यपि जीवनक अधिक अंश उत्तर प्रदेशमे बितौलन्हि । कर्म्मकाण्डक कट्टर पक्षपाती छलाह । कहथि, पत्रोमे लिखथि—"मिथिलाक कर्म्मकाण्ड लुप्त भेल जाइत अछि—एकर रक्षा करैत जाएब । एहि ठामक वा कहि सकैत छी समस्त भारतक

भित्ति थिक सदाचार जकर बिना शुद्धि नहि भए सकैत अछि आ बिना शुद्धिक ज्ञान प्राप्त नहि भए सकैत अछि। बाह्य शुद्धि एक वैज्ञानिक विषय थीक। प्रत्येक आचरणमे युक्ति अछि तें ओकर पालन धर्म्म कहल गेल अछि जाहि आधारपर मानवताक अस्तित्व छैक। यदि ओ लुप्त भए गेल तँ पाशव धर्म्म आबि जाएत तें ई सतत स्मरण राखब जे आचारक वर्जनसँ लोक अधःपतित होइत अछि आ पालनसँ उपर उठैत अछि। वेद आओर उपनिषद् एकरा सर्वत्र पुष्ट करैत अछि।"

(२) "मिथिलामे शिव-शक्तिक उपासनाक बड़ छूटि अछि एकर दार्शनिक हेतु अछि आओर एही दूनूसँ सकल चराचरक सृष्टि होइत अछि।" अपन प्रिय श्लोक,

शिवः शक्त्या युक्तो यदि भवति शक्तः प्रभवितुं
न चेदेवं देवो न खलु कुशलः स्पन्दितुमपि।
अतस्त्वामाराध्यां हरिहरविरंच्यादिभिरपि
प्रणन्तुं स्तोतुं वा कथमकृतपुण्याः प्रभवन्ति॥

(श्रीशङ्कराचार्य्य——आनन्दलहरी)

एकर उल्लेख अधिक काल करथि। विद्यापतिक प्रसंग रामकृष्ण महाविद्यालय मधुवनी, दरभंगामे जयन्तीक अवसरपर सभापतिक पदसँ बाजल छलाह जे "प्रत्येक व्यक्तिमे अर्द्ध-नारीश्वर-तत्व अछि। सबहिक शरीरमे शिवशक्ति विद्यमान छथि। अहाँकें ज्ञानोपार्जनक हेतुक कतहु अन्यत्र नहि जाए पड़त——सभटा आत्मनिष्ठे अछि। एहन कोनो जीव नहि अछि जकरा मे माता-पिता दूनूक अंश नहि छैक। इएह भावना नर-नारीक बीच अभेद स्थापित करैत अछि। विश्वक सकल कर्त्तृत्व एहीपर अवलम्बित अछि। "कलौ चण्डीमहेश्वरौ" जे मिथिलामे लोक कहैत छैक तकर कारण इएह थीक। वाह्याचरणमे शिवपूजन आओर दुर्गामाहात्म्य पाठ एहीसँ आएल। अहुखन गाम-गाममे लाखक लाख शिवलिंगक पूजा होइत अछि, प्रायः अधिक लोक दुर्गापाठ करैत अछि। शारदीय नव-रात्र मनवैत अछि। तें वाह्यसँ अन्तरमे प्रवेशक ई एक संकेत थीक।"

(३) "मिथिला जे यज्ञभूमि कहल गेल अछि तकर कारण अछि जे जहिना मेघ-वर्षा-अन्न आओर प्राणीक उत्पत्ति तथा विकास यज्ञसँ होइत अछि तहिना अन्त-र्मुख यज्ञ सेहो जानक थीक। पूर्व-मीमांसा एहि ठाम सोपान मानल जाइत छल। जेना बहुत उच्च पदार्थकें बिना सिढ़ीपर चढ़ने अहाँ नहि पाबि सकैत छी तहिना बिना पञ्चयज्ञक सम्पादन कएने ज्ञानक अधिकारी नहि होएब। वेदाध्ययनोक इएह प्रयोजन अछि। तें प्राणीक ऐहिकामुष्मिक हितसाधनक हेतु एकरा जानब। "यज्ञः कर्मसु कौशलम्"। एतावता सकल यज्ञानुष्ठान ओहि दिशा दिश इङ्गित करैत अछि जाहि ठाम लोक-कल्याण आओर आत्मज्ञान दूनू प्राप्त भए सकैत छैक। "आहुति" शब्द अत्यन्त मार्मिक अछि ओहि मे त्याग आओर तपस्या दूनू अछि। एक-एक शब्दक विश्लेषणक बिना अनुसन्धान पूर्ण नहि भए सकैत अछि। यज्ञशेषग्रहणक जे व्यवहार अछि तकरा ईशा-

वासोपनिषद् दून्नू दिश सूचित करैत अछि —"तेन त्यक्तेन भुंजीथाः मा गृधः कस्यस्विद्धनम् ।" प्राणीक हितसाधने सर्वत्र संकल्प जानक थीक ।"

(४) पत्र लिखने छलाह—"मैथिली गद्यक द्वारा भारतीय शास्त्रक विषयपर यदि अहाँलोकनि प्रकाश नहि देबैक तँ मिथिलामे दून्नूक प्रति आघात पड़त ।" हुनक ई विचार भविष्यक हेतु एक प्रेरणा दए रहल अछि । ते मैथिली सेवीकेँ एहि दिश ध्यान देब आवश्यक । मैथिलीभाषी जे विभिन्न शास्त्रक विद्वान्लोकनि छथि ओलोकनि अपन अपन विचारकेँ यदि लिपिबद्ध कए प्रकाशमे आनथि तँ एक पैघ अंशक पूर्ति भए जाएत ।

महामहोपाध्याय हमरा जनैत प्रधानतः एक दार्शनिक छलाह जे हिनक कृतिसभसँ प्रमाणितो होइत अछि । नेनामे हम "Dream Theory" पढ़ल आ समर्थ भेने "Conception of Matter" तथा "A Critical Study of Bhagawadgitā" | एहि सबहुक अध्ययनमे विशेषता पाओल—विषयक स्पष्टीकरण तथा विभिन्न मतक समालोचना प्राचीन शास्त्रार्थक ढंगसँ । खण्डन-मण्डन ऊहापोहपुरस्सर विचार-वैशद्यसँ ज्ञान प्राप्त होइत अछि । तेँ हिनक कृतिपर शोधकार्य्य एक महत्त्वपूर्ण कर्त्तव्य अछि । समयाभाव तथा स्थानाभावक कारणेँ केवल विषय-प्रवेश मात्र ध्यानपर देल अछि । म० म० स्वतन्त्र विचारक लोक छलाह । प्राचीनो आचार्यक कथनकेँ आँखि मूनि नहि मानथि । एहि हेतुक यदि रूढ़िवादीक संग मतान्तरो भए गेलन्हि, तथापि अपन संकल्पसँ कहिओ च्युत नहि भेलाह । "स्ववीर्यगुप्ता हि मनोः प्रसूतिः"क ई एक प्रतीक छलाह ।

## TRIBUTE TO THE SACRED MEMORY OF LATE MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA DR. UMESH MISHRA

The death of Dr. Mishra has removed from the literary world of Northern India one who dedicated his life to the cause of higher education for several decades in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. His field of literary activities was first at Allahabad, then at Darbhanga where he adorned the coveted post of the Vice-Chancellor of Kameshwar Singh Sanskrit University for some years.

It was during the period of his Vice-Chancellorship that I had an opportunity to come in closer contact with him.

A versatile genius, a talented scholar, a seasoned academician and a patron of learning, Dr. Mishra won a name in the hierarchy of eminent scholars of India and outside.

Mithila is really proud of having produced a son of the calibre of Dr. Umesh Mishra. He began his educational career as a teacher and ended it as the Vice-Chancellor of a university. He was a true friend to his colleagues, a noble guide to his students, a sincere adviser to his friends, a loving relation to his kinsmen and a successful pilot to educational institutions and universities. His students are spread over in different walks of life in various states of India.

Like a typical orthodox Brahmin of Mithila, he was very simple but conservative in his habits with regard to food and drink. He spent the best part of his life in studying books and teaching his pupils. He was God-fearing and religious-minded and devoted some time every day to meditation and religious pursuits. Everybody who came in personal contact with him, was charmed by his profound scholarship and deep learning. He had no doubt a rough exterior which scared away many persons from his presence, but his heart was full of the milk of human kindness. He always rendered a helping hand to the poor and indigent students. And those who approached him in distress with a begging bowl, were never disappointed. He passed the few years of his retired life in his home land, Mithila, for the development of his mother-tongue but the cruel hand of death snatched him away from the midst of his co-workers, without his life's mission being fulfilled.

His death has dimmed the literary horizon of Mithila and belied the hopes of scholars who worked with him. It is difficult to fill up the void created by his sad demise in the near future. But his sacred memory still exists amongst the people of Mithila to serve as a beacon light and guide them to the right path.

ARUN KUMAR DUTTA

# SECTION II
# PHILOSOPHY

# THE DOCTRINE OF ĪŚVARA AS EXPOSED IN THE NYĀYAKANDALĪ

By George Chemparathy*

The Nyāyakandalī is one of the three commentaries on Praśastapāda's Padārthadharmasaṁgraha that have come down to us.[1] In it, Śrīdhara[2] gives us a lucid explanation of the text of the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha followed often by an excursus, long or short as the case may be, in which the author offers us an exposition of the discussions on the topic dealt with, together with remarks of his own. Without putting forward any claim to an exhaustive study, I have tried to put together in this paper the main outlines of Śrīdhara's Īśvara-doctrine as it has been constructed from the scattered passages in his Nyāyakandalī,[3] which is the only work of his that is available to us.[4]

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1. Meant here are the Vyomavatī of Vyomaśiva, the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara and the Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana. The Līlāvatī ascribed to Śrīvatsa by Rājaśekhara in the opening lines of his Pañjikā to the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara,—if such an ascription is indeed right—has not come down to us. The Līlāvatī, or more correctly, the Nyāyalīlāvatī as it is named in the second introductory verse of the work, of Vallabha is not a commentary, in the strict and traditional sense of the term, of the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha, but rather an independent work based on and closely following the Padārthadharmasaṁgraha.

2. It may be noted that, although the author of the Nyāyakandalī is often called Śrīdhara *sine titulis*, in the colophons at the end of his commentary on each of the six *padārthas* of the Vaiśeṣika system and in the ninth of the concluding verses, the author's name is given as Bhaṭṭaśrīśrīdhara. But the seventh of the concluding verses mentions his name simply as Śrīdhara.

3. The edition used for Padārthadharmasaṁgraha (hereafter abbr. PDS) and for Nyāyakandalī (hereafter abbr. Ny. Kand) is: Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṁgraha) with commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdharabhaṭṭa along with Hindi translation, (=Gangānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā Vol. I) Varanasi 1963. The other edition of the Nyāyakandalī (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Vol. 4, Benares 1895) was, to my deep regret, not easily accessible to me for consultation.

4. But Śrīdhara mentions in his Nyāyakandalī the following works of his:

(1) Advayasiddhi (cf. p. 11, 3);

(2) Tattvaprabodha (cf. p. 197, 6; 347, 11);

(3) Tattvasaṁvādinī (cf. p. 197, 6).

In his conception of the nature and functions of Īśvara, Śrīdhara follows the tradition common to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Thus, to start with the less important function of Īśvara, Śrīdhara conceives of Īśvara as the author of the Veda. Even though in his excursus on the authoritativeness or validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the Veda[5] he never employs the term "Īśvara" in connection with the authorship of the Veda, there can be no doubt that he recognises Īśvara as the author of the Veda, since the term *puruṣaviśeṣa* used by him[6] stands for no other than Īśvara. It is further interesting to note that while refuting the Mīmāṁsaka view that the Veda is authoritative because it is eternal, Śrīdhara maintains that the authoritativeness of the Veda is based not on its eternity but on its author's freedom from faults or defects (*doṣābhāva*).[7] Such a view appears, at least in its formulation, to be different from the opinion generally accepted by the Naiyāyikas of the time, according to whom the authoritativeness of the Veda is based not simply on the absence of faults or defects in its author, but rather on the presence in him of positive good qualities of a trustworthy author (*āptakartā*) such as a direct and accurate cognition of the Dharma taught in the Veda, compassion towards the living beings to whom the Veda is communicated, the desire to communicate the truth exactly as he knows it and finally the capacity to communicate it to men.[8]

Despite his negative formulation of the criterion of the authoritativeness of the Veda, Śrīdhara seems to have conceived of the "absence of faults" (*doṣābhāva*) in the author of the Veda in a more

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The Saṁgrahaṭīkā mentioned on p. 279, 13 and 377, 10 and which is considered by D. N. Shastri as another work of Śrīdhara (Cf. his, Critique of Indian Realism, Agra 1964, p. 118) is but another name for the Nyāyakandalī itself. In the colophon at the end of each of the *padārthas* the Nyāyakandalī is termed a Ṭīkā. Although it is said to be the Ṭīkā on Padārthapraveśa, the latter work was more properly called Padārthadharmasaṁgraha, so that also the word 'Saṁgrahaṭīkā' can be explained.

5. Ny. Kand, p. 519 ff.

6. Ibid., p. 520, lines 1-2, 5 and 8. Note that the term is used in the singular in each of these cases.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 520, 3–6.

8. Such was the view generally accepted from the time of Pakṣilasvāmin onwards, although the fourth quality was explicitly mentioned for the first time by Vācaspati in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (Edition used: Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares 1925. Hereafter abbr. NVTT) p. 431, 3–6. Note that Vācaspati refutes (Ibid., p. 202, 22) a view according to which trustworthiness of the author consists in the absence of defects.

positive manner than the expression seems to suggest; for, while arguing against the Mīmāṁsakas that the Veda is authoritative even though it is composed by a person (*pauruṣeya*), he remarks: "For it cannot (even) be doubted that one who has cognised the object really as it is, who is devoid of love and hatred (lit. "from whom love and hatred have disappeared") (and) who is compassionate, while engaged in instructing (others) would teach (them) what is true."[9] Such a statement, in fact, agrees with the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that was current at the time of Śrīdhara.[10]

That the Veda has been composed by a special person (*puruṣa-viśeṣa*) namely, Īśvara, is proved by Śrīdhara on the ground that its teaching (*artha*) is unanimously accepted as authoritative by all the four castes belonging to the four stages of life.[11] The sacred scriptures of the Buddhists and other heterodox sects are not authoritative precisely because their teaching is not thus universally accepted.[12]

However, for Śrīdhara, as it is indeed for all the adherents of philosophic theism, Īśvara is, first and foremost, the creator (*kartā*) of the universe. It is around this most characteristic function of Īśvara that the exposition of the Īśvara-doctrine is usually centred. And it is in his commentary on Praśastapāda's account of the creation and the dissolution of the universe, and more especially in his excursus that follows this section of the commentary,[13] that we have the important material for our study of Śrīdhara's Īśvara-doctrine.

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9. Ny. Kand., p. 520, 6-7: *na hi yathārthadraṣṭā prakṣīṇarāgadveṣaḥ kṛpāvān upadeśāya pravṛtto 'yathārtham upadiśatīti śaṅkām ārohati.*

10. Cf. Udayana's Ātmatattvaviveka (Chowkh. S. Series edition, Benaras 1940) p. 413, 8 ff.

11. Ny. Kand., p. 520, 8-9.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 520, 9-10; 428, 15-17.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 121, 10—142, 11. The excursus begins on p. 133, 12.

Furthermore in the introductory verses at the beginning of his commentary to each of the six *padārthas* Śrīdhara makes his obeisance to Īśvara viewed under various aspects, but mainly considered as the cause of the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the universe and endowed with eternal cognition and infallible volition (*satyasaṅkalpa*). We leave these verses out of consideration here, as they are rather expressions of the author's personal attitude of devotion to Īśvara and mixed up with mythology.

We shall, for the sake of convenience, arrange the material of our study under the following heads:

I. The Existence of Īśvara.

II. The Nature and Attributes of Īśvara.

I. *The existence of Īśvara*

The major part of Śrīdhara's excursus on Īśvara deals with his existence. We shall restrict ourselves here to the main outlines of this problem without entering into all the details or implications of the discussions mentioned there, especially since these discussions repeat themselves more or less, in content and often even in form, in many of the philosophical treatises where Īśvara's existence is dealt with.

Like the other followers of theism, Śrīdhara admits two means of establishing the existence of Īśvara, namely scripture or revelation (*āgama*) and inference (*anumāna*).[14] He does not deal any further in this excursus with the proof from scriptural texts for the obvious reason that it has not much convincing value in the eyes of the opponents, since such texts are either differently interpreted by them (v.g. the Mīmāṁsakas) or because they are not accepted as authoritative texts by them (v.g. the Buddhists etc.).

The proof for the existence of Īśvara based on inference is formulated by Śrīdhara as follows:

"The fourfold gross elements (*mahābhūtacatuṣṭayam*) have an intelligent cause; because they are effects.

That which is an effect has an intelligent cause, as in the case of a pot.

And the fourfold gross elements are effects.

Hence they too must have an intelligent cause."[15]

14. *Ibid.*, p. 133, 12.

15. Ibid., p. 133, 12—14: *mahābhūtacatuṣṭayam upalabdhimatpūrvakaṁ kāryatvād, yat kāryaṁ tad upalabdhimatpūrvakaṁ yathā ghaṭaḥ, kāryañ ca mahābhūtacatuṣṭayaṁ tasmād etad api upalabdhimatpūrvakam.*

With the expression *mahābhūtacatuṣṭayam*[16] Śrīdhara brings under the subject of the thesis (pakṣa) all the compound forms or products of the four elements, earth, water, fire and air, their *dvyaṇuka*-compounds not excepted. The reason (*hetu*) brought forward by Śrīdhara is the classical reason for proving the existence of Īśvara adduced by the theists. That the fourfold gross elements or compounds such as earth etc. are effects is proved by Śrīdhara on the ground that they have parts (*sāvayavatvena*).[17]

The opponent raises a number of objections against this proof. First of all, the operation of inference, argues he, takes place through the establishment of the pervasion between that which proves (the Hetu or the reason) and that which is to be proved (the Sādhyam). But no universally valid pervasion can be established between the "being a product" (*kāryatvam*) and "having an intelligent being as maker" (*buddhimatpūrvakatvam*); for, although we observe such a pervasion in the case of effects like pot etc., we do not find it in the case of the sprout etc. that come into being. Consequently a valid inference of Īśvara from the product is impossible.[18]

Secondly, the theists aim at proving not merely an agent in general (*kartṛmātram*), that is to say, some agent such as the human agents, for example, but rather a particular agent (*kartṛviśeṣa*) who is capable of producing the effects such as the earth etc. and who possesses special qualities such as eternal omniscience necessary for producing those effects. Such a special agent cannot be established by inference without a contradiction; for he would be either endowed with a body or devoid of a body. If he is endowed with a body, he cannot be the special agent that produces the earth etc., since, being possessed of sense organs, he would not be able to know the causal potency of such causes as the ultimate atoms (*paramāṇu*) and the merit (*dharma*) and the demerit (*adharma*) of the souls, which are beyond the domain of the sensible perception. On the other hand, an agent devoid of body cannot be the agent that produces the earth

16. The term *mahābhūta* is, really speaking, more a Sāṁkhya term than Vaiśeṣika. Praśastapāda uses it in the introductory line of his account of *sṛṣṭi* and *saṁhāra* and Śrīdhara probably uses the term because it was used by Praśastapāda. The prefix *mahā*— here is meant to exclude the ultimate atoms (*paramāṇu*) from the *pakṣa*. Cf. Ny. Kand., p. 122, 6 ff.

17. Ny. Kand., p. 134, 1—3.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 134, 3—135, 4.

etc.; for it is established by the methods of concomitance and non-concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*) that every agent at first cognises the nature of the causes he has to employ; thereafter he desires to produce a particular effect out of those causes; afterwards he wills to produce it and causes his body to act accordingly; then he directs the causes and finally he poses the action that produces the effect. But he who does not know the causes nor desires nor wills nor causes his body to act, does not put forth the action of producing the effect. Hence, argues the opponent, one has to infer from an effect also an agent possessed of a body with as much logical necessity as when one infers from the effect an agent that is endowed with intellignce.[19]

Such being the case, conclude the opponents, the argument for the existence of Īśvara brought forward by the theist is inconclusive and thus it fails to establish his existence.

These objections are familiar to us from the works anterior to Śrīdhara[20] and his answer also follows in many respects the answer found in those works. In answer to the first objection of his opponents, he argues that, although the presence of an intelligent agent cannot be observed in the production of the earth etc., still the existence of such an agent can be inferred by means of the type of inference called *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭam;* for from the universally valid pervasion that is perceived to exist between the effect and an intelligent maker, we can conclude to the existence of an intelligent maker for the earth etc., even though he is not perceived, on the strength of the perceived pervasion between effect and an intelligent maker, since earth etc. possess the nature of effect (*kāryatvam*).[21]

To the second objection Śrīdhara answers that just as the opponent infers the presence of fire in general (*agnisāmānyam*) from the smoke and a special kind of fire (*agniviśeṣa*), namely fire existent on the ridge of a mountain, from the fact that the smoke in question belongs to that particular subject as its quality (*pakṣadharmatāvaśena*), in the same manner, also in the case of the inference of Īśvara,

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19. *Ibid.*, p. 135, 4 ff. The same objection can be found in Kumārila's *Ślokavārttikam,* Saṁbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ, Chowkh, S. S. edition, Benares 1998) verses 47 ff.

20. Cf., for example, *Vyomavatī* (Chowkh, S. S. edition, Benares 1930), p. 302, 12 ff.

21. Ny. Kand., p. 134, 7 ff.

his existence as an agent in general (*kartṛmātram*) is inferred from the pervasion of effect with an intelligent cause in general, while his existence as a particular kind of agent is inferred on the strength of the nature of the effect present in the particular subject of the thesis of the argument, namely, the products of earth, water, fire and air. It is only a special kind of agent endowed with omniscience that can explain the quality of effect (*kāryatvam*) existing in this particular product we call universe.[22]

With regard to the objection that the inference can lead only to an agent endowed with a body, Śrīdhara answers by showing the opponent that the possession of a body is not invariably connected with action. He argues that agency (*kartṛtvam*) does not consist in the mere possession of the body; otherwise even an idle or sleeping person would have to be considered an agent. Agency consists rather in the employment of the causes that have been observed to be capable of producing the effect (*paridṛṣṭasāmarthyakārakaprayojakatvam*). This is possible even when the agent is devoid of a body, as seen in the case of our soul (*ātmā*) which, though itself unbodied, is able to set in motion the body it occupies or animates. It is, indeed, true that the soul possesses the body it animates and sets in motion, in as far as the soul has acquired that particular body through the fruit of its own actions; but the soul does not make use of the body as a means for setting the body in motion. If the opponent argues that the soul acts because it possesses the body as that which is to be set in motion (*preryatayā*), that is granted, but then Īśvara too could be, in the same manner, said to possess the atoms as that which is to be set in motion by him.[23]

The opponent now tries to show that the body is employed by the soul indeed as a means for its own action (*svapreraṇāyām*), and

22. *Ibid.*, p. 135, 9 ff.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 138, 9–139, 5. Compare Vyom., p. 305, 12–14. It is interesting to note that Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Kashi S. S. edition, Varanasi 1957), p. 494, 13–495, 5 argues that the atoms might be considered, with respect to the creative action of Īśvara, as that which is to be directed, but he too refuses to admit that the atoms are the body of Īśvara in the sense of their being a subject of sense organs. It may also be noted here, with regard to the example given of the soul setting the body in motion, that in the *Vaiśeṣika*—we would even say, in Indian philosophy in general—this dichotomic conception of the soul and the body has been so clearly maintained that they could not be thought of as forming one single being in substantial unity.

not only as that which is to be set in motion. For, argues he, it is only when the body is present that desire (*ichhā*) and volition (*prayatna*) are produced, and not when the body is absent. Śrīdhara answers that the body serves as a cause only in the generation of desire and volition; but once desire and volition have thus been generated, the soul operates without using the body as a means for its own operation. Furthermore, the soul stands in need of a body for the generation of desire and volition only when these two are adventitious or non-eternal (*āgantuka*), but not when they are eternal (*nitya*). And there is no contradiction whatever in the desire and volition being eternal or non-generated, since qualities such as colour etc. are known to be either eternal or non-eternal according to the substance in which they inhere.[24] Since the cognition, desire and volition in Īśvara are eternal, they do not need to be generated, and consequently they do not require a body for their coming into being. And, as said earlier, the body can be said to be necessary only for the sake of the generation of desire and volition, but not necessarily for the action of the agent.[25]

Śrīdhara then mentions one of the old objections against the inference of Īśvara as the cause that directs and sets in motion the atoms and the merit and demerit of the souls etc. at the time of creation.[26] The opponent argues that the ordinary souls themselves are able to direct these causes for the production of the universe. Granted that the directing agent must have perfect and direct cognition of these causes, the opponent maintains that the souls, although devoid of all conjunction with a body at the period of dissolution, possess an innate consciousness or cognition (*sahaja-caitanyam*) that extends itself to all objects (*sarvaviṣayavyāpi*), so that they are capable of directing these causes for the origin of the universe, even without the directing agency of an Īśvara.

Śrīdhara rejects this argument on the ground that the souls are devoid of any consciousness or cognition whatever until they are, at

24. Cf. Vaiśeṣikasūtras VII, 1, 4—9; PDS, (Ny. Kand., edition), p. 251, 1 ff.

25. Ny. Kand., p. 139, 5—140, 4.

26. Cf. Nyāyavārttikam (Edition used is · Nyāya-Darśanam, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XXIX, Calcutta 1944. Abbr. NV hereafter), p. 947, 8—20; Nyāyamañjarī (Edition used is: Kashi S. Series, No. 106, Benares 1934. Hereafter abbr. NM), p. 186, 20 ff; Ślokavārttikam, Saṁbandhākṣepaparhāra, verse 75.

the time of creation, united with a body.[27] Thus he does not agree with the opponent that the souls are endowed with innate consciousness even at the period of dissolution. For if the souls really possess such an innate omniscience, how can we explain the fact that we experience things as earlier unknown to us? It cannot be argued that this innate omniscience remains locked up within the soul without being directed outwards on the ground that it is, so to say, concealed by the cover of the body; for such a concealment of the innate omniscience is ununderstandable, since, being eternal and in constant contact with the object through the omnipresence (*vyāpakatvam*) of the soul, its nature of being a light with regard to the objects cannot be removed. Nor can it be maintained that the concealment of this innate consciousness consists merely in the hindrance of the activity of the soul; for in that case one cannot explain how the embodied souls are at all able to grasp the objects. If one explains the activities of the embodied soul through the propinquity of the sense organs with the object, then it should be conceded that the operation of the soul is really dependent upon the sense organs, and not merely on the presence of the objects. Hence, concludes Śrīdhara, the souls that are devoid of body do not have any cognition of the objects and therefore they cannot direct the atoms etc. at the beginning of creation for the origination of the universe. Consequently, a director (*adhiṣṭhātā*) superior to them, possessed of an innate cognition of all objects as well as the nature of an agent (*kartṛsvabhāva*) must be inferred, since the general principle that non-conscious (*acetana*) causes cannot act unless they are directed by a conscious agent, admits of no exception. Such an agent is the Īśvara.[28]

The author of the Nyāyakandalī has thus vindicated against the objections of the opponents the existence of Īśvara as the maker of the universe. In connection with the creative activity of Īśvara the exponents of the Īśvara-doctrine have often also dealt with the motive or purpose (*prayojana*) which prompts Īśvara to his creative activity; for no reasonable agent poses an action without an end in view.[29] Although Śrīdhara makes no reference

27. Ny. Kand. 140, 6. Instead of *śarīrotpatteḥ vinā* I read *śarīrotpatteḥ prāk*.

28. Compare Uddyotkara's answer in NV p. 947, ff. and Vyomaśiva's answer in Vyom. 304, 2—15.

29. Śrīdhara himself says in Ny. Kand., p. 5, 7-8: *prayojanādhigatipūrvakatvāt sarvaprekṣāvatpravṛtteḥ*.

in his long excursus, to the motive of Īśvara in his activity, yet in commenting upon a passage of the section of the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* on creation and dissolution he indicates his view with regard to this problem. The creative activity of Īśvara is prompted, according to him, not through any motive of self-interest (*svārtha*), but only for the sake of the others (*parārtha*), that is to say, for the sake of helping the living beings that are still in the bondage of Saṁsāra. The fact of the presence of sufferings does not go counter to such a conception, since Īśvara in his creative activity is conditioned by or dependent upon the merit and demerit of the souls. Although Īśvara is able to direct these causes, he cannot alter the irreversible law of Karma according to which each soul must experience or enjoy the fruit of its past deeds. Such a dependence of Īśvara on the merit and demerit of souls goes as little against his nature as Īśvara as does the nature of an earthly master become affected by his conferring upon his servants the fruits of their services, to each according to his merit. Furthermore, Śrīdhara makes an observation at this juncture which is, as far as I know, not met with in Vaiśeṣika works earlier to him, namely that even the creation of the universe with suffering does not go against the compassionate nature of the creator, since these sufferings become indeed a means for the attainment of the supreme end of man, the final liberation from the bondage of Saṁsāra, by producing in men dispassionateness or detachment (*vairāgya*) from this world.[30]

The creator of the universe established by Śrīdhara is not only endowed with eternal cognition and the nature of an agent, but he is also only one (*eka*), without a second to equal him. The postulation of several Īśvaras who are all non-omniscient would be as unsatisfactory to explain the universe as is the case with the ordinary souls. If one of the several Īśvaras is omniscient, then there is no need of accepting any other. If we assume several Īśvaras, all of equal importance, there is no reason at all that they should at all times be unanimous in their decision and thus the effect may not at times originate. If the others direct their activity in accordance with the will (*abhiprāya*) of one of them, then that one, whose will the others follow, will be the Īśvara, and not the others. If all the Īśvaras agree unanimously concerning the production of an effect, just as the several members of a religious assembly agree unanimously

30. Ny. Kand., p. 132, 1—133, 2.

on a particular undertaking, then no single one of them can be called Īśvara.[31]

## II. *The Nature and Attributes of the Īśvara*

The Vaiśeṣikas had classified the totality of reality under the well-known six categories (*padārthāḥ*) of substance, quality, movement, generality, particularity and inherence. Of these, as can easily be understood, Īśvara could be classed only under the category of substance (*dravyam*). In the enumeration of the substances,[31a] however, there is no mention of Īśvara as a separate substance. Hence it was generally accepted by the theists that Īśvara belongs to the class of "soul" (*ātmā*) mentioned among the nine substances.[32]

Śrīdhara shares the general view that Īśvara belongs to the class of substances called souls on the ground that Īśvara possesses cognition (*buddhi*)[33] which, according to the Vaiśeṣika system, is one of the specific, though not essential, qualities of the soul.[34] No doubt, Īśvara differs from the ordinary souls; for while Īśvara possesses, according to him, only six qualities (*guṇa*), as we shall soon mention, the ordinary souls possess no less than fourteen of them.[35] Yet Īśvara and the ordinary souls do not differ in their nature as souls solely through the difference in their qualities (*na ... guṇabhedena bhidyate*); for otherwise it would follow that the liberated souls would cease to belong to the class of souls, since, in the view of the Vaiśeṣikas, they are devoid of cognition etc. in the liberated state.[36]

In what does, then, Īśvara differ from the ordinary souls? Since Īśvara was considered to belong to the class of souls, the problem

31. Ibid., p. 141, 9—142, 1. Similar arguments can be found in Yogabhāṣyam to Yogasūtra I, 24; NV p. 950, 13—16; NM p. 186/20—187, 10.

31a. There are 9 substances enumerated in Vaiśeṣikasūtra I, 1, 4; PDS, p. 20, 2-3.

32. We have sufficient indications in the early Nyāya-literature to suppose that there was probably a discussion on this point, but the treatment of this special problem must be deferred to another occasion.

33. Ny. Kand., p. 26, 12.

34. PDS p. 202 4 ff; 230, 3-4. It is specific to the soul in as far as it is found only in the souls (ātmā); but it is not an essential quality of the soul in as far as souls can exist, as they indeed do, in the states of *pralaya* or of liberation, without this quality.

35. PDS p. 208, 1-2.

36. Ny. Kand., p. 26, 12-13.

seems to have been posed already from an earlier period whether he belongs to the group of souls that are said to be bound (*baddha*), that is to say, still entangled in the cycle of Saṁsāra, or to that of the liberated souls (*mukta*). Śrīdhara answers that Īśvara is not "bound" since the causes of bondage such as afflictions (*kleśa*) are absent in him. Nor can he, on the other hand, be said to be a liberated soul, since he was never under the bondage of Saṁsāra. If one insists on classifying Īśvara under one of these two groups, one might designate him as eternally liberated (*nityamukta*), which naturally implies that he was at no time subject to bondage. In this context Śrīdhara quotes with approval the definition of Īśvara given by the author of Yogasūtras: "Īśvara is a special soul, untouched by the afflictions, the Karma and its maturations and latent impressions." (YS I, 24). Thus while belonging according to his nature to the class of souls, Īśvara is still different from the ordinary souls in that he is not subject like them to the causes of bondage.[37]

With regard to the attributes of Īśvara, Śrīdhara mentions two views. The upholders of the first view deny in Īśvara six of the fourteen qualities ascribed to the ordinary souls, namely pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), hatred (*dveṣa*), merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*) and impressions (*saṁskāra*). Thus they admitted in Īśvara eight qualities: three qualities, namely, cognition (*buddhi*), desire (*icchā*) and volition (*prayatna*) which are specific to the soul, and five common qualities, namely, number (*saṁkhyā*), size (*parimāṇa*), individuality (*pṛthaktva*), conjunction (*saṁyoga*), and disjunction (*vibhāga*). The followers of the second view deny in Īśvara even desire and volition as distinct from his cognition and thus admit only six qualities in him: one specific quality of the soul, namely cognition (*buddhi*) and the five abovementioned common qualities.[38]

37. Ibid., p. 142, 8—11; Yogabhāṣyam to YS I, 24; NV p. 952, 15-16. Thus, according to Śrīdhara, the difference between Īśvara and the ordinary souls does not consist in their nature as soul; for both belong to the same class called *ātmā*. Nor do they differ from each other through a difference in their qualities (as Uddyotkara admitted, Cf. NV, p. 951, 5—8), since this possibility is excluded by a positive statement of Śrīdhara (Ny. Kand., p. 26, 12-13). The real difference between them consists, according to Śrīdhara, in the fact that Īśvara is eternally liberated, in other words, he never was and never will be in bondage, while the ordinary souls, even when they attain liberation, were at some time subject to bondage.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 142, 1—8.

While speaking of these two views Śrīdhara does not make any explicit mention of his own standpoint, but ascribe them respectively to "some" (*kecit*) and to "others" (*anye*).[39] But in an earlier passage, while speaking of Īśvara as belonging to the class of souls, he mentions that Īśvara is the subject of six qualities (*ṣaḍguṇādhikaraṇa*).[40] On the other hand, we know that he admitted in Īśvara innate (*svābhāvika*),[41] eternal (*nitya*)[42] and single (*eka*)[43] desire and volition. Hence we have to conclude that Śrīdhara conceived of the desire and volition of Īśvara, not as qualities distinct from the cognition of Īśvara, but as identical in nature with it, or as different aspects of it.

If we cast a glance at the history of the development of the Īśvara doctrine, we see that the second view, which is also the one followed by Śrīdhara, is an older view maintained, for example, by Uddyotkara in his *Nyāyavārttikam*. Uddyotkara had admitted in Īśvara desire (*icchā*) (with volition probably implied in it), but while enumerating the qualities of Īśvara, he omits desire (and volition) and mentions only six qualities: the five common qualities, namely, number, size, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction, and the specific quality of cognition.[45] The first view, according to which Īśvara possesses eight qualities is the view maintained by the theistic philosophers in general from the time of Vācaspati onwards.[46]

It is rather surprising that Śrīdhara follows the older view of Uddyotkara in preference to the view more commonly accepted at his time. Further, it is also to be observed that, although Śrīdhara mentions only two views concerning the number of qualities in Īśvara, they cannot be taken to be the only theories that existed. For we know that Jayanta, who is believed to have lived in the ninth

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39. *Ibid.*, p. 142, 6.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 26, 12.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 140, 1.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 140, 2.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 127, 16-17: *digādivan nityatvād ekaiveśvarecchā* ...

44. NV p. 952, 13-14: *icchā tu vidyate 'kliṣṭā'vyāhatā sarvārtheṣu.*

45. *Ibid.*, p. 951, 13-14: *saṁkhyā-parimāṇa-pṛthaktva-saṁyoga-vibhāga-buddhaya eva tasya* (=*īśvarasya*) *guṇāḥ.*

46. NVTT p. 604, 2.

century,[47] explicitly admits in Īśvara five of the nine specific qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa*) of the soul, namely, cognition, desire, volition, and merit and pleasure as well as the five common qualities,[48] so that Īśvara possesses, according to him, ten qualities. It is strange that Śrīdhara makes no mention of this view according to which Īśvara would be said to possess ten qualities (*daśaguṇādhikaraṇa*).

I have tried in the preceding pages to reconstruct Śrīdhara's Īśvara-doctrine in its main outlines, as it is exposed in the Nyāyakandalī. It can safely be said that he has given us a very clear account of most of the problems connected with the Īśvara-doctrine, the major portion being dedicated to the establishment of the existence of Īśvara. Much of the contents of his exposition may be found in the works of authors before him, but there are also, it seems to me, some ideas that we come across for the first time in his commentary. Such seem to be for example, some of his arguments against the opponents who maintained that an agent must necessarily be bodied, or his idea that the creation of a world full of sufferings does not go against the compassionate nature of Īśvara in as far as these sufferings become for the living beings a means towards the attainment of the final end, or his arguments against those who held that the souls possess an innate consciousness that enable them to be eternally in cognition of all objects. Of course, we must not forget that we do not possess much of the Vaiśeṣika literature that existed before Śrīdhara,[49] so that we cannot be sure whether or how far even these ideas or arguments are his own or reproduction of the ideas and arguments of those who went before him. We cannot certainly place him on a par with an original thinker like his contemporary Udayana but we can certainly say that Śrīdhara has given us a very clear exposition of the Īśvara-doctrine under its different aspects and it is certainly in this manner that he has made a valuable contribution to the development of the Īśvara-doctrine.

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47. Cf. B. Gupta: Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjarī, Bonn 1962, pp. 11-12.

48. NM p. 185, 14-15: *tad evaṃ navabhya ātmaguṇebhyaḥ pañca jñāna-sukhecchā-prayatnadharmāḥ santīśvare* ...

49. Perhaps one of the important Vaiśeṣika works on Īśvara doctrine that has been lost to us is that of the teacher of Vyomaśiva who seems to have "given a detailed exposition" (*vistareṇoktam*, Vyom., p. 308, 7) of the Īśvara-doctrine.

# STATISTICS OF THE BHAGAVADGITĀ[1]

*By* R. MORTON SMITH*

This article aims to continue the search for statistical methods of separating different authors in composite and anonymous work, which we began with our study of Ambā (Adyar Bulletin 1955), and expanded on Nala (JOIB 1960) and Śākuntalā (JBRS 1960). We intend to app'y these techniques to some of the Rāmāyaṇa, and also to some Brāhmaṇa; we hope to find some indications of relative chronology as a by-product. While aiming at criteria that eliminate personal impression or prejudice, we find it is easier said than done, because one is continually having to decide e.g. whether a *-ta* participle is a noun or verb, or when is a compound a compound, e.g. *nṛpa*. I am inclined to think that it does not matter significantly how one decides so long as one is consistent in the texts counted and compared. The method would be ideal for a computer, but I suspect programming would be rather complicated for Sanskrit. Human counting is laborious, and one is apt to miss the odd occurrence, sufficiently to be irritating to one's love of accuracy, while statistically insignificant.

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* Toronto.

1. *Abbreviations*

We use the ordinary grammatical abbreviations but append the following for readers' convenience.

Scansion; vipulas –,– – – M – ⏑ ⏑ – X ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ – π – ⏑ – ⏑ T ⏑ ⏑ – – im

Others.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adj. | adjective | ath. | athematic |
| B | bahuvrīhi | D | dvandva |
| cpd. | compound | excl. | excluding |
| fin. | finite | infin. | infinitive |
| ger. | gerund | incl. | including |
| K | karmadhāraya | n. | neuter |
| m. | masculine | f. | feminine |
| pass. | passive | pl. | plural |
| pt./part. | participle | prep. | preposition |
| r | ratio : to | s./sing. | singular |
| T | tatpuruṣa | th. | thematic |

We offer these techniques as a *pis aller,* not a substitute for the old-fashioned literary criticism and its sensitivity of experience; some traits elude grammatical statistics, e.g. whether the vocabulary is rare, precious or common, and even with common vocabulary, real differences can be shown by the words preferred, e.g. for 'king' or 'speak.' Differences of statistics do not prove conclusively that a writer might not have more than one style, depending on age or mood; nor since some differences must be expected between narrative and philosophy, that one person could not write both; e.g. one would expect more imperfects in narrative, and presents in philosophy.

We classify differences as A and B; in class A the figures of the alleged authors differ so that $X+20\%$ is outside of $Y-20\%$. In the B difference, the variations overlap, though the central figures are outside the 20%. Within this interval, difference of two central figures is not significant. There are apt to be considerable differences between chapters in any one grammatical form, but unless they coincide with a significant number of other unrelated differences, they can be safely ignored. Many things can be counted, and we have to discover by experience what counts show differences, and what do not; for instance, the ratio of athematic to thematic verbs or nouns does not seem to change much; figures for Gītā and Ambā are much the same. However the labour of the negative result has provided some interesting figures on the frequency of grammatical forms, unexpected by the writer. I would have liked some figures from the Śānti and Anuśāsana Parvans, but I have not had time to get them.

One may look for differences in absolute quantity, e.g. the ratio of presents to lines, or relative frequency, e.g. how many perfects to imperfects. The most significant differences should occur between alternatives. Our figures are for the ślokas; but we have taken figures for the triṣṭubhs, and they seldom seem to raise the language to a more 'poetic' level, e.g. with the appearance of rare grammatical forms or more elaborate compounds. In our figures for nouns, we omit proper names, numbers and pronouns; we sometimes transfer categories, e.g. it is misleading to take sat or jagat as present participles, and we treat them as consonant stems; so too we take dhī as a root stem, not fem. —ī like devī. In compounds, we do not take verbal prepositions as separate members, e.g. rūpa-sam-anvita we take as a simple compound of two members, not four. In the participial figures we do not consider the negative as making a compound verb, though we do acknowledge the negative in our figures

for compounds; e.g. adṛṣṭa is a simple compound, while a-pūrva-dṛṣṭa would be a 3-member compound.

Prof. Ingalls suggests that the authority of the Gītā is late, since the philosophers do not quote it till late: this may well be right. My own feeling is that such a poem would have a rapid appeal, and this is why it is comparatively uninterpolated; interpolations would have to be early and with the popularity of the work became impossible quite soon. The Gītā mirrors the situation at Pāṭalīputra on the death of the bandhu, regent, in 212 B.C. (except that Śāliśūka was willing to kill his kin), and I would suggest was composed between 210 and 200 B.C., it carries its interpolated authority into the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, where Śvet. 3.16-7 quotes Gītā 13.13-4, and 3.18a quotes Gītā 5.13c. The lateness of the Gītā quotations by the great philosophers I would explain by suggesting that they belonged to the court brahmins (or their tradition did), just as we find Nāgārjuna or Dignāga at court, whereas the epic, with the Gītā was in the hands of the non-court, village Brahmins till about the time of Vasudeva I Kushan. Indeed I would be willing to believe that there are only minor additions to the Māhābhārata after his reign, 189—232 A.D. Judging from Gītā 10.22, .25 and .31, I would suggest that the author was a Bhārgava of the Sāmaveda; the Bhāgavas had control of the epic, and Rāma in .31 is quite likely to have been Paraśurāma in 200 B.C.

The last chapters of the Gītā have long been suspected as unoriginal from their content. 17 and the first part of 18 go closely together, but as the poem was made up for its present place, and so must have had verses preparing for the resumption of narrative, the last part of 18 should be original. 12 is also needed for the anticlimax from the vision of 11. The division we suggest is therefore Chh. 1 — 12+18.55 — .78 as the original, and we call it A, its author A. Chh. 13 — 16 we ascribe to author B, though more than one may be involved. Chh. 17-18.54 we ascribe to author C. In A there seems to me very little that can be shown to have been interpolated. Misapplied particles often show up insertions, but particles are relatively few in the Gītā, and offer no suspicion. I suspect 2.19-20, quoting the Kaṭha-upaniṣad and 2.28-29, interrupting a run of .. *na tvaṁ śocitum arhasi* .. are interpolated; but by 200 B.C. quotation might be perfectly natural. 3.23cd does look inserted, interrupting construction and sense, but excellent in its recurrence at 4.11cd. I strongly suspect tampering in 10, where Kṛṣṇa is the best of everything; but the order is so chaotic, and I have so failed to

F. 6

find an original order, boustrophedon or other, that I hesitate to expel, though e.g. 10.37 I would gladly dismiss. For instance, I would like to follow Skanda of generals in .24c with Rāma of weapon-bearers in 31b, rather than by Ocean of streams, and precede Rāma with wind of purifiers. But I have taken no action, and considering that it would take a very strong anomaly to upset the general statistic, I give the figures for the text as I find it in the Poona edition.

In the following figures we will omit Gītā 1, unless otherwise said, owing to its very different content of narrative; the remainder is like the alleged interpolations, philosophic, and therefore most closely comparable. Nevertheless, there are many figures which the inclusion of Ch. 1 does not alter appreciably, e.g. the vipula pattern,

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A incl. Ch. I | (827P/10M | 25X | 45 | 18T | 1 im | 926 | lines |
| excl. | 738P/10 | 25 | 43 | 15 | 1 | 832 | „ |
| B | 175P/ 7 | 3 | 7 | 8 | — | 200 | „ |
| C | 138P/ 8 | 6 | 10 | 2 | — | 164 | „ |

While the patterns of B and C show a class A difference only in respect to T, (and in ratio to lines, also for X), A shows a very different pattern, with M as the least favoured vipula, and showing a class A difference in ratio both to X and π against authors B and C.

The figures following we will give in the order A (original minus Ch. 1), B (Chh. 13–16), C (Chh. 17–18.54), underlining the B and C figures when they give a class A difference from A.

Verbs

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thematic verbs | 322 | 71 | 34 | r : lines | 1 : 2.58 | 2.7 | 4.82 |
| athematic „ | 246 | 48 | 24 | „ | 3.38 | 4.16 | 6.83 |
| ratio ath. : them. not significantly different. | | | | | | | |
| Par. (pres/fut. stems) | 500 | 93 | 42 | r : lines | 1.64 | 2.15 | 3.9 |
| Atm. | 123 | 37 | 16 | „ | 6.78 | 5.4 | 10.25 |
| r At. : Par | | | | | 4.065 | 2.51 | 2.625 |
| No past stems Ātm. Add. | 4 | 1 | — | aor. Par. | | | |
| | 24 | 7 | 3 | perf. Par. | | | |
| Simple vbs. all parts | 842 | 147 | 144 | r : lines | 0.988 | 1.37 | 1.14 |
| cpd. 1 prep. „ | 369 | 91 | 68 | „ | 2.25 | 2.198 | 2.41 |
| „ 2 & 2+ prep. „ | 45 | 11 | 14 | „ | 18.49 | 18.18 | 11.71 |

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -ta pt. simple non-cpd. | 220 | 32 | 43 | „ | 3.78 | 6.25 | 3.81 |
| „ +prep. | 158 | 45 | 47 | „ | 5.26 | 4.65 | 3·49 |
| „ simple in cpd. | 199 | 52 | 61 | „ | 4.17 | 3.857 | 2.69 |
| „ +prep. „ | 179 | 25 | 29 | „ | 4.58 | 8 | 5.65 |
| r simple cpd. : non-cpd. | | | | | 1.105 | 0.615 | 0.7049 |
| „ +prep. „ | | | | | 0.88 | 1·8 | 2.103 |
| gerunds | 104 | 25 | 18 | r : lines | 8 | 8 | 9.11 |
| -tva | 50 | 11 | 5 | r -tva : -ya | 1.08 | 1.27 | 2.6 |
| -ya | 54 | 14 | 13 | | | | |
| r ger. : finite vbs (non-significant difference) | | | | | 6.03 | 6.44 | 5.92 |
| „ : pres. pt. (all voices) | | | | | 0.952 | 0.6 | 0.22 |
| pres. pt. „ | 99 | 15 | 4 | | 8.404 | 13·33 | 41 |
| r pres. pt. Ātm./Par. : finite pres. stem | | | | | 2.03 | 3.71 | 20.33 |
| Fut. pt. poss. -tavya | 10 | — | 3 | | 83.2 | 0 | 54.67 |
| -ya non-cpd. | 26 | 7 | 15 | r : lines | 32 | 28.57 | 10.93 |

(non-cpd. does not exclude simple negatives in a; -tavya does not occur in other compounds, whereas —ya does, e.g. avadyāṅga).

Nouns/Adj.

The ratios of declined stems of various kinds to lines does not seem to differ significantly, nor does it do so greatly between philosophy and narrative; e.g. the ratio of -a/ā stems to lines is 1 : 0.49, 0.422, 0.39 in the Gītā, and 0.483 in Ambā. However differences can show up on breaking down the figures. For instance

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -i stems | 195 | 47 | 37 | r : -a stems | 8.118 | 9.51 | 10.65 |
| but -u „ | 63 | 9 | 7 | „ | 23.54 | 50.77 | 56.28 |
| -r „ | 18 | 10 | 8 | „ | 87.94 | 45.7 | 39.25 |
| -in „ | 80 | 11 | 22 | „ | 19.788 | 41.54 | 17.91 |
| -as „ | 97 | 35 | 22 | „ | 16.32 | 13.05 | 17.91 |
| -a/-ā „ declined | 1698 | 474 | 420 | | | | |
| „ prior in cpd. | 572 | 153 | 149 | r cpd. : decl. | 2.968 | 3.163 | 2.856 |
| -i/u/r/ declined | 270 | 65 | 50 | | | | |
| „ prior in cpd. | 38 | 19 | 10 | r cpd. : decl. | 7.105 | 3.42 | 5 |

The ratio of nominal compounds to lines does not differ between authors;

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| total cpds. | 874 | 210 | 181 | r : lines | 0.953 | 0.952 | 0.906 |
| 2 members | 719 | 162 | 133 | | 1.157 | 1.23 | 1.23 |
| 3 „ | 121 | 32 | 33 | | 6.87 | 6.5 | 4.97 |
| 4+ „ | 34 | 16 | 15 | | 24.47 | 12.5 | 10.93 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| r 3+ : 2 members | | | | | | 4.632 | 3.375 | 2.77 |
| cpds. excl. a-, su- etc. | B | 250 | 41 | 47 | | | | |
| | TK | 388 | 102 | 88 | r B : TK | 1.54 | 2.4878 | 1.87 |
| | D | 24 | 9 | 12 | r D : lines | 34.6 | 22.22 | 13.67 |
| a-, su-, etc. only | B | 57 | 14 | 14 | | | | |
| | TK | 155 | 44 | 20 | | | | |

Class A differences are not easily found among the compounds.

-an stems are like -a stems in compound, and we find their ratios as prior in cpd. : declined is much the same, 2.76, 2.07, 3.08. But other root and consonant stems do show class A difference :

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| prior in cpd. | 14 | 8 | 16 | | | | |
| declined | 383 | 91 | 61 | r cpd. : decl. | 27.357 | 11.375 | 4.0265 |

Turning to particles, the descending order of frequency is

A : ca —eva —hi —api —tu — evaṃ (total) — k. cid — tasmād — tathā — iha — caiva — tatas — eva ca — tatra — atha — k. cana — others under 7

B : ca — eva ca — api — tu — caiva — eva — evaṃ (total) — tathā — api ca — tatas — cāpi — others twice or less.

C : ca — tu — caiva — eva — eva ca — hi — tathā — others occur twice or less, or not at all.

Absolute numbers :

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ca | 132 | 53 | 42 | r : lines | 6.303 | 3.77 | 3.905 |
| eva | 70 | 5 | 9 | „ | 11.88 | 40 | 18.22 |
| eva ca | 10 | 13 | 3 | „ | 83.2 | 15.38 | 54.67 |
| api | 51 | 9 | 7 | „ | 16.31 | 22.22 | 23.428 |
| hi | 52 | 2 | 3 | „ | 16 | 100 | 54.67 |

(hi is used 7 times to avoid hiatus by A, but not by B or C)

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tu | 41 | 6 | 14 | r : lines | 20.29 | 33.33 | 11.71 |
| caiva | 13 | 5 | 10 | „ | 64 | 40 | 16.4 |
| tathā | 14 | 4 | 3 | „ | 59.43 | 50 | 54.67 |

Others could be added; but it would seem that particles show up differences well, and it may indicate that individual words do so better than grammatical forms.

In B there is no name of or vocative to Kṛṣṇa, and only 4 in C (1 : 41 lines) A's ratio (excl. Ch. 1) is 1 : 25.1. The figures for Arjuna are:

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| as Arjuna | 20 | 0 | 2 | r : lines | 41.6 | — | 82 |
| Bhārata | 10 | 9 | 2 | ,, | 83.2 | 22.22 | 82 |
| Dhanañjaya | 9 | 0 | 1 | ,, | 92.4 | — | 164 |
| Pārtha | 29 | 2 | 9 | ,, | 28.69 | 100 | 18.22 |

In the figures given we have found between A and B 16 class A differences out of 38, excluding particles and scansion, and between A and C 21 out of 38. There are only 15 between B and C. One might expect more differences between shorter units from the randomness of sampling; but these B and C figures would indicate that 150 ślokas can form a fair test.

We suggest that the figures given are enough to substantiate the probability of different authors for A, B and C; what we would like to find is some other part of the epic, preferably philosophic, where the same figures coincided 80% within 10% of the central figures of B or C, indicating the same hand at work elsewhere.

In the course of our counting we have noticed several interesting facts of frequencies of grammatical forms in Epic Sanskrit, which we offer tentatively. The -s Aorist is distinctly unpopular, while the perfect vies with the imperfect; this is the opposite of the Pālī position. Fut. part. pass. -anīya is absent from Gītā and Ambā, and from author A of Nala. The fem. gender does not occur as often as one would except, and in Gītā it makes a poor showing; except for instr. sing. (10) and 1 fem. acc pl. in -i, the fem. endings in -i and -u stems do not occur; nor does the neut. except for 5 NVA pl. in -i, 2 in -u. Instr. sing. masc. e.g. śucinā, is not popular.

The nom. s. and acc. s. are usually of a different order of frequency from the other cases, the former perhaps half as common again as the latter. (We hope soon to publish some figures from several texts.) But the consonantal accusatives especially those in (v) ant (which does not include pres. part. Par.) are relatively much rarer, except for -an stems, e.g. Gītā A acc. : nom, s. m. st. and consonant stems, 3 : 20; -in 4 : 37; -an 16 : 32; -(v) ant 1 : 22; -(a) s 2 : 12. In Gītā B and C the nom. superiority is much less, but -vant acc. is relatively equally unpopular in Nala (all authors) and Ambā.

The dative is a rare case outside -a stems, except for names, and this unpopularity may explain its disappearance from the infinitive. In Ambā (ślokas) there are 18 dat. s.+18 more proper names against 809 nom. s. excluding proper names. In the Gītā the figures are dat. s. -a 14–5–1, -i 3–0–1, -u 2–0–1, -an 0–0–1; dat. pl. -a only, 0–1–1. Ambā has no dat. pl. The abl. is almost as unpopular outside -a stems. This again may explain the failure of the abl. infinitive. The figures for Gītā are -a 54–10–8, -i 2–0–0, consonant stems 5–2–0; abl. pl. -a 7–2–0, + -in 3–0–0. The figures for Ambā are much the same, and curiously it is absent from the fem. -ī and -ā stems, and so too in Nala. The relative frequency of sing. and pl. in the various declensions is very similar in Gītā and Ambā. While -i stems are much commoner than -u stems in the sing., this does not hold for the plural. While loc. s. is much commoner than gen. s. in the -a stems, they are roughly equal in other stems.

I have not noticed anything particular on the verbal usage; narrative is a better field for that. But I hope to include pronominal figures in further studies, and trust that this article would have interested the distinguished scholar in whose honour it has been written.

# VEDĀNTA PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS WORKS

*By* HAJIME NAKAMURA*

It is needless to say that the *Vedānta* philosophy has far more frequently been taken up for discussion in the field of philosophy and religion than in any other cultural areas since it is the most important philosophical thought among the orthodox Brahmanical traditions. For this reason a number of philosophical works of the orthodox Brahmanical traditions which were composed before Śaṅkara constitute the most valuable materials for clarifying how the early Vedānta school was. There are, however, only a few passages in these works which refer to the *Vedānta* philosophy. The majority of the extent philosophical works of the orthodox Brahmanical traditions were written after the time of Śaṅkara, and only a few texts which were written before him have been handed down by each school of philosophy. Other religious and theological works, especially those of Hinduism, should also be taken into consideration, but almost all of the extant texts of this kind were composed after Śaṅkara, though the historical origin of Hinduism can be traced back to an exceedingly ancient period. Because of the scarcity of materials, the passages which refer to the early *Vedānta* philosophy are very few in number and far less than the data which are available from the Buddhist and the Jaina scriptures. However, no matter how scanty the materials may be, they are so important that they cannot be overlooked. In the following pages I would like to examine them one by one.

First of all, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (7, 2, 3 and 4) refutes the view that everything is one (*sarvaikatva*), and concludes that the theory

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that all is one is wrong (*bhrānta*). Here it may be rejecting the *Sāṁkhya* as well as the *Vedānta,* but at any rate it is clear that it refutes the monism of the *Vedānta* philosophy.

Moreover, the same text (4, 2, 2 and 3) refutes not only the theory that the body consists of the five material elements but also the opinion that the body consists of the three material elements, earth, water and fire. As the reason for his rejection the author states: "For the other attributes (*guṇa*) do not appear." The attributes of water and fire do not appear in the dead body. If the body were composed of earth, water and fire, their attributes should appear in the body not only while alive but also after death. But this does not occur. This fact demonstrates that the body is not composed of the three elements, but it has one element, earth, as its chief component. This argument is evidently made against the *Vedānta* school which asserts on the basis of Uddālaka's thought (*Chāndogya Up.* VI, 3—6) that all things consist of water, fire and earth and the body is also composed of the same three elements (*cf. Brahmasūtra* II, 4, 20-22).

Furthermore, while demonstrating the existence of *ātman,* the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* refers to the argument of the opponents that the existence of *ātman* cannot be established by means of inference but only by means of the *Veda.* Even if one touches another person, e.g. Yajñadatta, the sense-perception does not arise that this *ātman* is Yajñadatta. Therefore, there is no visible mark (*liṅga*) which indicates the existence of *ātman.* Since tangibility is commonly seen in other things than *ātman,* it is not distinct from them in this respect. One cannot, therefore, know the existence of *ātman* through sense-perception. For this reason *ātman* should be known by means of the *Veda* (*āgamika,* III, 2, 2—68).[1] Since it is chiefly the *Upaniṣads* that teach the existence of *ātman,*[2] those who attack the *Vaiśeṣika* view here might be *Vedāntins* who adhere to the *Upaniṣads.* The view, that *ātman* cannot be established by means of logic but only by means of the *Veda,* is what is emphasized by Bhartṛhari and

1. As for such an interpretation of these *sūtras,* see Hakuju Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenkyū* (=A Study of Indian Philosophy), Vol. III, pp. 487 ff. and p. 520.

2. *tasmāt samyag Upaniṣadāṃ śravaṇāt tattvasākṣātkāra upapadyate, natu mananapraṇālikāyā* (Upaskāra and *Vaiśeṣikasūtra,* III, 2, 8).

Śaṅkara later.[3] However, since the *Mīmāṁsā* and the *Vedānta* schools had not yet been divided at that time, it might well be thought that the *Mīmāṁsakas* are also included among the opponents of the *Vaiśeṣika* school who hold the above view. (It is likely that the *Mīmāṁsā* school at that time had not yet been influenced by the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy).

Our examination of the above arguments reveals that a group of Brahmans who regarded the *Upaniṣads* as their absolute authority attacked, and were refuted by, the *Vaiśeṣika* school in the first century, A.D. since the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* took its form in 50–100 A.D.[4]

There is no other reference to the *Vedānta* philosophy[5] in the works of the *Vaiśeṣika* school which were written before Śaṅkara, but the works of the *Nyāya* school, a sister system of the former, provide information about it which should be examined in order to know the history of the *Vedānta* school. There is no direct reference to it in the *Nyāyasūtra* but some interesting information about it is available in Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra*.

Vātsyāyana accepts the fourfold learning exactly as it is taught in the *Kauṭilīya-Arthaśāstra*.[6] According to him, philosophy (*ānvīkṣikī*) is the fourth learning (*caturthī vidyā*) which means nothing but logic (*nyāyavidyā, nyāyaśāstra*). Against the charge that: "Is it not meaningless to construct a philosophical system of the *Nyāya* school by setting up doubt (*saṁśaya*) and other items? For they are comprised in the right means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)

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3. As for the doctrine of Bhartṛhari, see the present work, Vol. IV, pp. 141 ff. *śrutyavagāhyam evedaṁ atigambhīraṃ brahma na tarkāvagāhyam* (Śaṅkara *and Brahmasūtra* II, 1, 32, Vol. I, p. 502, line 2); [*vedānta*—] *vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatir nānumānādipramāṇāntara-nirvṛttā* (Śaṁkara *and Brahmasūtra* I, 1, 1, Vol. I, p. 36, line 2): *tasmāt śabdamūla evātīndriyārthayāthātmyādhigamaḥ* (Śaṁkara *and Brahmasūtra* II, 1, 27, Vol. I, p. 496, line 8). In addition to those Śaṁkara's argument of this kind can be frequently seen in his works.

4. Hakuju Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Shi* (=A History of Indian Philosophy), p. 178.

5. In addition to the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Praśastapada's *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* and the *Daśapadārthaśāstra* were also composed before Śaṅkara but in neither of them any passages can be found which present the doctrine of the *Vedānta* school.

6. Vātsyāyana *and Nyāyasūtra* I, 1, 1, pp. 4-5; 10 (Ānandā) stanza Sanskrit Series).

F. 7

and the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) and they are not separate things" he asserts that "doubt and other items should be set up" and discusses as follows:

"If these [items] be not stated separately, this [philosophy] would become merely [a study] of the inner *ātman* like the *Upaniṣads*. Therefore, [philosophy] is separately established by means of doubt and other items."

*teṣām pṛthagvacanam antareṇādhyātmamātram iyaṃ syāt, yathopaniṣadaḥ. tasmāt saṁśayādibhiḥ padārthaiḥ pṛthak prasthāpyate.*

Commenting on this, Uddyotkara says:

"[If there be no such items as doubt in philosophy, it] would be included in the *Vedic* study like the *Upaniṣadic study* since [it] would be merely a study of the inner *ātman*. Thus the four-foldness [of the learning] would cease to exist."

*adhyātmavidyāmātravad Upaniṣadvidyāvat trayyām evāntarbhāva iti catuṣṭvam nivarteta.*[7]

Thus both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotkara regard the "*Upaniṣadic* study" (*Upaniṣadvidyā*) or a "study of the inner *ātman*" merely as theology or the *Vedic* study and not as philosophy. According to them a learning which gives rise to doubt about every aspect of nature and life and then an answer to it by means of reasoning can really deserve the name of philosophy. However, the *Vedānta* school attaches importance only to the *Upaniṣads* and negates the meaning of logical thinking. Considering, therefore, that the *Vedānta* is not philosophy in its pure sense of the term, they decline to give the name of philosophy to it. It is clear that with regard to this point as well these *Nyāya* philosophers hold the same opinion as the author of the *Arthaśāstra*.

In this way the early *Nyāya* philosophers refused to admit the significance or raison d'être of the *Vedānta* philosophy as philosophy. Nevertheless, they would not neglect the social fact that this philosophy was actually gaining strength in the intellectual world of that

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7. *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 12.

time. Referring clearly to the *Vedānta* philosophy in another place[8] of his commentary, Vātsyāyana refutes it as follows:

> "[Final release] is to discard life already received and not to receive another life. The people who know final release set forth that this state of infinity is final release. '[It is taught in the scripture that] "*Brahman* is the fearless, immortal and non-aging state and arrival at peace." Alike [its] greatness the eternal bliss of *ātman* is manifest in the state of final release. When it is manifest, a man is absolutely released and becomes joyful.'———thus think some people. [However,] their argument is not reasonable because of the absence of evidence. There is neither sense-perception nor inference nor scriptural testimony with which to prove that "Alike [its] greatness the eternal bliss of *ātman* is manifest in the state of final release."

"Some people" referred to in the above passage are evidently those of the *Vedānta* school. They consider *brahman* as the absolute principle and final release as manifestation of the eternal bliss (*nityaṃ sukham*)[9] of *ātman* which is one's own nature. Such a concept of final release is one of the characteristics of the *Vedānta* philosophy.

Furthermore, the same work of Vātsyāyana (*Nyāyabhāṣya* IV, 1, 41)[10] introduces different theories which classify all things in various ways. One of them is the opinion that:

"All is one and existent because of the absence of distinction." —*sarvam ekaṃ sad, aviśeṣāt.*

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8. *Nyāyabhāṣya*, I, I, 22, pp. 37-38.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 306.

10. But it is not possible to conclude absolutely that it points to the *Vedānta* school, since it might point to the *Sāṁkhya* school. In a work, ascribed to āryadeva such a theory is attributed to the *Sāṁkhya* school: There are some heretics who say that everything is. ... It is the doctrine of the *Sāṁkhya* school that everything is one." (*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, Vol. XXXII, p. 155a.). However, it might be more reasonable to look upon it as pointing to the *Vedānta* school. Furthermore, the theory that everything is the same also appears in the (Upāyakauśalyahidaya) (Hakuju Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Kenykū*, Vol. II, pp. 486 ff.). The same is also said in the (Mahāyānāvatāra): "The doctrine of the *Sāṁkhya* school has a fault in thinking that [everything] is one." (*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, Vol. XXXII, p. 40b.).

In his sub-commentary *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* Vācaspatimiśra interprets it as a theory of non-dualism of *brahman* (*brahmādvaita*), quoting the passage which explains *brahman* as one without a second (*ekam evādvitīyam, Chāndogya Up.* VI, 2, 1) and that which denies the distinction of all beings (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up.* IV, 4, 19). To deny or disregard the distinction of all beings, interpreting them as transformations of the one ultimate principle, is one of the characteristics of the *Vedānta* philosophy. Therefore, the theory quoted above may point to a doctrine of the *Vedānta* school.[11]

In his days Vātsyāyana, who was active in 350—400 A.D., could not longer disregard the *Vedānta* scholars who advocated such a doctrine. Moreover, in his *Nyāyavārttika* Uddyotkara (550—600 A.D.) refers to views suggestive of the *Vedānta* philosophy in places other than the above mentioned. For example, he criticizes a theory according to which *ātman*, the controller of the individual, is the ruler of merit and demerit.[12] It is in accordance with Jaimini's theory which is referred to in *Brahmasūtra* III, 2, 40, and it has been inherited by the *Mīmāṁsakas*. It may, however, be possible to regard it as one of the different views presented by the early *Vedānta* philosophers since it is referred to in the *Brahmasūtra*.

Thus in the works of the early *Nyāya* and the *Vaiśeṣika* school the primitive *Vedānta* philosophy of the early period is transmitted and no reference is made to any theory like that of false manifestation (*vivartavāda*) of the Śāṅkara school. Even in later centuries Udayana (10th century), an important scholar of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school, gives the name of Bhāskara as one who taught that all things evolved from *brahman*[13] without referring to Śaṅkara. The Śāṅkara school does not seem to have been yet regarded as important in the intellectual world of that time.

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11. Hakuju Ui, *Indo Tetsugaku Shi*, p. 478.

12. *ātmaivādhiṣṭhātā dharmādharmayor bhaviṣyatīti* (*Nyāyavārttika* IV, 1, 21, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series, p. 459). Yamada and Itō (tr.), *Indo Kodai Shinkan Shi* (Die Entwicklung der Gottes; dee be: den Indern von H. G. Jacobi), p. 147. Cf. *Gauḍapādīyakārikā* II, 25 and my translation and note on it in the present work, Vol. III, p. 350.

13. In his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (2) Udayana says: *"sargo brahmaparinter iti Bhāskaragotre yujyate,"* and Govardhana comments on it as: *"Bhāskaras Tridaṇḍimatabhāṣyakāraḥ."* (Aufrecht, *Catalogus Catalogrum*. Vol. I, p. 793).

Together with the *Vedānta* school the Sāṁkhya school is one which exerted the greatest influence upon the history of Indian thought, and the blending and synthesis of the thought of both schools can often be found in important works of thought in India. The thought of both schools possesses inherently the possibility of being easily synthesize, but the purely classical *Sāṁkhya* school rejects the *Vedānta* philosophy. Especially the ancient *Sāṁkhya* school which is grounded on the theory of plurality of *ātman* was not able to admit the monistic tendency of the *Vedānta* philosophy. The former takes up this point of the latter for thorough investigation.

The *Sāṁkhyakārikā* (18), which is the classical text book of the Sāṁkhya school, rejects the theory of oneness of *ātman* and advocates that of its plurality. This argument could be summarized as follows: the existence of many *ātmans* which are mutually different should be admitted, for the activity, function and state of an *ātman* are neither common to those of another nor does a change in an *ātman* take place in another. The same argument is employed when the Buddhists and the Jainas attack the *Vedānta* philosophy.

In relation to this argument commentators introduce the *Vedānta* thought of that time.

"According to a theory, the one *ātman* pervades all the bodies just as a string pierces gems although gems are many and the string is one, and just as Viṣṇu shares His pleasure with 16,000 maidens at the same time. So is the one *ātman*. It can pervade all the bodies."

(*Suvarṇasaptati*)

"Then certain masters who are *Vedavādins* think as follows: 'This only one *puruṣa* can be seen in all the bodies just as a string (*sūtra*) pierces [a great number of] gems (*maṇi*). As for the string, no matter how many gems there may be in this world, only one string pierces all gems.' If so, does the highest *ātman* which corresponds to a string exist in many bodies which corresponds to gems or is the one called *puruṣa* perceived in many [bodies] just like the moon reflecting on the surface of water, that is to say, just as one moon is perceived on the surface of water of rivers, wells, tanks, and so forth? Therefore, doubt arises in this point." (*Māṭharavṛtti*)

"The only one *ātman* is the ruler (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) in all the bodies just like a string which by nature pierces [many] gems." (Gauḍapāda)

The simile of a string piercing gems is introduced in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* as well.[14] That of the moon reflecting on the surface of water is frequently employed by the later *Vedānta* school (Cf. *Brahmasūtra* II, 3, 50), and a such method of explanation is called the reflection theory (*pratibimbavāda*). Therefore, those facts reveal that the doctrine of the *Vedānta* school was known to the *Sāṁkhya* school at that time and that the relationship between the highest *ātman* and the individual *ātman* was variously explained by the same school. However, Māṭhara attributes the theory to a *Vedavādin* and not to a *Vedāntavādin*. Therefore, it is likely that the independence of the *Vedānta* school had not yet been generally accepted. The *Suvarṇasaptati* was composed before 546 A.D. and the other two commentaries were probably written in about 600–700, A.D.[15] It is, therefore, to be noted here that, although it was the period when *Vedānta* philosophers appeared one after another, their view was ascribed to the *Vedavādins*.

The origin of the *Sāṁkhya* school is exceedingly ancient, but the extant texts of the school which were composed before Śaṁkara are only the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* and its commentaries. They refer briefly to the *Vedānta* philosophy as I have mentioned above and there is not any reference to the *māyā* doctrine yet. In the works of the *Sāṁkhya* school, the *māyā* doctrine was called into question only after the time of Śaṅkara. In commenting *Sāṁkhyakārikā* 9 Vācaspatimiśra attacks the *māyā* doctrine, saying, "It is not possible to say that the notion of the phenomenal world being real is false because of the absence of evidence which contradicts it."[16]

Next, as works of the *Yoga* school prior to *Śaṅkara* there are the *Yogasūtra* and Vyāsa's commentary (*Bhāṣya*) on it. But the *Yogasūtra* is not concerned with logical debates, and even in the commentary of Vyāsa there is no place where he refutes the *Vedānta* school. The practice of *Yoga* is common to nearly all of the schools

14. Cf. the present work, Vol. I, pp. 189 ff.

15. Hakuju Ui, *Indo Tetsukagu Shi*, p. 473.

16. *prapañcapratyayaś cāsati bādhake na śakyo mithyeti vaditum iti.*

in India, and the *Vedānta* school also adopts it. Therefore, they did not probably think it necessary to refute the doctrine of the *Vedānta* school.

The *Mīmāṁsā* school has been in a sister relationship with the *Vedānta* school since the time of its establishment, and they profess themselves to be the two great systems of the orthodox Brahmanical tradition. Most scholars of the early *Mīmāṁsā* school belong to the *Vedānta* school at the same time. One and the same person studies both doctrines. Therefore, the *Mīmāṁsakas* did not refuse the *Vedānta* philosophy (in this connection, see the present work, Vol. II, pp. 1 ff. and Vol. III, pp. 1 ff.). However, in the later centuries, there arose in the *Vedānta* school a tendency to reject as the learning low in value the *Mīmāṁsā* philosophy which has rites as its principal things. Consequently the *Mīmāṁsā* school came to reject positively the *Vedānta* philosophy. The eternal existence of the individual *ātman* from the standpoint of the highest truth is the absolutely necessary and indispensable presupposition on which the *Mīmāṁsā* philosophy can establish their rites. Nevertheless there appeared a number of philosophers in the later *Vedānta* school who asserted that "the individual *ātman* is real only in the worldly life and unreal from the standpoint of the highest truth." Therefore, the *Mīmāṁsakas* tried hard to attack such an idea that was a menace to the basis of their ritual philosophy. As the result the *Mīmāṁsā* school came closer to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophy with regard to the problem of the individual *ātman*.

As far as the extent texts show, it is Kumārila who first attacked the *Vedānta* philosophy among the *Mīmāṁsakas*. In his *Śloka-vārttika* (*Pratyakṣasūtra*, 114–116, p. 169) he introduces and attacks a view. According to its commentator Pārthasārathimiśra it is the theory of the *Vedāntins*. It runs as follows:

> "But other people (=*Vedāntins*) say that [the object of non-determinative knowledge][17] is the highest universality (*mahā-sāmānya*), the substance (*dravya*) and the being (*sat*). Thus the theory that sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) has universality (*sāmānya*) as its object has been accepted." [114]

> "[If you ask, 'If sense-perception is non-determinative, how can particularities (*viśeṣa*) be cognized?,' we reply that] various

17. *nirvikalpakasya viṣayam.* Comm.

particularities are cognized by the determinative faculty of cognition (*savikalpakabuddhi*). Therefore, particularities (i.e. individuality) exist only in their respective objects and again, particularities [such as cowness (*gotva*)] exist in many objects." [115]

"When one does not think of these particularities which are established by [mutual] exclusion and agreement, the sense-perception which arises with reference to a cow is not distinguished from that which arises with reference to a horse."[18] [116]

According to the commentary, this argument is refuted in the following stanzas and later again the next argument is mentioned as theory of opponents and it may also be that of the *Vedānta* school.[19]

"[The determinative] subject of cognition (*dhī*) superimposes a genus (*jāti*) and so forth [which are different from a thing] upon a thing (*vastu*) which is not a genus itself. Therefore, the subject of cognition is [false] like a mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*)."[20] [140]

The *Vedānta* doctrine mentioned here resembles that of Śaṅkara but it is not the same in every respect. For example, it is in accordance with Śaṅkara's philosophy in regarding the Absolute as being but he does neither call it substance (*dravya*) nor the highest uni-

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18. *mahāsāmānyam anayais tu dravyaṃ sad iti cocyate /*
*sāmānyaviṣayatvaṃ ca pratyakṣasyaivam āśritam // 144 //*

*viśeṣās tu pratīyante savikalpakabuddhibhiḥ /*
*te ca kecit pratidravyaṃ kecid bahuṣu saṃśritāḥ // 115 //*

*tān akalpayad utpannaṃ vyāvṛttānugatātmanā /*
*gavy aśve copajātaṃ tu pratyakṣaṃ na viśiṣyate // 116 //*

In translating the last stanza I read *vyāvṛttyanugamatmanā* (for *vyāvṛttanugatātmanā*), following the reading of the commentary.

19. The commentary reads: *codayati.* The English translator G. Jhā interprets it as *Vedāntic* objection.

20. *jātyādyarthāntaraṃ yasmād atadrūpe 'pi vastuni /*
*bhavaty adhyasya dhīs tasmān mṛgatṛṣṇādibhiḥ samā //* (pp. 177-178). *jātyādi=jātiguṇakriyānāmadheyāni* ("genus and so on" denotes a genus, a quality, action and name), Comm.

versality (*mahāsāmānya*).[21] In these respects the *Vedānta* doctrine in question is the closest to Bhartṛhari's view. At least, that which is taught in stanzas 114—116 is all advocated by Bhartṛhari.[22] It also resembles greatly what is mentioned as a *Vedānta* theory by a Jaina scholar Mallavādin.[23] These facts show evidently that a doctrine different from Śaṁkara's was prevalent in the world of thought prior to him.

It is to be noted here that the concept of the highest universality (*mahāsāmānya*), which had been generally thought as that in the very limit and at the highest rank but had had its *raison d'être* as a mere abstract conception, was made the essential character of the Absolute by philosophers like Bhartṛhari. Their unique significance in the history of philosophy can be recognized in this respect. However, the idea was not original with these *Vedānta* scholars but was what had already been taught in the *Vijñānavāda* philosophy of Buddhism. In his *Bodhisattvabhūmi* Maitreya regards the highest universality as a characteristic of the ultimate state and understands that it can be reached by means of non-determinative wisdom.[24] Therefore, the influence of the *Vijñānavāda* can be seen upon the *Vedānta* philosophy here.

In the *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila there is another place where he attacks the *Vedānta* philosophy.[25] There he only attacks the *Vedānta* philosophy without introducing it. But from his sentences one may guess whom he attacks.

"Then the impure transformation would not belong to the pure puruṣa." [82cd]

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21. But this statement is concerned with the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* only.

22. Cf. the present work, IV, pp. 208 ff.; H. Nakamura, '*Kotoba no Keijijogaku*' (=Metaphysics of Language), *Tetsugaku Zasshi*, Jan.-Feb., 1945.

23. Cf. the present word, Vol. I, pp. 425 ff. ........ ........ ..........

24. *yā bodhisattvānām anabhilāpyaṃ dharmanairātmyam ārabhya satyāvabodhāya vā satyāvabodhakāle vā satyābhisambodhād vā ūrdhvaṃ prajñā paramapraśamavyupasthānā nirvikalpā sarvaprapañcapagatā sarvadharmeṣu samatānugatā mahāsāmānyalakṣaṇapraviṣṭā jñeyaparayaṁtagatā samāropāpavādāntadvayavivarjitā madhyamapratipadanusāriṇī, iyaṃ bodhisattvānāṃ tattvānubodhaprativedhāya prajñā veditavyā* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, p. 212, lines 12—20).

25. *Ślokavārttika, Saṁbandhākṣepaparihāraḥ*, vv. 82cd—86 (pp. 662-663).

"And, [if one says that living beings are afflicted with psychic affection because of merit and demerit made by each individual *ātman,* we reply,] the existence of psychic affection is not reasonable because merit and the like are based upon [*puruṣa,* i.e. *brahman*] itself. Or, if [merit and the like] start functioning by their own power [in the beginning of the world, they] would exist apart [from brahman]. [If so, the monism of *brahman* would be discarded since the creation would not be caused by the desire of the Lord]." [83]

"Further, since [*brahman*] itself is of the pure nature and there exists nothing else [but *brahman*], how could nescience (*avidyā*) like a dream and so forth work on that [*brahman*]?" [84]

"If one says that [*brahman*] is invaded by something else, [his position] would become dualism. [In other words, since the two principles, *Brahman* and something else, have to be accepted, non-dualism will be discarded]. On the other hand, if [one says that] nescience belongs to [*brahman*] by nature, [which does not need another principle because of the function of nescience, we reply,] nobody would not be able to cut it off. [If so, no final release would be possible]." [85]

"Indeed, if something different [from nescience, e.g. *yoga,* etc.] could arise, the nescience which exists by nature should come to be destroyed somewhere. But for those who regard the only one *ātman* as the means [to destroy nescience] there is no cause [, the means to destroy nescience,] different [from *ātman*]."[26] [86]

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26. *puruṣasya ca śuddhasya nāśuddhā vikṛtir bhavet* // 82cd //
*svādhīnatvāc ca dharmādes tena kleśo na yujyate* /
*tadvaśena pravṛttau vā vyatirekaḥ prasajyate* // 83 //
*svayaṃ ca śuddharūpatvād asattvāc cānyavastunaḥ* /
*svapnādivad avidyāyāḥ pravṛttis tasya kiṃkṛtā* // 84//
*anyenopaplave 'bhīṣṭe dvaitavādaḥ prasajyate* /
*svābhāvikīṃ avidyāṃ tu nocchettuṃ kaścid arhati* // 85 //
*vilakṣaṇopapāte hi naśyet svābhāvikī kvacit* //
*na tu ekātmābhyupāyānām hetur asti vilakṣaṇaḥ* // 86 //

Stanzas 82 and 83 attack the most ancient *Vedānta* philosophy, especially the theory of transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*), which agrees with the theory of an opponent school in the *Brahmasūtra* (II, 1, 4, II, 1, 34 and 35). Therefore, Kumārila repeats here the refutation *Vedānta* philosophy which has been made since the time prior to him. In the next stanzas 84–86 he attacks a new form of *Vedānta* philosophy, i.e. the theory of false manifestation (*vivartavāda*). According to the commentator Pārthasārathimiśra the author refutes the *Ātmādvaitavādins* here. From the above stanzas it is known that these people were of opinion that the absolute *brahman* evolves itself by the power of nescience (*avidyā*), the phenomenal world as its effect being illusory like a dream and illusion. Their view is in accordance with the thought of non-dualism. This fact indicates that such a non-dualistic thought has already come into existence before Śaṅkara, since Kumārila lived before him.[27] It is very significant from the standpoint of the history of thought. Kumārila's argument against it hits a critical point of non-dualism. Such an argument is often made in attacking non-dualism in India. The argument in stanzas 85 and 86 resembles that in the *Āptamīmāṁsā* (v. 25) of Samantabhadra, a Jaina scholar, as well and is similar in its idea to what is discussed by Hemacandra when he attacks non-dualism.[28] The principle of nescience which was posited in order to place a firm foundation on non-dualism is in fact the weakest point in this doctrine and the attack of other schools has been focused upon it.

As is known from Kumārila's arguments he no longer regards the *Vedānta* school as a sister system of the *Mīmāṁsā* school. Since he attacks it as sharply as he criticizes other schools it can be thought that from his time the two schools came to be separated from, and antagonistic to, each other. *Mīmāṁsā* scholars after Kumārila likewise reject the *Vedānta* philosophy. *Śālikanāth*, a pupil of the *Mīmāṁsā* scholar Prabhākara who was in opposition to Kumārila, also attacked non-dualism.[29] In every later centuries the *Mīmāṁsā*

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27. Cf. the present work, Vol. I, pp. 107 ff.

28. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 424 ff.

29. In his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (pp. 154-155) Śālikanāth attacks the *Advaitasiddhānta* by quoting the second verse of the *Tarkakāṇḍa* in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍanamiśra. It is a very interesting fact in the history of thought that Śālikanāth attacks Maṇḍanamiśra's non-dualism without criticizing Śaṅkara's (S. Kuppuswami Shastri, 'Further Light on the Prābhākara-problem,' *Proceedings and transactions of the Third Oriental Conference*, Madras, 1924, p. 480).

school was inclined to adopt the *Vedānta* philosophy.[30] Until that time the two schools seem to have been mutually antagonistic.

We have so far examined the references to the *Vedānta* philosophy which are made in early philosophical works. In addition to them we must deal with the *Vedānta* philosophy as is seen in the works of Hinduism, which is a popular religion of India. Since Hindu sects have been greatly influenced by the *Vedānta* philosophy, it is no doubt certain that Hindu masters have been in a close contact with the *Vedānta* school. However, I would like to clarify the relationship between the two on some other occasion and now examine how Hindu works describe the *Vedānta* school and its doctrine.

The theological works of Hinduism are innumerable, but nearly all of them came into existence in later centuries, and only a few belong to the same period as the early *Vedānta* philosophy prior to Śaṅkara. The *Purāṇa* literature is one of them. For example, the *Garuḍapurāṇa*[31] admits that the *Vedānta* is related to philosophical discussion. Again in the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* the supporter and ruler of all beings is regarded as the god Viṣṇu, and it is said that Viṣṇu is praised in the *Vedānta*.[32] However, in so far as the ancient *Upaniṣads* are concerned, one cannot say that they regard Viṣṇu as the highest Lord. In that case, was the author of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* acquainted with the new *Upaniṣads* which emphasize the worship of Viṣṇu? Or, does he venture to assert that there is such a concept in the *Upaniṣads*? At any rate it is certain that authors of the *Purāṇas* knew that the *Vedānta* (=the *Upaniṣads*) is a special section of the *Veda* which teaches the highest principle. They knew not only that but also the germ of the new *Vedānta* philosophy. The *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (V, 1) refers to the twofold *brahman* and the twofold knowledge corresponding to it (*dve vidye*), i.e. higher and lower knowledge and also mentions a branch of learning which acquires into the distinction between the individual self and the great self. It is possible that the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* exercised some influence upon formation of Śaṇkara's thought since he quotes it in his works.[33] Moreover, the *Vāyupurāṇa* reads as follows:

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30. For example, see Laugākṣki-Bhāskara's *Arthasaṁgraha* VII, *Arthavāda*.

31. Cf. the present work, Vol. I, p. 136.

32. Works by H. H. Wilson, Vol. III, p. 95; Vol. IX, p. 252; Vol. X, p. 201.

33. Śaṅkara's *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya* (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series p. 280) says: *"tatroktaṃ Paurāṇikaiḥ—'ābhūtasaṃplavaṃ sthānam amṛtatvam hi bhāṣ-*

"He who knows the only one *puruṣa* is called *Brahmavādin*."[34]
*ekaṃ yo vetti puruṣaṃ tam āhur brahmavādinam* /

As the *Vāyupurāṇa* probably came into existence already by the 7th century, it can be known that some people advocated the only one *puruṣa* as the world principle before that time. The *Purāṇa* literature has made a great contribution to the establishment of the *Vedānta* philosophy, but it seems that there are only a few direct references to the *Vedānta* school. Since the religion of the *Purāṇas* is generally for the general masses, they do not seem to have had any intention to argue with nor defend the *Vedānta* school as a school of philosophy.

Among the Hindu scriptures *Itihāsas, Purāṇas,* many *Saṁhitās* of the Vaiṣṇavas and *Āgamas* of the Śaivas should be taken into consideration, but most of them are unpublished or difficult to obtain though they have been published. Here I would like to take up only the best-known *Ahirbudhnyasaṁhitā* for discussion. This work seems to have come into existence around the 5th century.[36] The work (12, 3) *enumerates* and explains the *Veda* (*trayī*), the *Sāṁkhya*, the *Pāśupata*, and the *Sātvata* (=*Pāñcarātra*) as the five kinds of doctrinal systems. They are the same as those mentioned in the *Mahābhārata* XII.[37] Therefore, the author of this work like the author of the great epic did not admit the *Vedānta* school as a special independent school of philosophy. Although he refers to the *Vedānta* (*Trayyanta*), it means the *Upaniṣads* and has no relation with the name of a school of philosophy. He asserts that one can directly (*aparokṣam*) cognize *brahman* by means of the *Vedānta*.[38]

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*yate iti*/" This is a quotation from *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, II, 8, 96 (cf. Jacob: *The Vedāntasāra*, p. 6). Further, there exists a quotation from the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* in Śaṅkara's *Gītābhāṣya* as well (cf. A list of quotations at the end of the Ānandaśrama Sanskrit Series edition of the *Gītābhāṣya*).

34. Th. Aufrecht: *Catalogue Codicum MSS. Sanskriticorum Bibliothecae* Bodleianae, Oxonii 1859–64, p. 56b.

35. M. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. I, pp. 553-554.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 589, n. 3.

37. Cf. the present work, Vol. I, p. 443.

38. *antaraṅgaśamādyaṅgabhaktiśraddhāpuraḥsaram* /
*Trayyantair brahmavijñānam aparokṣaṃ vibhāvyate* // (*Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*, XIII, 26)

*tasya yo 'vyabhicāreṇa sādhanatvaṃ prapadyate* /
*hitasādhanam ity uktaḥ so 'rtho Vedāntapāragaiḥ* // (*Ibid.*, XIII, 10)

On the whole the thought of the *Ahirbudhnyasaṁhitā* itself is remarkably *Vedāntic* and there are not a few assertions which remind one Śaṅkara's non-dualism. For example, it admits two kinds of knowledge, higher and lower, and teaches that all *karmans* are burnt up by means of the former.[39] And in the same work the power which covers the highest nature (*paraṃ rūpam*) of the individual *ātman* and the supreme *ātman* is called nescience (*avidyā*).[40] In this respect its similarity to Śaṅkara's philosophy could be pointed out, but it cannot be said to be the same with his concept of nescience since, according to him, nescience is not the cause which establishes the pluralistic opposing relationship of the individual selves. Moreover, the text refers to the *Karma-Mīmāṁsā*,[41] but only as an accessory (*upāṅga*) to the Vedic study and not as the *Mīmāṁsā* as an independent school of philosophy.

However, at the time of Śaṅkara the *Vedānta* school is referred to as an independent school in works of Hinduism as well. In the *Yogavāśiṣṭha*, which was perhaps composed before the 8th century,[42] the *Vedāntavādins'* concept of final release is stated along with those of the *Sāṁkhya* school (*Kāpila*), the *Vijñānavādins* and the Jainas (*Ārhata*).

> "Ascertained by the widely known notion that this [all] is *brahman, the Vedāntavādin's* final release has been settled as accompanied by tranquility of the mind and control of the senses."[43]

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39. *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*, XLV, 18 (but this information is obtained from Schrader: *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* 1916, p. 97).

40. *Ibid.*, XLV, 3-4 (but this information is obtained from Schrader. *op. cit.*

41. *Ibid.*, XII, 12.

42. A man called Gauḍābhinanda, who lived in the middle of the 9th century, condensed this work into his *Yogavāsiṣṭhasāra* (S. Konow, *Karpūramañjarī*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. IV, p. 197). The fact that such a summary work was composed concerning the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* means that it must have won considerable authority at that time. This may indicate that it probably came into existence before the 8th century. However, on the other hand, stanzas II, 16. 60 in this work is almost the same as a passage in Kālidāsa's *Kumārasaṃbhava*, but the former may be a quotation from the latter (cf. S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 230). Therefore, this work must have been after the 5th century.

43. *Vedāntavādino buddhyā brahmedam iti rūḍhayā /*
*muktiḥ śamadamopetā nirṇīya parikalpitā //* (*Sthitiprakaraṇa* 21, 26)

From this it might be concluded that in this period the *Vedānta* school had socially been recognized as a school which was in opposition to the other powerful schools of philosophy.

After the time of Śaṅkara the connection between Hinduism and the *Vedānta* philosophy became closer and closer and a great number of theological works have been handed down to to-day. However, since they are outside the scope of the present work, I would like to entirely omit them here.

# A DISCOURSE ON *SACCIDĀNANDA*

*By* R. K. GARG*

The concept of *Saccidānanda* finds its most exalted and perfect expression in *Prasthānatrayī,* the source books of Indian philosophy and culture—viz., the *Upaniṣads,* the *Brahmasūtra* and the *Bhagavadgītā.* Since its culmination in *Prasthānatrayī,* it has always been a watch-word of Indian philosophy and culture. The entire history of Indian philosophy, indeed, tells a story of *Saccidānanda.*

Investigated and examined on the psychological criteria, the concept in question fully stands them. Man, the psychologists profess, is gifted with three psychic endowments—cognition, conation and affection. Cognition connotes the process of intellectual apprehension; conation denotes the process of ethical discrimination; and affection signifies the process of aesthetic taste or realisation. Corresponding to this psychological analysis of the human mind, *sat, cit* and *ānanda* respectively relate to cognition, conation and affection. Psychologically speaking, an integrated personality is one in which all these psychological processes unite in a balanced, ordered, synthesised and proportionate degree. On the other hand, a disproportionate, chaotic, imbalanced and unsynthesised unification of them gives birth to a split or disintegrated or abnormal personality. It is not out of place to mention here that though the psychologists of today speak of integrated personality, yet amply doubt its practical realisation. Each is said more or less disintegrated and abnormal, but no one perfectly integrated and normal. But, to the mind of Indian philosophers, let us remember, an integrated personality is not a misnomer or utopian idea but a perfectly realisable, practicable and feasible fact. Truly speaking, the Indians have always lived a life of *Saccidānanda.*

Besides its being grounded in first principles of psychology, the concept of *Saccidānanda* is big with enormous implications and connotations. The exploitation of its meanings, implications and applications needs a thorough inquiry into the nature of its each constituent, viz., *sat, cit* and *ānanda*.

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Let us first take up *'sat.'* In *Saṁskṛta* terminology, the word *'sat'* is found pregnant with numerous meanings and wide implications. In Indian philosophy and culture, it is used in at least three different senses, not to speak of more,—metaphysical, religious and ethical. Lord *Śrī Kṛṣṇa,* in the *Gītā,* explains these three senses of *'sat'* to His dedicated disciple, *Arjuna*: "*'Sat'* is used to signify existence and saintliness; so also, O *Pārtha,* the word *'sat'* is used for good acts."[1] Thus it denotes existence, meaning thereby, reality in its metaphysical sense, saintliness in its religious sense, and good act in its ethical sense.

We first take up the metaphysical sense for consideration. The word *'sat',* in *Śaṁkarite* terminology, is always construed in the sense of the eternal and ultimate reality. Therein *'satya'* and *'sat'* are taken for synonymous terms. *Śaṁkara* defines *'satya'* as free from contradictions.[2] Similarly, *'sat,'* he says, is not contradicted; and *'asat,'* he says, is not experienced.[3] To be very exact, we may say that if a thing, determined in the form, continues forever to retain its very same form, without contradiction, then and then only, it is worth naming as *sat* or *satya.*[4] It must, however, be noted that *Śaṁkara* has not interpreted these words anew; he has rather echoed the self-same idea of the *Gītā* and the *Upaniṣads.* In the *Bhagavadgītā, Śrī Kṛṣṇa,* the Lord, observes, "The non-existent is never affirmed, and the existent is never negatived; the essence of these both, *sat* and *asat,* is seen by those who have had a direct vision of the reality."[5] The authority of no less a man than the Lord Himself establishes unquestionably the identity or non-duality of *sat* or *satya* and *Brahman* or reality. *Sat,* in the *Upaniṣads,* is said primeval and one without a second.[6] It is not an article of faith; it is rather ratiocinative, or better say, supra-rational, meaning thereby, intelligible only by intuition, not by intellect, whose ten-

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1. *Gītā,* XVII. 26; so also the word 'sat' is defined in the *Śabdakalpadruma* as—*'Paramārthasattvasādhutvapraśastatvādibhiḥ sacchabdaḥ.'*

2. *'Satyaṁ bādharāhityam'—Śārīrakabhāṣya.*

3. *'Saccenna bādhyate, asaccenna pratīyate'*—Ibid.

4. *'Yadrūpeṇa yanniścitaṁ tadrūpaṁ na vyabhicarati tatsatyam'—Śaṁkara's* commentary on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad,* Memorial Edition of *Śaṁkara's* Works, Vol. 6, p. 62, Vāṇī Vilāsa Press.

5. *Gītā,* II. 16.

6. *Vide Chāndogyopaniṣad,* VI. 2. 1.

dency is to divide, not to unite, nor by speech, nor by hearing, nor to exist for ever.[8] According to the *Mīmāṁsakas,* only the eternal *Brahman, jīva* and *jagat*—are called *sat,* because they alone are said to exist forever.[8] According to the *Mīmāṁsakas,* only the eternal *paramāṇus* and *ātmans* deserve the appellation of *sat.*[9] For the *Yogins, Īśvara, prakṛti* and *puruṣa* alone are *sat;* and for the *Sāṁhayakas* only the latter two.[10] The *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vaiśeṣikas* take sixteen and seven categories respectively for *sat.*"[11] The *Bauddhas* deny the existence of any persistent and eternal *sat,* for they believe in momentarism and pragmatism.[12] The *Jainas* define *sat* as *pariṇāminitya,* meaning thereby, not letting its permanency go even in the midst of transformations, viz., origination and decay. *Sat,* then, consists of three factors—origination, decay and permanence[13]—which characterise all things, living and non-living. The *Jainas* speak of seven *padārthas* which are all *sat.*[1] The *Cārvākas* define *sat* as something cognisable or perceptible. So then, they believe only in four perceptible material elements of which the consciousness is called a quality.[15]

This is, then, all about the metaphysical meaning of the word '*sat,*' in brief, as contained in the different philosophical systems of Indian philosophy.

Now, we propose to consider the religious sense of the word '*sat,*' which denotes saintliness. '*Sat*' used for saintliness signifies austerities, charity and actions done for the sake of the Lord.[16]

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7. *Vide Kenopaniṣad,* I, 3, 4; *Taittirīyopaniṣad,* II. 4 and 9; *Kaṭhopaniṣad,* I. 2, 22 and I, 3, 15.

8. *Vide Śrībhāṣya* (only introductory portion).

9. *Vide Śabara's* introduction to his commentary on the *Mīmāṁsāsūtras.*

10. *Vide Yogasūtra* of *Patañjali* and *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* respectively.

11. *Vide Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* respectively.

12. *Vide* chapter on *Buddhism* in the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* of *Mādhavācārya.*

13. *Vide Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra,* V. 29. and *Devanandi's Sarvārthasiddhi* on it.

14. *Ibid.,* I. 4.

15' *Vide Bārhaspatyasūtras* in the chapter on *Cārvākadarśana* in the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraḥ* of *Mādhavācārya.*

16. *Vide Gītā,* XVII. 27. and also *Śaṁkara's* commentary on it.

Actions that have for their aim the favour of the Lord, like the collection of offerings for devotion, cleaning of the temple and its courtyard, anointing, painting and making flower garlands, are actions for the sake of the Lord; other actions to accomplish these, like the laying out of gardens and agricultural fields and acquiring wealth, are actions done indirectly for the sake of the Lord. The latter, even though so indirect, are verily called *'sat.'*[17] These important auspicious acts are verily enjoined upon all the four *varṇas,* the so-called castes; and they are directed to perform them out of a religious consciousness for the good of their selves.[18]

In its religious sense, *'sat'* is, thus, used for rituals which are said to satisfy the religious sentiments and cravings of man, provided *'sat'* is uttered at the commencement of each of them.

Let us now discuss the ethical sense of the word *'sat.'* *'Sat'* in this sense stands for *satkarman* or *sāttvikakarman* or good acts. The goodness or badness of a certain act is judged with reference to its conformity and correspondence or inconformity and non-correspondence to the ideal involved in human life.[20] In other words, if a certain action is true to the standard, whatsoever it be, it is called 'good', if not, it is labelled as 'bad'. Inasmuch as all the Indian philosophical systems with the lone exception of the *Cārvāka* unanimously hold liberation to be the *summum bonum* of human life, it is the final standard of liberation, or, say, in Indian philosophical and ethical terminology, the *caramapuruṣārtha* (*mokṣa*), the promotion or retardation of which determines the goodness or badness of actions done by a moral agent.[21] It should, however, be noted that even though the Indian philosophical systems are one-minded on liberation as the final end of human life, they do differ on its nature.

The *Cāravākas* regard gratification of the senses, resulting from enjoying the gross pleasure, to be the ultimate standard of judg-

17. *Vide Śrîdhara Swāmin's* commentary on *Ibid.*

18. *Vide Rāmānuja's* commentary on *Ibid.*

19. *Vide* B. G. Tilak's commentary on *Ibid.*

20. Cp., J. S. Mackenzie, *"Manual of Ethics,"* p. 1—4, London (1929).

21. *Vide* S. N. Dāsguptā, *A History of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. 1, p. 74-75, London (1922).

ment.[22] They warn us not to let any moment pass away unpacked with the intensest of pleasures.[23] For them, actions are good in proportion as they tend to produce pleasure and bad in proportion as they tend to produce just the reverse of it.[24] Such an ideal or standard as this has been condemned and sometimes even reproached like anything by the Indian moral philosophers, for example, *Yājñvalkya* and *Manu* for the grave reasons that it leads man astray from his goal and that instead of elevating him for the acquisition of higher values, it degenerates him into a life of pig. This is why, to the mind of the Indian moral philosophers, only those acts deserve the name of 'good acts' which help promote the highest goal of human life.

Defining good acts or, to be more technical, *sāttvikakarman*, the Lord says to *Arjuna*, "An action which is ordained, performed without attachment, free from attraction or repulsion, by one not desiring to obtain its reward, is said to be *sāttvika*, i.e., good act."[25] So then, according to the Lord, only those acts are called '*sat*' or 'moral' which are done for the sake of duty in the wake of one's realisation of the self or selves.[26] The Lord enlists two other kinds of actions —rājasakarman and tāmasakarman—which, are called 'bad' in sharp opposition to *sāttvikakarman*. "That action which is done with much trouble by a fruit-seeking or egotistic person, is called '*rājasa*;' and that action which is commenced through delusion, with no regard to consequence, loss, injury and capacity, is called '*tāmasa*'."[27] In comparison to the *rājasakarman*, which is relatively bad, the *tāmasakarman* is absolutely bad as it is completely destitute of moral worth. Besides this one, *Śrī Kṛṣṇa* speaks of another classification of actions. According to this classification, there are

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22. *Vide* the chapter on *Cārvākadarśana* in *Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* and *Haribhadra's Ṣaḍadarśanasamuccaya* alongwith *Guṇaratna's* commentary thereon.

23. *Cp.* James Seth's treatment of Hedonism in his *"A Study of Ethical Principles,"* p. 84, London (Eighteenth ed.).

24. *Cp.* Bentham's conception of pleasure in his *"Theory of Legislation,"* Vol. I, p. 42-43, London (1914).

25. *Gītā*, XVIII. 23, and also *Jñāneśvarī* on it.

26. *Cp.*, U. M. Urban, *"Fundamentals of Ethics,"* pp. 16—20, New York (1936).

27. *Gītā*, XVIII. 24-25, and also *Śaṁkara* and *Śrīdhara's* commentary on them.

three categories of actions which are technically known as *karman, vikarman,* and *akarman.*[28] *Karman,* here, stands for *satkarman* or good actions; *vikarman* means *asatkarman* or bad actions; and *akarman* denotes supra-moral actions which refer to a higher spiritual state than morality. Only his actions deserve to be called *'akarman,'* he who is so deep-rootedly established in his eternal soul that his actions stop to bear fruits, good or bad, in spite of his being engaged in multitudinous activities.[29] Such a person transcends morality which paves the way for spirituality.[30] His actions are not judged as they are beyond the criterial of good and bad. He never does wrong. Strictly speaking, he does not come under the fold of morality.

Thus, we come to notice that the word *'sat,'* in its ethical sense, has been taken for 'good' by all the codifiers of the Indian moral philosophies.

Now, we desire to inquire into the nature of *'cit.'* It literally means knowledge (*cit saṁjñāne*).[31] Consciousness,[32] soul,[33] feeling,[34] *Brahman*[35] and the disposition[36] which accomplishes the awareness of the assemblage of unconscious body etc., are also the possible meanings in which *cit* is at times used. These meanings broadly speaking purport knowledge. Knowledge, in the *Gītā,* is spoken of three types. viz., *sāttvika, rājasa* and *tāmasa.* Of this threefold knowledge, *sāttvika* is being stated: The knowledge by which one sees in all beings, from unmanifest *Brahman* down to inanimate objects, which are divided, distinguished from one another, the one undivided, underlying, imperishable, changeless substance, viz., the supreme self, should be known as *sāttvika.*[37] *Rājasa* knowledge is

28. *Vide Gītā,* IV. 17.

29. *Vide Gītā,* IV. 18—20, and also *B. G. Tilak's* commentary thereon.

30. Cf., John Caird, *"Introduction to Philosophy of Religion,"* Ch. IX, Cal. (1956).

31. *Vide,* Monier Williams, *"A Saṁskṛt-English Dictionary,"* p. 323, Oxford.

32. *'Cit jñāne cetanāyāṁ ca'—Amarakosa.*

33. *Vide Rāmānuja* and *Nimbārka's* commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra.*

34. *'Cit caitanye'—Vācaspatyam.*

35. *'Nirviśeṣasphuraṇamātre cetane svata eva prakāśamāne brahmaṇi'—Ibid.*

36. *'Cidasi manāsi dhīrasi'—Yajurveda,* 4, 19, and also *'Acetanadehādisaṁghātasya cetanatvaṁ saṁpādayanti vṛttiścitaṁ. tadevātra cidityucyate'—Vedāntadīpikā.*

37. *Vide Gītā,* XVIII, 20 along with *Śāṁkarabhāṣya.*

being described: But the knowledge by which one sees as distinct, in all beings or bodies, really different entities or souls of various kinds, diversely conditioned by pleasure, pain, etc., should be known as *rājasa*.[38] *Tāmasa* knowledge is being explained: Knowledge which is attached to a single product, the body or an image, as if it were the whole, which is irrational, not founded upon truth and trivial is declared to be *tāmasa*.[39] Of this threefold knowledge, *sāttvika* is the only knowledge worth its name. It is the knowledge which burns all actions to ashes.[40] Having realised it, there remains nothing worth realising in this world.[41] It is the knowledge which shines by its own brilliance like the sun, and manifests the highest reality.[42] It is the light of all lights and is said to be beyond all darkness.[43] In *Prasthānatrayī*, *cit* or *jñāna* is verily employed for, or identified with, *Brahman* or *Ātman*. *Śaṁkara*, in his commentaries, takes knowledge for self-realisation or *ātmadarśana*.[45] The *Upaniṣads* speak of *Brahman*, as: 'Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is *Brahman*;'[46] 'Knowledge, Bliss is *Brahman*;'[47] 'Existence, Knowledge, Bliss is non-dual *Brahman*.'[48] So also, the *Brahmasūtra* does.[49] It will not be out of place to mention here that knowledge is not a sort of quality attributed to *Brahman*. It is the very essence of *Brahman*; it permeates through and through it; it can by no means be abstracted from it. The typical example employed by the *Upaniṣadic* sages and also accepted by *Śaṁkara*, with regard to it, wonderfully echoes this.[50] A lump of salt put in water dissolves into it and then it cannot be grasped separately from the water,

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38. *Ibid.*, XVIII. 21 along with *Śrīdharabhāṣya*.
39. *Ibid.*, XVIII. 22.
40. *Vide Gītā*, IV. 19 and 37.
41. '*Yajjñātvā neha bhūyonyajjñātavyamavaśiṣyate*'—*Ibid.*, VII, 2.
42. *Ibid.*, V. 16 and also care for *Kaṭhopaniṣad*, V. 15.
43. *Gītā*, XIII. 17; *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV. 4. 16; *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, VI. 14.
44. *Cf.* '*Śrutau jñānaṁ brahmeti*'—*Vidvanmanorañjanī* on *Vedāntasāra*, 1.
45. '*Jñānamadvaitāmadarśanam*'—*Śaṁkara's* commentary on the *Gītā*, XVIII, 20.
46. *Vide Taittirīyopaniṣad*, II. 1.
47. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, III. 9. 28.
48. '*Saccidānandādvayaṁ brahma*'—*Vedāntasāra*, 6.
49. *Vide Brahmasūtra*, III. 3. 11 along with *Śāṁkarabhāṣya*.
50. *Vide Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, II. 4. 12 along with *Śāṁkarabhāṣya*.

because it permeates through every particle of water. So also, knowledge is the inseparable and non-distinct essence, or say, the very nature of *Brahman*.[51] It is called *vijñānaghana*.

Besides the above-discussed essentially metaphysical and epistemological interpretations, the term *'cit'* or *'jñāna'* is also used in one more special sense, wherein, it signifies either the means to knowledge or the moral consciousness, i.e., the power or faculty of differentiation between good and bad, right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice. Here we must be on our strictest guards against the confusion worst confounded, that Indian philosophy, like European philosophy, espouses the cause of a dualism or antagonism between spirituality and morality. It has indeed never lent its support, qualified or unqualified, to such a move. Spirituality and morality, in Indian philosophy, are interlinked, intertwined and interwedded to each other. Even if they appear to be numerically two, they are not two, but, in fact, one. He who rightly knows the 'good,' also knows the real, and vice versa. The reason being that morality consummates in spirituality and spirituality presupposes morality. Hence, we need not be surprised to hear the aforementioned peculiar meaning of the term in question. The *Gītā* eloquently expounds it in its thirteenth chapter. The Lord says to *Arjuna*, "Humility, unostentatiousness, harmlessness, forbearance, uprightness, service to the preceptor, purity, steadiness, self-control, dispassion for sense-objects and absence of egoism, seeing misery and evil in birth, death, old age and sickness, non-attachment and non-identification with son, wife, home, etc., ever being even-minded whether good or evil befalls, unswerving devotion to Me through the *yoga* of non-separation, resorting to solitude, and aversion to company, being ever devoted to spiritual knowledge, perception of the aim of the knowledge of reality—all this is called knowledge."[52] Knowledge, thus, implies all these twenty moral virtues and noble emotions, whereby the total purification of the mind is continually achieved in conduct. Man may be said to have acquired real knowledge, only when he is fully alive to the need of, nay, is in possession of, the above-mentioned means to knowledge.[53] It is a

51. *'Śrutau jñānam brahmeti sāmānādhikaraṇyadguṇatve tasya tadanupapatteḥ'—Vidvanmanorañjanī* on *Vedāntasāra*.

52. *Gītā*, XIII. 7—11.

53. *Vide*, B. G. *Tilak*, *Gītā-Rahasya*, Vol. I, p. 342, Poona (first edition of English translation).

proposition of metaphysics that knowledge must needs produce an effect on the mind by way of equanimity of reason; and that otherwise, that knowledge is incomplete or immature. This is why, *jñāna* is defined in terms of the aforementioned twenty moral qualities which are said to awaken true knowledge.[54] In Kantian terminology, we can say that knowledge includes not only pure reason but also practical reason. It is, in fact, a unique synthesis of morality and spirituality.[55]

Now, we take up the final constituent of *Saccidānada*, viz., *ānanda* or bliss. *Ānanda* may etymologically be construed in many an allied meaning, viz., pleasure, enjoyment, gladness, happiness, delight, joy, bliss, peace, etc.[56] Pleasure and enjoyment smack of sensual gratification and aggrandisement, or, in *Saṁskṛta* terminology, *ādhibhautikasukha;* happiness is an indicative of rational pleasure, or, in *Saṁskṛta* terminology, *ādhidaivikasukha;* and delight, joy, bliss, gladness and peace are expressive of spiritual and aesthetic pleasure, or, in *Saṁskṛta* terminology, *adhyātmikasukha.*

Although the word *'ānanda'* may be taken for all kinds of *ānanda,* yet we have to distinguish between *ānanda* and *ānanda.* It is ordinarily applied to denote 'material pleasure' or 'sensual pleasure' or *ādhibhautikasukha.* We may simply call it pleasure (*sukha*). This view of *ānanda,* amongst the Indian philosophical systems, was, at a very early date, taken by *Cārvāka* system which represented a theory of gross materialism by way of advocating for the pursuit of material gains and sensual enjoyments, even at the cost of other's misery and discomfort.[57] Such a theory looks upon agent's own material pleasure and comfort as the highest good and totally disregards what happens to others. It has been treated by almost all Indian philosophers, and even by ordinary people, as extremely objectionable, immoral and disdainable.[58]

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54. *Ibid.,* Vol. 2, p. 1112.

55. *Cf. Gītā,* XVIII. 78.

56. *Vide Bārhaspatyam; Vacaspatyam; Śabdakalpadruma;* and *Āpte* and *William's Saṁskṛta-English Dictionaries.*

57. *Vide Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha,* Chapter I; *Tattvopaplavasiṁha;* Garbe's *The Philosophy of Ancient India. Prabodhacandrodaya,* Act II; and care for the *Gītā,* XIV where the demoniac treasure is discussed at length.

58. Cf. *Gītā-Rahasya,* Vol. 1, p. 107.

But as 'material pleasure' is not the only kind of pleasure, it is possible to adhere to 'rational pleasure' or *ādhidaivikasukha* which is of necessity a higher kind of pleasure, say, happiness (*preya*). Even the eminent utilitarianist, J. S. Mill, admits that the merit of rational pleasure is higher than that of physical pleasure. To quote him : "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."[59] In Indian philosophy, all the theological, nay, *Brāhmanical* systems with the lone exception of *Advaita-Vedānta,* seem to subscribe to this interpretation of *ānanda,* inasmuch as they do not admit *ānanda* to be either the permanent quality of the soul or the identical essence of the soul or of the highest reality. They enjoin upon us to perform virtuous acts which lead us to *svarga* or heaven, where we are entitled to experience unalloyed pleasure, so long as the merits of ours are not completely exhausted.[60] Happiness derived from virtuous acts, which are performed with certain motives, is definitely of a higher kind. Inasmuch as it is rational, it is not obtained at the cost of others' pleasure.[61] This conception of *ānanda* is also severely criticised in Indian philosophy, especially in *Vedānta*.[62]

*Prasthānatrayī* substitutes happiness or *ādhidaivikasukha* by bliss or *śānti* or *ādhyātmikasukha,* which is certainly beyond the heavenly happiness both in its essence and nature. No less a philosopher than plato, also, endorses this fact. He maintains that rational happiness is superior to bodily pleasure, and that, that joy which can be realised by means of spiritual endeavour alone, is superior even to rational happiness.[63] It seems to be quite in the fitness of things to mention here that bliss or *śānti* is not taken, in *Prasthānatrayī,* in the negative sense of total absence of sufferings[64] as all Indian philosophical systems except *Jainism* and *Vedāntism* very often interpret it; but it is construed therein in the emphatically positive sense of

59. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism,* p. 14, London (1907).

60. Cf. the treatment of *Brāhmanical* systems in Max Muller's *Six Systems of Indian philosophy* and *Rādhākrishṇan's Indian Philosophy,* Vol. 2.

61. Cf. Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason.*

62. *Vide Gītā,* II. 42—44, IX. 20-21; *Kathopaniṣad,* I. 2. 1—3.

63. *Vide,* Plato, *Republic,* Book IX.

64' '*Na ca brahmaṇyānandaśabdo duḥkhābhāvaparaḥ*'—*Vidvanmanorañjanī* on *Vedāntasāra,* 1.

identical state of the soul, technically called *ātmānanda* or *brahmānanda*.[65] *Ānanda*, in this positive sense, is, then, the highest accomplishment, where the consciousness of distinction amongst the knower, the known and the knowledge vanishes and they become one. "Here the philosophical quest terminates, the suggestion being that there is nothing higher than *ānanda*. This *ānanda* is active enjoyment of unimpeded exercise of capacity. It is not sinking into nothingness, but the perfection of being."[66] To this effect that *ānanda* is synonymous with the supreme reality, *Brahman*, or, that *ānanda* signifies Brahman, the allusions in *śruti* are not wanting.[67]

Let us, then, cast a bird's eye-view on what the *Upaniṣads* observe regarding *ānanda* : 'Knowledge, *Bliss is Brahman*';[68] '(He) knew that *Brahman* is[69] Bliss;' 'The Blissful Immortal that gleams forth is *Brahman*;'[70] 'Who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this Bliss in ether;'[71] 'That which is great (*bhūmā* i.e., *Brahman*) is bliss;'[72] 'From Bliss, indeed, all creatures are born, when born they live by Bliss, on return they enter into Bliss;'[73] 'He who knows the Bliss of *Brahman*, never fears at any time at all;'[74] 'The united mass of knowledge, which has become one in the

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65. *Vide* different conceptions of liberation and soul in different systems, in the *sūtra* literature thereof.

66. *Vide* S. *Rādhākrishṇan's* citation from the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* in his *Indian philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 165, New York (1951).

67. *'Na ca brahmaṇa ānandatmatve pramāṇābhāvaḥ'—Vidvanmanorañjanī* on *Vedāntasāra*, 1.

68. *'Vijñānamānandaṁ brahma'—Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, III. 9. 28; see also *Pañsadaśī*, XI. 59—62.

69. *'Ānando brahmeti vyajānāt'—Taittirīyopaniṣad*, III. 6; see also *Pañcadaśī*, XI. 12 and 13.

70. *'Ānandarūpamamṛtaṁ yadvibhāti* (*tadbrahma*)*'—Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, II. 2.7 alongwith *Śaṁkara* and *Rāmānuja's* commentaries thereon.

71. *'Ko kyevānyātkaḥ prāṇyādyadeṣa ākāśa ānando na syāt'—Taittirīyopaniṣad*, II. 7 alongwith *Śaṁkara's* commentary thereon.

72. *'Bhūmaiva sukham,—Chāndogyopaniṣad*, VII. 23.1. alongwith *Śaṁkara's* commentary thereon; see also *Pañcadaśī*, XI. 14—17.

73. *'Ānandāddhyeva khalvimāni bhūtāni jāyante. Ānandena jātāni jīvanti. Ānandaṁ prayantyabhisaṁviśantīti.'—Taittirīyopaniṣad*, III. 6. alongwith *Śaṁkara's* commentary thereon.

74. *'Ānandaṁ brahmaṇo vidvān na vibheti kadācana'—Ibid.*, II. 4 and 9.

state of deep-sleep, is possessed of Bliss and enjoys Bliss;'[75] 'During the time of deep-sleep when everything is resolved, (the soul) which is obscured by ignorance attains to the nature of Bliss.'[76] All these passages leave not the slightest doubt as to the identical unity and oneness of *Brahman* and *ānanda*.

Surprisingly enough, even this truism has been a subject of heated discussion and strong controversy amongst the commentators of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahmasūtras*. The exact point of controversy is whether *ānanda* refers to *Brahman* or to the individual soul. All but *Śaṁkara* expressly, emphatically, declare that all the *Upaniṣadic* passages referring to *ānandamaya*, by their suffix 'mayat,' relate to *Brahman*.[77] In *Śaṁkara's* opinion, they refer to the individual soul, consisting of five sheaths, of which *ānandamaya* is its innermost sheath.[78] It should, however, be noted that he could not avoid admitting, though, of course, half-heartedly, reluctantly and hesitatingly, that even this could be construed to refer to *Brahman*. In his view even if it be supposed that the word *'ānandamaya'* of the *Upaniṣads* refers neither to the individual soul, nor to the *prakṛti* of *Sāṁkhya* but to the *Upaniṣadic Brahman*, it does not, however, follow that *Braman*, by the characterisation of *ānandamaya*, is transformed into bliss as suggested by the suffix *'mayat;'* but what, in fact, follows from this is that *Brahman* is the infinite source of bliss.[79]

This controversy assumes more poignancy in the commentaries on the *ānandamayādhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra*.[80] According to *Upavarṣa*,[81] *Rāmānuja*[82] and others, *ānandamaya*, in the *ānanda-*

75. *'Suṣuptisthāna ekibhūtaḥ prajñānaghana evānandamayo hyānandabhuk'—Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*, 5; and also compare with *Pañcadaśī*, XI. 67 and 68.

76. *'Suṣuptikāle sakale vilīne tamobhibhūtaḥ sukharūpameti'—Kaivalyopaniṣad*, 13; also care for *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, IV., 3. 21 and 22, and *Pañcadaśī*, XI. 40—58.

77. *Vide* all the commentaries except that of *Śaṁkara* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, III. 9. 28, and the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, II and III.

78. *Vide Śaṁkara's* commentary on *Ibid.*

79. *Vide Ibid;* also care for *Vedāntasāra*, Col. Jacob's edition (Sec. 7).

80. *Vide* commentaries of *Upavarṣa, Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Mādhva, Vallabha* and *Caitanya* on the *Brahmasūtra*, I. 1. 12—19.

81. *Vide Upavarṣa's* view cited by *Śaṁkara* in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, I. 1. 12.

82. *Vide Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya* on *Ibid.*, I. 1. 12—19.

*mayādhikaraṇa,* refers to *Brahman* on account of repetition of the word *'ānandamaya* in the *Taittirīya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Muṇḍaka* and other *Upaniṣadic* texts. Repetition, in *Vedānta,* has been admitted to be a means to ascertaining the purport of the *Upaniṣadic* texts. Therefore, *ānandamaya* refers to *Brahman.* The suffix *'mayat'* is also not out of place in *Brahman,* because it is used to indicate abundance or *prācurya* of bliss. Hence, *ānandamaya* should be taken for the highest *Brahman.* *Śaṁkara* objects to this interpretation of the *sūtras* and declares that *ānandamaya* cannot be the highest *Brahman.*[83] First, there is not the least justification, for suddenly changing the interpretation of the suffix *'mayat'* from transformation in the case of *vijñānamaya, prāṇamaya,* etc., in the preceding passages to abundance in the case of *ānandamaya,* so as to construe this word to refer to *Brahman.* Secondly, the very idea of abundance of bliss denotes that there is also misery in it, howsoever slight. Such an idea, in his opinion, is absurd.[84]

It does not seem to be out of place to mention here an interesting incident which is oft-quoted to have taken place in the life of *Śaṁkara.* It is said that, when *Śaṁkara* had completed his commentary on the *ānandamayādhikarṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra* with this conclusion that *ānandamaya* referred to the individual soul and not to the highest *Brahman, Bādarāyaṇa* appeared before him and held a discussion, which is said to have continued for several days, with him, with a view to winning him over to the conclusion that it referred to the essential *Brahman.* Neither could defeat the other and the two parted company with honours shared. It was after this that *Śaṁkara* also accepted this view and gave the forced interpretation that *ānandamaya* might be applied to *Brahman.* Whatever be the basis of this incident, it points out to one fact that *Śaṁkara,* for himself, never favoured such an interpretation that *ānandamaya* could be taken for *Brahman.*[86] He should, however, not be misunderstood that even *ānanda* as such was denied to be an identical essence of *Brahman.* The word *'ānanda,'* not *ānandamaya,* used in the *Upaniṣadic texts,* speaks of Brahman, without any reservation and qualification. He says, "In the scriptures the word *ānanda* is used for *Brahman*; from this, we cannot conclude that *ānandamaya,* the

83. *'Nānadamayasya brahmatvam'—Śāṁkarabhāṣya,* I. 1. 19.

84. Cf., *Swāmīvīreśvarānanda, Brahmasūtra,* I. 1. 17, p. 47, Almora (1936).

85. *Vide* any book on the life of *Śaṁkara* or any *Śāṁkaradigvijaya.*

86. Cf., N. *Śāstrī, A Study of Śaṁkara,* p. 119, Calcutta (1942).

self-consisting of bliss, is also *Brahman*, for the suffix *'mayat'* shows that it is a transformation."[87] This unequivocal utterance of his leaves not the least doubt as to the identity of *ānanda* and *Brahman*.[88]

With regard to *ānanda,* the *Gītā* abides by the conclusions reached by the hoary savants of the *Upaniṣads*. *Ānanda* or bliss, in the *Gītā*, is called by the name of *śānti, brāhmī-sthiti, brahmanirvāṇa, ātyantikasukha, atyantasukha, uttamasukha* and *sāttvikasukha*. What the *Gītā* understands by *śānti* is that it is the climax of bliss which is realised only by he who is non-covetous, non-egotistic and free from the idea of ownership.[89] *Śānti*, then, results from renunciation of the fruits of action.[90] This is verily the state of *brahmanhood* (*brāhmī-sthiti*), attaining to which one realises *Brahman* (*brahmanirvāṇa*) in its pristine purity.[91] Herein one realises unsurpassed, everlasting, transcendental and absolute bliss (*ātyantikasukha*).[92] Established in this bliss, the *Gītā* says, one does not waver from the reality, thinks of no other acquisition as greater than that, and is not purturbed even by great sufferings.[93] Bliss is also known as beatitude (*uttamasukha*) which is realised only by the *yogins* who are steady in mind, sinless and identified with *Brahman*.[94] The *yogins*, entirely free from taint, constantly controlling the mind, thus attain easily to the infinite bliss (*atyantasukha*) of union with *Brahman*.[95] In the eighteenth chapter of the *Gītā*, we find a threefold division of pleasure, viz., *sāttvikasukha, rājasasukha* and *tāmasasukha*. "That spiritual bliss which is like poison at first, but like nectar at the end, is declared to be *sāttvika*, i.e., born of the serenity of the self-engrossed reason." The *Gītā* goes on to say that "that material pleasure which results from the contact between the objects and the senses, and is like nectar at the beginning, but like poison at the end is known as *rājasa*, i.e., of a lower grade; and that pleasure which is self-delusive both at the beginning and at the end, and which results from sleep, lassitude and inadvertance, is said

87. *Vide Śāṁkarabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra*, I. 1. 18.
88. Cf., S. *Rādhākrishṇan, Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, p. 167—69.
89. *Vide Gītā*, II. 71.
90. *Ibid.*, XII. 12, and also care for XVIII. 62.
91. *Ibid.*, II. 72.
92. *Ibid.*, VI. 21; see also *Śrīdhara's* commentary thereon.
93. *Ibid.*, VI. 21 and 22.
94. *Ibid.*, VI. 27.
95. *Ibid.*, VI. 28.

to be *tāmasa,* i.e., of the most inferior grade."[96] It is, then, a matter requiring no proof or discussion that it is the *sāttvikasukha* which alone deserves to be called bliss as it is no other than the bliss of *Brahman* or *Ātman* (*brahmānanda* or *ātmānanda*).

In this way, we have proved that the *Gītā* also, like the *Upaniṣads,* identifies bliss with *Brahman* or *Ātman,* and rates it uniquely higher than all other kinds of pleasure and happiness. It is well worth mentioning here that though the *Gītā* rates spiritual happiness (*ānanda* or bliss) higher than material pleasure, it does not, however, undermine the value and significance of the latter.[97] The *Gītā* and the *Upaniṣads* are fully alive and awakened to give material pleasure its due. They recognise its value for the survival of the body. They do not, however, forget to add that since material pleasure or satisfaction of the bodily self has got extrinsic worth, it is desirable in so far as it conduces to the bliss of the soul.[98]

Before we close, we intend to take stock of our inquiry into *Saccidānanda. Saccidānanda,* as we have already said and proved, is the kernel of Indian philosophy, inasmuch as the quest of all Indian philosophers is the search for *Saccidānanda.* Moreover, it is many a hoary savant of the *Prasthānatrayī* who has fully succeeded, in his mission to live a life of *Saccidānanda* and give us a heart-felt first hand knowledge of what they realised in their states of *turīya* and *samādhi.* In *Prasthānatrayī, Brahman* is defined as *Sat* (Existence), *Cit* (Knowledge) and *Ānanda* (Bliss). The threefold nature of *Brahman* defined by the *Vedāntic* texts is essential to it, inasmuch as it forms its essence and serves to discriminate it from the *nāmarūpātamakaṁ jagat* (i.e., the world of name and form) which is unreal (*anṛta*), non-intelligent (*jaḍa*) and of the nature of suffering (*duḥkha*). "Being (*sat*), intelligence (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) are neither parts of *Brahman* nor its properties. The real is devoid of internal differentiation and external relations. Being, intelligence and bliss constitute the very nature of *Brahman,* and not its attri-

96. *Ibid.,* XVIII. 37—39.

97. *Vide Gītā-Rahasya,* Vol. 1, p. 62, and compare with W. M. Urban's treatment of '*Value as standard*' in his book entitled "*The Fundamentals of Ethics.*"

98. *Vide Kaṭhopaniṣad,* VI. 18, and *Gītā,* XVIII. 78.

butes."[99] Though they are inseparable from *Brahman,* they seem as if separable. To exemplify: As bliss, experience of objects, eternity, etc.—the inseparable essential qualities of the soul—seem to be separable by means of *antaḥkaraṇa* (the psychosis of the internal organ), so also is the case with *Saccidānanda.*[100] Saccidānanda, is verily *advaita* (unique).[101]

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99. *Vide,* T. M. P. Mahādevan, *"The Philosophy of Advaita,"* p. 111, Madras (1957).

100. *Vide, Bhāratītīrtha Vidyāraṇya, Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha,* p. 12, edited by *Rāmaśāstrī Tailangna,* Benaras.

101. *Vide* the interpretation of the word *'advaita'* in *Śaṁkara's Nirvāṇa-daśaka,* 10.

# ON THE INTERPRETATION OF A KĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARA KṚṢṆA

*By* Dr. V. Varadachari*

In his paper 'Pramāṇas and their Objects in Sāṁkhya,' the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Umesh Mishra offered a correct and convincing interpretation for the sixth Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. Besides helping us in understanding the purport of this Kārikā in the right spirit of the Sāṁkhya thought, his interpretation provides us with ample scope for a deeper study of the Kārikā.

The sixth Kārikā runs as follows :–

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रसिद्धिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात्सिद्धम् ॥

This Kārikā enumerates the scope for the operation of each of the three pramāṇas which were enumerated in the fourth Kārikā and defined in the fifth Kārikā.

According to most of the commentators,[2] this Kārikā declares that the objects which lie beyond the reach of the sense organs are proved to exist through the sāmānyatodṛṣṭa kind of inference and that those objects which are still beyond the scope of this kind of inference are proved through Āgama. The two kinds of inference namely Pūrvavat and Śeṣavat are confined, for their application, to matters that belong to the future, that is, those which have not come into being and to matters that belong to the past, having had existence already showing that they do not exist at the present time. Hence, the Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa kind is mentioned here as operative with reference to the objects Pradhāna and Puruṣa. Heaven, mokṣa, Indra and others, which are beyond the scope of this inference, are proved to exist through Āgama.

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1. *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXV, parts 1–4, 1961, pp. 406–413.

2. Gauḍapāda on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* 6; Jayamangalā, Sāṁkhyatattva-Kaumudī Māṭhara, Svaraṇasaptati on *ibid;* Vanśīdhara on *Sāṁkhyatattva Kaumudī*.

This interpretation requires some elucidation. The fifth Kārikā offers a definition of each of the three pramāṇas. While doing so, the inference is stated to be of three kinds but their names are not enumerated.[3] If the sixth Kārikā is to be taken to refer to the specific scope for the operation of the pramāṇas, the absence of the mention of perception and the two other kinds of inferences, together with the objects which they would apprehend will have to be accounted for. That they are too well-known not requiring any illustration would only help in attributing carelessness to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa who, with scrupulous care, dealt with the pramāṇas, their definitions and their scope in a particularly ordered manner. Therefore, this Kārikā must be shown to treat of all the pramāṇas with their scope.

At the outset, Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is found using the words siddhi,[4] prasiddhi,[5] and siddha[6] in the sense of proving or establishing. Final release is stated to be obtained through the correct cognition (vijñāna) of the manifest (vyakta), unmanifest (avyakta) and knower (jña), standing respectively for the evolutes of matter, matter and self. These are enumerated in Kārikā 3. Vijñāna is the correct knowing and it is held to be the same as proving that the object to be known correctly is existing (siddhi). The instruments of valid cognition are therefore essential and they are enumerated in the fourth Kārikā. The fifth Kārikā defines them. Logically speaking, the sixth Kārikā should treat of the objects of all the three pramāṇas. The words anumānāt and āptāgamāt are in the ablative case and are taken to stand for the two pramāṇas. The word sāmānyataḥ is taken together with the word dṛṣṭāt and treated as an adjective for the word anumānāt and the one justification that could be offered to this could be based on the absence of the word 'siddha' or 'prasiddha' disapproving the taking of the word dṛṣṭāt as meaning through perception.

As against this interpretation, it is found that the dropping of pratyakṣa and of the pūrvavat and Śeṣavat kinds of inference will have to be explained. Being part of the scheme of the prāmāṇas, they must have their scope explained. Strong reasons are available

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3. *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, 5.
4. *Ibid.*, 4.
5. Ibid., 6.
6. *Ibid.*, 6.

to take this Kārikā as explaining the scope of all the pramāṇas. The Sāṁkhya Kārikā uses the word dṛṣṭa[7] in the sense of perception. This word with the ablative case ending as dṛṣṭāt must be taken to mean through perception, as the words anumāna and āptavacana are. The word sāmānyataḥ an indeclinable formed with the suffix-tasil must not be considered as an adjective to the word dṛṣṭāt. The suffix-tasil is used to convey the sense of all cases and not merely that of the ablative.[8] Here it is proper to take the word sāmāyantaḥ in the sense of those which are of a general nature. The word dṛṣṭāt must mean through perception, which shall make known those which are of a general nature, that is, which are within the reach of the sense organs.[9] The five elements and their products alone must be taken to have been meant here. The particle 'tu' has several senses to convey of which the sense of restriction or emphasis is applicable here.[10] Hence the meaning of the first quarter of the Kārikā is that the establishment of those which are within the range of the senses alone is made out through perception.

Some of the objects which are perceivable to the senses may not be cognized at times through the senses.[11] There are also some objects like matter, intellect, ego, subtle elements and sense organs which lie beyond the range of senses. All these are cognized by inference. They may remain imperceptible for ever but could be inferred through the marks which are possessed by them. The marks may also take the shape of the effect of which those which have such marks might be the causes.[12] Hence all the three kinds of inferences will have to be admitted as applicable to infer these according to their nature.

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7. *Ibid.*, 4, 5, 6.

8. Vide itarābheyo 'pi dṛśyante. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5. 3. 14 and *Siddhānta Kaumudī* on it.

9. Vide—Nārāyaṇás Candrikā on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* 6.

10. Vide—tu syādbhede 'vadhāraṇe. Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana 3. 3. 242.

11. Vide—*Sāṁkhya Kārikā* 7.

12. Vide—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात् कार्यतस्तदनुपलब्धिः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिविरूपं सरूपं च ॥

*Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 8.

The self is admitted to be beyond the range of the senses. Naturally perception cannot be of any use in apprehending it. Since the self is not in any way related to matter, there cannot be any mark which could help the use of inferential method for cognising the self. Inference cannot be therefore applied to apprehend the self. In the systems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and others, the soul gets into the physical body and makes itself felt internally through some marks in the body or bodily changes.[13] The same may of course apply to the self also in the Sāṁkhya school, but the Sāṁkhya school does not admit of any real connectedness between the body and soul. It is possible to show that inference could be employed to know or prove this soul which is empirically in bondage.[14] However, to consider that the self is thus made out amounts to obtaining not the real knowledge (vijñāna) of the self. It is therefore just to consider that the soul is an entity in the Sāṁkhya system which is unrelated to matter and as such could not be known through perception or inference. Āgama then is the only pramāṇa to prove the self.

The 17th Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa declares that the soul exists since the aggregate objects exist only for another, there is in the self the reverse of the three attributes, they are controlled (by a sentient being), there must be some one (as a sentient) to enjoy them and there is activity towards getting release. This Kārikā is cited as illustrative of the inferential method getting employed to prove the self.[15] This however does not stand to reason on two grounds. Since the self is not in any way related to the matter, it is futile to argue that a sentient being must exist as not having the three guṇas, and as controller and enjoyer. Inference cannot therefore prove this. As regards the activity towards release, it must be made clear for whom this release is meant. The soul is ever released and never in bondage.[16] Secondly, the use of the words sanghātaparārthatvāt, adhiṣṭthanāt and others in this Kārikā with the ablative case ending must not be taken to mean that inference is the pramāṇa here. Any argument to prove a conclusion must take the form of inferential proposition but it does not prove that this conclusion is arrived at through inference.

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13. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* III. 2. 4. Nyāya Sūtra I. 1. 10.

14. *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, Vol. XXV, Parts 1–4. 1961 p. 412.

15. Gauḍapāda on *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* 17.

16. Vide—*Sāṁkhya Kārikā* 62.

The interpretation that is offered here to this Kārikā shows that both pramāṇavyavasthā and pramāṇasaṁplava should apply here.[17] The restricted employment of the three pramāṇas cannot apply to the vyakta, avyakta and jña of the Sāṁkhya reality and so pramāṇavyavasthā cannot fully apply. While vyakta is cognised by perception and inference, avyakta could be apprehended only by inference and the self is to be known only through Āgama. There is therefore pramāṇavyavasthā in the case of avyakta and self and pramāṇasamplava is applicable to vyakta alone.

17. Vide—Nyāya *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya Sūtra* I. 1. 3.

# NĪLAKAṆṬHA AS A MĪMĀṀSAKA

*By* Dr. S. G. Moghe*

In the domain of the application of Mīmaṁsā maxims and technical terms to the Dharm-Śāstra, Nīlakaṇṭha, who flourished between 1610 and 1645 A.D., occupies an honourable position.

Nīlakaṇṭha composed an encyclopaedia of religious and civil law, styled Bhagvanta-Bhāskara, in the honour of his patron, Bhagvantadeva, a Bundella chieftain of Sengara clan, that ruled at Bhareha near the confluence of Jumna and Chambal. In all, Nīlakaṇṭha composed 12 Mayūkhas. (1) Samaya Mayūkhas. (2) Saṁskāra mayūkhas. (3) Ācāra Mayūkha. (4) Śrāddha Mayūkha. (5) Nīti Mayūkha. (6) Vyavahāra Mayūkha. (7) Dāna Mayūkha. (8) Utsarga Mayūkha. (9) Pratiṣṭhā Mayūkha. (10) Śuddhi Mayūkha. (11) Prāyaścitta Mayūkha and (12) Śānti Mayūkha.

In all these 12 Mayūkhas, Nīlakaṇṭha has used 29 Mīmāṁsā and laukika maxims and about 52 Mīmāṁsā technical terms from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, in order to remove contradiction in the mutually apparent contradictory texts and arrived at a pointed definite conclusion thereon.

In this article, an attempt is being made to estimate Nīlakaṇṭha as a Mīmāṁsaka, from the following different points of view.

I. Nīlakaṇṭha expressly criticizes the view-points of his predecessors like Vijñāneśvara, Divodāsa, Raghunandana, Hemādri, Haradatta, the author of Dāyabhāga, Khaṇḍadeva, Bhavadeva and his own revered father Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa.

Our author Nīlakaṇṭha expressly criticizes Vijñāneśvara who holds that the prohibition as regards the giving of the son in adoption when the adopting person is not in distress, is a fit case of Puruṣārtha and not of Kratvartha. As opposed to this, Nīlakaṇṭha thinks that the giving of the son in adoption when the adopting person is

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not in distress, is a fit case of Kratvartha and if the rule of Manu is violated, then the adoption will become defective.[1]

Nīlakaṇṭha further expressly criticizes the opinion of the above mentioned Vijñāneśvara, when he says while commenting on the Manu-Smṛti IX.106, that the gift of the eldest son in adoption is prohibited by the text of Manu. Nīlakaṇṭha, however, disagrees with Vijñāneśvara and points out that this view is not supported by any written text.[2] Thirdly Nīlakaṇṭha expressly criticizes the view-point of Vijñāneśvara, when he says, while commenting on Yājña valkya-Smṛti I.53 that the marriage with a sickly girl is a fit case of Puruṣārtha. Nīlakaṇṭha disagrees with this view and states that this is a case of Kratvartha and if violating the rule of Yāj. I.53, the marriage takes place, then a man will suffer not only from the seen fruits but also from the unseen fruits.[3] Fourthly, while interpreting the text of Bṛhaspati, Vijñāneśvara lays down two injunctions i.e. Vidhis. (1) Reunion takes place when separated coparceners again begin to stay together and (2) that reunion can take place only between the cases of persons specified. Here Vijñāneśvara's opinion is not acceptable to our author Nīlakaṇṭha who holds that if the above mode of interpretation is adopted, then it would involve a serious fault of Vākyabheda. Nilkaṇṭha, very carefully avoids the fault of Vākyabheda stating that reunion takes place only among those members who were parties to the original partition and the reference to the father, son etc. is only illustrative.[4]

Nīlakaṇṭha expressly disagrees with the view point of Divodāsa and others, who, while interpreting the text of Prajāpati imagine the appearance and disappearance of impurity every day, when the Brahmacārī offers rice-balls in the honour of his dead father. Here

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1. अयं निषेधो दातुरेव पुरुषार्थो न क्रत्वर्थ इति विज्ञानेश्वरः। तन्न। व्यवहार-मयूख. p. 107.

2. ज्येष्ठेन जातमात्रेण पुत्री भवति मानवः इति ज्येष्ठस्यैव पुत्रकार्यकरणे मुख्यत्वात् स न देय इत्ययमपि निषेधो दातुरेव न प्रतिग्रहीतुरित्यपि सः। —व्यवहार-मयूख. p. 108.

3. यदपि विवाहप्रकरणे तेनैवोक्तं रोगिण्यपि निषेधातिक्रमे दृष्टविरोध एव भार्यात्व-तूत्पद्यते एवेति तदप्यनेनैवापास्तम्। व्यवहारमयूख. p. 108.

4. विभागकर्तृसामानाधिकरण्येनैव सेतियुक्तम्। पित्रादिपदानि तु विभागकर्तृमात्रो-पलक्षकानि। अन्यथा वाक्यभेदात्। व्यवहारमयूख. p. 146.

this involves the fault of Kalpanā-gaurava. Nīlakaṇṭha disagrees with Divodāsa and others and points out that the text of Prajāpati is to be interpreted in a way so as to be in agreement with the text of Brahmapurāṇa and in that case the impurity will last only for the first day and the fault of Kalpanā-gaurava can be avoided.[5]

Nīlakaṇṭha expressly criticizes the view point of Raghunandana who holds that clarified butter, boiled rice and fuel sticks are to be offered together to the deities like the offering of the mixture of curds and milk to the deities Indra or Mahendra. Nīlakaṇṭha clearly points out that this is not a case of Tantratā because the three different modes are adopted for offering clarified butter, boiled rice and fuel sticks. Sṛca is the proper means of offering caru. Ājya is offered with sṛva and sacrificial sticks are offered with the hand.[6]

Our author disagrees with Hemādri while interpreting the text of Gobhila in connection with Sapiṇḍadānam. Here Hemādri makes the anuṣaṅga (syntactical connection) of the word pūrṇa which precedes the word saṁvat with ṣaṇmāse and tripakṣe. But Nīlakaṇṭha holds that this type of syntactical connection is not warranted by any evidence or by any authoritative text.[7]

Nīlakaṇṭha refutes the opinion of Haradatta who holds that ordinarily though the performance of the five great sacrifices is prohibited as a result of the dead person, yet they are to be performed because of the sūtra of Āśvalāyana that "tān etān yajñān aharahaḥ kurvīta." Haradatta treats this as a fit case of Pratiprasava. But our author does not agree with Haradatta and holds that none of the five great sacrifices are to be performed during impurity, relying on the text of Devala. According to Nīlakaṇṭha, the text

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5. दिवोदासादयस्तु आद्यदिने पूर्णमाशौचं सन्ध्यादि कर्मलोपश्च, द्वितीयादि दिनेषु पिण्डदानादिकाल एवाशौचम्, न तु ततः पूर्वोत्तरकालयोरित्याहुः । तन्न······प्रत्यह-मनेकाशौचोत्पत्तिनाशकल्पना गौरवाच्च। शुद्धिमयूख. p. 45.
6. आज्यहविः समिधां संप्रतिपन्नदेवताकत्वान्मिलितानामेव होमः सान्नाय्ययोरिवेति दिव्यतत्त्वे गौडमीमांसकाः । तन्न । व्यवहारमयूख. P. p. 54.
7. अत्र हेमाद्रिणा पूर्णे संवत्सरे षण्मासे त्रिपक्षे वा गोभिलवाक्ये पूर्णपदं षण्मासादिष्व-न्वेतीत्युक्तम्, तदनुषङ्गे प्रमाणाभावादुपेक्ष्यम् । श्राद्धमयूख. p. 140.

of Āśvalāyana simply shows that the sacrifices are compulsory and not optional.[8]

Nīlakaṇṭha disagrees with the author of Dāyabhāga in the course of his discussion on the text of Yājñavalkya II. 114. According to the view point of Dāyabhāga the text of Yājñavalkya lays down two injunctions. (1) The father should divide his self-acquired wealth. (2) The father should divide his wealth as per his wish. Nīlakaṇṭha thinks that this involves a serious fault of Vākyabheda. He simply suggests that the first line simply indicates or conveys optional Vikalpa based on the sweet will and the second line is the elaboration of it.[9]

Our author criticizes the view point of Khaṇḍadeva that Garbhadāsa can be given away in the Viśvajit sacrifice. Our author, however, disagrees with Khaṇḍadeva and holds that as a man has not got any ownership over the dāsī kept by him, consequently it follows that he has not got any ownership over the children born of that dāsī. In conclusion, Nīlakaṇṭha holds that Garbhadāsa cannot be given away in the Viśvajit sacrifice.[10]

Our author also refutes the view point of Bhavadeva and Śūlapāṇi who hold that in the case of Atideśa complete expiation should be prescribed. Bhavadeva further holds that the equal mention is merely glorificatory and it does not indicate any deduction in the expiation. Our author does not agree with this view and points out that in the case of Atideśa some lesser expiation is to be understood. For this purpose, he relies on the view point of Vijñāneśvara and the text of Manu. Our author further points out that just as in the sentence " राज्ञा समो मन्त्री । " though minister is regarded as equal to a king, yet the word, सम shows some deterioration or degradation in level between the two, in the similar manner the

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8. यत्तु हरदत्तः—सूतकमध्येऽपि ब्रह्मयज्ञाभिश्चत्वारो न त्याज्याः "तानेतान्यज्ञानहरहः कुर्वीत इति सूत्रात्.........। तन्न । आचारमयूख. p. 70.

9. ऐच्छिकविभाग एव विवृत उत्तरार्धेन । इच्छायाः संभवति उक्तपक्षद्वयालम्बनत्वे स्वातन्त्र्ययोगात् । वाक्यभेदापत्तेः । व्यवहारमयूख. p. 97.

10. यत्तु षष्ठे गर्भदासदानमुक्तम् (पूर्वमीमांसा vi. 7.6) तत् चिन्त्यम् । तन्मातरि मुख्यदानप्रतिग्रहक्रयविक्रयाद्यभावेन स्वत्वाभावे तदुत्पन्ने गर्भदासे सुतरां तदयोगादित्यस्त्वप्रासङ्गिकम् । व्यवहारमयूख. p. 93.

equal mention indicates the lesser expiation in the case of Atideśa. Thus, our author has refuted the view point of Bhavadeva and Śūlapāṇi.[11]

Nīlakaṇṭha goes to the extent of criticizing the view-point of his revered father Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa who holds that the scope of the verse "mṛte ahani etc. of Śloka Gautama is curtailed by the verse "Aputrāstu yadā" etc. which refers to the yearly śrāddha. Nīlakaṇṭha says that the scope of the verse "mṛte ahani" etc. cannot be curtailed by the verse "aputrāstuyadā" etc. because both are written by Śloka-Gautama. Moreover, the scope of both these verses is quite different.[12]

II. Sometimes, after citing the two divergent opinions in the matter under discussion, Nīlakaṇṭha passes over the point in silence. The following may be cited as the instances of this type.

In the course of his discussion on the topic of the expiation to be performed by a man in the case of his eating impure things of his body, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes a verse from the Manu-Smṛti V. 134 which states that second thread ceremony is necessary. Now the important question is whether this is an independent expiation or whether it is to be combined with the other expiation. Here Nīlakaṇṭha cites the two divergent opinions of Śūlapāṇi and others. Śūlapāṇi holds that the second thread ceremony is to be combined with the other expiations. While others hold that this is an independent expiation. Here Nīlakaṇṭha does not express his judgment on this point.[13]

While discussing the topic of punarupanayanam, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes a verse from the Parāśara Smṛti which lays down that in the case of the second thread ceremony, the deer-skin, Mekhalā, staff,

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11. यच्च भवदेनः–साम्योक्तिरर्थवादः—अन्यथाब्रह्महत्या सुरापानसमे मिथ्योत्कर्षोक्ति वेदनिन्दादिष्वपि द्वादशाब्दं स्यात्........तदपि न । प्रायश्चित्तमयूख. p. 16.

12. मम तु प्रतिभाति—कालादर्शदावनयोर्द्वयोरपि वाक्ययोः श्लोकगौतमीयतया लिखनान्नोपसंहारो युक्तः सामान्यवचनानर्थक्यापत्तेः। श्राद्धमयूख. p. 28.

13. पुनःसंस्कारः पुनरुपनयनम् । इदं च प्रातिस्विकैः शारीरमलभक्षणप्रायश्चित्तैः समुच्चीयत इति शूलपाणिः । स्वतन्त्रमेव प्रायश्चित्तमित्यन्ये। प्रायश्चित्तमयूख. p. 114.

collecting alms etc. do not take place again. While commenting on this point, Nīlakaṇṭha cites the opinion of some writers on Dharma-Śāstra who hold that when there is a second thread ceremony, there should be followed the whole details of the first thread ceremony. Again Nīlakaṇṭha passes over this point in silence. Dr. Kane says that in such cases, perhaps he agrees with the last view quoted.[14]

In the course of his discussion about the things to be avoided in the Kali age, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes a verse from the text of Devala which states that so long as the division of the castes is maintained, and so long as the study of the Veda is continued, a man should resort to asceticism in the Kali age. Nīlakaṇṭha further cites a verse from the text of Vyāsa which lays down that after the lapse of 4,400 years of the Kali age, one must not resort to asceticism. In this connection, Nīlakaṇṭha cites the two diametrically opposite views. Some hold that the scope of the general text of Devala is curtailed by the particular text of Vyāsa. While others held that this is a case of Vyavasthita Vikalpa. Nīlakaṇṭha does not express his opinion in this matter but simply says that these passages are not to be found in the great works.[15]

III. Though, Nīlakaṇṭha criticizes the peculiar views of his predecessors in one context, yet he is good enough to accept the view points of his predecessors in the other context. In this connection, two instances can be cited.

While discussing the prohibition of some things on the particular days of the fortnight, Nīlakaṇṭha cites a verse from the Vāmana Purāṇa which states that Abhyaṅga snāna is prohibited on the nandā tithī which comes on the 1st, 6th and 11th days of each fortnight. Nīlakaṇṭhas further cites the texts of Vyāsa and Gārgī to show that abhyaṅga snāna is prohibited on the ṣaṣṭhī, aṣṭamī, caturdaśī and amāvāsyā days of both the fortnights. When the abhyaṅga snāna was already prohibited by the text of Vāmana Purāṇa, then what is

14. पराशर——श्राडीनं मेखला दण्डो भैक्षचर्यां व्रतानि च । निवर्तन्ते द्विजातीनां पुनः संस्कारकर्मणि । अन्ये तु पुनः संस्कारो विधीयते तत्रापि इयमेवेतिकर्तव्यतेति । संस्कारमयूख. p. 39

15. यद्यपि संन्यासस्य चतुश्चत्वारिंशत्········। त्रिदण्डैकदण्डाभिप्रायेण व्यवस्था इत्यपरे । सामान्यतो निषिद्धस्य व्यासवाक्येनोपसंहार इत्यन्ये । समयमयूख. p. 187.

the purpose-of repeating the same by citing the texts of Vyāsa and Gārgī. Our author, in this connection, cites the view point of his revered father that the remention ( पुनर्वचन ) of the prohibition is for the purpose of showing or indicating additional fault or sin.[16]

In the course of his discussion of the topic of temporary or casual non-study of the Veda, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes a verse from the Manu-Smṛti that states that when there is lightning, thundering of the clouds, and the possibility of rain and ulkas i.e. a fiery phenomenon in the sky, there should be considered the casual non-study of the Vedas. While commenting on this verse, Nīlakaṇṭha states that there is temporary non-study provided there is a proximity (sāhitya) of all these things mentioned. For this purpose, he relies on the statement of Medhātithi who says that sāhitya is to be understood because of the mention of lightning etc. in the Dvandva compound.[17]

IV. After citing the two divergent opinions or meanings of the word, Nīlakaṇṭha states which meaning or opinion is acceptable to him and gives reasons for his view. In this connection, it will be proper to cite an illustration.

Whle discussing the topic of adoption, Nīlakaṇṭha cites a verse from the Manu-Smṛti IX. 168, in which the word sadṛśam occurs. Here Nīlakaṇṭha quotes the opinions of Kullūka-bhaṭṭa and Medhātithi who held the word—sadṛśam in two different senses. Medhātithi understands the word sadṛśam in the sense of "equal by family qualities and not by caste." But Kullūka-bhaṭṭa understands it in the sense of "equal by caste." Nīlakaṇṭha sides with Kullūkabhaṭṭa, supporting his view on the text of the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti II. 133 which states that this vidhi is laid down by me for the sons belonging to the same caste. Thus, relying on the text of the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti II. 133, Nīlakaṇta sides with Kullūkabhaṭṭa.[18]

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16. अत्र नन्दादिनिषेधादेव षष्ठीनिषेधे सिद्धे पुनस्तद्ग्रहणं दोषाधिक्यार्थमिति द्वैतनिर्णये तातचरणाः । समयमयूख. p. 178.

17. द्वंद्वनिर्देशादिति मेधातिथिः । संस्कारमयूख. p. 57.

18. सदृशं कुलगुणादिभिर्न जात्या । अतः क्षत्रियादिरपि विप्रादेः दत्तको भवतीति मेधातिथिः । सदृशं जात्येति कुल्लूकभट्टः । युक्तं चेदम् । याज्ञवल्क्येन...... II. 133 सजातीयेष्वयं प्रोक्तस्तनयेषु मया विधिः । इति उपसंहारात् । व्यवहारमयूख. p. 108.

V. Sometimes, in the course of his discussions, Nīlakaṇṭha refers to the view points of some authors on the Dharma-Śāstra by using the expression "इति एके" or इति अन्ये. The two instances of this point may be cited.

While discussing the topic of the expiation to be performed by the women leading immoral life, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes a verse from the Manu-Smṛti XI. 176 and says that whatever is the expiation laid down for men approaching the women of other castes, the same is to be extended to the case of women leading immoral life. According to some writers on the Dharma-Śāstra, even though this is a fit case of Vācanika—Atideśa, yet the expiation which a woman is required to perform should be less by one quarter of the expiation a man is required to observe. Here Nīlakaṇṭha does not state the name of the person whom he is referring to.[19]

(2) In the course of his discussion of the things to be avoided in the Kali age, Nīlakaṇṭha, in the first place, cites the text of Devala. And later on cites the text of Vyāsa which lays down that a man should not resort to asceticism after the lapse of 4,400 years of the Kali age. In this connection, Nīlakaṇṭha cites the opinion of some writers on Dharma-Śāstra that the general text of Devala is curtailed by the particular text of Vyāsa. Here we fail to understand whose opinion our author is referring to.[20] Possibly Nīlakaṇṭha might not have thought it proper to mention the name of the person whom he is referring to, as he is not very important in the field.

VI. At times, Nīlakaṇṭha resorts to an option either on the ground of the sweet will of the performer or on the ground of the manners and customs prevalent in the particular region, or on account of the availability of the equally authoritative texts. Nīlakaṇṭha very carefully resorts to an option when the two texts are equally powerful or authoritative. In this connection, the instances are many but to avoid prolixity, I may cite here only one instance.

In the course of his discussion on the topic of the piṇḍadāna sthāna kalpanā, Nīlakaṇṭha quotes verses from the text of Devala

19. एतच्च वाचनिकातिदेशात्पादोनमिति केचित् । पूर्णमेव तु युक्तम् । प्रायश्चित्तमयूख p. 165.

20. सामान्यतो निषिद्धस्य व्यासवाक्येनोपसंहार इत्यन्ये । समयमयूख. p. 187.

to show that after the spreading of the Kuśa grass is over, the Yajamāna should sprinkle water on the grass at the śrāddha ceremony. In this connection, Nīlakaṇṭha cites the two views. According to Sumantu, the water must be sprinkled after the spreading of the grass is over.. While Kātyāyana says that the sprinkling of the water must be done before the actual spreading of the Kuśa grass. Here on account of the availability of the two equally authoritative texts, Nīlakaṇṭha suggests Vyavasthita Vikalpa as per the family tradition or custom of the Yajamāna.[21]

VII. Like Vijñāneśvara, Nīlakaṇṭha also goes to the root of the Subject of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and makes his own comments on the particular technical terms of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. He throws light on the term Tantratā in the course of his discussion in the Prāyaścitta Mayūkha.[22] At times, our author quotes the sūtras of Jaiminī verbatim in his works.[23] Sometimes, Nīlakaṇṭha does not quote the Mīmāṁsā sūtras exactly in the same words in which they are to be found in the work of Jaiminī.[24] At times, however, he is content with referring to the principles of the maxims or the commentary of other writers on Jaiminī's Sūtras, and offers his own comments.[25]

VIII. Nīlakaṇṭha seems to be very cautious and careful in giving the illustrations of the sub-divisions of the technical terms Atideśa and Artha-Vāda.[26] But there are some cases where instead

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21. कात्यायनेन तु बर्हिस्तरणात्पूर्वमनेजनमुक्तम् । अनयोर्विकल्पो यथाशाखं व्यवस्था वा । श्राद्धमयूख. p. 96.

22. तत्रानेकनिमित्तेषु प्राजापत्यादीनां सजातीयानां प्रायश्चित्तानांदेशकालकर्त्रैक्ये तन्त्रम् । प्रायश्चित्तमयूख. p. 13.

23. Cf:—फलवत् संनिधौ अफलं तदङ्गम् । in the Śrāddha Mayūkha Page No. 5 with Jaiminī's sūtra IV. 16—37.

24. Cf.—संख्यामुक्तेषु समुच्चयः स्यात् can be compared with संख्याविहितेष समुच्चयोऽसंनिपातित्वात् । Jaiminī XII. iii. 3.

25. यत्तु षष्ठे गर्भदासदानमुक्तं (पूर्वमीमांसा VI 7. 6) तच्चिन्त्यम् ।………… व्यवहारमयूख. p. 93.

26. (१) इति विशिष्टायां गवि इति ब्रह्महत्याव्रतमतिदिष्टम् । प्रायश्चित्तमयूख. P. 82. This is an example of ताद्रूप्य अतिदेश ।

(२) एतच्च वाचनिकातिदेशात्पादोनमिति केचित् । पूर्णमेव तु युक्तम् । प्रायश्चित्त मयूख. p. 165. This is an instance of वाचनिक अतिदेश ।

of stating explicitely whether this is a case of śrautī parisaṁkhyā or Lākṣaṇikī Parisaṁkhyā he leaves the decision to the readers.[27]

IX. Compared with his father Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa, Nīlakaṇṭha does not appear to be a very profound Mīmāṁsaka. His revered father has introduced in his Mīmāṁsā-Bāla-Prakāśa, the further sub-divisions of Ūha, pratipattikarma, Bādha etc. But it is interesting to note here that in all the Mayūkhas of Nīlakaṇṭha we do not get the examples of these sub-divisions of the technical terms, with possibly the exception of the varieties of Atideśa.

X. As compared with Vijñāneśvara, it appears that in the employment of the Mīmāṁsā doctrines to the Dharma-Śāstra, Nīlakaṇṭha has made abundant use of the principles of Mīmāṁsā. Dr. P. S. Sane has already pointed out in his Thesis that Vijñāneśvara has used two laukika or popular maxims such as Takrakauṇḍinya nyāya and Brāhmaṇaparivrājika nyāya and seven Mīmāṁsā maxims such as (1) Jāteṣṭi nyāya. (2) Sarvaśeṣa nyāya. (3) Śākhātantara nyāya. (4) Niṣādasthapati nyāya. (5) Rātrisatra nyāya. (6) Śāstraphalam prayoktari nyāya and (8) Dvayoḥ praṇayanti nyāya. As opposed to this, Nīlakaṇṭha has used about 29 Maxims both Mīmāṁsā and popular. Out of 29, 8 maxims are popular. e.g. (1) Dehalī dīpaka. (2) Daṇḍā Pūpīkā nyāya. (3) Kākākṣigolaka nyāya. (4) Āgantunamante niveśaḥ nyāya. (5) Avirodhāt Sāmānyāt itareṣu tathātvam. (6) Gobalīvarda nyāya. (7) Kaimutika nyāya and (8) Nāgṛhīta viśeṣaṇa nyāya. While Nīlakaṇṭha has used 21 Mīmāṁsā maxims such as (1) Phalavat sannidhau aphalam tadaṅgam. (2) Anuṣaṅga nyāya. (3) Pūṣaprapiṣṭatā nyāya. (4) Niṣādasthapati nyāya. (5) Vṛttidvaya-virodha nyāya. (6) Viśaye ca prāyadarśanāt. (7) Sādhūneva prayunjita. (8) Saṁkhyāyukteṣu samuccayaḥ syāt. ((9) Sandigdheṣu ca vākyaśeṣāt. (10) Sarvaśākhāpratyayamekaṁ karma nyāya. (11) Sāmānya vidhiḥ aspaṣtaḥ saṁhriyeta viśeṣataḥ nyāya. (12) Pratipradhānam guṇāvṛttiḥ. ('3) prathamatyāge kāraṇābhāvāt. (14) Nimittagatam viśeṣaṇam avivakṣitam. (15) Na tau paśau karoti. (16) Tatprakhya nyāya. (17) Jāteṣṭi Nyāya. (18) Ekasya tu ubhayatve saṁyogapṛ-

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27. (१) तदाराणां पुष्पवत्वे निमित्ते :……मृततिथिरूपकालविध्यर्थंम् । श्राद्धमयूख. p. 28. This is a case of श्रौती परिसंख्या.
(२) तदपि अ्रनापदि अ्रामहेमपरिसंख्यार्थम् । श्राद्धमयूख. p. 29. This also is a case of श्रौती परिसंख्या ।

thaktvam. (19) Kapiñjala Nyāya. (20) Ange phalaśṛtiḥ athavādaḥ and (21) Uddeśyagatam Viśeṣaṇam avivakṣitam nyāya.

Even though it is true from the above list that some of the maxims are common to both Nīlakaṇṭha and Vijñāneśvara yet there are some maxims which are used only by Nīlakaṇṭha. The reason for this can be seen in the bulk of the works of Nīlakaṇṭha. Vijñāneśvara has used about 80 Mīmāṁsā technical terms in the course of his discussion. But Nīlakaṇṭha has used about 52 Mīmāṁsā technical terms in all his Mayūkhas. Here one is tempted to say that the principle and the application of the maxim of Dvayoḥ praṇayanti used by Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti II. 135-136 is so difficult that the like of this is not to be met with in all the 12 Mayūkhas of Nīlakaṇṭha. Moreover, in the application of the Mīmāṁsā technical terms and in making the distinction between the terms Vijñāneśvara is more sharp, acute and deep-rooted as compared with Nīlakaṇṭha.

XI. *Nīlakaṇṭha's contribution to the field of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and his peculiar views*:—

(1) The readers of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā generally come across the use of the Mīmāṁsā maxim "Uddeśyagatam viśeṣaṇam avivakṣitam." But the converse of this maxim i.e. Vidheyatam viśeṣaṇam vivakṣitam" is to be found in the Śuddhi Mayūha.[28]

(2) Nīlakaṇṭha's introduction of the three varieties of Atideśa and his successful attempt to refute the view-point of Śūlapāṇi and Bhavadeva in connection with this topic is really original and deserves praise from the scholars. This is evident from his discussion in the Prāyaścitta Mayūkha.[29]

(3) Even though it is absolutely necessary that for Tantratā, the sameness of agents, place and time is required, yet Nīlakaṇṭha very explicitely mentions in the Vyavahāra Mayūkha that in the absence of the sameness of Agents, Tantratā is possible. It is significant to note that this view of Nīlakaṇṭha is supported by the text of Nārada.[30]

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28. अत्र विशेषणद्वयमपि विवक्षितम्, विधेयकर्तृगतत्वात् शुद्धिमयूख. p. 48.

29. अत्र साम्यातिदेशेऽर्द्धं, ताद्रूप्यवाचनिकयोस्तु पादोनम् । प्रायश्चित्तमयूख: p. 14.

30. अत्र देशकालकर्त्रादीनामैक्ये कर्मणोनेकप्रयोगविषयिणी न्यायेन प्राप्तापि तन्त्रता-विभक्तकर्तृभेदेऽपि वचनेन बोध्यते । व्यवहारमयूख. p. 133.

(4) At time Nīlakaṇṭha throws light on some of the Mīmāṁsā technical terms like Prasaṅga and Tantratā in the course of his discussion. This is also very happy.[31]

(5) Nīlakaṇṭha's explanation of the term "Bhāvya" in the sense of " भाःयोपयोगी " i.e. useful in near future in the course of his discussion in the Vyavahāra Mayūkha is also very happy and worth appreciating.

(6) Nīlakaṇṭha's peculiar views on the sūtras of Jaiminī in connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice are clear in his discussion in the Vyavahāra Mayūkha.

*Conclusion* :

From the above discussion, it is quite evident that Nīlakaṇṭha not only criticizes the peculiar views of his predecessors in one context, but at times in other context, accepts their views also. His criticism is generally impartial and free from any bias as befitting the scholar. He is not a blind follower of the views of anybody. He makes abundant use of the Mīmāṁsā technical terms and maxims in the course of his discussion. His revered father Śaṅkarabhaṭṭa appears to be a thorough and profound Mīmāṁsaka as compared with Nīlakaṇṭha, and our author does not stand in comparison with him. Sometimes, however, Nīlakaṇṭha passes over some important points in silence, where the readers are curious to know the considered opinion or judgment of our author. Nīlakaṇṭha seems to lack in precision in writing his works since, at times he does not mention the name of the persons whose views are referred to by him. Perhaps these persons may be negligible according to our author. Or it is quite likely that the views of those persons might be so famous that the readers could have understood references to them without mentioning their names. At times, Nīlakaṇṭha, after citing the two divergent opinions on the matter under consideration, states the opinion acceptab'e to him and also at the same time cares to give reason for his view. Compared with Vijñāneśvara, it can be said with reasonable certainty that Nīlakaṇṭha is also a great scholar of Pūrva-Mīmāṁā. It is true that he has used less number of Mīmāṁsā technical terms as compared with Vijñāneśvara. Both of them are really the masters in the field. Over and above, it is evident that

31. तत्र विशेषग्रहणे सकृदनुष्ठानं प्रसङ्गः । प्रायश्चित्तमयूख. p. 13.

Nīlakaṇṭha's contribution to the field of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and his peculiar views on some of the topics connected with Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā cannot be easily ignored by a careful and cautious reader of his Mayūkhas. In his discussions, he goes to the root of the subject and impresses the readers by his impartial judgment and his ardent desire to find out the truth. Any way, we do not meet with any hair-splitting discussion as we meet with in the scholarly commentary of Vijñāneśvara on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti. In any case, the appreciable position of Nīlakaṇṭha, in the application of the Mīmāṁsā doctrines to the Dharma-Śāstra, can hardly be gainsaid by any one.

# ŚRI VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA (1268 A.D.–1368 A.D.)

*By* Prof. K. C. Varadachari*

## I

It is seven hundred years since one of the most illustrious teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita was born in the year 1268 A.D. In one sense, he was so towering a personality in every sense of that term, that after him hardly any one equalled him in any one of those qualities that make one unique and a vibhūti of God. In his case in his own life-time he was known as the incarnation of the Bell of God (ghaṇṭāvatāra). It appears that his ringing voice was almost like a temple bell calling devotees to prayer and worship. It may be that it also drove away the forces of evil at the approach of the beneficent deity. It is said that his mother dreamt that the temple bell of Veṅkateśwara or Veṅkaṭam came into her womb one night when she was on the Veṅkaṭa Hill and soon after Veṅkaṭanātha was born, and was given the name of Veṅkaṭanātha. In any case it was well-known even in his own lifetime by a section of the people that he was a divine personality, who came to establish firmly the Vedānta (nigamānta) tenets according to Śrī Rāmānuja-Yāmuna School, known as Viśiṣṭādvaita. He was a profound scholar who systematized all the views of his predecessors and fixed the boundaries of the system so that no one could tamper with its basic tenets. For this purpose he had to write, important works like the *Nyāya siddhāñjana, Nyāya pariśuddhi, Tattva-muktākalāpa* with its commentary Sarvārthasiddhi, Adhikaraṇasārāvali, Tātparyacandrikā on the Gītā, Tattvatīkā on the Śrībhāṣya, and his Maṇipravāla works Rahasyatrayasāra and Paramatabhaṅga. His own works in poetry were *Yādavābhyudaya, Haṁsasandeśa, Saṅkalpasūryodaya, Pādukāsahasra* and a score of stotras or praises on the different deities.[1] The first made him known as Tārkikasiṁha, whereas the second group made him known as Kavi-siṁha. Combined with each other Śri Veṅkaṭanātha was known as Kavi-tārkika-siṁha. As he was well-versed in all the different branches of knowledge he was known as Sarva-tantra-svatantra.

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1. Bibliography of Sri Vedānta Deśika's Works: Madras Law Journal Press, 1928.

His mastery of the Sanskṛt and Tamil languages was acknowledged as of a very complete scholarship. In the special language of maṇipravāla he was equally proficient. There is at least one poem which he wrote in prākṛt. His erudition in matters of spiritual concern must be deemed to be remarkable in his time. He was prodigy. His debating skill was also never excelled in his time. His *Śataūṣaṇi* is a well known work of refutation of Advaita doctrine of the Māyāvāda Buddhist affiliation.

A critical estimate of his works has yet to come out, for many of his works have to have competent *editions*.

In this article I shall try to present what I deem to be very important contributions of Veṅkaṭanātha to spiritual thought. His versatility apart it is rather a question why he did not write commentaries on all Upaniṣads or on the whole range of works on the Tamil hymns of the Āḻvārs. Philosophically, Śrī Rāmānuja's system is based on the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā* and the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. It is also known that it is based on the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*. The mystical experiences of the Āḻvārs contained in the Divine literature (divya prabandham) helped the religious experience of the Divine Personality and were seen to be reflecting the Vidyās or upāsanas of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta Sūtra (Śārīraka Sūtras).[2] The most important discovery was that the cardinal principle of Viśiṣṭādvaita has to be considered to be Śarīra-śarīrī saṁbandha-body-soul relationship between God and the soul, and God and Nature. This saṁbandha was known to be unbreakable (*aprathak siddha*). It persists under all conditions—prior to creation or manifestation or during manifestation and after dissolution. The soul and Nature are not qualities nor just attributes as usually considered by the logicians, for they are entities which have a peculiar dependence on the Godhead even as the body has on the soul. This makes the saṁbandha aprathak-siddha, which is a descriptive term, and not mere samavāya (inherent relationship) as between a substance and its guṇas. Nor is it just an adjective which is just a quality. It is what it claims to be a serious substantial relationship and its nearest analogy is to that of the body-soul (śarīra-śarīrī-bhāva). Undoubtedly the concept of the śarīra has demanded a critical appreciation and rejection of the mechanistic and materialistic view and the statement

2. Viśiṣṭādvaita is also known as *Ubhaya-Vedānta,* because of this twofoldness.

of the conditions which make for a soul being a body of Brahman, even as Nature is shown to be the body of God. The definition does not suffer from the defects of definitions when one delves into the actual experience of one being a body and one being a soul—a contingency that the human being has. Spiritual experience is the ultimate authority for spiritual truth or reality. Even scripture has to abide by the deliverances of the spiritual experiences. It is the only corrective to misinterpretations and superficial interpretations of the scriptures themselves, which are a matter for words, contexts and intentions and uses. Even if all these had a real contradiction from spiritual experiences it would demand a careful scrutiny of the earlier interpretations. Such having been the case the great Rāmānuja utilised the spiritual experiences of the Āḷvārs and of himself presumably to make Viśiṣṭādvaita not a mere logical debate but a spiritual meditation, Upāsana.

Śri Veṅkaṭanātha wrote only one upaniṣad commentary—and that was on the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*.[3] He wrote only one commentary on the Hymns of the Āḷvārs—and that on the ten verses of Tiruppan Āḷvār.[4] The first he holds which is the shortest Upaniṣad having 18 mantras, consists of all that is necessary to give a full account of the nature of Brahman, (*tattva*), the means to attain Him (*hita*) and the goal to be gained with His help and grace (the *puruṣārtha*). He also holds that this one Upaniṣad when understood properly will also refute all other systems of thought and speculation. No bare Absolute is being taught in this Upaniṣad, but a fully competent Godhead as the common man looks for:

Sarveśānaḥ sahajamahimā sarvabhūtāntarātmā
Sarvān doṣān svayam atipatan sarvavidyaikavedyaḥ /
Karmādhyakṣaḥ kaluṣaśamanaḥ ko'pi muktopabhogyaḥ
siddhopāyaḥ sphurati puruṣo Vājinām saṁhitānte //

Abhedam bhoktṛṇām atha ca bhavinām eva paratām
Tathā bhedābhedam jinasugata nītim ca jagati

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3. Īśāvāsyopaniṣad-bhāṣya of Veṅkaṭanātha. ed & trans by Dr. K. C. Varadachari and D. T. Tatachari 1942 and 1956. Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute. Tirupati. Īśāvāsyopaniṣad—Festchrift Kane 1941.

4. Āḷvārs of South India: K. C. Varadachari. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, pp. 105 ff.

cf. Journal of the Sri Venktesvara Oriental Institute. Vol. VII. 1946. pp. 1–8.

asaṁpādyam muktim bhavabhayamalām ca pathata-
masavisetyadirna katham anuvākaṃ pratibhaṭaḥ //
(last verse of the Īśā. Com.)

*Trans*: "The transcendent Person, Lord of All, of innate greatness, the Inner Self of all beings, Himself eternally transcending all faults, the One object of all sciences (vidyās), the presiding one of all action, the extinguisher of sins, Enjoyable by all the liberated, the Ready means (to mokṣa), shines at the end of the Saṁhitā of the Vājins. (Īśā. com. 2)

"How is this anuvāka beginning with the Īśā not opposed to those who hold in this world that there is identity between all enjoyers, that bond souls are the Supreme, that there is identity and difference, who accept the philosophy of the Jains and Buddhists, that liberation is not something that is to be attained, since all are ever-free and that fear of bondage is illusion."

His commentary on the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* reveals his critical appreciation of the basic emphasis that is made in the work about the critical synthesis of the threefold attitudes of karma, jñāna and bhakti yogas, each one of them depending on the others—real karmayoga is not possible without jñāna and both of them culminate in devotional aproach. It should perhaps be emphasized that they lead to śaraṇāgati or prapatti than bhakti, as Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha shows that the mantras 15 to 18 really are prayer to the supreme Being to remove the lid of rajas (egoism) that covers the face of Truth. Prayer is always a variety of prapatti or śaraṇāgati (self-surrender) undertaken in extremity of one's own impotence and helplessness, whereas praise may be the basic notion of most kinds of bhakti. One has to distinguish between prayer and praise, the former is invaluable in Yoga or upāsana, whereas praise is just an acknowledgement of the saviour's greatness. When it follows fulfilment of one's wishes then it is real, but if it precedes it may turn out to be just flaterry.

The last most famous mantra: *Agne naya supathā rāye asmān viśvāni* deva vayunāni vidvān....' that is found in all the Vedas is the classical mantra of surrender: *bhūiṣṭām te nama uktim vidhema.* Śrī Veṅkaṭanātha reveals that this is the real essence of sāttvikatyāga of the ego and this is achieved by the *Ahaṁgrahopāsana*—the process by which the Divine is made to assume 'I-ness' of the individual soul—as explained by him under the mantra 16—'So'ham asmi'. This is the supreme attainment for the individual soul—to

regain God as the indwelling self or aham of oneself. Though God is always present in oneself but most people feel God if at all as a superior witness within but not as the living self. This descent or avatār of the Supreme within oneself as the Aham (I) is a spiritual experience as revealed by the Pañcarātra āgama concept of the antaryāmi or hārda-avatāra or avatāra who incarnates in the heart of the Yogi in his spiritual dhyāna (meditation: yogi hṛd dhyāna gaṁyam.

While it is clear that realisation would have no meaning if the soul was always free—a point which Sri Veṅkaṭanātha has mentioned in the verse mentioned above, it is equally true that if God was in absolute possession of the soul always there is no need to seek His presence in oneself to be the Aham or Self of oneself. This reveals that spiritual experience and philosophical logic are in a sense opposed to one another. An *ought to be* cannot be converted simply into an *is*. This would be a valuable distinction between spirituality which is a process of realisation and a philosophy which seeks to affirm implications causal or effectual as actual. Ideal implications are ideal, they have to be realised or made actual or real. In this sense it is that the Mīmāṁsā rule affirms that every vākya of the Veda is either a vidhi or a niṣedha and this means that it is not a mere affirmation but an imperative, positive or negative. The spiritual obligation like a moral or ethical obligation is a dharma, an imperative or command. Because of the sadyaḥ phala or immediate effectivity of the action done according to the Vedic command, as it was made to stand for a future result *as if* it is already attained. Time lag no longer avails between the cause and effect. So the aprathak-saṁbandha is a basic potentiality of the God-soul relationship as of God and nature, which it is the business or imperative of spiritual life to realise in their own lives.

The great rift between philosophy and spirituality is evident in the stalemate that has arisen when the philosophers refuse to recognize the distinction between the *is* and the *ought*.

Therefore Śri Veṅkaṭanātha showed that as in the case of the *Bhagavad Gītā*[5] the three yogas, karma, jñāna and bhakti demand the fourth Śaraṇāgati or God's grace and individual's handing over his 'i-ness' to God and become His body (śarīra), a bhoga vastu and a bhogakaraṇa of God, and incidentally 'enjoy' (tyaktena bhunjīthāḥ).

5. cf. Meditation on the Iśāvāsyopaniṣad. 15—18. GJRI J. Vol. 1945. All India Oriental Conference Xth Session.' A clue into the relationship between the mystical and religious consciousnesss." Proceedings 1940.

## II

If the Upaniṣad revealed the synthetics of spiritual life and also revealed the philosophical subordination to spiritual obligation or command or imperative, the āḷvār prabandham showed how a life lived in such a manner could result in granting the jñāna, the darśana and laya or līna in God Himself. (jñātum draṣṭumca tattvena praveṣṭum ca parantapa of the *Bhagavata Gītā*).

Śri Veṅkaṭanātha as pointed out earlier in the course of this paper commented on the prabandham of Tiruppanāḷvār entitled *Amalanādippirān*. He has of course written a full stotra giving exposition of the several Āḷvārs—Dehalīśa-stuti, Godā-stuti, Dramiḍopaniṣad-sāram and tātparya ratnāvalī, Yatirājasaptati etc. This is the only prabandham where he has given commentaries hymn after hymn showing that it is a concisest exposition of the kernal of the Āḷvār message. Here the fundamental puruṣa or God is seen by his divine eyes or rather divinised eyes as an object of divine sight. The whole Form of the Divine is revealed not in the language of the mere Arcā, (Icon in the temple) but as the Beauty that is the Transcendent into whom all the divinised souls seek entry and refuge to whom the divine has verily opened His divine body (tanūm svām).

The description of the vision of God begins with the feet and goes up hymn by hymn to the crown of His head. This shows that the form of God is not a mere human or anthropomorphic habit of mind to make God in the image of man, reversing the European tradition of making man in the image of God. There is a form of God which is not opposed to that of the human—of which the human may be an inversion, as expressed in the *Kaṭha* (VI. 5) analogy—yathā darśe tathā ātmani, as in the mirror Brahman is seen in the soul (body). The divine seen in the heart (hṛdi) is the reflection of the Ultimate form of the Divine in his transcendence.

The first experience of God is that He is Free from all impurities (*amalan*), that He is the First Lord (ādi-pirān), one who has made the lover of God the attendant of these who have attained the Feet of God (adiyār), the persona who is *vimalan, nirmalan, niti-vān-avan,* who is essentially following the divine law (nītī).

In another context it is said that the Form of the Divine is Śānti (śāntākāra), viśva-ākāra, and so on, emphasizing that when one beholds the Divine, the basic nature or attributes of God stand

revealed to the inner yogic vision granted by the Divine. One ought to distinguish between the ordinary yogic vision that arises from the mere control of the citta, that may give rise to haliucinations, or just clairvoyance and so on, and the divine supersensory or non-sensory vision and non-mental or supramental darśana given as a matter of Grace by God. Peace, auspiciousness, and liberation from all sāṁsāric bonds happen to one who has beheld the vision of God—of his feet alone. How much more when one is led up to see the other glories of the Divine. The exploits of God in his slow movement towards revealing. His other mansions are also given full place, but not as praise but as the fruits of His grace so that one is first given the Idea of God, (jñāna), then is granted the darśana of the levels of God his figure upto His crown. Lastly the Āḻvār utters the oft-uttered words. My eyes that have beheld thee have no place for any other object.—*unnai kaṇḍa kaṇgil mattronnum kāṇāve.*

The hymn as a whole has to be read with deep awareness of the vision of God in order to appreciate the poetic excellence that transcends poetry. The Āḻvār finally according to the promise of Lord Kṛṣna in the *Bhagavad Gītā* finally enters into the divine body of God. Here is the mergence which philosophy denies as possible, but it is a mergence which has to be interpreted in the mystical way not in the physical way of being dissolved like sugar in water or like the rivers in the sea or like the moths in the flame.

Śri Veṅkaṭanātha calls Tirup-pan-āḻvār *Nam pānanāthan.* Our Lord of breath (prāṇa-nāthan). The importance of the fulfilment of the divine aspiration and devotion must find their culmination here on this earth itself by the entry of the soul into its real abode—Nārāyaṇa. Bhakti that does not culminate in it is not a yoga. And every yoga must find fulfilment in the divine enjoyment of the Figure, personality and union (immergence) in God. As I pointed out the spiritual entry into God should not be confused with the philosophical explanations of this process, which compels one to affirm the annihilation or extermination of the soul or ego or the individual or shows the impossibility of sāyujya. Śri Veṅkaṭanātha shows in his Commentary on the Īśā mantras referring to Asambhūti and saṁbhūti[6] the necessity to be born in God and of God (brahmaja).

## III

Śri Veṅkaṭanātha has had to meet with stiff opposition from both those who were not affiliated to Viśiṣṭādvaita and were its rivals

6. Proceedings Xth Session: AIOC. 1940. pp. 276 ff.

in Vedānta and those who belonged to it but held queer doctrines. One of them obviously refers to the very concept of this kind of Vaiṣṇavism which calls itself Śrī-Vaiṣṇavism, that Vaiṣṇavism which gives the most important place to Śri, conceived as the Śakti or Spouse of the Ultimate Viṣṇu. In his brilliant commentary on the *Catuśślokī* by Yāmunācārya,[7] Śrī Venkaṭanātha shows that the great Yamuna emphasized the divya-dāmpatya (divine bharta-bhārya relationship between the Lord Viṣṇu and Śrī. Śrī Rāmānuja himself claimed that the Ultimate Lord is always with Śri in His chest. The full meaning of this is further explained by Śri Veṅkaṭanātha in his *Śrī Stutī* where he says that Śri refers to her being the Śreyo-mūrti as contrasted with the preyo mūrtitva of the other powers of Gods. This is the exclusive śakti of God Viṣṇu and it is this distinction that makes Śrī Vaiṣṇavism a spiritual religion seeking the Ultimate Puruṣārtha of Mokṣa and not the other three puruṣārthas which the Preyas can grant. This shows also his Vairāgya that he demonstrated in his famous reply to Swami Vidyāraṇya who offered him a lucrative living at the Court at Vijayanagar.[8]

However he reveals that the Śri is a personality not merely an attribute of Godhead necessary for His being a God at all. Further all the six divine attributes of aiśvarya, vīrya, jñāna, bala, śakti and tejas also inhere in her Śreyas, Śrī, and it is futile to think that Śri is just another soul, śarīra of God.

Philosophical theology cannot at higher levels of mystical experiences be adequate. The controversy between the spiritual experience of the figure and form and attributes of God and the barren utterly unqualified and featureless, formless Ultimate is eternally irreconcilable. But it can be so only till one attains to the Ultimate state or the real transcendent state not a state of abstraction from all concrete personal experiences. If as is customary some consider that it is not called for and that one must be content with scriptural texts their harmonisation becomes imperative and this obviously can meet no success especially when the methods adopted are entirely without direction. Indeed all types of experiences are thrown into the spiritual and religious category and the selection of the adequate and proper spiritual from others has become quite a task.

The scholastic period, fortunately for it, did not meet with scepticisms of our times and could go on with their traditional modes

7. cf. *My Idea of God*. (SVOI. publication 1st ed.).

8. *Vairāgyapañcakam*.

of debate and discourse, alongside the laborious scholarship intended to promote spiritual hankering and devotion for God in their personal lives. Śrī Vedānta Deśika was known as an assiduous practicer of the Nitya (daily worship) according to the Pāñcakālavidhi of the Pāñcarātras which has been known as the Sātvata darśana promulgated by Śri Kṛṣṇa.[9]

His own personal experiences of the several forms of the Ultimate Godhead Viṣṇu and Śrī together, had given a real stamp to his writings and proved of enormous spiritual power to awaken the real yearning in his devotees.

Dr. M. M. Umesh Misra was a towering personality and I fully remember the most enthralling conversation I had with him in Sept. 1966 at the Research Institute, Allahabad for more than an hour and a half. His vivacity, remarkable mastery over intricate philosophical and philological points along with his openness of mind, his austerity in the performance and observance of traditional Brahmanic modes of life, made him a symbol of all that is best in Indian Hindu Tradition of the Orthodox. Śri Vedānta Deśika was known to be the lion among men who carried the banner of Hindu Śri Vaiṣṇavism—the mother of all bhakti schools in India, in the face of the already terrific onslaughts of other religions and sects, and paved the way for the preservation of the essentials of spiritual tradition of personal realisation of God on the one hand and religious practices of worship of God on the other hand. I believe that a link between these two is appropriate and that is the *raison d'etre* of this paper.

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9. (a) My Bibliography of Śri Vedānta Deśika's work (1928) on the occasion of His 660th Birthday.

(b) Sri Vedānta Deśika as Teacher: Gaudiya Math. Souvenir. Madras 1964.

(c) Śri Kṛṣṇa—the founder of the Seventh Darśana. Mother Calcutta.

# ON SOME IMPORTANT CITATIONS IN THE *NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ* OF JAYANTABHAṬṬA[1]

*By* Dr. H. G. Narahari*

Quite a number of writers, orthodox and heterodox, are mentioned[2] in the *Nyāyamañjarī,* a very authoritative work on Nyāya Philosophy whose object is to establish the supremacy of the Nyāya view in contemporary thought. The object of the present paper is, not to enumerate all these writers, but only to mention some important ancient writers, referred to in this work whose works are unknown but who are known so far only by citations in other works.

1. *Bhartṛmitra*

At least twice[3] this writer is referred to by name in the *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathimiśra. From the evidence available in this work it would appear that Bhartṛmitra introduced[4] many wrong theories (*apasiddhānta*) leading the orthodox Mīmāṁsā School dangerously near atheism (*lokāyatīkṛtā*) :

मीमांसा हि भर्तृमित्रादिभिरलोकायतैव सती लोकायतीकृता

Among the wrong theories mentioned above is the view[5] that there is no fruit (*phala*) for the performance of daily (*nitya*) and prohibited (*niṣiddha*) actions. Another wrong theory of Bhartṛmitra is condemned by Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*;[6] and this is that

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1. In a summarized form this paper was submitted to XXIII All-India Oriental Conference, Aligarh, October 1966. I offer this paper to the present Volume for, if my esteemed friend the late Mm. Dr. Umesha Misra were alive, he would be delighted to read this paper and offer his valuable comments.

2. For details, see H. G. Narahari, *Aryan Path,* Bombay, 1966, pp. 25 ff.

3. On *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila, Verse 10, pp. 3-4.

4. For full details, see V. A. Ramasvami Sastri, Introduction to *Tattvabindu* of Vācaspatimiśra, pp. 24 ff.

5. *Nyāyaratnākara,* loc. cit.

6. Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1936, I. 196, 207.

the auditory sense is nothing more than the impression (*saṁskāra*) produced by the wind (*pavana*):

१. तथा च भर्तृमित्रः पवनजनितसंस्कारपक्षो भवतु तथाऽपि नातिप्रसङ्गः नियतदेशस्यैव तत्र संस्कारात् ।

2. यत्तु भर्तृमित्रस्तमेव संस्कारं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियमभ्युपैति तदिदमपूर्वकं किमपि पाण्डित्यम् ।

Ramasvami Sastri[7] places this writer "between Śabarasvāmin and Kumārilabhaṭṭa i.e. *c.* A.D. 300–600."

## 2. *Ravigupta*

Eleven different epithets are used[8] in the *Nāyamañjarī* to designate a Buddhist. Among individual Buddhist writers referred to or mentioned here are *Dharmakīrti* and *Ravigupta;* the former of these, called *Kīrti* and *Bhikṣu* also here, is well-known. But this cannot be said of the latter who seems to be an old Buddhist writer believing in the theory of Momentary Flux (*Kṣaṇikatva*). Jayantabhaṭṭa[9] refers to him thus:

एतेन रविगुप्तोऽपि परिम्लानमुखीकृतः ।
क्षणिकत्वक्षमादित्व समुत्प्रेक्षणपण्डितः ॥

## 3. *Rājā*

In the course of a refutation of the Sāṁkhya view of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), Jayantabhaṭṭa refers[10] to this ancient writer of that School thus:

यत्तु राजा व्याख्यातवान् प्रतिराभिमुख्ये वर्तते तेनाभिमुख्येन विषयाध्यवसायः प्रत्यक्षमिति तदप्यनुमानादावस्त्येव ॥

This *Rājā* is very probably the author of the *Rājavārttika* to which reference is made by Vācaspatimiśra towards the end of his commentary[11] on the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa:

तथा च राजवार्त्तिकम्—
प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यथा ।
पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥

7. *op. cit.*, p. 26.

8. For full details, see H. G. Narahari, *Sri Venkatesvara University Oriental Journal,* Tirupati, 1962, pp. 34 ff.

9. *Nyāyamañjarī*, II. 34.

10. *Ibid.*, I. 100.

11. *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī* on Kārikā 72 (Ed. by Ganganath Jha), p. 81.

4. *Śaṁkarasvāmin*

Concluding a discussion of the view of the *Pravaras* on the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence (*vākyārthabodha*), Jayantabhaṭṭa refers[12] to Śaṁkarasvāmin, a follower of this School (*pravaramatānuyāyin*):

तादृशस्यागृहीतसंबन्धत्वादर्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वं न स्यादित्यास्तामपूर्वमिदं शङ्करस्वामिनः पाण्डित्यम् ॥

Could he be the father of the famous Upavarṣa who wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*), long before Śabara, on the Mīmāṁsāsūtras? This is suggested by the following verse in the *Bṛhatkathāmañjarī*[13] of Kṣemendra:

शङ्करस्वामिनामाभूद्ब्राह्मणो वेदपारगः ।
वर्षोपवर्षौ तस्येमौ तनयावतनुत्विषः ।
संप्राप्य विद्यामतुलां विश्रुतो लोकपूजितः ॥

5. *Govindasvāmin*

Jayantabhaṭṭa, about to conclude his section on Word-Meaning Relation (*padasaṁgatigraha*), refers[14] to this dispassionate knower of Brahman:

वीतरागस्य च ब्रह्मविदो वित्तैषणव्युत्थितस्य गोविन्दस्वामिन इव निधिरपि हेयतया परिस्फुरति·········।

It is quite possible that Jayantabhaṭṭa refers only to an ascetic of that name famous in the province he lived. But since no such assertion can be made with certainty, guesses should be permissible on this point of the identity of Govindasvāmin. I would like to venture now a guess on this problem though I am quite conscious that it is rather far-fetched. The epithets given by Jayantabhaṭṭa to Govindasvāmin are the characteristics, according to the commentary (*bhāṣya*) of Śaṁkara on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*,[15] of one who has achieved the state of a *Paramahaṁsaparivrājaka*. Now this is a familiar epithet of *Govindabhagavatpūjyapāda* who was Śaṁkara's preceptor. Could Jayantabhaṭṭa be alluding to him? Since he lived[16] in *c.* 890 A.D., he is later than Śaṁkara and perforce later than his preceptor. I submit this vague guess for the consideration of scholars interested in the problem.

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12. *Nyāyamañjarī*, I. 363.
13. I. 2. 24 (*Kāvyamālā*, No. 69, Bombay, p. 9).
14. *Nyāyamañjarī*, I. 269.
15. III. 5.
16. See H. G. Narahari, *Poona Orientalist*, Vol. XXII., p. 77.

# THE CAUSAL RELATION

*By* DR. P. S. SASTRI*

One dominant view holds that the effect is the transformation of the cause. The effect is a new manifestation that was previously unmanifest and hidden in the cause. In essence the cause and the effect are identical, but the form of the manifestation is different from that of the cause. The causal relation thus becomes one of identity-in-difference. The effect here has the same order of being, and it is a real transformation of the cause. This law of causation thus postulates the real transformation of an entity belonging to the same order of reality.[1] The effect modifies the nature of its cause. On this basis a variety of examples are often adduced. But we have to know how the effect gets manifested.

If the manifestation of the effect has no cause, then it is not different from the uncaused; and as such it will have neither existence, nor non-existence. If it has a cause, it cannot be a specific entity. There may be an ass present prior to the origination of the pot, and the ass is as much a specific entity as the lump of clay. To avoid this difficulty one may take recourse to the entity that is capable of manifesting the effect. This entity has a form which excludes others. If this exclusive entity has the causal nature, then it can give rise only to one effect. The causal nature of one entity cannot be identical with the causal nature of others. This causal nature cannot be immanent in all entities in an identical fashion.[2]

If the effect in its entirety is latent in the cause, then the effect is never produced. If the existent alone is producd, there should be incessant production. An existent effect does not need an agent for its production because it is already existent. If the agent's activity is necessary, the effect must be non-existent. If the manifestation of the effect is non-existent, its prior existence has to be established. The production of a non-existent manifestation is not possible. That

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1. *Siddhānta Leśa Saṅgraha*, 54.

2. *Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya*, 1224,

which was non-existent before its production can become existent if it can be true of all other effects. If the manifestation is existent, and if it abides in a subtle form, we have to assume the manifestation of that manifestation. This leads to a regress. If manifestasion exist like the effect, it contradicts the manifestation of the effect. If the manifestation is existent prior to the activity of the agent, the agent is unnecessary.

Is the manifestation identical with the effect manifested? If so, it can be either non-existent or existent. We have seen that either alternative is illogical. If the manifestation is different from the effect manifested, it can either be related to the effect or not related. If there is no relation, there can be no manifestation because the manifestation has nothing to do with the effect. If there is a relation, is the manifestation existent or non-existent prior to the production of the effect? If the relation is present prior to the production of the effect between the manifestation and the effect, it would mean that the effect is manifested even before it is produced. Since manifestation is already present in the effect, there can be no manifestation. If non-manifestation is present even at the time of the manifestation, there will always be the non-manifestation of the effect.

The cause and the effect have their own respective natures. This does not allow them to be non-different. The cause is an accomplished entity, while the effect is yet to be. There must be a specific feature in each to distinguish one from the other. If the two are non-different, then an entity will be its own cause, and the presence of the cause would mean itself and also the presence of the effect. Then there is also no production or destruction of effect, and the activity of an agent would serve no purpose. The effect would always be manifested in the cause. No time would intervene between the cause and the effect, and no causal relation would be possible.

To avoid this absurdity it may be held that the difference of the cause and the effect is their essence, and that non-difference is their relation. Is this non-difference different from the cause and the effect, or non-different or both? If it is different, we need some other relation to relate this non-difference to the cause and the effect; and that relation will be other than non-difference, thereby requiring another relation in its turn. This is an endless regress. If non-difference is itself a relation, the relation needs another relation

to relate it to its own ground. If nondifference is absolutely different from the cause and the effect, it cannot be related to them because no relation can be totally distinct from its terms.

If nondifference is nondifferent from the cause and the effect, is it of the nature of perfect identity or of essential identity with some difference? The second alternative is not possible because of the difficulties we encounter with the concept of difference. In the case of the first alternative, nondifference will not be an attribute of the cause and the effect.

If the nondifference is both different and nondifferent from the cause and the effect, then we are again in trouble. Nondifference being identity, this identity will have to be both different and non-different. This nondifference of the second factor will again be different and non-different; and this leads to a regress.

If the essence of the cause and the effect is to be sought in their difference from the effect and the cause respectively, difference becomes an entity and it cannot be an attribute of an entity. If difference is an entity, its perception cannot depend on the knowledge of its counter entity. If difference is the very nature of an object, its perception must be the same as the perception of its difference from others. Then a rope should never be misperceived as a snake. If the given has the nature of mere difference, then the perception of the given must depend on the perception of its counter entity; the knowledge of one object would depend on another which is its counter entity; and the knowledge of the counter entity will depend on another. This infinite regress would not allow us to establish any object. Hence the causal relation cannot be explained by taking difference as the essential nature of the cause and the effect, with non-difference as its attribute.

It may be argued that the difference between the cause and the effect does not constitute their essential nature, and that the difference is only their essential quality. The cause and the effect are non-different. This nondifference is the negation of difference.

Now if difference implies mutual exclusion, we cannot admit both difference and nondifference here. If the difference and the nondifference are said to be having different grounds, then the same effect cannot be both different and nondifferent. The two properties can coexist if difference means only partial negation, not denial, but

limitation of difference. But negation cannot and does not imply degrees of denial. If nondifference qualifies difference, it must be a positive quality.

The next way is to argue that difference and nondifference are positive in character and that they are the qualities of the cause and the effect. The two attributes have to be related to their grounds, because as unrelated they will cease to be attributes. The relation may be one of conjunction, inherence, or identity. If qualities and actions are different and also nondifferent from their substance, there cannot be a relation of conjunction. The conjunctive relation holds between substances and not between a substance and a quality. They cannot have a relation of inherence with the cause and the effect because this relation unites two distinct enties; and inherence is a distinct relation which is made to operate here between an attribute and a substance.

That difference and nondifference are positive attributes referring to the nature of the cause and the effect is not a fact of perceptual experience. If direct experience can present the true nature of a relation always, then there cannot be erroneous cognitions.

If difference and nondifference are somehow related to the cause and the effect, we must find out how they can exist together in both the cause and the effect. In order to coexist they cannot be contradictories or contraries, and the affirmation of one should not imply the denial of the other. Each will be a unique entity transcending and yet involving the law of contradiction. And such a unique entity cannot be the cause or effect of another unique one. If the concept of difference and nondifference does not mean the presence of difference and of nondifference, and if it is a new kind of attribute, it can exist along with absolute difference or along with nondifference. Then we should say that the cause and the effect are absolutely different and also absolutely different-cum-nondifferent; or they are both absolutely non-different and also absolutely different-cum-nondifferent. Either position involves selfcontradiction.

The position that is now left is to argue that the cause and the effect are different in one aspect and nondifferent in another aspect. Prior to its manifestation the effect is undifferentiated in the cause, and after its manifestation the causal essence is the essence of its effect. As the essence, the effect is thus nondifferent from the cause. As manifested, the effect reveals certain features that are different

from those of the cause; and this constitutes their difference. But do their features form an integral part of the concept of the effect? If they are, then this important aspect of the effect is nonexistent in the cause prior to its production, and this makes out the effect to be absolutely different from its cause after its production. But if these specific features of the effect are only accidental, then the true effect must be only its essence. Then the effect is absolutely nondifferent from the cause. That is, the cause remains unchanged, unmodified, and as such there is no causation.

But it may be held that the essence as particularized by the specific features is the real nature of the effect. Then we can preserve its difference and also nondifference from the effect. But if this particularized essence is different from the unparticularized essence, we have only a relation of difference; and if it is nondifferent, the particularization has no meaning.

How is the essence of the effect related to its particularizing features? Any kind of relation here is helpless to establish the relation of difference-cum-nondifference between the cause and the effect. If the particularizing features are non-different from the essence, the essence is unparticularized, thereby denying a causal relation. If they are different, they cannot be related in any way. If the particularizing features are just added to the essence without any modification of its essential nature, we do not get a real effect.

We do not find a causal relation between objects disparate in nature. The products having the features of clay come from clay only. Likewise the universe having among its characteristics pleasure, pain and infatuation, can be the effect of a cause which is constituted of these characteristics. The impure world as an event must presuppose an impure cause. This universe has the sentient and the unsentient, the latter functioning as a means or as an auxiliary. Where there is parity in nature, there can be no such relation as that of principal to its auxiliary. Two flowers, for example, cannot subserve each other's purpose. Moreover, the nature of the constituent cause is known to continue in its effect. It might be said that the cause of the universe is sentient and that this character is not perceived because of a modification in it. For example, we do not perceive the sentient character of an individual when he is in a state of sleep or swoon. Thus a log of wood may be a similar case in-

volving its character of an auxiliary. The body and the organs are auxiliaries to the soul even though both may participate in sentiency.[3]

This approach is untenable. We do notice that from sentient beings there do emerge the non-sentient ones like hair and nails. We cannot say that these come from the nonsentient body alone since the body is charged with life. There is the divergence between a living body and what comes out of it. This contradicts the notion of similiarity between cause and effect. If these are physical products traceable to the physical body, we can as well say that these share with the individual the character of existence which is persistent.[4]

The universe as an event is related to the Absolute. If there is a disparity between these, does it mean that the characteristics of the Absolute do not in their entirety inhere in the world? or does it mean that there is no characteristic of the Absolute which inheres in the world? or does it mean that there is a characteristic like sentiency which does not inhere in the world? The first alternative would identify the cause with the effect, thereby destroying the causal relation. The second alternative is difective because there is atleast the characteristic of existence. The third alternative is so vague that there is no example to prove it.[5]

The denial of the existence of the effect prior to its production is a denial which refers to no real object. This denial is powerless to prevent the recognition of the antecedent existence of the effect. The effect as an effect is dependent upon its ground or cause. If so even prior to its existence in the form of an effect, it did exist.[6] We have instances of the effect merging back into the cause without contaminating it by its own characteristics. The earthen plates as products of the clay can be good or bad, high or low. Once they are destroyed they become one with the clay losing all these distinctions. Golden ornaments of varying shades of beauty retain their distinct features as effect; and once they are reconverted into gold, they lose their different features. This is so because the effect has in it the nature of the cause. The cause does not have in it the nature of the effect.[7]

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3. *Vedānta Sūtra Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on 2. 1. 4.
4. *Ibid.* on 2. 1. 6.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.,* on 2. 1. 7.
7. *Ibid.,* 2. 1. 9.

The magician is not affected by the illusions he spreads out before the spectators. Likewise the Absolute is not affected by the multiplicity of appearances. A similar experience befalls the soul witnessing a dream.[8]

Foam, wave, riffle and bubble are the modifications of the ocean. They are not distinct from the ocean whose essence is the water. Still there is a distinction between them and there can be a mutual relation like conjunction among them. They are distinct from one another, and yet not distinct in so far as their essence is concerned. Thus the cause and the effect need not involve the transformation of the one into the other.[9]

But ultimately speaking there is no distinction between cause and effect. The effect is nonexistent apart from the cause. When a lump of clay is comprehended in its real nature as clay, all fabrications of clay such as jar, plate, waterpot and the like, being no more than the clay in essence, can be easily comprehended. These modified forms are a fabrication of the mere word clay. They are only names originated by a word, as when it is said that here is a jar, a plate, a water-pot and so on. The modified form as such has no reality; it is only a mere name, an appearance, and the reality belonging to it is only as it is clay.[10]

The ether delimited by a jar and by a water-pot is not distinct from the great mass of ether in its entirety. The water in the mirage is not distinct from the sandy plane. Here is a form that appears and disappears and as such it cannot be described in its real essence.[11] When the sand appears as water, the effect can appear to be totally different in essence from its ground. The constituent cause alone is real. The effect, has in such cases no relation to the cause. It does not have also an independent existence. The effect turns out to be an appearance while the cause is real.

It is only upon the existence of the cause that the effect is perceived, and not upon its nonexistence. When clay is there, a jar is seen to emerge. The cloth is observed because of the threads. But

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*, on 2. 1. 13.

10. *Ibid., on* 2. 1. 14.

11. *Ibid.*

a horse, for instance, is not invariably found only where a cow exists; and a jar is not found only where the potter exists. The effect thus is invariably related to the cause. The effect is invariably coloured and interpenetrated by the cause.[12]

There is also a direct perception of the non- distinctness between the effect and the cause. In the aggregate of threads we do not observe a new and distinct effect called a piece of cloth. We observe threads spread out length-wise and breadth-wise. Likewise there are only fibres in the threads and there are still smaller segments in the fibres. This cognition can take us back to the three forms or aspects of red, white, and black out of which everything is made. This movement towards the ground leads us gradually to the Absolute.[13]

Prior to its origination the effect is nondistinct from the cause. The effect belongs to the subsequent time. If a thing does not exist within another as of one essence with it, it cannot arise out of that. Thus oil does not come from the grains of sand. Because of the nondistinctness in the causal stage, the effect has to be treated as non-distinct from the cause even after it is produced.[14] Any thing with a fully evolved name and form is treated as an existent; and it is only in this sense that the effect prior to its origination is non-existent.[15]

In normal life, when we desire to produce curd, jars and golden ornaments, we resort to milk, clay and gold respectively. Desiring curd one does not take up clay. This cannot be explained if the effect did not exist prior to its origination. It may be said that in milk alone there is a certain subtle predisposing form of the curd. But this in itself rejects the prior nonexistence of the effect in the cause. But one may posit in the cause a certain potency for invariably producing a certain specific effect. This potency cannot be a determining principle of the effect if it were to be distinct from the effect, or if it were altogether of the nature of nonexistence. Its nonexistence or distinctness would not be specifically restricted to particular effects alone. Hence the potency has to

12. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 15.
13. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 16.
14. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 17.
15. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 18.

form one essence with the cause, and the effect has to form one essence with the potency. It is also necessary that we should assure an identity of essence between the cause and the effect since there is no distinctness between them.

We cannot assume a relation of inherence between the cause and the effect. If two entities are to be related, the relation must be related separately to each entity. In order to relate the relation we need another relation. This regress is unavoidable. If no such inherence is required, an entity can have only a conjunction or contact with inherence; and this can be put an end to. If inherence being a relation does not need an intervening relation in order to be related to the entities, then conjunctive relation too, being itself a relation, ought to be related with the objects in contact without requiring an intervening relation of inherence. This assumption of a relation of inherence is useless because the pairs like substance and its qualities are actually perceived as being identical in essence.[15]

When a piece of cloth is rolled up, it is not clearly perceived as a cloth. But when the same is spread out, it is clearly perceived; and one can then say that the object that was rolled up was a piece of cloth. It is not taken to be distinct from the one with the rolled-up form. Likewise an effect is non-manifest while it subsists in the form of its causes like the threads; and it is rendered manifest for perception by the operation of the causal factors like the shuttle, the loom and the weaver.[16]

When we speak of causal facts, we do not mean that causal relation is a many–one relation. Milk or water gets itself transformed into curd or ice. They appear to require heat and the like in the process. But these accessories only accelerate the process. If milk does not of its own accord possess an inner proclivity for becoming curd, even heat and the like would not succeed in transforming it. These accessories do not force the water to become curd. They contribute merely to the perfection of the effect.[17]

But milk being nonsentient may not need an accessory. The potter is a sentient being and he needs clay, wheel and other things. He needs a material and the means to fashion a pot. One may answer

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16. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 19.
17. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 24.

by pointing to the magician who can present a number of things without needing a specific material or instruments. The spider spins out the web out of itself.[18]

The cause is transformed into the form of the effect. If the cause is one and if it does not admit of parts, the whole cause must be thus transformed. This would imply the complete destruction of the cause as the cause. This would have disastrous consequences if the Absolute were to be the cause of the universe. And if a part of the universe were to be so transformed, the Absolute would be no better than any other whole.[19]

The cause and its manifestations are not mutually identical. The essence of the effect is identical with the cause, and the effect has no independent existence while the cause has. The modifications are necessary objects of perceptions, while the cause need not be an object of sense perception.[20] As an example we have the single individual creating manifold objects in his dreams. The individual's own nature remains as it was.[21]

Primal matter is devoid of sound and other qualities. It is the cause of the effect which is divisible into parts, which has a limited size, and which has qualities. There can not be a complete modification of this matter which is impartite. It may be argued that this primal matter is only a state of equipoise of the three qualities or elements of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; and that therefore with these parts the primal stuff is capable of division into parts. But the three elements are each equally impartite. If one of these assisted by the other two is the constituent cause of a similar world of phenomena, then for other phenomena this quality or element will not be available as the cause or as the causal auxiliary. And if the primal matter is divisible, it becomes impermanent.[22]

The identity of cause and effect advocated by the Sānkhya system will have to explain how qualities like sound which are not in primal matter emerge in the products. The effect like sound

18. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 25.
19. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 26.
20. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 27.
21. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 28.
22. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 29.

must be non-existent prior to its appearance or origination.[23] This is contrary to the facts of experience. Such instances only go to show how difficult it is to establish a positive relation between cause and effect.

The identity of cause with itself is the only valid idea. The alleged effects making up the world of appearances are not intrinsically real because they do not have an independent existence. This cause is the Absolute or Reality. Prior to the realisation of the Absolute as the only true Reality, all ordinary views and practices can well be true, like the phenomena of the dream-exprience prior to one's waking up. Till the identity of the Absolute is realised, the manifold appearences fall into the distinctions of means, objects, and fruits of knowledge. Because of these distinctions we get at the notions of the 'I' and the 'Mine'.[24] But from an ultimate standpoint such distinctions are unreal and nonexistent. Then we can only argue in favour of *Sat-Kāraṇa,* not of *Sat-Kārya.* The ground or foundation of all appearances is the Absolute. This Ground is immutable and it is beyond change or activity.[25]

The true causal law can accept only the reality of the cause; for the effect is an inexplicable appearance of the cause and there is no real modification of the cause.[26] The phenomenal universe is an inexplicable appearance of the Absolute, not its actual modification or transformation.[27] The effect is not different from its cause, though it does not have the same order of being as its cause. The effect is only an appearance, something that appears to be a transformation though it is not one such. Its appearance does not affect the nature of the cause.[28] And the cause is that which can not be contradicted or negated at any time or place.[29]

It is not possible to maintain that being alone or non-being alone can be the cause. If it be said that nonbeing cannot be the cause because then the effect ought to be produced from anything, the

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23. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 10.
24. *V.S.B.* 2. 1. 14.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Tattvabodhinī,* 576.
27. *Bhāmatī,* 225.
28. *Tattvabodhinī,* on 2, 65.
29. *Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya,* 20.

argument runs into trouble. The moment of the origination of the effect is the moment when the causal accessories cease to operate. If the origination of the effect is accompanied by the nonbeing of these accessories, this nonbeing which is identical with the moment cannot be different from another prior moment. It may be said that the cause is not the simultaneous nonbeing of the causal factors but their prior being. Then the causal factors have a prior being and a present nonbeing. If these have a power to originate an effect, a prior nonbeing too can originate a present being. But the being of the causal factors is the immediate antecedent of the originating moment. Then the moment when the effect originates is the moment when the cause ceases to be. The being of one and the nonbeing of another are related as the determined and the determinant. But these are simultaneous and nondifferent, whence no such relationship is possible.[30] As such the relation of determining must refer to two different moments. Then we can as well argue that the nonbeing of the cause in one moment can be the cause of the being of the effect in another moment.[31]

The moment when the effect originates is qualified by the origination itself. The presence or absence of the being in one moment does not appear to affect the presence or absence of another moment since the moments are not causally related.

The latent being of the effect is not the cause of the explicit being of the effect. and so is the implicit nonbeing of the effect. If the implicit being of the effect were to cause the explicit being of the effect, the effect will have its ground in itself.[32] This impossibility cannot disappear even if we argue that the cause is qualified or determined by the implicit being of the effect for the effect continues to be both the ground and the consequent. This difficulty can be got rid of only by accepting the non-being of the effect prior to its origination. It may be argued that the being of the implicit effect is other than the being of the explicit effect. But in such a case the prior being cannot be the same as the subequent being; and if the latter is being, the former will be nonbeing.[33] As nonbeing, the causal nature cannot endure into the effect.

30. *Ibid.*, 24–27.
31. *Ibid.*, 28.
32. *Ibid.*, 30.
33. *Ibid.*, 31.

If the being of the cause refers to the form, the being of the pot is determined by the form of the pot. Then the form of the pot will be the cause of the pot. Hence neither being, nor nonbeing can be the cause of the effect. But it may be said that being is no other than the nature of the cause, and that the cause is only the invariable antecedent being. Then the cause would be being as such, a being that is not modified or transformed. Then causal nature being mere existence, the cause must be an existent, not an existence which is an implicit being of the effect.

Neither being nor nonbeing can be the cause. The cause is only the invariable antecedent. This antecedent must exist. Otherwise there is no meaning in speaking about this antecedent. This presumption regarding an antecedent is not a case of erroneous apprehension, because experience contradicts the absence of such an antecedent. It is not a mere conceptual being, since the concept of the antecedent is evoked by its being. This antecedent is foundational to all existence and experience. It is *Svayam-Siddha* and as such it is presupposed in every experience. This is the ultimate cause of every thing. Since the effect is not related to it, it is a case of *Vivarta*, an appearance which is an inexplicable fact. As nonbeing the inveriable antecedent cannot determine the being of the effect. As being, it cannot become anything. Then this is an inexplicable being.[34]

34. cf. *Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādya*, 42.

# SOME MISSING PORTIONS OF THE GOTRA-BHŪMI

*By* KARUNESHA SHUKLA*

1. *Śrāvakabhūmi,* the xiii section (bhūmi) of the *Yogācāra-bhūmiśāstra* of Ācārya Asaṅga[1] comprises the three stages of gotra, avatāra and naiṣkramya. In the solitary single manuscript of this bhūmi discovered by the late Mahāpaṇḍita Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana[2] a considerable portion of the gotrabhūmi and the avatārabhūmi along with some portions of the naiṣkramyabhūmi and the prefatory remarks are missing. No other manuscript of the bhūmi is available and only a translation of the entire work is preserved in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka (*Tanjour,* edited by D. T. Suzuki, Vol. 110, p. 35 sq., Tokyo-Kyoto, 1957). Its Chinese and Japanese versions are also available.[3]

2. It would not be out of place to mention here briefly the main contents of the gotrabhūmi.

In the gotra-bhūmi, discussions on the following points are found :

(1) *Prefatory remarks* : Statement that the Śrāvakabhūmi contains the three bhūmis of gotra, avatāra and naiṣkramya.[4]

(2) *a brief definition of the gotra-bhūmi.*

(3) *definition of gotra,* its nature; gotra-vyavasthāna—i.e.,

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1. Vide, YBŚ, I. 3.

2. For a description of this Ms. vide, Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, JBORS, XXIV. 138; Wayman, Alex, Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi MS., p. 2 sq.; Wayman has presented a study and analysis of this MS. in his monograph; we have edited the MS. for the K. P. Jayaswal, Research Institute, Patna.

3. For information, vide, Alex Wayman, Ibid., p. 58 sq.

4. Vide the Uddāna Kārikā:

गोत्रमेवावतारश्च तथा नैष्क्रम्यमेव च ।
भूमयस्तिस्र एता हि भूमिः श्रावकसंज्ञिता ॥

(4) *the four causes leading to the non-acquisition of the Supreme Deliverance (Nirvāṇa) by the pudgalas containing the nature of Nirvāṇa (parinirvāṇadharmaka)* — (i) being produced in unfavourable circumstances (*akṣaṇopapannatvam,* (ii) being possessed with the evil of inattention (*pramattadoṣatvam*); (iii) being produced in elusive circumstances (*mithyopapannatvam*); and (iv) the evil being unmanifested (*āvṛta-doṣatvaṁ*);

(*b*) *four causes of the non-aquisition of Nirvāṇa by the parinirvāṇa-dharmaka pudgalas*—i.e. being deprived of (Vikala) (i) the origination of the Buddhas (*buddhānām utpādaḥ*); (ii) listening to the right moral instructions (*saddharma*); (iii) the instructions favourable for the acquisition of Nirvāṇa (*ānulomika upadeśaḥ*); and (iv) (proper) acquisition of instructions (anuśāsana-prāptiḥ); (c) *two conditions (pratyayas) for the acquisition of Nirvāṇa of the pudgalas*—main (pradhāna) and the subsidiary (hīna). The *pradhāna pratyaya* contains (i) sound (word) from outside in accordance with the right moral instructions. (*Saddharmādhipateyaḥ parato ghoṣaḥ*) and (ii) right mental orientation (*Yoniśo manaskāraḥ*).

The *hīna pratyaya* comprises many aspects such as :

(i) the self (acquired) excellence (ātma-saṁpat);

(ii) the excellence of others (para-saṁpat);

(iii) the desire to acquire Kuśala dharmas (*kuśalo dharmacchandaḥ*);

(iv) renunciation (pravrajyā);

(v) restraint in moral conduct (*śīla-saṁvaraḥ*);

(vi) sense-restraint (indriya-saṁvaraḥ);

(vii) knowledge of the quantity of food (*bhojane mātrajñata*);

(viii) being awake in the pūrvarātra and the apararātra (*pūrvarātrāpararātram jāgarikānuyogaḥ*);

(ix) Walking while knowing it well (*saṁprajānadvihāritā*);

(x) loneliness (*prāvivekyam*);

(xi) purification (extinction) of the (five) hindrances (*nivaraṇa-viśuddhiḥ*); and

(xii) taking resort to concentration and meditation (*samādhi-saṁśrayaḥ*).

(4) *a description of the marks* (*liṅgam*) *of the pudgalas stationed in the gotra-stage.*

(5) *a brief description of the following pudgalas stationed in this bhūmi—*

(i) a pudgala stationed in the gotra only (*gotra eva sthitaḥ*);

(ii) descended and not departed (*avatīrṇo, na niṣkrāntaḥ*);

(iii) descended as well as departed (*avatīrṇo niṣkrāntaḥ*);

(iv) a pudgala being equipped with mild senses (*mṛdvindriyaḥ*);

(v) a pudgala having an indifferent sense (*madhyendriyaḥ*);

(vi) a pudgala equipped with a sharp sense (*tīkṣṇendriyaḥ*);

(vii) a pudgala having the conduct of attachment (*rāgacaritaḥ*);

(viii) a pudgala having the conduct of envy (*dveṣacaritaḥ*);

(ix) a pudgala having the conduct of sloth (*mohacaritaḥ*);

(x) a pudgala produced in unfavourable circumstances (*akṣanopapannaḥ*);

(xi) a pudgala having undertaken elusive way (*mithyāpratipannaḥ*);

(xii) a pudgala having not undertaken elusive way (*a-mithyāpratipannaḥ*);

(xiii) a pudgala encompassed (in the circumstances not leading to Nirvāṇa) (*āvṛtaḥ*);

(xiv) a pudgala not encompassed (in the circumstances not leading to Nirvāṇa) (*an-āvṛtaḥ*);

(xv) a pudgala stationed far (from Nirvāṇa) (*dūre pudgalaḥ*);

(xvi) a pudgala stationed near (Nirvāṇa) (*āsanne pudgalaḥ*);

(xvii) a pudgala matture (for parinirvāṇa) (*paripakvaḥ pudgalaḥ*);

(xviii) a pudgala immature (for attainment of parinirvāṇa) (*a-paripakvaḥ pudgalaḥ*);

(xix) a purified pudgala (viśuddhaḥ pudgalaḥ); and

(xx) an unpurified pudgala (a-viśuddhaḥ pudgalaḥ).

3. Out of these, *the portions* (*a*) *beginning from the prefatory remarks upto the enumeration of the different aspects of ātmasaṁpat,* and (*b*) *the description of the āsanne pudgalaḥ, and the aparipakvaḥ, viśuddhaḥ and aviśuddhaḥ pudgalaḥ in addition to the concluding remarks of gotrabhūmi are missing in the MS.*

4. A restoration of these portions has been attempted in the following pages on the basis of the Tibetan[5] translation.

*Gotrabhūmi* (a) योगाचारभूमौ श्रावकभूमिः[६] ॥

रत्नत्रयाय नमः[७] ॥

श्रावकस्य सर्वभूमिसङ्ग्रहस्य पिण्डोद्दानम्[८] ॥
गोत्रं पुद्गलास्तथा[९] लौकिको लोकोत्तरश्च प्रयोगः[१०] ॥
श्रावकभूमिस्त्वेषा सर्व्वं प्रोक्ताऽत्र समासतः[११] ॥

॥ उद्दानम् ॥

गोत्रमेवावतारश्च तथा नैष्क्रम्यमेव च ।
भूमयस्तिस्र एता हि भूमिः श्रावकसंज्ञिता ॥
सङ्क्षेपेण इमा एव श्रावकभूमिः कथ्यते ।

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5. Our basis for this restoration has been the Tibean translation of the text as preserved in the Tanjour Tibetan Tripiṭaka, referred to above (ff 1); the English rendering of the portions of the text under consideration supplied by Prof. Alex Wayman has also been quite useful to us; in the Sanskrit restoration of the text, we have been assisted by Prof. L. Jamaspal of the Vārāṇaseya Saṁskṛta Vishwavidyalaya Vārāṇasî and our thanks are due to him.

6. Tib. ñanthe/sa/

7. It seems to be a later addition by the translator. Such expressions are not found at the beginning of other bhūmis.

8. Tib. sdomb/sa/=Uddānakārikā.

9. Wayman (W) पुद्गलाश्च.

10. W. adds मार्ग, while Tib. Omits this.

11. Tib. Omits उक्ता and सर्व्वं.

तत्र गोत्रभूमिः कतमा । आह । यद्[12] गोत्रम्, गोत्रस्य यद् व्यवस्थानम्, गोत्रस्थानां पुद्गलानां यल्लिङ्गम्, गोत्रस्थो[13] यः पुद्गलः तत्सर्व्वमे[14]कत्यमभिसङ्क्षिप्य गोत्रभूमिरित्युच्यते ।

तत्र गोत्रं कतमत् । गोत्रस्थस्य पुद्गलस्य[15] यो बीजधर्मः । यस्मिन् सति भवति, असति न भवति । पुद्गलानां प्रत्ययप्राप्तानां निर्व्वाणं प्राप्तुं स्प्रष्टुं शक्नोति च[16] । तस्य गोत्रस्य कति पर्यायनामानि । बीजं धातुः प्रकृतिरिति पर्यायनामानि[17] भवन्ति ।

तत्र तस्य गोत्रस्य स्वभावः कतमः । तत् कायाद्विशिष्टं, षडायतनेन उपात्तं, धर्मतया[18] प्राप्तम् । अनादिकालात् परम्परया समुदागतम् । एवं भवति । यस्यैतानि[19] गोत्रं, बीज, धातुः स्वभावश्च इतीमानि पर्यायनामानि भवन्ति तद् गोत्रमित्युच्यते ।

[तत्र] कतमद् गोत्रव्यवस्थानम्? तद् गोत्रं स्थूलं[20]सूक्ष्मं[20]वा कथ्यते ।[21] आह । सूक्ष्ममिति कथ्यते । तत् कस्य हेतोः । । यावत् । तस्माद् बीजात् फलं न उत्पादितं[23], फलं न सिद्धं[24], तस्मात् तत् सूक्ष्ममिति कथ्यते[26] । यदा [ च ] फलमुत्पा-

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12. W. Omits यत् in all the four cases.
13. 'च' may be added here: W. सर्वे च ते गोत्रस्थाः पुद्गलाः,
14. May also be सर्व्वमेतदेकस्त्यमभिसङ्क्षिप्य ।
15. W. पुद्गलानाम् ।
16. W. यत्किञ्चिच्च तानि सन्ति यावत्कालञ्च वर्त्तन्ते, यदि तानि गोत्रस्थानां पुद्गलानामानुलोमिकान् प्रत्ययान् प्राप्नुवन्ति, शक्तानि तानि भविष्यन्ति, शक्ष्यन्ति च स्प्रष्टुं [परि] निर्व्वाणम् ।
17. W. Omits नाम ;may also be पर्यायाः
18. Tib. Chos/ñid.
19. Tib. यस्मिन्.
20. W. adds वत् (as).
21. W. व्याख्यातम् (–यते)
22. Tib. Sa-bon.
23. Tib. b-ska/yed/pa.
24. Tib. dgrub.
25. May also be उच्यते,
26. W. यावच्च तद् बीजं फलं न जनयति, परिपाचयति (साधयति) वा तत्फलम् इदं सूक्ष्ममित्युच्यते

दितं सिद्धं च बभूव[२७] तदा यद्बीजं यच्च फलं तदेकत्यमभिसङ्क्षिप्यते[२८], तस्मात् तद् गोत्रं स्थूलमित्युच्यते ।[२९]

अत्र तद्गोत्रमेकसन्तत्याप्तं[३०] वाऽनेकसन्तत्याप्तं वा कथ्यते ।[३१] [इति][३१] चेद्[३२] आह । एकसन्तत्याप्तमुच्यते[३३] । तत् कस्य हेतोः । ये धर्मा । लक्षण-भिन्नत्वेन वस्तुभिन्नत्वेन वा प्रवर्त्तन्ते तेषां प्रत्यात्मं सन्ताननानात्वेन नानात्व-मवतारनाना [त्वेन नाना][३४] त्वं च देश्यते । तस्य बीजस्य तेभ्यः षडायतनेभ्यः पृथक्त्वेन नानात्वलक्षणं नास्ति । अनादिकालात् परम्परया समुदागतानां धर्मतया समुपात्तानां षडायतनानामीदृग्भूतायास्तस्या अवस्थाया गोत्रं धातुः स्वभावश्च इति संज्ञा प्रज्ञप्ति [र्व्यवहारः][३४] । तस्मात्तदेव एकसन्तानाप्त[३३]मित्युच्यते[३५] ।

यदि गोत्रस्थाः पुद्गलाः परिनिर्व्वाणधर्म्मका भवन्ति[३६] अगोत्रस्थाश्च अपरि-निर्व्वाणधर्मका दृश्यन्ते[३७], कस्मात् परिनिर्व्वाणधर्म्मकाः पूर्वान्ताच्चिरेण संसरन्तो न परिनिर्वृता । इति[३२] चेद्, आह । चतुर्भ्यो हेतुभ्यो न परिनिर्वृताः । कतमेभ्यश्चतुर्भ्यः । अक्षणोपपन्नत्वात् प्रमत्तदोषत्वात्, मिथ्योपपन्नत्वादावृतदोषत्वाच्चेति ।

तत्र कतमदक्षणोपपन्नत्वम् । [आह][३४] यत्र चतुष्कुलेषु सज्जनैः सम्यग्गतैः सत्पुरुषैर्न गन्तव्यम् । कान्तारमनुष्येषु, चौरेषु, म्लेच्छेषु । [तत्रो][३८] पपन्ना [ये][३४] ते अक्षणोपपन्नाः ।

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27. should be भवति ?

28. Tib. Cik-tu-dus-ñe.

29. W. यदा च तत् फलं जनयति परिपाचयति च तत्फलम्, तदा यत्किञ्चित् बीजं यत्किञ्चिच्च फलम्, उभेते सम्बध्येते तस्मात् स्थूलमित्युच्येते । Tib. has प्रतीयते instead of उच्यते =tog pa ra gyu ro).

30. Tib. tok-pa-w : सम्बद्धम्, may also be एक सन्तानाप्तम्, ऐकसन्तानिकम्.

31. Tib. and W. Omit and this.

32. W. Omits this.

33. May also be—ऐकसन्तानिकम्

34. Tib. omits this.

35. Hereafter W. adds: z

यावच्च तद्बीजं षडायतनाद् बहिःस्थितं भवति न तावद् भेदलक्षणानि धार-यति……।

36. Tib. in-la.

37. Tib. ta-na.

38. Tib. omits तत्र,

प्रमत्तः[३९] कतमः । आह । यत्र चतुर्षु कुलेषु[४०] सज्जनैः सम्यग्गतैः सत्पुरुषैः गन्तव्ये मध्यदेशे[४१] अचौरमनुष्येषुम्लेच्छेषु उपपन्नोऽपि[४२] सम्भोगसम्पन्नेषु उच्चकुलेषु उपपन्नोऽपि[४२] कामेष्वधिसज्जते परिभुङ्क्ते [च कामान्][४३] [कामेषु चा][४३] ऽऽदीनवं न परिजानाति[४४] स प्रमत्त इति कथ्यते ।

मिथ्योपपन्नत्वं कतमत् । आह । ईदृशो मध्येषु मनुष्येषूपपन्नपर्यन्तो विकसितोऽपि[४५] तीर्थिकदर्शनयुक्तो भूत्वा दानं न भवतीति प्रवृत्त्या, इतो भवान्तरं न ज्ञायत इति न भवतीति पर्यन्तेन विस्तरेण पश्यति कथयति च ।[४६] तत्तीर्थिकदर्शनमपि बुद्धानामनुत्पादे सद्धर्मद्रष्टृकल्याण-मित्राणामभावे प्राप्यते । तन्मिथ्योपपन्नत्वमिति कथ्यते ।

आवृतत्वं [४७] कतमत् । आह । इत्थं मध्येषु मनुष्येषूपपन्नपर्यन्तः पूर्ववद् भवति । लोके बुद्धानामुत्पादो भवति । सद्धर्मद्रष्टृकल्याणमित्राणि चोपलभ्यन्ते । स मूर्खः, विद्या तन्मोहितत्वं, हस्तेन सङ्केतयति, सुभाषितदुर्भाषितानाञ्च धर्माणामर्थं न शक्नोति ज्ञातुम् । आनन्तर्यकर्म करोति च चिरक्लिष्टम् । तदावृतत्वमिति[४७] कथ्यते ।

[तत्र][४३] येभ्यो हेतुभ्यो [विकलत्वात्][४९] पुद्गलानां परिनिर्वाण-धर्मकाणां धार्मिणामपरिनिर्वाणधर्मकाणाञ्च पुद्गलानां परिनिर्वाणं न भवति, ते कतमे । आह । परिनिर्वाणधर्मकाणां पुद्गलानां परिनिर्वाणं भवति ।[४३] तत्र । येभ्यो हेतुभ्यः । विकलत्वात् । परिनिर्वाणधर्मकाः पुद्गलाः न परिनिर्वृताः ते चत्वारस्तद्यथा[५०] यदा बुद्धानामुत्पादः, सद्धर्मश्रवणम् । आनुलोमिक उपदेशः अनुशासन प्राप्तिः । तेषां[५१] [विकलानां][४९] हेतूनामभावे च कुशलमूलानि परिपक्वानि भवन्ति, क्रमशः परिनिर्वान्ति च । अपरिनिर्वाणधर्मकाः पुद्गलास्तु[५२] नियतसमूहे स्थितास्तस्मात् निमित्तप्राप्तिः[५३]

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39. W. suggests प्रमत्तदोषत्वम् ।
40. Tib. चत्वारि कुलानि ।
41. May also be गन्तव्यस्य मध्यदेशस्य ।
42. Tib. उपपन्ना अपि ।
43. Tib. omits this.
44. Tib. परिज्ञायते ।
45. Tib. विकसितेऽपि ।
46. Tib. पश्यन्ति कथयन्ति च ।
47. Should be आवृतदोषत्वम् ।
48. Tib. Zchos–chañ.
49. Tib. omits this, added by us.
50. Tib. तेपि
51. This refers to the four hetus of aparinirvāṇa mentioned above, pp. 6.
52. Tib. omits तु.
53. Tib. tshogs.

स्याद्वा, न वा स्यात् सर्वथा, सर्वथा न [ते] परिनिर्वाणभाजो भवन्ति । तत्र परिनिर्वाण धर्मकाणां पुद्गलानां या विकलता भवति, अभावश्च भवति असन्निधिश्च भवति, तदसद्भावे परिनिर्वान्ति । तस्य कतिप्रत्ययाः । आह । द्वौ[५४] प्रत्ययौ प्रधानो हीनश्च । प्रधानः प्रत्ययः कतमः । आह । तद्यथा सद्धर्माधिपतेयः परतो घोषः, योनिशश्च मनस्कार ।[५५] हीनः प्रत्ययः कतमः । आह । हीनप्रत्यया बहवः । आत्मसम्पत् । परसम्पत् । कुशलो धर्मच्छन्दः । प्रव्रज्या ।[५६] शीलसंवरः । इन्द्रियसम्वरः । भोजने मात्रज्ञता ।[५७] पूर्वरात्रापररात्रं जागरिकानुयोगः । सम्प्रजानद्विहारिता ।[५८] प्राविवेक्यम् । निवरणविशुद्धिः । समाधिसन्निश्रयश्च ।[५९]

तत्र आत्म[६०] सम्पत् कतमा । आह । मनुष्यत्वम् । आर्यायतनेप्रत्या जातिः ।[६१]

## (b) गोत्रस्थाः पुद्गला

आसन्ने पुद्गलः[६२] कतमः । आह । अस्ति[६३] पुद्गलः कालस्यासन्नतया निर्वाणस्यान्तिके । प्रयोगस्यासन्नतया चाप्यस्ति निर्वाणस्यान्तिके । तत्र कतमः कालस्यासन्नतया निर्वाणस्यान्तिके[६४] । कायेऽन्तिमस्थानभावे स्थितः तेन कायेन परिनिर्वाति । तस्मिन् क्षणे आनन्तर्यक्लेशप्रहाणं साक्षात्करोति [एवं] [६५] कालस्यासन्नतया परिनिर्वाणमप्यासन्नम् । योगस्यासन्नतया परिनिर्व्वाणस्यान्तिके[६४] कतमः ।[६६] यो गोत्रस्थो गोत्रे च प्रतिपन्नः । एतत् सर्व्वमेकत्यमभिसङ्क्षिप्योच्यते आसन्ने पुद्गल इति ।

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54. W. adds [आनुलोमिकौ]

55. This is according to W; Tib. has अध्यात्मयोनिशकारश्च
nan/gi/tshul/bshin/yid/byad/pa/

56. Tib. rab/tu/byun/.

57. Tib. zas/kyi/tshod/rig/pa/.

58. Tib. suggests also सम्प्रजन्येन चर्या, Shes/bsin/dusbyod/pa/nid/.

59. Tib. sgrib/pa.

60. Tib. mistakes पर for आत्म

61. Tib. suggests : मध्यदेशे उत्पत्तिः

62. The portion hereafter is not available in the MS. and lost in the original, but preserved in the Tibetan and Chinese translation (s), onwhich this reconstruction is based.

63. Tib. adds here

64. Tib. अन्तिकत्वम्,

65. Tib. Omits एवम्,

66. [पुद्गलः] may be added before कतमः.

अपरिपक्वः पुद्गलः कतमः । आह । यस्य पुद्गलस्य[67] स्थित्वा परिनिर्वाणं, सम्यक्त्वेन[68] निष्क्रान्तश्चरमकायोऽप्राप्तः सोऽपरिपक्वः पुद्गलः ।

परिपक्वः पुद्गलः कतमः । आह । यस्य पुद्गलस्य[67] स्थित्वा परिनिर्वाणं, सम्यक्त्वेन[68] निष्क्रान्तश्चरमकायः समुदागतः स परिपक्वः पुद्गलः ।

अविशुद्धः पुद्गलः कतमः । आह । येन पुद्गलेन आर्यमार्ग उत्पादितस्तत्फलञ्च [यत्][70] तन्न साक्षात्कृतम् । सोऽविशुद्धः पुद्गलः ।

विशुद्ध : पुद्गलः कतमः । आह । स एतद्विपरीतत्वेन वेदितव्यः ।

सर्वं इमे गोत्रस्थाः पुद्गला इति वेदितव्यम् । तद्यथा येऽनिष्क्रान्तास्तेषां प्रविष्टीकरणम् । प्रवेशः, ये परिपक्वांस्तेषां परिपाकः, ये विशुद्धास्तेषां सर्वेषां विशुद्धिः । एषामर्थाय बुद्धा भगवन्तो लोक उत्पद्यन्ते, धर्मचक्राणि च प्रवर्त्तयन्ति, शिक्षावस्तूनि च प्रददति ।

स्वभावस्तद् व्यवस्थानं लिङ्गं पुद्गल एव च ।
गोत्रभूमिर्हिविज्ञेया सर्व्वमेतत् समासतः ॥

श्रावकभूमौ गोत्रभूमिः समाप्ता ॥

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67. Tib. यस्मिन् पुद्गले,

68. May also be सम्यक्तया,

69. May also be प्रविष्टः; —Tib. nes pa lajug pa,

70. Tib. omits this.

# BRAHMASŪTRAKĀRA : AS INTERPRETER OF THE GĪTĀ

*By* P. M. Modi*

The Brahmasūtra undoubtedly contains a few aphorisms in which there is little doubt of the Gītā having been referred to. But the number of aphorisms in the Brahmasūtra which *seem* to deal with certain views in the Gītā is still greater.

Regarding the occurrence of the word "Brahmasūtrapada" in Bha. Gī. XIII. 4 it may be briefly said here that this verse of the Gītā seems to me to refer not to the present Brahmasūtra which is a *sarvaśākhīya* aphoristic work or to a number of an ancient works called Brahmasūtra, each of which might have been a pratiśākhīya Brahmasūtra work, but, it is likely to refer to those sentences or *words* (*padas*) of the accepted Upaniṣads, which form the *viṣayavākyas* in the Br. Sū. I—IV, and which also contain the arguments (*hetus*) — also mentioned in the Brahmasūtras—proving that the topic of the particular *Viṣayavākya* is Brahman. Itself, though the word in the *Viṣayavākya* may be *ākāśa, jyotiḥ, prāṇa,* or some other word. To give an example, in the Śruti *"Sadeva somyedamagra āsīt* (Chā. Upa. VI. 2. 1—3), *"sad"* is a word meaning Brahman and *īkṣati* in *"tad aikṣata"* is the reason (*hetu*) proving *"sad"* to mean "Brahman", thus the sentence of the Upaniṣad is itself possessing the *hetu* or the reason, the argument. If we compare the language of these sentences (*viṣayavākyas*) of the Upaniṣads with the Gṛhyasūtras or such other Sūtras, there is no difference in the language of the two. Thus, the compound word *"brahmasūtra padas"* in Bha. Gītā XIII—4 does not definitely prove the existence of a work called "Brahmasūtra".

There is no doubt that a few Sūtras of the Brahmasūtra clearly refer to the Bhagavad-gītā.

Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 19—21 refer to Bha. Gī. VIII. 23—25. The Gītā view regarding the Śukla and Kṛṣṇa *Gatis* or *śrutis* have been here noticed by the Sūtrakāra as being in conflict with the similar *ayanas* mentioned in the Upaniṣads. What is interesting here is that according to the Sūtrakāra, the Bhagavadgītā holds that a Brahma-

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jñānin who leaves the body at night or in the southern *ayana* (movement of the Sun to the south) does not go to Brahman, inspite of his having attained "Brahmajñāna". Bādarāyaṇa clearly says that this view of the Gītā is *smārta,* not *śrauta,* the view in the Upaniṣads, which say that knower of Brahman comes into contact with the rays of the Sun, even if he leaves the body at night or even in the southern movement of the Sun. The Gītā view is, according to the Sūtrakāra, meant only for the yogins (persons following the Disinterested Action of the Gītā) and it is a *smārta* view, rather than *śrauta.*

Śaṅkarācārya has explained the Sūtras (Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 19—21) in the above sense. But after having explained them as such, he gives a second interpretation of the verses of the Gītā (not of the Sūtras, as he sometimes does), and tries to show that the verses of the Gītā are not in disagreement with the śrutis in question. We must never forget that according to Bādarāyaṇ even the *Kṛṣṇā Gati* deals with a Brahma-jñānīn who is a yogin, i.e., a sage who follows the Disinterested Action taught in the Gītā, while the Upaniṣad śrutis in question deal with a knower of Brahman who is a sannyāsin, a follower of Renunciation taught in the Upaniṣads (accepted by the Sūtrakāra in his system).

Tilak has proved beyond all doubt that the above Sūtras (IV. 2. 19—21), particularly Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 21, deals with the Gītā. As the word "Yoginaḥ" occurs in this Śūtra and also in the corresponding verses of the Gītā (Bha. Gī. VIII. 23—*āvṛttim caiva yoginaḥ*). I make bold to suggest that Bra. Sū. II. 1. 3 (*etena yogaḥ prayuktaḥ*) in which the word "Yoga" occurs, also rejects the Disinterested Action, "Yoga" taught in the Gītā which professes to be clearly "Yoga Śāstra", a Scripture of the Disinterested Action.

Śaṅkara takes Bra. Sū. II. 1. 3 as rejecting *one part* of the Yoga (Dhyāna, meditation) taught e.g., by Patañjali, because the other part of that Yoga is acceptable to the Vedanta Philosophy (of the Sūtrakāra and Śaṅkara). But I have taken "yoga" in the Sūtra as denoting Disinterested Action (Yoga, the Central Teaching of the Gītā), as distinguished from the Sannyāsa of the Upaniṣads. The reason for this suggestion of mine is that Bra. Sū. II. 1. 1—2, in my opinion, clearly say that a very important doctrine of the Gītā, viz., the principle called "Prakṛti", is not acceptable to the author of the Brahmasūtra as a principle (Smṛtyanavakāśa in Bra. Sū. II. 1..). In Br. Sū. I. 4. 23—28, the Sūtrakāra says that "Prakṛti" means "Brahman", not a principle in Brahman or an evolute from Brah-

man. According to the Sūtrakāra who follows the Pratijñā and Dṛṣṭānta of Chā. Upa. VI. 1—4, the world is *directly* created from and it again returns directly into Brahman (See e.g. *'sākṣāt'* in Bra. Sū. I. 4. 25). There are other reasons also, why "Prakṛti" in the Gītā must mean Brahman (Vide Bra. Sū. I. 4. 24, *abhidyopadeśa, atmakṛteḥ pariṇāmaḥ*-25). When "Prakṛti" in the Gītā is thus interpreted by the Sūtrakāra, there is no scope for the verses of the *Gītā*, which mention "Prakṛti" as a principle. This is the doṣa called "smṛtyanavakāśadoṣa". The Sūtrakāra welcomes this charge of his opponent, here, of course, a Vedāntin who followed the Gītā smṛti, because he (the Sūtrakāra) says that there are other Smṛtis, which he will be liable to be charged with as rejecting, if he would accept the Gītā Smṛti. To be free from this charge, the Sūtrakāra, rejects both (or all) the Smṛtis (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 1). His another reason for rejecting "Prakṛti" of the Gītā is that other similar principles (*māyā, avyakta, svabhāva, kṣetra,* etc. etc.) of the Gītā are not found in the Upaniṣads (Bra. Śū. II. 1. 2).

The Yoga of the Gītā is based upon the view that all actions are being done by the principle called "Prakṛti" and that therefore realizing that he is no kartṛ, the sage must continue doing all actions dis-interestedly, rather than take to *sannyāsa* taught in the Upaniṣads. But, to the Sūtrakāra "Prakṛti" as a principle separate or separating from Brahman is not acceptable; so, by this rejection of Prakṛti or really by this interpretation of Prakṛt that it is Brahman Itself, the Sūtrakāra rejects automatically the Yoga of the Gītā (Br. Sū. II. 1. 3).

The above discussion (of Sūtras I. 4. 23—27 and II. 1. 1—3) makes it clear that according to the Sūtrakāra the Gītā teaches "Prakṛti", which is not mentioned in the accepted Upaniṣads (particularly in Chā. Upa. the most acceptable Upaniṣad to the Sūtrakāra); but the Sūtrakāra does not reject the Gītā, nor its Prakṛti; he simply asks us to take Prakṛti of the Gītā (and also of the Sve. Upa. IV. 10) as identical with "Brahman" of the Upaniṣads. This is in fact the novel interpretation given to the Prakṛti of the Gītā by the author of the Brahmasūtra who generally accepts the Oldest Upaniṣads, particularly the Chā. Upa. (Pratijñā-Dṛṣṭānta in Bra. Sū. I. 4. 23) and, as is clear, interprets "Prakṛti" of the Gītā in the light of the Oldest Upaniṣads. In Bra. II. 1. 4—11, some more objections are raised by the followers of the Gītā, but ultimately they have been refused by the Sūtrakāra. In Bra. Sū. II. 1. 12, the Śūtrakāra says "By the foregoing ultimate rejection of Prakrti as a principle separate

or separating from Brahman, the remaining unacceptable views (*śiṣṭāḥ aparigrahāḥ*) of the Gītā Smṛti have also been explained (*vyākhyātāḥ*)." The Sūtrakāra holds that not only Prakṛti, but several other principles and views of the Gītā are not found in the Upaniṣads. He does not discuss them. He discusses only one, viz., Prakṛti. He applies his explanation (*vyākhyā*) of "Prakṛti" to these remaining unacceptable principles or views of the Gītā. The remaining unacceptable ones may be the same as are meant by "*itareṣām*" in Bra. Sū. II. 1. 2, which as said above probably means principles like Svabhāva (Bha. Gī. V. 14), Avyakta (Bha. Gī. VIII. 18 and XIII. 5), Māyā (Bha. Gī. VII. 14), Kṣetra (Bha. Gī. XIII. 3—6 and 26), etc., etc. The Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra II. 1. 12) means that these also should be taken as identical with Brahman.

The Upaniṣads take *ākāśa, jyotiḥ, prāṇa,* etc. etc. (Bra. Sū. I. 1—3), as Brahman from which all beings are born, while the Gītā generally takes "*two* principles working together" or two-in-one as the origin of all beings. Thus, Bha. Gī. VII. 5-6 says that all beings are born of para Prakṛti and the Lord Kṛṣṇa. Bha. Gī. XIII. 26 says that all beings are born of Kṣetra and Kṣetrajña. Bha. Gī. XIV. 2-3 holds that Mahad Brahman and Kṛṣṇa are the source of all beings. (Vide also Bha. Gī. IX. 10). In place of these two principles, the Sūtras teach, only *one,* viz., Brahman as the cause of the creation, continuation and dissolution of the world, as is found in the Upaniṣads. The Sūtrakāra has saved the Vedānta Philosophy from being a semi-dualistic doctrine, which it had become in the Gītā.

In another way also the Sūtrakāra has saved the Vedānta of his days from being a dualistic philosophy, but this would have been a dualism of two spiritual principles, viz. Akṣara and Puruṣa, the nirākāra and sākāra aspects of the Reality. In the days of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Gītā, the sages mentioned merely Akṣara or Avyakta and Puruṣa. I have elsewhere pointed out (In Akṣara: A Forgotten Chapter) a number of passages from these ancient works, which mention these two spiritual principles and which say also that "Puruṣa is higher than Akṣara or Avyakta". One very famous passage in the Gītā is Bha. Gī. VIII. 20—22, and a similarly famous passage from the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads is Kaṭha Upa. III. 10 (*Avyaktāt Puruṣaḥ paraḥ*). The Avyakta or Akṣara was the impersonal reality and it was either the Dhāman (Abode) or Pada (the place, Kaṭha Upa. III 9) of Puruṣa (Bha. Gī. VIII. 20—22, Kaṭha Upa. III. 9) or Viṣṇu (Kaṭha Upa. III. 9), whom the Gītā speaks of Kṛṣṇa. *Both* these were spirits or spiritual, living, cons-

cious principles, and from very ancient times Puruṣa was said to be higher than Akṣara or Avyakta, without as yet there being any definite arguments given for this relation between these two Realities. In Bha. Gī. XIV. 27, Kṛṣṇa is the support of Brahman the *nirākāra* Reality (*Brahmaṇo hi pratiṣṭ hā ham*).

Now, the Brahmasūtra refutes a view that "there is a principle higher than the Avyakta" (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23—37, particularly Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31 which gives the pūrvapakṣa). After it is established (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23-24) that Brahman is Avyakta, an Opponent says, "(The Reality) is higher than this Avyakta because the Avyakta is said to be *setu "Bridge"*, because the measure (*unmāna*) of Avyakta is mentioned, because of the mention of the relation (between the Avyakta and the One who is above it) and the difference (between the two)." I have elsewhere (A Critique of the Brahmasūtra: Part I : Interpretation of the Sūtras), shown that these four "reasons" are given in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (*Setu* in Kaṭha Upa. III. 2, etc.) and that in this Sūtra a view like the one regarding Avyakta—Akṣara and Purṣa in Bha. Gī. VIII 20—22 is mentioned and it is supported by quoting arguments from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. I would call this view the pūrvapakṣa of a Śāṅkara Vedānta School, like that of the Gītā. The Sūtrakāra refutes this pūrvapakṣa and establishes that there is no principle higher than the Avyakta.

Though the author of the Brahmasūtra does not accept the Puruṣa as higher than the Avyakta or the Akṣara, he has undoubtedly made a compromise with the Gītā by admitting that Brahman has *two* aspects, sākāra and nirākāra. He says that Brahman has rūpa (See rūpopanyāsāt in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 21—23) and he also says that Brahman is arūpavat "formless", because "that (formless) aspect is the chief aspect of the Reality (*arūpavad eva hi tat-pradhānatvāt*— Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14." I have established that the author of the Sūtras holds the view that the Śrutis describe the sākāra aspect with the attributes of the nirākāra one and nirākāra aspect with those of the sākāra (See *Vyatihāro viśinṣanti hītaravad*—Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37). Thus, by admitting two aspects, sākāra and nirākāra, of Brahman, both of which are of equal status, the Sūtrakāra has given a new interpretation to the passage of the Bhagavad Gītā like VIII. 20—22, XIV. 27, etc. etc. and also to the similar passages of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads. This interpretation of these passages is in harmony with the passages of the Chāndogya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads, some of which mention only the sākāra while others only the nirākāra, as the final Reality. In fact the Sūtrakāra interprets

this important doctrine of the Gītā regarding the relation of Akṣara-Avyakta and Puruṣa in the light of the view of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads on this point.

In the Brahmasūtra (III. 4. 1—17) there is a discussion regarding the comparative value of *jñāna* and *karman* (*niṣkāma karman*) in the achievement of Mokṣa. Bādarāyaṇa holds that mokṣa (the Puruṣārtha) is achieved by means of jñāna or vidyā (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 1 and III. 4. 8) while Jaimini seems to have believed that *jñāna* is subsidiary to *karman* (action done disinterestedly) in the achievement of Mokṣa. Both of them had believed that *all other* means, *brahmacharya, tapas,* etc. were *subsidiary* (śeṣa); both of them were agreed in taking *tapas* etc. (means other than *jñāna* and *karman*) as *subsidiary*. They differed only as regards the comparative value of *Jñāna* and (disinterested) *Karman*. In these Sūtras, it is not clear that Jaimini took the niṣkāma or disinterested actions as the *main* means of Mokṣa, to which the *jñāna* or *vidyā*—that of the Avyakta or the Puruṣa—was held by him to be subsidiary. But it is not unlikely to assume that Jaimini may have got inspiration from the Bhagavadgītā as regards his view that Action is the chief means for Mokṣa and Jñāna is subsidiary to action. Generally in the Gītā all philosophical doctrines are mentioned only as a means to Disinterested Action. To give an example, the second Adhyāya* discusses various views as regards the destructibility (or otherwise) of the soul when "killed" (as Arjuna believed) in a war, but the purpose of the author is to make Arjuna *fight* disinterested by (Gītā II. 38). To give another example, in the third Adhyāya (III. 27) the doctrine of Prakṛti is stated but only the fact of all actions being done by Prakṛti is stated in order to convince Arjuna that he *was not the real agent;* only the *guṇas* of the Prakṛti were doing all deeds. Here also the doctrine of Prakṛti and its knowledge is made subordinate to disinterested action. Similarly various philosophical doctrines are mentioned in the other Adhyāyas of the Gītā to convince Arjuna that with the knowledge of those doctrines he should fight and do all his duties disinterestedly; so, it is not unlikely that Jaimini may have taken from the Bhagavadgītā the inspiration for his view that

* Three views are mentioned :—

(1) The soul is never killed (Bha. Gī. II. 11—25).

(2) The soul dies, but is always reborn (II. 26-27).

(3) The origin and disappearance of the soul cannot be known (II. 28-29).

action was the chief means to Mokṣa and Jñāna was subordinate to action.

It may here be noticed that the Bhagavadgītā mentions two views: (1) One, that a sage who has achieved Mokṣa in this very life through *jñāna* should, like Janaka and even like Kṛṣṇa, the Yogin and the Yogeśwara, continue performing all his duties disinterestedly, though he can as well take to Renunciation, as did the sages of the Upaniṣads. (2) Another view, that a Mumukṣu should perform actions disinterestedly in order to get Mokṣa and the *jñāna* (or *bhakti* or even *action*) will be a help to such actions, if that *jñāna* accompanies his actions. Jaimini seems to have based his tenet on this second view, while Bādarāyaṇa who did not reject such actions believed that Mokṣa is mainly achieved through Jñāna. He seems to have derived his inspiration from the first view. The details of Brahmasūtra III. 4. 1—17 may be slightly disputable, but as regards the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa there seems to be not much scope for doubt, and hence a comparision of the views of the Gītā (Jñānakarmasamuccaya) with their views throws light on the interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā.

(It may also be noted that Bādarāyaṇa looked upon jñāna as "something to be performed" (*anuṣṭheya*—Bra. Sū. III. 4. 19; A critique of the Brahmasūtra: Part I: Interpretation of the Sūtras, by Dr. Modi).

The Sūtrakāra says that *also* the duties of the order of life (*āśrama*) to which the seeker of Brahman belongs are to be done by him as co-operating with jñāna in the achievement of Mokṣa (Br. Sū. III. 4. 32-33). This view will be a little different from the view of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads which advise the renunciation of all actions for residence in forest for the realization of Ātman; but it seems to have been taken by the author of the Sūtras from the Gītā, in some verses of which we are told to do the *varṇa* and āśrama) karmans for Mokṣa (after a particular knowledge has been achieved). The actions of āśrama are to be done as *sahakārin of* (Co-operating with) the jñāna, says the Sūtrakāra; the Gītā says that knowledge and there is a variety of such knowledge—precedes actions and such actions lead to Mokṣa.

In a succeeding Section the Sūtrakāra says (Sūtras III. 4. 31—39) that even without (*antarā cāpi*) the āśrama (and other) actions, the Mumukṣu may attain Brahman (Br. Sū. III. 4. 36), and special

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Grace (*viśeṣa anugraha*) of the Lord will be upon those Mumukṣus who abandon āśrama karmans in order to meditate upon Brahman. After this, the Sūtrakāra says that "the other course (on which a seeker continues doing *āśrama* duties) is better (*jyāyas*) than this (of abandoning those duties)" (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 39). This view of Bādarāyaṇa can also be traced to Bha. Gī. III. 8, V. 2, which clearly says that *karmayoga* is superior to *karmasannyāsa*.

There is a very important doctrine of Bādarāyaṇa in which the influence of the Bhagavad Gītā is clearly visible. According to my view Bra. Sū. III. 4. 18–26 discuss the question whether Jñāna (of Brahman) is of the nature of reflection, thoughts, thinking, consideration (*parāmarśa*) or whether it is something to be performed (*anuṣṭheya*). Jaimini who believes that Jñāna is subsidiary (śeṣa) to (Disinterested) Action (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 2) holds that Jñāna (of Brahman) is *parāmarśa* (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 18) while Bādarāyaṇa who believes that Jñāna is the main means of Mokṣa (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 1 and III. 4. 8) says that Jñāna is something *"to be performed"* (*anuṣṭheya*). If my interpretation of these Śūtras is correct, we find here the influence, on Bādarāyaṇa, of the view of Jaimini and the Bhagavadgītā. The Sūtrakāra's view is a compromise with the view of the Gītā. The former says that Jñāna is something to be performed and that it is laid down (*vidhi*—in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 20); the Sūtrakāra has not accepted the Yoga of the Gītā, (Disinterested Action), but he has interpreted his Jñāna of Brahman as a thing to be performed and has thus shown the influence of the Yoga on him. Thus, we get from the Brahmasūtra a clue to what could have been the meaning and interpretation of the Gītā Smṛti in his days. Jaimini differed from Bādarāyaṇa and emphasised the action.

The above Sūtras (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 18–26) reveal an interpretation of the Gītā which is till now no where seen. The Gītā teaches *jñāna* or various *jñānas* as help to Disinterested Action. Bādarāyaṇa seems to be influenced by this view of the Gītā and holds that the *jñānas* and according to him it is the jñāna of Brahman—is itself something "to be performed". The Kaṭha Upaniṣad says: "A man having *performed* this knowledge of Brahman does not become sorry (*anuṣṭhāya na śocati*—Kaṭha Upa. V. I.)." The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to this Śruti (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 19-20). The author of the Gītā teaches that with help of knowledge a Mumukṣu *should perform* all his actions instead of taking to Renunciation, so the Sūtrakāra, instead of telling us that Brahman is to be meditated upon in the forest by the Mumukṣu ascetic, tells us that the knowledge of

Brahman is something "to be performed" by the Mumukṣu in this world whether he is a householder or an ascetic. (Vide Dr. Modi's interpretaion of Bra. Sū. III. 4. 19-20 in his Critique of the Brahmasūtra: Part I: System of the Sūtrakāra).

We have seen above that in Bra. Sū. II. 1. 1–12, the author of the Brahmasūtra refuses to give any scope (*avakāśa*) to principles like Prakṛti, Avyakta, Svabhāva, etc. of the Gītā, if these are to be in any way looked upon *as separate from Brahman.* I may suggest here that the remaining Sūtras (13–37) of Brahmasūtra II. 1 seem to me to be the Sūtrakāra's *answers* to arguments and objections raised by the Gītā or a *smārta Vedānta School* of the days of the Sūtrakāra, which has philosophical doctrines based upon the Gītā and some of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads having the same views as the Gītā. It is not possible to go into the detail by interpreting each Sūtra (from Bra. Sū. II. 1. 13–37). But it may be suggested that if the sūtrakāra does not accept a principle like Prakṛti separate from Brahman, either as Its effect or Its attribute, the Smṛti, e.g., the Gītā, would present the following objections:—

1. The creator, creating the world from itself, will be the bhoktṛ, (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 13).

2. That as Brahman is called *jīva,* it will be liable to the fault of not doing a thing beneficial to Itself (Br. Sū. II. 1. 21).

3. As Brahman is without a principle like Prakṛti either as Its effect or as Its very attribute, It cannot create the creation, because in the world we see "a collection" or "a collective aggregate" as doing or making a thing, as producing something (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 24).

4. That the whole of Brahman will undergo a change into the shape of the world, otherwise, Brahman will cease to be "impartite" (*niravayava*—Śve. Upa. Bra. Sū. 1. 26).

5. That Brahman cannot create the creation because it is devoid of senses (*vi-karaṇa*)—(Bra. Sū. II. 1. 31).

6. Brahman cannot be the creator because the creator must have a purpose (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 32).

In my humble opinion all these objections are raised by the followers of the Gītā; the Sūtrakāra also says that the Pāda (II. 1)

deals with the *Smṛiti* and according to the Sūtrakāra Smṛti means Gītā. Though Śaṅkara and others say that "Smṛti" may mean both the Gītā and the Sāṁkhya, yet I have shown that "smṛti" in the Sūtra must mean only the Gītā. Moreover, the objections of Upasamhāradarśana ("the experience that a cause is always an aggregate"), Vikaraṇatva (the fact that Brahman has no senses) are such as cannot proceed from the Sāṁkhya School, and the other objections, *bhoktrāpatti* (Brahman will be liable to become the enjoyer), *itara-vyapadeśa* or *jīva-vyapadeśa* (the fact that Brahman is called *jīva*), are such as the followers of the Gītā can put forth in so far as they believe in the Prakṛti as the cause of the world, (no matter whether Prakṛti be an effect of Brahman or an attribute of Brahman). Thus, the Smṛtipādā seems to throw a flood of light on the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of the Gītā as a Smṛti.

That the Sūtrakāra does not reject the Gītā, but on the contrary welcomes it as a Smṛti pramāṇa is clear from several Sūtras. Thus, in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 25 the verse about the Vaiśwānara of Bha. Gī. XV.[14] is referred to as a pramāṇa for deciding that the Vaiśwānara of the Upaniṣads (Bhā. & Bṛ. Upa.) is the sākāra aspect of the Reality. Also in Br. Sū. I. 3. 23 the verses (6–15) of the fifteenth Adhyāya of the Gītā are mentioned as an authority (as a Smṛti) to decide that Mu. Upa. II. 2. 10 deals with the Puruṣa or the sākāra aspect of the Reality.

There are several occasions in the Brahmasūtra, where the Sūtrakāra says that a particular principle in a particular Śruti is not identical with a similar particular principle in the system of the Gītā–Smṛti or in a particular verse of the Gītā. Thus, the Śukla-kṛṣṇa gatis (Gītā VIII. 23–27) are not the Devayāna-Pitṛyāna Gatis of the Upaniṣads.

When the Sūtrakāra quotes "Pratyakṣa" and "Anumāna" as proofs for his conclusions, he refers to the "Śrūti" and "the Gītā" as authorities, e.g., in Bra. Sū. IV. 4 20 and others respectively.

Thus, the Brahmasūtra accepts the Gītā as an authority but interprets it in the light of the Upaniṣads.

### *CONCLUSION*

We may now summarise the information which we gather from the Brahmasūtra regarding the interpreation of the Bhagavadgītā :

1. Certain Sūtras of the Br. Sū. undoubtedly refer to the Gītā. A good many Sūtras refer to views of the Gītā. There are also some Sūtras which contain views of the Sūtrakāra who was influenced by the views expressed in the Gītā.

*N.B.* :—Bha. Gī. XIII. 4 does not refer to any kind of "Brahmasūtra" either sarvaśākhīya or pratiśākhīya.

2. Bha. Gi. VIII. 23—28 deals with two *gatis* of the Yogin (performer of Disinterested Action) who was Brahma-jñānin (Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 19—21).

3. Bha. Gī. deals with Yoga (Disinterested Action) ; this is different from the teaching of the Upaniṣads and the author of the Bra. Sū. rejects it (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 3).

4. The principle called "Prakṛti" must be identified with Brahman itself (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 23—27), says the Sūtrakāra. But thereby we learn that the Gītā's Prakṛti is its own peculiar principle.

5. Other principles, *like* Prakṛti are not found in the Upaniṣads (Bra. Sū. II. 1-2) and they must be explained in the light of the Śūtrakāra's explanation of "Prakṛti" (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 12). Thus, the principles known as Svabhāva (Gī. V. 14), Māyā (Gītā VII.), Avyakta (Gītā VIII. 18, XIII.), Mahad Brahman Gītā XIV. 2-3), etc. are to be taken as the same as the supreme Brahman, according to Bra. Sū. II. 1. 2.

6. According to Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31—36, the Akṣara and Kṛṣṇa or Puruṣa in the Gītā (e.g. Gītā VIII. 20—22) are not to be related as Dhāman and the occupant of the Dhāman, but as two equally important aspects of the one Supreme Principle called the Avyakta or Brahman. Also Kṛṣṇa is not the supporter of Brahman (Bha. Gī. XIV. 26-27) ; but both would be equally the aspects of the One.

7. Bādarayaṇa notes Jaimini's view that in the achievement of Mokṣa, Jñāna and Karman work together as also held by Bādarāyaṇa, but that Karman plays a greater part. Here both Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini are influenced by the Gītā and we learn that the Gītā taught Jñāna-Karmasamuccaya, in which according to one view the Karman was more important than Jñāna.

8. Also the entire Smṛti Pāda (Bra. Sū. II. 1) explains the Gītā's doctrine or doctrines of Creation and gives details, as known to Bādarāyaṇa.

From all this we learn much about the original meaning of the principles and views of the Gītā, as they were understood by the Brahmasūtrakāra who knew the Gītā correctly and hence tried to explain it away in the light of the Upaniṣads.

# DIṄNĀGA'S REMARK ON THE CONCEPT OF *ANUMEYA*

*By* Bimal Krishna Matilal*

In one's theory of inference, the question 'What is known through inference?' (in other words, 'What is the nature of *anumeya*?') seems to be a pertinent question. In developing his theory of inference, a logician must at a certain point answer this question. In ancient India, at a particular period, a great deal of discussion centered around this crucial question. Diṅnāga, for instance, discussed several alternative answers to this question, none of which he found satisfactory. At the end of his discussion, Diṅnāga gave his own view about *anumeya*. Uddyotakara[1] under *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 5 referred to several other alternative answers to the above question. He criticized, as usual, Diṅnāga's view and mentioned incidentally a new view which he supported by reasons. But inspite of Uddyotakara's critique, Diṅnāga's view seems to have been more acceptable to later logicians like Kumārila.[2]

Diṅnāga's discussion of *anumeya* is contained in the four verses (verses 8—11) of Chap. II of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Although the original Sanskrit work is lost, these four verses are found in Vācaspati Miśra's[3] *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*. Diṅnāga's own *Vṛtti* (to be called *Svavṛtti* henceforward) on these verses are available only in

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1. *Nyāyavārttika*, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1915, p. 50-51.

2. *Mīmāṁsā-ślokavārttika*, Ghowkhamba, Varanasi, 1898-1899, *Anumāna-pariccheda* verses 23—34.

3. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1925, p. 180. The verses are: (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chap. II):

*kecid dharmāntaraṃ meyam liṅgasyāvyabhicārataḥ /*
*sambandhaṃ kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmadharmiṇoḥ //8//*
*liṅgaṃ dharme prasiddhaṃ cet kim anyat tena mīyate /*
*atha dharmiṇi tasyaiva kim-arthaṃ nānumeyatā//9//*
*sambandhe 'pi dvayaṃ nāsti ṣaṣṭhī śrūyeta tad-vati /*
*avācyo 'nugṛhītatvān na cāsau liṅga-saṃgataḥ //10//*
*liṅgasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmeṇānyatra dṛśyate /*
*tatra prasiddhaṃ tad-yuktaṃ dharmiṇaṃ gamayiṣyati //11//*

Tibetan translations.[4] H. N. Randle[5] translated the Sanskrit verses into English in his *Fragments from Diṅnāga*. Randle did not use the Tibetan *Svavṛtti,* but closely followed Kumārila's rephrasing of Diṅnāga's discussion in his English translation of these four verses. It will be shown in this paper that Randle misinterpreted Diṅnāga at least in one place. It will be shown further that while Diṅnāga's main thesis on the nature of *anumeya* (i.e., *dharma-viśiṣṭa-dharmy anumeya*) was well understood by later logicians certain other points in his critique of alternative views were misunderstood and wrongly interpreted even by his successors in Sanskrit philosophy. This misunderstanding started, perhaps, with Vācaspati Miśra or some time after him. It will a'so appear that the later Naiyāyikas like Vardhamāna Upādhyāya did not consult Diṅnāga's own *Vṛtti* on these verses although it is conceivable that the original Sanskrit *Svavṛtti* of Diṅnāga was available at the time they wrote their own work.

It will be necessary for our purpose to give an explanatory translation of the four verses of Diṅnāga in the light of his own *Vṛtti* on them. The Tibetan version[6] of the *Vṛtti* will be used to settle ambiguity of the verses. *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* Chap. II, verse 8 states that, according to some, a different property, *viz.,* fire, is what we infer from the known property (smoke) because the inferential mark, smoke, is in invariable relation with that different property, *viz.,* fire. (Let us call the upholder of this view Opponent A.) According to others (let us call this group of thinkers Opponent B), it is the relation of fire to the place, mountain, is what we know through inference, since both the *dharma* (the property fire) and the *dharmin* (the property-possessor mountain) are known already as established objects. (It is understood that the object of our knowledge acquired through inference cannot be an already known object.)

Criticizing the first view (Opponent A), Diṅnāga says in verse 9: If the property, smoke, is well-known as being related to fire it

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4. Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking edition, Mdo-ḥgrel XCV, Ce. No. 5701 : Vasudhararakṣita. No. 5702 : Kanakavarman.

5. *Fragments from Diṅnāga*, The Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1926, p. 18–21.

6. I like to thank here my esteemed friend Professor Masaaki Hattori of Kyoto University, Japan, who helped me in reading the *Svavṛtti* of Diṅnāga upon the aforesaid four verses.

would not be proper to say that we infer fire from smoke. (It is to be understood that when seeing a body of smoke one remembers the relation between fire and smoke the other property, fire, becomes an already known object, and hence there will be no room for inference). If, however, it is asserted that we infer the other property, fire, as characterizing the locus, mountain, why do we not say that the place itself which possesses fire is what is our *anumeya*.

The second view (that of Opponent B) is criticized in verse 10: The relation (*sambandha*) in question does not possess the two characters (*viz.*, fire and smoke) which an object should possess in order to be an *anumeya*. (It should be admitted that the object of inferential knowledge, i.e., the *anumeya*, is connected, in the first place, with the *sādhana*, *viz.*, smoke, and, for that matter, with the *sādhya*, viz., fire). If the relation between the mountain and fire were our *anumeya*, one would expect in the verbal expression of our inferential thesis (*pratijñā*) a genitive case ending in the word expressing the adjunct of such relation. In other words, the verbal expression would be of the form "There is the relation of fire here (*atra vahneḥ sambandhaḥ*)," and not of the usual form "There is fire here (*atra vahniḥ*)." Inasmuch as the said relation is only implied, not expressed, by the inferential thesis "*atra vahniḥ*" we have no right to call such relation the *anumeya*. Moreover, the said relation is not connected with the *sādhana* (*viz.*, smoke, the inferential mark).

Randle gave a slightly wrong interpretation of this verse.[7] He thought that if the said relation were accepted as *anumeya* we would expect the genitive in the inferential thesis in order to express that relation. He contrasted the usual form of inferential thesis "There is fire in the mountain (*parvate 'gnir asti*)" with the unacceptable form "There is fire of the mountain (*parvatasyāgnir asti*)." He also quoted Pāṇini's rule "*ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe*" II, III, 50 and indicated that the genitive expresses mere relation, and not a *kāraka*-function like the locative. But it is evident from our above interpretation that these remarks of Randle were beside the point. Randle was thus puzzled when he saw that another acceptable form of the inferential thesis "The mountain is fiery (*parvato vahnimān*)" does contain the possessive suffix *matup* (=*mān*) which also expresses *mere* relation.[8]

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7. See *Fragments from Diṅnāga*, p. 20 and footnotes 1 and 2 therein.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 20, footnote 3.

But this confusion stems mainly from his misunderstanding of Diṅnāga's point about the genitive case ending.

Verse 11 gives Diṅnāga's own view about *anumeya*. The invariable connection of the inferential mark, smoke, with the property fire is seen in other places; and the inferential mark, being well established in such other places, leads us to infer the present property-possessor (*dharmin*), *viz.*, the mountain, possessing the property fire.

Uddyotakara inserted the discussion of *anumeya* while he was explaining the meanings of the terms *pūrvavat* etc. in *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 5. The gist of his arguments on the notion of *anumeya* can be stated as follows. What we know by inference through the inferential mark, *viz.*, smoke, is not another property, *viz.*, fire, nor the place itself, nor the existence of fire, nor even the place as possessing fire. The *anumeya*, i.e., the object of inference, must be related to the inferential mark (*sādhana*) as a property to a property-possessor. Moreover, the object of inference should not be known in advance. None of the above things, viz., the property like fire, the place, or the existence of fire, can be said to be related to smoke, the inferential mark, as its property. And all of them become known before we reach the conclusion of the inference. The particular place, viz., the mountain, which possesses fire (*Diṅnāga's* own view) cannot also be regarded as the *anumeya* because smoke, the *sādhana*, is not known to be a property of this complex (*viz.*, the mountain characterized by fire). We do not actually see the place that possesses fire, but we see only smoke coming out of a particular place. If Diṅnāga says that the observed smoke by virtue of its invariable connection with fire leads us to infer the particular place as possessing fire, it might be asked what is meant by this invariable relation (*avinābhāva-sambandha*)? It cannot mean an invariable co-occurrence in the same locus because a body of smoke is sometimes seen hovering in the sky without fire. It is also seen that a body of fire (in a red-hot iron ball) unaccompanied by smoke. Thus, since the invariable relation itself, of smoke with fire, cannot be established beyond doubt, it is not proper to say that we infer the place as possessing fire through the inferential mark, smoke, on the basis of its invariable relation with fire. What we infer is that this body of smoke (perceived on the mountain) possesses fire too (as its qualifying adjective). According to Uddyotakara, in an inferential situation, the particular smoke is perceived and along with it the property of its continuously rising upwards from a particular source and such other characteristics (*cf. sātatya-saṁhatya-ūrdhvagati-svabhāvādayo*

*dharmāḥ*, Uddyotakara, p. 51) are also perceived. What is not perceived is that this particular smoke is also characterized by, i.e., connected with, fire. Hence, this unperceived factor, *viz.*, this smoke possesses fire, is what is grasped by inference. Uddyotakara repeated the same view about *anumeya under Nyāyasūtra* 2. 1. 46.[9]

This view about the nature of *anumeya* is a bit peculiar. Instead of accepting the propositional complex, the mountaining possessing fire, as the object of our inference, we have to admit, under this view, another complex, *viz.*, this particular smoke, because of its certain peculiar characters, is related to fire also, as the object of inference. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[10] mentioned this view about the *anumeya* in a couple of places of his *Nyāyamañjarī*. As far as I can see, this view seems to be a more sophisticated rephrasing of an older view. According to earlier logicians, inference is what extends our knowledge by informing us of the unperceived fact from the perceived one. Thus, inference becomes a function of two terms only, the property to be inferred and the inferential mark.[11] In this theory of inference, the minor term (to use Aristotelian terminology) does not play any important role. From the existence, or presence, of certain property (or, properties) we infer the existence, or presence, of certain other property accompanying the former property. Uddyotakara gave simply a refined version of this theory. Even the well-known case of inference "Sound is non-eternal because it is produced" was understood by Uddyotakara as follows. Sound or noise is a known entity, so is its property of being produced. We infer non-eternalness of sound from the property of its being produced.[12]

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9. *Nyāyavārttika*, Chowkhamba, Varanasi, 1915, p. 258.

10. Compare: *yathā agnimān ayaṃ dhūmaḥ bahulapāṇḍutādidharmayogitvān mahānasāvadhṛtadhūmavad iti, dhūma evāgnimattayā'numīyate.........*" *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Varanasi, 1934, p. 117. Compare also Jayanta's remark on p. 118. Curiously enough Jayanta quoted Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in both the places. But Kumārila, as I have already stated, supported Diṅnāga's view about the nature of *anumeya* although he mentioned other alternative views. Jayanta, on the other hand, had something like Uddyotakara's view in mind.

11. The crudest form of inference was to derive the knowledge of *x* from our knowledge of *y*. Thus, in the earliest phase, the Vaiśeṣikas inferred the existence of soul, mind or the physical space (*ākāśa*) through our knowledge of their qualities such as cognition, desire and sound. In Nyāya tradition also, we infer future rain from the cloud and past rain from the fullness of the river.

12. Compare: *śabdasyātmasattā prasiddhā kṛtakatvaṃ ca dharmas tv anityatvalakṣaṇo 'prasiddha iti/tad-viśeṣaṇo 'yam anumīyata iti*, (*Nyāyavārttika*, p. 51).

Uddyotakara's critique of Diṅnāga's view about *anumeya* sounds all right as far as it goes. It was admittedly unclear in Diṅnāga's exposition whether the locus (i.e., the place), which is the subject of the inferential thesis, should be known to us prior to the inference or not. In fact, Uddyotakara bases his objection upon the principle that the property-possessor (*dharmin*) as well as the inferential mark becomes known to us (*prasiddha*) and hence cannot form a part of our *anumeya*. Besides, Diṅnāga's use of the term "property-possessor (*dharmin*)" was ambiguous. To avoid the Lokāyata critique of inference, Uddyotakara pointed out that not in all cases, our perception of smoke will validate our inference of fire, but only of some particular types of smoke, such as one that continuously rises from a spot. If the locus or the minor term is thought to be a part of the inferential mark (the middle term), we can happily explain the earlier examples of inference found in the Nyāya tradition. Thus, we infer the future rain from the cloud and the past rain from the fullness of the river.[13] Later commentators, however, analyzed these examples in such a way that we get the cloud as the minor term (*pakṣa* or the locus of inference) in the first case and the river (or the fullness of the river) in the second.[14] The middle term or the *hetu* crystalized, in the hand of the later commentators, as some specific character or characters (*viśeṣa*) of the minor term (or *pakṣa*), such specific character being experienced to be invariably related to the inferable property (the *sādhya*) or the major term.

Diṅnāga's theory of logic, like other contemporary systems of Indian logic, was based upon the principle that inference is a function of three terms, the property to be inferred (*sādhya*), the inferential mark (*sādhana*) and the locus (*pakṣa*) or the property-possessor. Diṅnāga's own view about *anumeya* (*viz.*, we infer the propositional complex, the mountain possessing fire) was quite consistent with this principle of inference with three terms. Thus, Kumārila closely followed Diṅnāga in his discussion of *anumeya*. The two views (Opponents A and B) rejected by Diṅnāga were also noted by Kumārila; and he correctly understood the position of Opponent B. Vācaspati Miśra, after quoting verses 8—10 from Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chap. II, inserted the following explanatory remark:

13. See Vātsyāyana's examples under *Nyāyasūtra* 1. 1. 5.

14. Compare Uddyotakara's analysis: *vṛṣṭimanta ete meghāḥ gambhīradhvānavattve sati bahulabalākāvattve sati aciraprabhāvattve sati unnatimattvāt vṛṣṭimanmeghavad iti* (p. 47). Jayanta also gave similar analyses. See Nyāyamañjarī, p. 117-118.

*na hi sambandhadharmatayā liṅgaṃ pramīyate, api tu deśa-saṃgatam ity arthaḥ*. But this explanation, presumably of verse 10d of Diṅnāga's work, was not consistent with Pārthasārathi Miśra's explanation of a similar verse of Kumārila. Randle was rightly puzzled over this discrepancy.[15] But Randle did not notice that in the Nyāya tradition these verses (8–10) of Diṅnāga were given a slightly different interpretation. We shall see presently how Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, the celebrated Naiyāyika of the 14th century, explained these verses in his *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*.

Vardhamāna came across these verses of Diṅnāga while he was commenting on Vācaspati's *Tātparya-ṭīkā* and Udayana's *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*.[16] Commenting on verse 8cd, Vardhamāna remarked: *pakṣāntaram āha| sambandham iti| agnidhūmayor iti śeṣaḥ kṛtaḥ*. This means that Opponent B of Diṅnāga holds that our *anumeya* is the relation between fire and smoke, and not the relation of fire with the mountain. Since Diṅnāga has mentioned the term "*sambandha* (relation)" in his verses without specifying the relata, it is quite possible for someone (who has not read his *Svavṛtti* on these verses) to interpret this as referring to the relation between fire and smoke. In fact, Vardhamāna construed the view of the opponent quite differently from that of Opponent B. Accordingly, I shall call this view that of Opponent C. In plain words, Opponent C maintains that what we infer is the relation between fire and smoke. In verse 10, Dinnāga criticized Opponent B as I have shown above. But here too, Diṅnāga's arguments are couched in such a language that one might, if one is not acquainted with the *Svavṛtti*, interpret them as rejecting the new view, i.e., that of Opponent C. Vardhamāna actually followed this course of explanation in order to be consistent with his earlier explanation. He commented on verse 10ab as follows: *sambandhaṃ sādhyaṃ dūṣayati| sambandhe 'pīti| dvayaṃ vakṣyamāṇam| tatrādyam āha|ṣaṣṭhīti|yadi sambandho 'numeyaḥ syāt tadāgnidhūmayoḥ sambandho 'stīti ṣaṣṭhiśravaṇaṃ pratijñāvākye syād ity arthaḥ*. Here, it has been stated without ambiguity that if the relation were accepted as the *anumeya* one would expect the statement of the inferential thesis to be of the form "There is the relation of fire and smoke." In other words, the two relations of the said relation would have genitive case ending. Vardhamāna con-

15. *Fragments from Diṅnāga*, p. 20, footnote 4.

16. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* by Udayanācārya with a Gloss called *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa* by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911 ff., p. 748-9.

tinued his remarks on verse 10c: *apratijñeyaḥ sambandha ity arthaḥ| kutaḥ dhūmavattvād agnir atrāstīty ata evāsmadabhimatāgniviśiṣṭadeśasādhyād arthato 'gnidhūmayoḥ sambandhasyāvagater ity arthaḥ.* This translates: 'The relation is not expressible in the statement of the inferential thesis. Why? Because we come to know of the *relation between fire and smoke* by implication from what we grasp as the inferential object, *viz.*, the place which is qualified by fire; and this is expressed as "there is fire here because it posseses smoke."' It is evident that Vardhamāna was always referring to Opponent C, and not Opponent B.

If we keep the view of Opponent C in mind, we will, perhaps, be in a better position to understand Vācaspati's remark under Diṅnāga's verse 10d. Apparently explaining verse 10d of Diṅnāga (*viz.*, "*na cāsau liṅgasaṃgataḥ*"), Vācaspati remarked: Furthermore (the relation cannot be our *anumeya* because) the inferential mark is apprehended not as a property of the (said) relation, but as one connected with the place. It seems to me that Vācaspati interpreted "relation (*sambandha*)" in Diṅnāga's verse in the sense of the relation of fire with smoke. Moreover, there is a variant of verse 8cd noted in the footnote of the Kashi edition of *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, p. 180) which reads: "*Sambandhaṃ kecid icchanti siddhatvāl liṅgaliṅginoḥ.*" Such a reading (or, perhaps, a misreading?) suggests that according to some (whom we have called Opponent C), what we infer is the relation between the inferential mark, smoke, and the possessor of such a mark, fire. I suspect that at least some Naiyāyikas understood Diṅnāga's verse 8cd in this way, and that Vardhamāna followed this Nyāya tradition. Commenting on verse 10d of Diṅnāga, Vardhamāna remarked: *na ceti| asau sambandho na liṅgena dhūmena saṁgataḥ sambandhaḥ liṅgadharmo na pakṣadharma ity arthaḥ.* What Vardhamāna meant is, perhaps, that the relation (which, according to him, is the relation of fire and smoke) is not a property of the inferential mark, and that, although the said relation is connected with smoke, it is not connected with the particular smoke which is our inferential mark, i.e., the body of smoke which is resident in the *pakṣa* (the mountain).

To sum up: the above study makes two distinct points—one is philosophical while the other is philological. Inference, in its crudest form, was regarded as a function of two terms where we are concerned only with the inferential mark and the property to be inferred. But gradual awareness of logical problems led the Indian philosophers to analyze inference as a function of three terms. The

minor term (i.e., the locus of inference) gradually rose to prominence. Diṅnāga's conception of *anumeya* is illustrative of this point. The philological (or, historical) point can be understood as follows. One might ask: Was the variant *"liṅgaliṅginoḥ"* in verse 8cd an original variant of the manuscript of Diṅnāga's text? The answer is obviously negative because the Tibetan tradition does not show this variant. Thus, I believe that this variant was the result of a misreading by a later Naiyāyika. We cannot be sure when this misreading actually took place. But this incident eventually led to the confusion of the views of Opponents B and C. One might further ask: Was the *Svavṛtti* of Diṅnāga on these verses (*PS*, Chap. II, 8–11) read by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya when he tried to explain these verses in his *Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa*? Or, was he merely depending upon the explanation suggested by his Nyāya teachers? I believe the second alternative to be correct. This is rather an unfortunate fact. But this is all the same an interesting point because the Sanskrit text of Diṅnāga's *Svavṛtti* might well have been available at the time when Vardhamāna was writing his commentary. According to scholars, the last Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* by Kanakavarman (and Dad-pa (ḥi) śes-rab) was done some time after the last quarter of the 15th century A.D.[17] The Sanskrit text of the *Svavṛtti* was definitely available when Vācaspati Miśra (10th century A.D.) wrote his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, but I doubt whether Vācaspati was directly acquainted with Diṅnāga's *Svavṛtti* on these verses. Otherwise, Vācaspati's remark on Diṅnāga's verse 10d would have been pointless. It is, nervetheless, extremely odd that a well-reputed Naiyāyika like Vardhamāna should explain these verses of Diṅnāga without reading his *Svavṛtti* on them. It is, however, conceivable that in the Mithilā Seminary where vardhamāna Upādhyāya received his education, Diṅnāga's text was not available.

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17. The name of the Tibetan collaborator (Dad-pa (ḥi) śes-rab) of Kanakavarman is not mentioned in *The Blue Annals* which was composed between 1476 A.D. and 1478 A.D. Thus, it seems that Kanakavarman appeared later than the last quarter of the 15th century. For more on this point see the Introduction of M. Hattori's book *Dignāga, On Perception*, H. O. S., 1968, p. 12–20.

# AUTHENTIC WORKS OF ŚAṀKARĀCĀRYA

*By* SANGAM LAL PANDEY*

There are some four hundred and odd works which are passing in the name of Śaṁkarācārya. These fall into three categories, (a) Commentaries, (b) Hymns and (c) Monographs (Prakaraṇas). Dr. S. K. Belvalkar has shown that following commentaries, hymns and monographs can rightly be attributed to Śaṁkarācārya[1] :

(a) *Commentaries*

1. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (alias Śārīrakabhāṣya).
2. Īśa–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
3. Kena–Upaniṣadbhāṣya.
4. Kaṭha–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
5. Praśna–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
6. Muṇḍaka–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
7. Taittirīya–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
8. Aitareya–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
9. Chāndogya–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
10. Bṛhadāraṇyaka–Upaniṣadbhāṣya,
11. Bhagavadgītā bhāṣya.

(b) *Hymns*

1. Ānandalaharī,
2. Govindāṣṭaka,
3. Dakṣiṇā mūrti stotra,
4. Daśaślokī,
5. Dvādaśa pañjikā,

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1. The Vedānta Philosophy part I pp. 218, 222, 226.

6. Bhaja Govindam Stotram,
7. Ṣaṭpadī,
8. "Harimīde" Stotra.

(c) *Monographs*

1. Aparokṣānubhūti,
2. Ātmabodha,
3. Upadeśasāhasrī.
4. Pañcīkaraṇa,
5. Śataślokī.

Dr. Belvalkar has further classified 26 works, the ascription of which to Śaṁkara is doubtful. Of these we shall discuss only the authorship of the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad-cum-Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā which has been enumerated as two works by the learned Doctor. But for this opinion we find no positive evidence and hence we shall call them by their common name the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya. He has again declared some 358 works[2] which can, without hesitation, be put down as Śaṁkara apocrypha.

Before adducing arguments for the genuine works of Śaṁkara we want to state that there are only thirteen works which can rightly be attributed to Śaṁkara, the founder of *advaita* Philosophy. They include the Upadeśa sāhasrī and the Āgama-Śastrabhāṣya (alias the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad-cum-Māṇḍūkya Kārikā-bhāṣya) and all the commentaries which Dr. Belvalkar attributes rightly to Śaṁkara. It is clear that we agree *in toto* with the Doctor in so far as Śaṁkara apocrypha enumerated by him are concerned. Further we include all hymns, attributed to Śaṁkara, in the list of apocryphal works, simply because there is no effective proof for their authentic authorship and further because left to themselves they countenance a philosophical position which is not supported by the accredited works of Śaṁkara. To formulate any opinion on the sole basis of these works and attribute it to Śaṁkara even though it runs counter to his views expressed in his commentaries upon the Brahmasūtra and the major Upaniṣads will assuredly be an absurd adventure. Moreover, the question why

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 218–230.

a dialectician author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya fame should indulge in the composition of cheap pangyrics and eulogiums of hymns cannot be answered by those who attribute them to Śaṁkara. It is not insignificant that neither the author nor the commentator of the Śaṁkara-digvijaya mentions these hymns where the works of Śaṁkara are enumerated.[3]

The so-called doubtful commentaries are all spurious except the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya, for there is no positive evidence to support that they were written by the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Of all the monographs attributed to Śaṁkara only the Upadeśasāhasrī can rightly be taken as a genuine work of his in view of the fact it is referred to by Sureśvara in his Naiṣkarmyasiddhi.[4] Now we shall adduce arguments to show that the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya is a genuine work of our Śaṁkara.

Serious doubts have been raised against Śaṁkara's authorship of this commentary. They are expressed by Professor V. Bhattacarya as follows:

I. There are two benedictory verses in the beginning of the commentary. In the major works of Śaṁkara there are no such benedictory verses. So to write benedictory verses was not a practice with Śaṁkara. "The commentary begins with two verses of such inferior quality that they could never have been composed by Śaṁkara."[5]

II. There is a metrical lapse in the second verse.[6]

III. "This book ends also with three verses of the same kind and quality, *as the benedictory verses in the beginning*, the last of which even contains grammatical inaccuracies."[7]

IV. "In Śaṁkara's Philosophy Ātman is ānandamaya or Ānanda-svarūpa and never Duḥkhātmā."[8] But in the introductory part of

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3. Śaṁkaradigvijaya. 6/60—63.

4. See Naiṣkarmyasiddhiḥ which contains as many as eighteen quotations from the Upadeśasāhasrī.

5. V. Bhattacharya—Śaṁkara's commentaries on the Upanisads, Sir Āśutoṣa Mookerji Silver Jubilee Volumes, Vol. III Orientalia Part II p. 103.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 103 (italics mine).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

the commentary Ātman is said to be duḥkhātmā (duḥkhātmakasya ātmano dvaita prapañcopaśame svasthatā). Similarly the explanation of the word sarvaduḥkhānām in the Kārikā 1/10, as Prājñataijasviśva-lakṣaṇānām, could never emanate from Śaṁkara.[9]

V. It is utterly strange for Śaṁkara to define his Paramārthatattva as beyond the four categories, existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence and neither-existence-nor-non-existence as the author of this commentary does.[10]

VI. The commentary betrays such crudeness of thought and expression in its author that he could never be identified with the great Śaṁkarācārya.[11]

To these doubts the following can also be added:

I. Professor Jacobi says:—"I am inclined to think that this Śaṁkara is not the same as the author of the Śārīrakabhāṣya. The latter would hardly have stated the argument in the form and the terms of an anumāna according to Nyāya principles,"[12] as the former does while commenting upon the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā II. 4.[13]

II. The commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā differs from Śaṁkara, the commentator on the Īśa-Upaniṣad. The former takes the word asaṁbhūti in the Īśa-Upaniṣad verse[14] No. 12 for saṁbhūti whereas the latter rightly reads it as asaṁbhūti.[15]

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9. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

12. Prof. H. Jacobi "Māyāvāda", JAOS Vol. XXXIII, 1913 p. 52.

13. अन्तःस्थानात्तु भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम्।
यथा तत्र तथा स्वप्ने संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते॥

While commenting upon this verse Śaṁkara says—

जाग्रद्दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यमिति प्रतिज्ञा। दृश्यत्वादिति हेतुः। स्वप्नदृश्यभाववदिति दृष्टान्तः। यथा तत्र स्वप्ने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यं तथा जागरितेऽपि दृश्यत्वमविशिष्टमिति हेतूपनयः। तस्माज्जागरितेऽपि वैतथ्यं स्मृतमिति निगमनम्। Here it is clear that five members of the syllogism are explicitly mentioned.

14. The verse runs as thus—

अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽसम्भूतिमुपासते।

15. T. R. Chintamani P.O.C., 1924, p. 420.

III. The commentator on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā is ignorant of the real import of a good many Buddhistic terms like Dharma, asparśayoga, bhūta, abhūta, tāyin, agrayāna and others. Śaṁkara, the author of the Śārīrakabhāṣya was more familiar with Buddhism than any other commentator on the Brahmasūtra. So he could not have betrayed his ignorance of Buddhistic terms in case he were the same as the author of the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya.[16]

IV. The commentator of the Māṇḍūkyakārikā holds the theory of Sphoṭa while the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya criticizes it.[17] So the two authors cannot be one and the same person.

It is not difficult to set these arguments at naught and establish the traditional view that the Āgamasāstrabhāṣya or the Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad-cum-Māṇḍūkya Kārikābhāṣya is in all probability, the first work of Śaṁkarācārya. The fact that it is the first work of his explains well the composition of salutatory verses in the beginning and the end of the commentary. Some grammatical mistakes and metrical lapses are also hence not unaccounted.[18] As regards the composition of the salutatory verses it can further be said that since, Śaṁkara was writing here as a literary novice on the works of the teacher of his own teacher, they were undoubtedly necessitated. More-

16. See Amaranatha Ray's article "Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda, Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies University of London, Vol. VIII, 1935, p. 110.

17. See the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya.

For the criticism of the theory see Śārīrakabhāṣya I. 3. 28.

वर्णेभ्यश्चार्थप्रतीतेः संभवात् स्फोटकल्पनाऽनर्थिका। ....वर्णवादिनो लघीयसी कल्पना; स्फोटवादिनस्तु दृष्टहानिरदृष्टकल्पना च, वर्णाश्चेमे क्रमेण गृह्यमाणाः स्फोटं व्यञ्जयन्ति स स्फोटोऽर्थं व्यनक्तीति गरीयसी कल्पना स्यात्।

18. T. R. Chintamani has offered some explanations for the metrical lapse in the second introductory verse. These are, first, the possibility of a corrupted test; secondly, the literary principle that definitions of metres should be based on existing facts about them and not vice versa and hence Śaṁkara's use of the metre should be recognized as making an original metre and lastly the fact that even great men commit faults unknowingly. P.O.C., 1924, The commentator of the Māṇḍūkya-Kārikās, p. 424.

Ānandagiri also has given an explanation for this lapse.

न च द्वितीयश्लोके चतुर्थपादे वृत्तलक्षणाभावादसांगत्यम् आशंकनीयम्। गाथालक्षणस्य तत्र सुसंपादत्वादिति।

Ānandagiri Tīkā on Āgama Śāstrabhāṣya I/2.

over the practice with him appears to be this that now he writes a work without introductory benedictory verses as, for instance, the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya and now he does with them as for instance the Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya and the Taittirīya-Upanisadbhāṣya.So far as the quality of these verses is concerned it can be said that they are not inferior as Professor Vidhuśhekhara Bhaṭṭācārya holds without showing any reason. They are on the contrary full of profound thoughts and are even imitated by Sureśvara in his Bṛhadāraṇyakavartika. The idea of bringing, out of mere sympathy, for the suffering humanity, the nectar in the churning rod of intellect is the point in instance. This idea is embodied in the last but one concluding verse of the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya and is imitated by Sureśvara in the last but two verses of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka vārtika. It is clear from this that these verses were regarded as exemplary by the disciples of Śaṁkara. That is why they *verbatim* attributed to him what he has done to Gauḍapāda.

The objection that Śaṁkara could never have used the expressions Duḥkhātmakasya (of that which is sorrowful) and Sarvaduḥkhānām (full of all sorrows) betrays the ignorance of advaita doctrines. The latter expression is used as an adjective of Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña[19] which are obviously sorrowful according to advaita. The Professor is not sure whether Ātman is Ānandamaya or Ānandasvarūpa. In reality according to advaita Ātman is not ānandamaya but Ānanda[20] and this *ānanda* is the presupposition of even sorrow[21] and for that matter sorrow is superimposed over it under ignorance. So there is nothing unadvaitic in the expression *duḥkhātmakasya*. It refers to *viśva, taijasa* and *prājña* which are all sorrowful. Moreover in the compound word *duḥkhātmaka* the word *ātmaka* does not mean *ātman* but simply "full of".

It is not strange for Śaṁkara to describe his paramārtha tattva (ultimate reality) as transcending the four categories of existence, non-existence, both existence-and-non-existence and neither-existence-nor-non-existence. The Nāsadīya Sūkta does distinguish ultimate reality from existence and non-existence and thereby from both-existence-and-non-existence. The negative dialectic of the Bṛhadāraṇ-

19. Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya I/10.

20. See Ānandamayādhikaraṇa Śārīrakabhāṣya, I/I/12—19.

21. दुःखज्ञानमपि चिदात्मकत्वात् आनन्द एव।
Brahmānanda Saraswatī in the Gauḍabrahmānandī.

yaka Upaniṣad further pushes this distinction to its extremest climax and states that the ultimate reality is other than everything that can be grasped. As has been pointed out by Dr. Belvalkar, the four-cornered dialectic is in reality derived from the Upaniṣadic dialectic.[22] What is remarkable in the present context is that the commentator of the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā takes these four categories as representing four theories of self and obviously his theory of self is different from each and all of them.[23] Now this is also the view of the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya who has criticized these theories and enumerated them at one place in his comments on the Brahmasūtra I/I/1.

The last argument of Professor Bhattacarya is very vague and is not in consonance with the objective appreciation of the commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Kārikā. The commentary is in reality very clear and deep. This is the reason why it has been commented by several earlier authors before Ānandagiri. The testimony of Ānandagiri as regards its depth and profundity[24] is sure to kill the vague and superficial impression that Professor Bhattacarya seems to foster.

Professor Jacobi's objection has already been replied by T. R. Chintamani.[25] He has rightly pointed out that Śaṁkara does use the five-membered form of Nyāya Syllogism in the Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya.[26] "Apart from this it is to be noted that he is commenting on a passage wherein the five members are plainly set forth (see Āgamaśāstra II. 4). In explaining them he candidly refers to what the author of the passage could have kept in view."[27] In this res-

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22. The Vedanta Philosophy, Part I p. 196.

23. Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya IV. 83.

24. गौडपादीयभाष्यं हि प्रसन्नमिव लक्ष्यते। तदर्थतोऽतिगम्भीरं व्याकरिष्ये स्वशक्तितः।

पूर्वे यद्यपि विद्वांसो व्याख्यानमिह चक्रिरे-
तथापि मन्दवुद्धीनामुपकाराय यत्यते। Ānandagiri Tikā, p. 1.

25. Proceedings of Oriental Conference, 1924, Śaṁkara—The commentator of the Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā, pp. 419—426.

26. Śārīrakabhāṣya, II. 2. 15.

परमाणूनामनित्यत्वविपर्ययः प्रसज्येत्......तस्मात्तेऽपि कारणवन्तः स्थूला अनित्याश्च प्राप्नुवन्ति।

27. T. R. Chintamani, op. cit., p. 421.

pect we should note that Śaṁkara and most of advaitins after him do not set their faces against the five-membered syllogism.

Mr. Chintamani has also replied to the objection based on the difference of interpretations in the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya and the Īśa-Upaniṣadbhāṣya over the phrase *Ye'sambhūti*. The author of the former takes this phrase as *Ye+Sambhūti* (who, Sambhūti) while that of the latter as *Ye+Asambhūti* (who not-sambhūti). This difference is explained by Mr. Chintamani as follows—

"The difference in interpretations is due to the fact that Śaṁkara was at liberty to comment as he liked, when he was dealing with the verse in the *Īśa Upaniṣad*. But in the Kārikās he had to explain them as understood and set forth by Gauḍapāda. The latter takes the word to be Sambhūti in *"andham tamaḥ praviśanti ye sambhūtim upāsate"* as we find in *Sambhūterapavādācca saṁbhavaḥ pratiṣid-dhyate*."[28]

Thus Mr. Chintamani makes Gauḍapāda responsible for this difference. But we think that there is absolutely no difference between the two readings of the line from the Īśa Upaniṣad. Gauḍapāda, the author of the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya and the author of the Īśā Upaniṣādbhāṣaya—all take one and the same reading of the above line. This line is the first half of the following verse:

Andham tamaḥ praviśanti yesaṁbhūtimupāsate /
tato bhūya evate tamo ya u saṁbūtyām ratāḥ //[29]

Now here in the first line there is a word *asaṁbhūti* and in the second line another word, *sambhūti*. Gauḍapāda refers to this second line in his Āgamaśāstra chapter 3 verse No. 25 wherein he uses the word *saṁbhava*. The commentator on this work quotes the first line but uses the word *saṁbhūti* just after the quotation. From this Mr. Chintamani and others infer that the commentator has read *saṁbhūti* in the word *asaṁbhūti*—a fact which is provided by the grammatical rule of saṁdhi. But this is a mistake, for the simple reason that though the commentator has quoted only the first line, he really means to refer to the second line. He has only referred to the passage by quoting the first line. So even the commentator of the Āgamaśāstra does not read saṁbhūti in the first line

28. Āgamaśāstra 3/25 and Mr. Chintamani, op. cit., p. 424.
29. Īśa-Upaniṣad, 12.

of the above verse. This explanation is fully indicated by Ānandagiri also.[30]

The objection that the commentator on the Āgamaśāstra is ignorant of many Buddhistic terms is baseless. The commentator knows the four-cornered dialectic and the reality which is beyond the four corners (Koṭis);[31] he knows Śūnyavāda. Further he is fully acquainted with Vijñānavāda, Bāhyārthavāda and Vijñānavādin's criticism of Bāhyārthavāda.[32] The Buddhistic terms upālaṁbha, ajāti, śūnya vijñāna and bhūta are rightly used by him. Then what is the reason that some people charge him with the misuse of Buddhistic terms? This charge so far as we know, is mainly based on three words agrayāna, asparśayoga and Buddha. These three words are not used by the commentator in the Buddhistic sense. Let us examine them.

There occurs a word agrayāna in the Āgamaśāstra chapter IV verse No. 90. Professor V. Bhattacarya says that "all the editions and MSS examined have °yāṇa instead of °yāna, as expected."[33] Now if all the editions and manuscripts of the Āgamaśāstra have the word agrayāṇa, it is unjust to ignore it and read instead agrayāna. So if the commentator of the Āgamaśāstra has explained the word agrayāṇataḥ as prathamataḥ, (first of all), this is perfectly right. Modern scholars with Buddhistic predilections want to distort the text to suit their own purpose by rendering agrayāṇa into agrayāna and identifying the latter with mahāyāna. There is nothing wrong with the reading agrayāṇa in the text and its commentary.[34] The word agrayāna thus does not occur in the text and its commentary at all.

The word asparśayoga occurs twice in the Āgamaśāstra II. 39 and IV. 2. Professor V. Bhattacarya says that the word does not occur in the Upaniṣad though Śaṁkara says on III. 39, .....that it is well-

30. Ānandagiriṭīkā on Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya, III. 25.

सम्भूत्युपासनाया मन्त्रार्धेनाद्येन निन्दां विधाय ततो भूय एवेत्यादिनोत्तरार्धेन सम्भूतेरुक्ताया देवताया हेयत्वमुपपाद्यते।

31. Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya, IV. 83, IV. 90.

32. *Ibid.*, IV. 28.

33. The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda by V. Bhattacarya, p. 199, footnote 1.

34. See the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad with Gauḍapāda Kārikās and the Bhāṣya of Śaṁkara by M. N. Divedi, p. 90.

known in the Upaniṣads.[35] He then shows that the word indicates the ninth stage of Buddhist meditation[36] viz., anupūrvavihāra or saṁjñāveditanirodha. What is remarkable in this context is that the learned Professor could not show whether the word asparśayoga has been used in Buddhistic literature before or after Gauḍapāda. The word, it seems, was coined by Gauḍapāda and has since then become the sole property of advaita literature. The Professor has shown the ideological parallelisms, of this term in the Buddhist literature. Śaṁkara, the commentator, in exactly the same manner has shown that the word summarizes the Vedāntic discipline described in the Upaniṣads and the Smṛtis. Mr. T. R. Chintamani, therefore, rightly remarks that "the commentator wishes to indicate that the idea conveyed by the phrase asparśayoga is to be often met with in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā."[37]

The word 'Buddha' both in the singular and the plural is used several times in the Āgamaśāstra. From this Professor Bhattacarya infers that the word refers to the Buddha or his followers. Upanisad-brahmayogin uniformly understands this word in the sense of the enlightened. Śaṁkara takes this word in the last but one verse for the Buddha though in all other places for simply the enlightened. There is no conclusive proof for the view that the word "Buddha" everywhere refers to the Buddha or his followers. So Śaṁkara, the commentator on the Āgamaśāstra cannot be charged with misinterpretation of the word 'Buddha'.

What has been demonstrated with regard to the words asparśa-yoga, agrayāṇa and buddha can also be done with regard to other words with ignorance of which Śaṁkara is generally charged by those who are interested more in proving the Buddhistic influence upon Gauḍapāda than finding out the real import of the use of his words.

As regards the last objection to Śaṁkara's genuine authorship of the commentary it can be said that a minor change of philosophical views cannot discredit his authorship. It is just possible that Śaṁkara at first might have been tempted to bring the force of sphoṭavāda to support his advaita while later on he gave it up in

35. Op. cit., p. 94.

36. Op. cit., 95-96.

37. Proceedings of Oriental Conference, 1924, op. cit., p. 421.

order to establish it independently of that doctrine which was discredited by such eminent scholars as Upavarṣa of the vṛttikāra fame.

Thus there is no argument to point out that the author of the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya is not the same person as that of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. The following additional arguments positively prove that the two commentaries were written by the same person.

I. Śaṁkara is traditionally credited with the authorship of ten commentaries upon the Upaniṣads which include the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya also but for which the tradition in this respect cannot be substantiated.

II. The commentary has a gloss by Ānandagiri who has commented on almost all the genuine works of Śaṁkara. He refers to many other glosses which were written upon it before him. The presence of early commentaries upon this commentary thus proves that it was regarded as a genuine work of Śaṁkara by very many earlier advaitins.

III. Some of the expressions of the commentary, as we have seen, are followed by Sureśvara.

IV. The commentary evidences all the rigour of logical subtlety that is Śaṁkara's. It must have been written by Śaṁkara the spiritual grandson of Gauḍapāda. The former must have been taught by the latter otherwise he would have commented *in extenso* upon the Kārikās of the second chapter of the Āgamaśāstra from the 21st to the 28th which deal with the numerous theories of cosmology and need much elaboration at the hands of those who fail to understand the main teaching of Gauḍapāda. For Śaṁkara, as for Gauḍapāda, cosmology was not the central doctrine of advaita and hence he summarily passed over these cosmological passages.[38] The emphasis that is found in the Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya I/7 and III/14-15 is on indifference to cosmology and all-concerted attention to self-knowledge—a subject which finds almost parallel expressions in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya I/4/14. This parallelism undoubtedly proves the identity of the two authors.

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38. प्राणादिश्लोकानां प्रत्येकं पदार्थव्याख्याने फल्गुप्रयोजनत्वात् यत्नो न कृतः।
—Āgamaśāstrabhāṣya II, 28.

Now about the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma has cast a doubt on Śaṁkara's authorship of this commentary.[39] His arguments are two. First, the style of the Gītābhāṣya is common place in comparison to that of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. Secondly there is a mistake of quotation in the commentary which assuredly cannot be expected from Śaṁkara, the author of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. The mistake is this: two verses from the Kāṭhaka Upaniṣad of the Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā of the Kṛṣṇa Vajurveda are quoted in the commentary as ṛk and not as yajus which, obviously they are.

But these doubts are baseless. The first is insignificant, for a slight difference of style cannot establish a different authorship. The second is also volatilized by consideration of the meaning and usage of the term ṛk which is used for a metrical mantra of the Veda, be it Ṛgveda, Yajurveda or Sāmaveda.[41]

The following arguments can be produced to prove that the Bhagavadgītābhāṣya is a genuine work of Śaṁkara.

I. The commentary is commented, among others, by Ānandagiri and Madhusūdana Saraswatī. They attribute it to Śaṁkara.

II. The author and the commentator of the Śaṁkara-digvijaya attribute the commentary to Śaṁkara.

III. Philosophically speaking there is nothing in the commentary which goes against the views of advaita propounded in other works of Śaṁkara. It is, rather, an elaborate vindication of the advaita discipline of jñānamārga (path of knowledge).

IV. Śaṁkara has been known as the first ācārya—a title which is generally given to the one who writes commentaries on all the three bases of Vedānta (Prasthānatraya), the Upaniṣads, the Brahmasūtra and the Bhagavadgītā. Rāmānuja and others in this respect took lessons from Śaṁkara for writing commentaries upon these sources.

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39. Poona Orientalist II No. I, 1937. Are the Gauḍapāda Kārikās Śruti? p. 21.

40. Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya 2/19-20.

41. Nyāya Kośa, p. 184

पादेनार्थेन चोपेता वृत्तबद्धा मन्त्रा ऋचः।

Moreover Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma himself has waived, once and for all, the objections that are usually repeated against Śaṁkara's authorship of the commentary. He has produced the following voluminious textual evidences to prove that Śaṁkara wrote the commentary:—

V. "The critics of Śaṁkara, especially, Rāmānuja and Madhva, have credited Śaṁkara with the authorship of his Gītābhāṣya. The evidence of such powerful opponents of Śaṁkara as these is more deserving of attention than all the assurances of his followers put together, the majority of whom are again later than both Rāmānuja and Madhva."[42]

VI. "Abhinavagupta objects in his commentary upon the Bhagavadgītā to the interpretation of all his predecessors including Śaṁkara."[43]

VII. "It appears, on Jaya Tirtha's showing in his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, that Bhāskara refuted Śaṁkara's interpretation of the Gītā in a separate commentary of his own,"[44] which is not extant now.

Such early writers as Bhāskara, Abhinavagupta and Rāmānuja have thus attributed the Gītābhāṣya to Śaṁkara. This is indeed a very weighty evidence. It is strange that in view of this evidence Mr. Sarma should have raised doubts against Śaṁkara's authorship of the commentary. Perhaps his doubts reflected the views of others and not his own.

No body has, in so far as we know, doubted Śaṁkara's authorship of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya. It is indeed above suspicion. Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā and Vācaspati Miśra's Bhāmatī, apart from Bhāskara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, are the earliest works which attest to Śaṁkara's authorship of this *magnum opus*. The presence of such early commentaries and references has made his authorship of the commentary unchallengeable.

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42. Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, Vol. XIV, 1932-33. "Śaṁkara's authorship of the Gītābhāṣya," p. 45.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

Coming to the Upanisadic commentaries it can be said at the very outset that Śaṁkara's authorship of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣadbhāṣya and the Taittirīya Upaniṣadbhāṣya is above suspicion in view of the presence of Sureśvara's Vārtikas on them. Sureśvara says that the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣadbhāṣya called Vṛtti[45] and the Taittirīya-Upaniṣadbhāṣya[46] were written by Śaṁkara himself. Despite this testimony of Sureśvara, an immediate disciple of Śaṁkara, if some people doubt Śaṁkara's authorship of the Taittīriya Upaniṣadbhāṣya mainly because there are three introductory verses in it, then it means that they are interested more in figments than in truths. MM Gopinatha Kaviraja regards the commentary as a genuine work of Śaṁkara's but states that the introductory verses are certainly interpolations.[47] The third verse is found in the Taittirīya Vārtika also. It seems that Sureśvara has incorporated or quoted it in his Vārtika from the commentary of Śaṁkara. The second verse occurs with a slightly variant reading in the Upadeśa-sāhasrī in the seventeenth prakaraṇa.[48] The first verse is exactly the same in meaning as the first verse of the eighteenth prakaraṇa

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45. यामस्मद्गुरुरेव वेदशिरसामैकात्म्यतात्पर्यंतो
वृत्तिं सज्जनशंकरीं सुविमलां नानानयोद्द्योतिताम् ।
चक्रे काण्वसमाश्रितोपनिषदो दुस्तर्कदोषापहाम्
श्रद्धामात्रबलेन वार्तिकमिदं तस्याः समासात्कृतम् ।।

—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārttika, 6/5/25.

—Śaṁkara calls this commentary Vṛtti.

इयमल्पग्रन्था वृत्तिरारभ्यते ।

—Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣadbhāṣya (Introduction).

46. तैत्तिरीयक सारस्य वार्तिकामृतमुत्तमम् ।
मस्करीन्द्रप्रणीतस्य भाष्यस्यैतद् विवेचनम् ।

—Taittirīya-Vārtika, III. 10. 90.

47. Op. cit., p. 30.

48. यैरिमे गुरुभिः पूर्वं पदवाक्यप्रमाणतः ।
व्याख्याताः सर्ववेदान्तास्तान्नित्यं प्रणतोऽस्म्यहम् ।

—Taittirīya Upaniṣadbhāṣya, 2nd verse.

पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञै र्दीपभूतैः प्रकाशितम् ।
ब्रह्मवेदरहस्यं यैस्तान् नित्यं प्रणतोऽस्म्यहम् ।

—Upadeśa sāhasrī 17/2.

of the Upadeśasāhasrī.[49] In view of these facts it is not correct to say that these verses of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad-bhāṣya are interpolations. The whole commentary including the introductory verses is a genuine work of Śaṁkara.

Professor V. Bhattacarya has rightly pointed out that the Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya and the Nṛsiṁhottaratāpinīya Upaniṣadbhāṣya which are passing in the name of Śaṁkara are not his genuine works.[50] The Kena-Upaniṣadbhāṣya is in two forms, the Pada-bhāṣya (word-commentary) and the Vākyabhāṣya (Sentence-commentary). Professor Bhattacarya has, again, very rightly proved that the author of the Padabhāṣya is different from that of the Vākyabhāṣya in view of the fact that there is a divergence of interpretations of the Upaniṣad in them.[51] So Śaṁkara should be credited with the authorship of the former only.

The advaita tradition attributes to Śaṁkara the authorship of ten commentaries upon the Upaniṣads which are Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Taittirīya, Chāndogya, Īśa, Kaṭha, Kena, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya and Aitareya. Ānandagiri's gloss is found on all of them. He attributes them to Śaṁkara. There is nothing in them which goes against advaita or Śaṁkara's authorship. So we can regard them as his genuine works. But recently Mr. M. D. Gadgil has shown that the Īśa-Upaniṣadbhāṣya is spurious.[52] He has concentrated on Śaṁkara's comments on the verses 9, 10 and 11, especially, on the words vidyā, avidyā, ubhayam saha and amṛtatvam and has called them as interpretation "A". Then he has very strenuously tried to gather another interpretation from the Kaṭha-Upaniṣadbhāṣya,

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49. यस्माज्जातं जगत्सर्वं यस्मिन्नेव प्रलीयते ।
येनेदं धार्यते चैव तस्मै ज्ञानात्मने नमः ।।

—Taittirīya Upaniṣād-bhāṣya 1st verse.

येनात्मना विलीयन्ते यद्भवन्ति च वृत्तयः ।
नित्यावगतये तस्मै नमो धीप्रत्यगात्मने ।।

—Upadeśasāhasri 18/1.

50. Śaṁkara's commentaries on the Upaniṣads—Sir Āśutoṣa Mookerji Silver Jubilee Volumes, Vol. III, Part 2, 1925, pp. 102—109.

51. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-2.

52. Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1943—Is Bhagawān Śaṁkara the author of the Bhāṣyam on the Īśa-upaniṣad? pp. 117—136.

Aitareya Upaniṣadbhāṣya, Taittrīya Upaniṣadbhāṣya and the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya of Śaṁkara and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārtika of Sureśvara wherein the above verses are referred to and a different interpretation is given. This interpretation is called by him B. Now his conclusion is that B is the correct interpretation and as it is not found in the Īśa Upaniṣad-bhāṣya, we may regard it as a spurious work of Śaṁkara's. Now A means the Synchrony of karma and upāsanā. Here vidyā, avidyā, ubhayam saha and amṛtatvam respectively mean worshipful meditation (upāsanā) and "Karma" simultaneously" and "relative immortality". Now what is B? B means the succession of karma and jñāna or karma-jñāna-krama-samuccaya. Here vidyā, avidyā, ubhayam saha and amṛtatvam respectively mean "knowledge" and karma" "successively" and "real immortality". Mr. Gadgil says that the explanation B is "the exact bhāṣyam by Śaṁkara."[53] He himself accepts that "neither the interpretation A nor the interpretation B is opposed to the main principles of Advaita Philosophy.[54] But what he has ignored is this that first he has not considered the appendix that is found in the Īśa-Upanisad-bhāṣya and secondly, he has not given thought to the fact that Śaṁkara is in the habit of giving several interpretations to one and the same text, all of which are undoubtedly in consonance with advaita. In the appendix he has criticized the Krama-samuccaya of Karma and jñāna[55]—a fact which undermines the very foundation of B. In fact the locus of knowledge is not the same as that of Karma. Hence Karma and knowledge can be combined neither simultaneously nor successively. If the locus of karma is not the same as that of knowledge, how can there be successive combination? Hence the interpretation B is not as correct as A. Śaṁkara anticipated B in the appendix and rejected it.[56] As regards Sureśvara's denunciation of synchrony of vidyā and avidyā, which has been pointed out by Mr. Gadgil,[57] it can be said that there is nothing in the Īśa-Upaniṣad-

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53. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

55. क्रमेणैकाश्रये स्यातां विद्याविद्ये इति चेत् ? न, विद्योत्पत्तौ अविद्याया ह्यस्तत्वात् तदाश्रयेऽविद्यानुपपत्तेः। न हि अग्निरुष्णः प्रकाशश्चेति विज्ञानोत्पत्तौ यस्मिन्नाश्रये तदुत्पन्नं तस्मिन्नेवाश्रये शीतोऽग्निरप्रकाशो वेति अविद्याया उत्पत्तिर्नापि संशयोऽज्ञानं वा।

56. केचित् संशयं कुर्वन्ति। अतस्तन्निराकरणाय संक्षेपतो विचारणां करिष्यामः।

57. Op. cit., pp. 128-129.

bhāṣya to obstruct it. Sureśvara simply points out that in the present context ubhayam saha should mean only successive combination of avidyā and vidyā. An intelligent reading of Advaita Philosophy will indicate that karma and upāsanā can be combined either simultaneously to a small extent only or successively in their fullest meaning. Hence Sureśvara was pointing out to the successive combination of Avidyā and Vidyā, Karma and Upāsanā for relative immortality. As regards another minor objection of Gadgil[58] that Śaṁkara reads *asambhūti* into the word *sambhūti* in the verse 14, it can be said that the logic of the context shows that Śaṁkara's reading is the only possibility. Hence there is nothing in the commentary which may go against Śaṁkara's authorship. In fact Śaṁkara himself wrote the commentaries on the major Upaniṣads including the Īśa as Ānandagiri says.[59] Now our investigation gives the following list of the genuine works of Śaṁkara—

I. Śārīrakabhāṣya or Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya.

II. Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

III. Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

IV. Taittirīya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

V. Aitareya-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

VI. Īśa Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

VII. Kena-Upaniṣad-pada-bhāṣya.

VIII. Kaṭha-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

IX. Praśna-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

X. Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad-bhāṣya.

XI. Āgama Śāstra-bhāṣya.

XII. Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya.

XIII. Upadeśasāhasrī.

*Abbreviations*: JAOS=Journal of American Oriental Society; POC=Proceedings of Oriental Conference.

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58. Op. cit., p. 131. Śaṁkara does not read "vināśa" for avināśa". But Mr. Gadgil charges Śaṁkara with this mistake also.

59. ईशाप्रभृतिभाष्यस्य शांकरस्य परमात्मनः।
मन्दोपकृतिसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रणीतं टिप्पणं स्फुटम्।

# PRE-ŚAṄKARA UPANIṢADIC PHILOSOPHY AS EXPOUNDED BY KĀLIDĀSA

*By* T. K. Gopalaswamy Iyengar*

The horizons of the Vedanta philosophy and the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa were very dim till Śaṅkarācārya wrote bhāṣya thereon, and expounded nirviśeṣādvaita doctrine. The Buddhism which originated in the fifth century B.C. was rampant till tenth century A.D. and its influence wrought much havoc on the vedic sacrifices on the one hand and adversely attacked the infallibility and the supremacy of the Vedas, on the other. Consequently the attention of the vedic followers was largely bestowed upon the restoration of the vedic karmas besides criticising the attacks of the anti-Vedic followers. Thus Pūrvamīmāṁsā based on Jaimini sūtras and the bhāṣya of Śabara thereon loomed large in the eyes of scholars to be the texts to be defended from critic's attacks. Kumārila who lived in the sixth century A.D. dedicated his entire life for the uplift of Vedic religion attacking the Buddhists who were the chief opponents. The entire energies of the Vedic scholars were directed towards the Buddhists and there was no time perhaps left to bestow their thoughts upon the Upaniṣadic teachings, much less on the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. About seventh century A.D. Gauḍapāda wrote his kārikās on the Māṇḍukyopaniṣad and even that did not escape the introduction of Buddhistic thoughts forced into it. Lastly Buddhism was fatally attacked by Śaṅkarācārya in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, and the Vedantic tenets were established on the lines of Nirviśeṣādvaita.

Though Śāṅkarācārya quotes some ācāryas prior to him in his bhāṣya, precise information regarding the import of Brahmasūtras is not available and even if available it is not conclusive. Even according to Sri Rāmānuja, Bodhāyana's vṛtti or gloss alone was available and not a bhāṣya, analogous with that of Śabarabhāṣya on the Jaiminisūtras. As such, the period from the inception of the sūtra to the period of Śaṅkara is a dark-age when Vedanta philosophy and the philosophy of the Brahmasūtras were not handled so freely as in the later ages after Śaṅkarācārya. As such, what the nature of philosophy that was known during the ages prior to Śaṅkara was, is the question that will confront any dispassionate scholar. The

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only source that can be tapped can possibly be the works of great poets who had woven the upaniṣadic thoughts into their works with the main idea of propagating Vedic religion. One such poet who contributed in great measure towards the exposition of the vedic tenets is the celebrated Kālidāsa and undoubtedly it is the greatest contribution that was made towards the successful solution.

Kālidāsa exercises his keen intellect in tackling the conflicting upaniṣadic passages and lays out a principle of interpretation to reconcile them hormoniously. That Kālidāsa evinces keen interest in portions of the Vedas (Karmakāṇḍa and Jñānakāṇḍa) is evidenced in the *Mālavikāgnimitra*.[1] He is pre-eminent among poets to incorporate in his works the Upaniṣadic conception of the body-soul relationship (Śarīraśarīribhāva) between the Supreme Brahman on the one hand, and the entire universe comprising both the sentient and insentient beings (cetana and acetana prapañca) on the other. Kālidāsa propounds this age-old theory of organistic conception as the *summum bonum* of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. He has a synthetic vision of the eternal verities as expounded in the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and Brahmasūtras. His aim and theme are directed towards the perpetuation of Vedic Dharma. The three benedictory stanzas or the Nāndīs in his three dramas, 'Mālavikāgnimitra, Śākuntala' and 'Vikramorvaśīya' put together, testify to his deep erudition in the prasthānatraya (the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and Brahmasūtras). The three nāndī-ślokas convey the following import :

"May Śiva, dispel your tendency dominated by Tamas (darkness and ignorance) so as to make you behold the virtuous path. O ! He, who though possessing magnificent powers which confer in many ways fruits on those who bow down, who himself clad in the elephant's hide, who though having his body united with that of His beloved is the pre-eminent among the ascetics whose minds are free from all sensual pleasures and who though sustaining the whole universe with his light bodily forms is yet quite bereft of self-conceit."

(*Mālavikāgnimitra*)

"May Śiva endowed with eight visible bodily forms protect you with eight forms that is, I. that which is the first creation of the creator (water) 2. that which conveys to the gods the oblation

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मंगलालंकृता भाति कौशिक्या यतिवेषया।
त्रयीविग्रहवत्येव सममध्यात्मविद्यया।

offered according to the Vedic rites (fire) 3. that which is the sacrificer and the devotee, 4 and 5 those two entities that regulate time (sun and moon) 6. That which has sound for its quality and which pervades the Universe (ether) 7. that which they call the source of all seeds (earth) and 8. that by which all creatures breathe (air).

(*Śākuntalam*)

"May Siva, whom the seers describe in the Upaniṣads as the only Supreme Being (Puruṣa) pervading the entire universe of whom the epithet (Supreme Lord) not applicable to any one else is quite significant, who is searched within the hearts by those who long for salvation by restraining their vital airs, prāṇa and others, and who is easily attained through steady devotion and contemplation, grant you the highest beatitude."

(*Vikramorvaśīya*)

The third Pāda of the ñandī in Mālavikāgnimitra viz. 'He who is bereft of pride even though He supports the entire universe with His eight bodily forms* is the master-key to unlock the organistic principle or body-soul relationship which Kālidāsa emphasises referring to the Supreme Being and the universe. Kālidāsa treats Śiva or Brahmā or Viṣṇu as the Supreme Being and as different phases of one Godhead (एकैवमूर्तिः विभिद्ये त्रिधा सा)

The nāndīs of both the 'Mālavikāgnimitra and Śākuntala disclose that the Lord supports the entire universe with his eight visible ( प्रत्यक्षाभिः तनुभिः ) bodily forms. The term, 'tanubhiḥ' is highly significant as a pointer to show that the sentient and non-sentient beings which compose the universe constitute his śarīra. In other words the Lord is considered as the Supreme soul to whom the entire universe (kṛtsnam jagat) assumes the role of a body to fulfil His purpose. As such the sentient beings (jīvas) are absolutely dependent upon Him like the non-sentient inert matter. Kālidāsa purposely enumerates the eight visible bodies of God Śiva to appeal even to a layman that the universe stands related to Him as a body. Just as the human body is absolutely passive and has no will of its own except to cater to the needs and purpose of the soul which sustain the body, so also the sentient beings ranging from Devas to the animals and plants are entirely dependent upon Him and Him alone.

To confirm this principle, Kālidāsa mentions the instances of sentient beings like the visible and powerful luminaries, the Sun and the Moon who rise and set without any rest traversing through the firmament under the category of visible forms ( प्रत्यक्षाभिः तनुभिः) Kālidāsa describes the plight to which even the powerful luminaries are reduced on the day following the full-moon day, namely, the simultaneous rising of the sun and the setting of moon and draws an appealing inference that the entire universe is being controlled by one supreme Soul.

यात्येकतोऽस्तशिखरं पतिरोषधीना-
माविष्कृतोऽरुणपुरस्सर एकतोऽर्कः।
तेजोद्वयस्य युगपद्व्यसनोदयाभ्यां
लोकोनियम्यत इवात्म दशान्तरेषु ॥

(*Śākuntala* IV. 2)

On one side the moon, the lord of the medicinal herbs is going to the peak of the western mountain. On the other is the sun having Aruna as his precursor. By the simultaneous rising and setting of the two luminaries, this world seems to be governed (niyamyate) in all vicissitudes of life).

Kālidāsa appropriately uses the Upaniṣadic word 'niyamyate' to indicate that there is a controller 'niyantā' by whom the network of destinies of all the living beings is checked in all the vicissitudes of the life. While giving expression to this idea, Kālidāsa is sure to have had in his mind famous upaniṣadic passage."

भीषास्मात् वातः पवते। भीषोदेतिसूर्यः। भीषास्मादग्निश्चेन्द्रश्च।
मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चम इति"

(The wind blows out of fear from Him. The Sun, Fire, Indra and Yama discharge their duties fearing Him). (Taittirīya Upaniṣad). The niyamana (control) which the Supreme Being as Niyantā (controller) exercises is only through the body soul relationship which Kālidāsa maintains as the vital import of the Upaniṣadic thought.

Kālidāsa had in his mind the clear import conveyed by the chapter on the long Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa of the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad beginning यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् etc. The free translation is given here under.

"Who dwells in the earth and with the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is and rules it from within. He is the Self, the inner ruler the (Immortal). In continuation of this, the Upaniṣad refers to Āpas (water), Agni (fire) Antarikṣa (firmament), Vāyu (wind), Dyāus (the heaven) Āditya (the Sun) Diśaḥ (directions), Candra and Tārakās (the moon and the stars), tamas (darkness) Tejas (light) Prāṇa (vital air) Vāk (speech), Chakṣus (the eyes) Śrotra (the ears) Manas (the mind) tvak (skin), Vijñāna (the intellect), the retas (energy). Kālidāsa has purposely chosen God Siva to point out that He clearly bears the visible bodily forms in unison with His epithet 'Aṣṭamūrti' and to attract the attention of everyone that the body-soul relationship is the conspicuous factor to understand Him in relation to the cit-acit universe cetana-acetana prapañca).

Kālidāsa mentions a corollary to the main theory that besides the Supreme Being assuming the role of a Śarīri. He is also the Inner Ruler (Antaryāmin). This aspect of the Lord's glory is dilated upon by the poet in the nāndī of the 'Vikramorvaśīya' as " अन्तर्यश्च मुमुक्षुभिः नियमितप्राणादिभिर्मृग्यते । " (He who is realised within the hearts by the sages who subjugate the functions of the sense-organs by taking recourse to the disciplined form of yoga). While recording this immanent aspect of the Lord Kālidāsa ought to have purposely echoed in the 'Vekramorvaśīya' that final import conveyed in the Antaryāmin Brāhmaṇ-of the Bṛhadaraṇyakopaniṣad at the end of each passage as "स ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृत:" "(He is the Self, the inner ruler of the immortal). The emphasis of the concept of Immanence of the Lord (Puruṣottama) is definitely introduced by Kālidāsa with the sole purpose of transfiguring the body into the living temple of the Lord or Brahmapura and infinitise the finite jīva.

Kālidāsa closely follows the four chapters of the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. The summary of the four adhyāyas (namely Samanvaya, avirodha, sādhana and phala) are respectively dealt with very crisply and unequivocally in the four feet of the Nāndī of 'Vikramorvaśīya'. In the first pāda, the substance of all the Upaniṣads (Vedāntas) are construed to signify एकपुरुषं (one single Supreme Soul) who pervades the whole Universe, ( व्याप्यस्थितं रोदसी ). By the mention of ekapuruṣa, Kālidāsa recalls to memory the famous Upaniṣadic passage ( एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म ) and makes mention of

His immanent characteristic as पूः प्राणिनः सर्वगुहाशयस्य (He who dwells in the city-like body of all the living beings).

He frequently recalls to memory the Antaryāmin aspect to insist on the mercy of God to be at an easy access to all the finite selves. In the second foot, he brings to light that every system of Philosophy connotes Him and Him alone as Īśvara or the controller of the Universe. In the third pāda, the means of attaining Him is advanced with special reference to the Dahara Vidyā of the Chāndogyopaniṣad. The last pāda gives an account of the fruit that accrues subsequent to the realisation of Brahman as the attainment of Niśreyas or the Highest Beatitude. The nature of the niśreyas is explained by Kālidāsa himself in the Bharatavākya of 'Śākuntala' पुनर्भवं क्षपयतु परिगतशक्तिरात्मभूः (May Siva put an end to my rebirth). The very manner of Kālidāsa's prayer at the end of the drama that there shall be complete cessation of birth, has bearing upon the last sūtra of the fourth adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras as (अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ) (non-recurring of rebirth on the authority of Scriptures).

Thus, Kālidāsa besides acknowledging the infallibility of the Vedas endorses that the Supreme Brahman is the only Śarīri (embodied) to whom the whole universe stands related as a body and that He abides within the lotus-like hearts as the inner Ruler. Hereby it is to be deduced that every entity ranging from a blade of grass to the highest Divine Being (devas) who is swayed by Karma, constitutes His body and consequently assumes the position of an inseparable adjunct to Him who is All-pervasive, Omniscient and Omnipresent. Kālidāsa is seen to unravel many of the mysteries of metaphysics set forth in the Upaniṣads by this 'Organism" conception. Evidently Kālidāsa does not mean the body which is generally taken as the seat of sense-organs and Vehicle of enjoyment as defined by the Naiyāyikas as भोगायतनं शरीरम् (the seat of enjoyment). Kālidāsa obviously establishes that the Supreme Being is different from or one with the Universe in the same sense as the soul is different from or one with the body. It is therefore quite clear that everything in universe however trifling it may appear to ordinary minds, has a specific function and place in the general scheme of the world order. The entire universe by virtue of being the body of the Lord is sacred.

Kālidāsa's organistic conception with the conception of Lord's immanence and *antaryāmitva* has a bearing upon the verbal potency

(śabdaśakti) of every word either Vedic or classical. Be it a word denoting a sentient or a non-sentient being, full signification in respect of its sense will go to the extent of tracing Him and Him alone who abides in the object. Kālidāsa strictly confines himself to the body-soul relationship and means that the verbal potency of a word towers to such an extent as to signify Him (the sole Owner of the object) without stopping with the delimited dimensions and sense conveyed by the word, such as pot, cloth etc. Kālidāsa who lays the riddle-like identity of the pairs namely the sacrificer (Hotā) and the offering (havya) meditator (dhyātā) and the meditated (dhyeya) enjoyer (bhoktā) and the enjoyable (bhogya) in the Kumārasaṁbhava. (II conto) can be solved only by the application of the principle that the verbal import conveyed by a word will not stop with the delimited sense of the mere features of the object but towers so high as to mention Him, who abides in the objects as the antaryāmin. Therefore, the ultimate entity connoted by the afore-said pairs is to be construed on the basis of the grammatical equation of the Vedāntins Śarīra śarīribhāva nibandhanam Samānādhi-karaṇyam. Kālidāsa can thus be conceded to establish the grammar of Vedāntic thought that every word has direct reference to Him alone and that the verbal potency of the words (śabdaśakti) will reach its finalised and perfected stage only by the study of the Vedānta to signify principally the Supreme Being alone. That Kālidāsa specially mentions this view of the verbal import is borne testimony by the second foot of the Nāndi of the Vikramorvaśīyam. The epithetised compound अनन्यविषय: as qualifying the term śabda is a conclusive proof that all the syllables (akṣara) reach their perfection of conveying the real sense when they signify Him, the controller of the universe, namely Īśvara. The Vedāntic scholar's approach to and comprehension of the object in the universe are quite different to those of laymen who take them at their face value based on outward appearance. To Prahlāda who was good-intoxicated, the serpents and scorpions, elephants and weapons, appeared as His body and consequently he found no reaction over him however much he was molested and tormented by his father.

Thus the organistic conception as expounded by Kālidāsa has ethical value in effecting social solidarity. Kālidāsa's exposition of the Vedic truth opens the door of national welfare and peace throughout the Universe by expounding that every being whether animate or inanimate has to serve passively His purpose like the hand and feet of the human body. Any ill-will directed against one

another is to be taken to incur His displeasure to whom the whole Universe stands as His limbs. This Vedic truth of Śarīra-śarīrā-bhāva if translated into action will bury all petty differences and establish absolute peace and good-will among the people of all countries. The warring tendencies for power or pelf over the seas of air, will be farthest removed if Kālidāsa's theory that everything in the Universe is the body of God and that every individual, be he rich or poor, intelligent or dull-headed, weak or strong, good-looking or uncouth, is deemed *to exist to serve His purpose.* Thus Kālidāsa's exposition or the organistic conception besides directing an effective measure to harmonise the apparent and contradictory Upaniṣadic passage, opens the door of perfect peace in the social life, spiritual service and toleration.

Kālidāsa does not conceive of māyā, avidyā etc. as enveloping the Supreme Being nor does he deny the reality of the world. His clarity of expression of doctrines of Vedānta is so indubitable that he can be taken as one who endorses the principle of interpretation of the Upaniṣadic philosophy of his times, unpolluted by the Buddhistic influence.

Thus it can be safely conceded that Kālidāsa is a perfect realist and an ardent advocate of the Upaniṣadic philosophy on the lines of the Śarīra-śarīribhāva which admits unity in spite of diversity, which was later on expounded in detail by Rāmānuja in the 11th century A.D.

# आगमिक ईश्वराद्वयवाद तथा शांकर अद्वैतवाद या ब्रह्मवाद

डॉ० राममूर्ति त्रिपाठी*

उपनिषदों और आगमों में आई हुई परतत्त्व-विषयक उक्तियों की सामान्यतः द्वैत, अद्वैत एवं द्वैताद्वैतपरक दृष्टियों से दार्शनिकों ने व्याख्याएँ प्रस्तुत की हैं। प्रस्तुत सन्दर्भ में औपनिषद उक्तियों का शंकराचार्य द्वारा अद्वैतपरक तथा आगमिक उक्तियों का काश्मीरी अद्वयवादी दार्शनिकों द्वारा अद्वयपरक जो व्याख्यान प्रस्तुत किये गये हैं—उनसे 'अद्वय' और 'अद्वैत' के स्वरूप निर्वचन में जो पार्थक्य आ गया है—उसी का निरूपण प्रस्तुत निबन्ध का उद्देश्य है।

(क) इस प्रसंग में सर्वप्रथम बिंदु है—आगमिक अद्वय और शांकर अद्वैत तत्त्व की स्वरूपविषयक धारणाओं में अन्तर। आगमिक दार्शनिक अद्वैत या अद्वय का अर्थ समझते हैं—"दो का नित्य सामरस्य"—द्वयात्मक अद्वय—"Two in One"। यह तथ्य विज्ञान सिद्ध है कि प्रत्येक व्यक्ति में स्त्रीत्व और पुंस्त्व का योग है। किसी भी एक लिंग का व्यवहार किसी एक के आपेक्षिक प्राधान्य पर निर्भर है। इस आधार पर यह स्पष्ट कहा जा सकता है कि दृश्यमान समस्त 'विशेषों' या 'व्यष्टियों' की मूल प्रकृति में जब द्वयात्मक अद्वयता सिद्ध है, तब इन समस्त विशेषों या व्यष्टियों के मूल 'सामान्य' या 'समष्टि' जैसे मूल स्रोत की प्रकृति में भी द्वयात्मकता होनी ही चाहिए। फलतः विज्ञानसिद्ध और अनुभवाधारित तथ्यों के बल पर आगमिक मूल समष्टि या सामान्य तत्त्व को अपनी प्रकृति में द्वयात्मक बताते हैं। इस प्रकार आगम-सम्मत अद्वय के दो पक्ष हैं—पहला निष्क्रिय और दूसरा सक्रिय। पहला निःष्पंद और दूसरा सस्पंद, पहला ऋणात्मक और दूसरा धनात्मक—दोनों अपनी समरसदशा में हैं—अद्वयात्मक। आगमिक इन दोनों पक्षों को 'प्रकाश' और 'विमर्श' नाम से पुकारते हैं—दोनों को वे अविच्छेद्य मानते हैं—चाँद और चाँदनी की भाँति। जैसे चाँदनी के बिना चाँद चाँद नहीं और चाँद के बिना चाँदनी का अस्तित्व नहीं—ठीक यही स्थिति 'प्रकाश' और 'विमर्श' या 'बोध' और 'स्वातंत्र्य' की है। इस द्वयात्मकता[1] को उस चित्र की भाँति समझना चाहिए जो एक तरफ से देखने पर गज की भाँति दिखाई पड़ता है और दूसरी

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* अध्यक्ष—स्नातकोत्तर हिन्दी विभाग, विक्रम विश्वविद्यालय, उज्जैन (म० प्र०)

१—आलेख्य विशेष इव गजवृषभयोर्द्वयोः प्रतिभासम्।
एकस्मिन्नेवार्थे शिवशक्तिविभागकल्पनां कुर्मः॥
महार्थमञ्जरी परिमल

तरफ से देखने पर वृषभ की भाँति दिखाई पड़ता है। यहाँ जैसे दृष्टिभेद से चित्रगत द्वयात्मकता के बावजूद वस्तुतः अद्वय स्थिति है—ठीक वही बात प्रकाश एवं विमर्श की अद्वयात्मकता में भी है। यहाँ एकान्ततः द्वैत का निषेध भी नहीं है और द्वैत की स्थिति भी नहीं है। उसमें किसी भी प्रकार का अवच्छेद न होने से और साथ ही उसके सर्वात्मक होने से—वह सब कुछ है और वह हर प्रकार की सीमा से परे है। वह सबको आत्मसात् करता हुआ भी सबसे परे है। वह विश्वात्मक भी है और विश्वोत्तीर्ण भी—इसीलिए वह 'पूर्ण' है। उसमें से न कुछ बाहर जाता है और न उसमें कुछ बाहर से आता है—दूसरी ओर बाहर जाकर भी न वह रिक्त बनता है और न भीतर आने देकर वह सातिशय होता है। इसलिए वह सदा सर्वदा एकरस या समरस है।

शांकर अद्वैत में समस्त द्वैतों या भेदों का अभाव है। वहाँ कोई 'विशेष' नहीं, कोई भेद – सजातीय, विजातीय, विगत नहीं, इसीलिए वह 'निर्विशेष' है। वह सब तरफ से सत् चित् एवं आनन्दमय है। सत्, चित् एवं आनन्द नामतः भिन्न होते हुए भी स्वरूपतः भिन्न नहीं हैं। इसीलिए ये विशेषण नहीं, लक्षण हैं—क्योंकि वह निर्विशेष है। लगता है कि शांकर अद्वैत को द्वैत से भीति है, आगमिक अद्वयवाद को नहीं। इसीलिए जहाँ शांकर अद्वयवाद निवृत्तिमूलक है, वहाँ आगमिक अद्वय सबको कुक्षिसात् करने वाला—एकत्र त्याग है, अपरत्र ग्रहण।

(ख) इस प्रकार आगमिक 'अद्वय' जहाँ स्वाभाविक (पंच) कृत्यकारी है, वहाँ शांकर ब्रह्म या अद्वैत औपाधिक कर्त्ता है—फलतः जहाँ पहले का 'कर्तृत्व' उसके स्वातंत्र्यमय स्वभाव का विलास होने से स्वरूपलक्षण भी कहा जा सकता है वहाँ शांकर ब्रह्म का 'कर्तृत्व' तटस्थ लक्षण माना जाता है। आगमिक अद्वय 'विमर्श' युक्त है, शांकर ब्रह्म 'विमर्शहीन' है। इसीलिए आगमिक शांकर ब्रह्मवाद को शांत ब्रह्मवाद भी कहते हैं। आगमिक अद्वय में 'ज्ञान' और 'क्रिया' समरस हैं—शांकर ब्रह्म में 'क्रिया' नहीं है और है तो औपाधिक या आगन्तुक। इसलिए शांकरी 'क्रिया' या कर्तृता से आगमिक 'क्रिया' भिन्न भी है। आगमिक 'क्रिया' ज्ञानात्मक ही है—क्योंकि आगमिक अद्वय की स्वातंत्र्यमूलक क्रिया ज्ञानस्वरूप ही है।

(ग) आगमिक अद्वय की भाँति शांकर अद्वैत भी यद्यपि शक्ति के सहारे ही विश्वात्मक परिणति लेता है—तथापि दोनों की 'शक्ति' सम्बन्धी धारणा बिल्कुल भिन्न है। आगमिकों की 'शक्ति' चिन्मयी तथा परतत्त्व से अभिन्न है, जब कि शांकर शक्ति जड़ात्मिका फलतः ब्रह्माश्रित होती हुई भी ब्रह्माभिन्न नहीं है। ब्रह्म से अभिन्न होना तो दूर, ब्रह्मबोध से वह सदा-सदा के लिए निवृत्त भी हो जाती है। उसे न तो एकान्ततः त्रिकालाबाधित होने के कारण 'सत्' ही कहा जाता है और न तो प्रतीतिसिद्ध होने से एकान्ततः मिथ्या ही कहा जाता है—इसीलिए उसकी पारिभाषिक संज्ञा है—'अनिर्वचनीया'। समस्त व्यावहारिक एवं प्रातिभासिक सत्ताएँ इसी अनिर्वचनीया 'माया' की परिणति हैं—जो ब्रह्मबोध से निवृत्त हो जाती

हैं और परमार्थतः सर्वाधिष्ठानभूत ब्रह्ममयी सत्ता ही त्रिकालाबाधित सत्य है। वेदांतियों के आवरण एवं विक्षेपमयी माया की भाँति आगमिकों की चितिशक्ति भी स्वरूप तिरोधानपूर्वक विकल्प सृष्टि करती है—तथापि यह सब उनकी भाँति औपाधिक नहीं, स्वाभाविक हैं—'स्वातंत्र्य' का विलास है।

(घ) "स्वतंत्रा-विश्वसिद्धि-हेतुः" चिति शक्ति का 'स्वातंत्र्य' ही ब्रह्मवाद से ईश्वराद्वयवाद का बड़ा स्पष्ट भेदक तत्त्व है। शांकर अद्वैत में सृष्टि या विश्व के प्राकट्य का कोई संतोषकर निमित्त नहीं मिल पाता। इसलिए शांकर अद्वयवाद में माया को अनादि कहकर छोड़ दिया जाता है। माया को ही नहीं—

जीव ईशो विशुद्धाचित् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा ।
अविद्यातच्चितोर्योगः षडस्माकमनादयः ।।

जीव, ईश, विशुद्धचित्, जीव और ईश्वर का भेद, अविद्या और उसका चित् के साथ योग—ये छः बातें शाङ्कर वेदान्तियों के यहाँ अनादि हैं—फलतः ये अपने उद्भव में अचिन्त्य और अतर्क्य हैं। यह ठीक है कि शांकर वेदान्त में यह कहा गया है कि सर्ग के आदि काल में परमेश्वर सृज्यमान प्रपञ्च वैचित्र्य के निमित्तरूप में प्राणियों के कर्म को सहकारी रूप में लेकर अपरिमित एवं अनिरूपित शक्तियों से युक्त माया के साचिव्य से नामरूपात्मक निखिल प्रपंच को पहले बुद्धि में आकलित करते हैं—तत्पश्चात् उनका संकल्प होता है और सृष्टि का आरम्भ हो जाता है--तथापि इस विवेचन से यही सिद्ध हुआ कि परमेश्वर सृष्टि कर्म में अन्य निरपेक्ष नहीं, वरन् अन्य सापेक्ष हैं। अन्य सापेक्षता ईश्वर के ऐश्वर्य का विघातक है--फिर यह ऐश्वर्य और कर्तृत्व आगन्तुक और औपाधिक भी तो है। आगमिक ईश्वराद्वयवाद में ईश्वर का ऐश्वर्य और कर्तृत्व उसकी स्वाभाविक विशेषता है। वह विश्ववैचित्र्य के अवभासन में अन्य-निरपेक्ष है—स्वतंत्र है। वह अपनी ही स्वातंत्र्यात्मा विमर्श शक्ति से केवल लीला के लिए विश्वावभासन करता है--आत्माराम होने के कारण उसमें कोई स्पृहा नहीं है। इसीलिए यहाँ किसी अभावमूलक प्रयोजन की भी बात नहीं की जा सकती। "स्वेच्छया स्वभित्तौ विश्वमुन्मीलयति"—के अनुसार आगमिक अद्वय मायूराण्डरसन्यायेन 'विमर्शगत' अव्यक्त विश्व-वैचित्र्य को अपने में प्रतिबिंबित करता है। यह परमेश्वर का स्वातंत्र्य ही है जिसके कारण वह संकुचित होकर एक तरफ जीवभाव ग्रहण करता है और दूसरी ओर विश्वावभास करता है। वास्तव में विचार किया जाय तो यही तर्कसंगत जान पड़ेगा कि जिस शक्ति से परमेश्वर अपने को आवृत करता है—वह उसकी अपनी ही है, फलतः उससे अभिन्न है। मेघखंड जिस सूर्य को ढँकता है--वह सूर्यरश्मियों से ही प्रसूत है, और वह सूर्य को आवृत करके भी वस्तुतः आवृत नहीं कर पाता है—अन्यथा प्रकाशमय सूर्य के सर्वथा तिरोहित हो जाने से स्वयं आवरक है या नहीं—इसका पता कैसे चलेगा ? शांकर अद्वैत भी अपनी शक्ति-माया से अपने स्वरूप को तिरोहित करता है और आगमिक अद्वय भी—पर जहाँ शांकर अद्वय उस आवरक शक्ति

को 'जड़ात्मिका', 'अनिर्वचनीय' अनादि भावरूप, एवं 'विद्यानिवर्त्य' कहता है वहाँ आगमिक अद्वयवादी उसी शक्ति को संकोच प्रसारात्मिका, चिन्मयी, अनादि, अनन्त तथा विमर्शात्मक कहते हैं। जहाँ शांकर अद्वैतवादी मानते हैं कि सोपाधिक ब्रह्मसृष्टि के लिए महासुप्तिस्वरूपिणी माया में प्रसुप्त प्राणियों के विचित्रकर्म और उपाधिभूत माया को सान्निध्य ग्रहण करता है वहाँ आगमिक अद्वयवादियों का विचार है कि परतत्त्व स्वरूपभूता स्वातंत्र्यमयी विमर्शात्मिका शक्ति से ही अन्य निरपेक्ष रहकर लीलार्थ दृष्टि का भासन या बहिःप्रकाश करता है। जहाँ आगमिक उस शक्ति को परतत्त्वाश्रित एक मत से स्वीकार करते हैं वहाँ शांकरमतानुयायियों में से विवरण प्रस्थानवाले तो उस शक्ति का आश्रय ब्रह्म को मानते हैं, पर भामती प्रस्थानवाले जीव को आश्रय और ब्रह्म को उसका विषय स्वीकार करते हैं।

(ङ) आगमिक परतत्त्व जिस सरणि से अवरोहण करता है—अर्थात् जीवभाव ग्रहण और विश्वावभास करता है शांकर अद्वैत उससे भिन्न सरणि का है। शांकर अद्वैत में महामाया या चिन्मयी शक्ति अव्यक्त है। अतः यहाँ मायावाले स्तर से अवरोहणक्रम अन्यसापेक्ष होकर होता है जबकि आगमिक अद्वयतत्त्व स्वेच्छया लीलार्थ मायोत्तर महामाया स्तर से अवरोहण करता है। सृष्टि के प्रारम्भ में शिव जब शक्ति की ओर अभिमुख होता है तो वहाँ द्विदलभाव आभासित होने लगता है और इसी प्रकार शक्ति गर्भस्थ विश्व भी उससे पृथक् होने लगता है। अथवा यों भी कह सकते हैं कि वही चिन्मयी शक्ति सृष्टि काल में भेद शक्ति के रूप में जब आत्मसंकोच या आत्मगोपन करती है—तब पूर्णाहं का संकोच और इदं भाव का प्रकाश साथ ही होता है—ग्राहक और ग्राह्य का उदय होता है। यहीं से आत्मभाव में अनात्मभाव का उदय है—फिर भी आश्रय अनात्मभाव का आत्मभाव ही रहता है। ज्यों-ज्यों यह अनात्मभाव प्रगाढ़ होता जाता है—आत्मभाव क्षीण पड़ता जाता है और अंततः आत्मभाव अनात्मभाव में डूब जाता है। यहीं से महामाया राज्य की समाप्ति और माया राज्य का उदय होता है—जहाँ से अनात्मा में निमग्न अहंभाव मायिक सर्ग में अपने को व्यक्त करता है—शांकर अद्वैत की सृष्टि प्रक्रिया में मायोत्तर क्रम-हीन अवरोहण की प्रक्रिया अव्यक्त है वहाँ महामाया का शुद्ध अध्वा नहीं है, जहाँ क्रियाशक्ति का विकास होता है। यही कारण है कि जिस प्रकार आगमिक अद्वयवाद में अशुद्धाध्वा का अतिक्रमण कर पूर्णज्ञान शक्ति का उदय करके भी शुद्धाध्वा में क्रिया शक्ति का भी विकास होता है और अंततः ज्ञान एवं क्रिया का सामरस्य हो जाता है, स्वरूप विश्रान्ति हो जाती है, पूर्णाहंभाव की स्थिति आ जाती है। वह बात शांकर अद्वैतवाद में नहीं है। वहाँ स्वरूपोपलब्धि का अर्थ पूर्णज्ञानोदय तो है। विद्यात्मिका वृत्ति अविद्या की निवृत्तिपूर्वक स्वतः कतकरजोन्यायेन शांत होकर स्वरूपभूत चित् या ज्ञान को निरावृत्त कर देती है। पर 'विमर्श' का अनुद्रय होने से 'पूर्णता' की उपलब्धि नहीं हो पाती। ब्रह्म 'विमर्श' हीन ही रह जाता है। यही विमर्शात्मा निजा शक्ति कुण्डलिनी शक्ति है जिसके जागरण का कोई प्रसंग ही शांकर अद्वैतवाद में संभव नहीं है। निष्कर्ष यह है कि

जिस प्रकार अवरोहण में कतिपय स्तरों के बाद की प्रक्रिया शांकर अद्वैतवाद में आरम्भ होती है, उसी प्रकार आरोहण में भी कुछ पहले ही रुक भी जाती है—माया स्तर से अवरोहण की प्रक्रिया बताई जाती है और क्रिया शक्ति के विकास से पूर्व ही आरोहण प्रक्रिया भी रह जाती है। इसीलिए शांकर अद्वैतवाद की सारी साधना जहाँ 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' की अखंडाकार विद्यात्मिका वृत्ति से अविद्यात्मिका (माया) वृत्ति की निवृत्ति में ही पर्यवसित हो जाती है और निरावृत विमर्शहीन चित् प्रकाशित हो जाता है, वहाँ आगमिक साधना उसके बाद भी चलती रहती है और विमर्शशक्ति के पूर्ण विकास के साथ समाप्त होती है। यहीं एक अंतर आरोहण और अवरोहण बेला में और है। आगमिक महामाया राज्य की गति से शांकर स्तर के माया-राज्य की गति भी ठीक विपरीत है। अवरोहण प्रक्रिया में महामाया राज्य के अन्तर्गत जागरण से स्वप्न के भीतर सुषुप्ति की ओर है। पर यह जागरण सूक्ष्म से स्थूल की ओर बढ़ता है। प्रत्यावर्तन वेला में इसी प्रकार उलटा क्रम है।

(च) शांकर अद्वैत जड़ जगत की निवृत्तिपूर्वक स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठ होता है—आगमिक अद्वय अचिदंश का भी चिन्मयीकरण करता हुआ सब कुछ के साथ स्वरूप प्रतिष्ठ होता है। यही कारण है कि शांकर अद्वैतवादी के जीवन्मुक्त की अनुभूति से आगमिक अद्वयवादी के जीवन्मुक्त की अनुभूति में भी अंतर होता है। जहाँ पहला संसार को अपनी मायात्मिका प्रकृति में दुःखमय स्वीकार करता है—फलतः उसकी निवृत्ति ही आनन्दमय स्वरूपोपलब्धि के लिए अनिवार्य समझता है वहाँ दूसरा विश्व को अपनी प्रकृति में आनन्दमय मानता है और उसकी दुःखात्मक प्रतीति का निमित्त संकुचित दृष्टिगत मानता है। फलतः संकोच से मुक्त होता है, पर स्वरूपोपलब्धि में विश्व की निवृत्ति नहीं, गृहीति ही अपनी 'पूर्णता' समझता है। इसीलिए जहाँ पहला वासना-निवृत्ति की बात करता है वहाँ दूसरा वासना के शोधन की बात करता है। पहला यह मानता है कि जीवन्मुक्ति के बाद विश्व की पूर्वानुभूति तत्त्व ज्ञान से बाधित हो जाती है और उसी बाधित की अनुवृत्ति चलती रहती है। उदाहरणार्थ, जब विशेष ढंग से हम कभी अपनी आँखें दबा लेते हैं तो आकाश का एक ही चन्द्र दो दिखाई पड़ता है। उस समय हम यह अच्छी तरह जानते हैं कि चन्द्र दो नहीं है, पर दिखाई दो पड़ते हैं। ठीक इसी प्रकार शांकर अद्वैतवादी जीवन्मुक्त को विश्व का बाध होने पर भी उसकी अनुभूति चलती रहती है—इसे वे लोग बाधितानुवृत्ति के नाम से कहते हैं। दूसरा यह मानता है कि जीवन्मुक्त का व्यष्टि देह समष्टि देह हो जाता है। वह समस्त विश्व को स्वांगवत् देखता है और दृष्टि के निर्मल हो जाने से अन्यथा दृष्ट विश्व यथावत् दीखता है—भेद निवृत्त हो जाता है। जहाँ पहला Exclusive है वहाँ दूसरा All-embracing है। जहाँ पहला जीवन्मुक्त समाधि और व्युत्थान में भिन्न अनुभूति करता है, वहाँ दूसरा दोनों में एक सा रहता है। व्युत्थान में जगत् को स्वांगरूप और आत्मक्रीडा या आत्मशक्ति के विलास रूप में देखता है और समाधि में भी

अपने रूप का ही अनुभव करता है । अभिप्राय यह है कि उसकी योगदशा कभी भी भग्न नहीं होती । यह आगमिक ईश्वराद्वयवाद की ही विशेषता है ।

(छ) इसी प्रकार दोनों का एक पारस्परिक वैशिष्ट्य या अंतर यह भी है कि आगमिक ईश्वराद्वयवाद न तो शुष्क ज्ञान मार्ग ही है और न ज्ञानहीन भक्तिमार्ग ही—इसमें दोनों का सामञ्जस्य है । शांकर अद्वैतवाद के अनुसार भक्ति भेद की ही भूमिका पर संभव है । अतः अभेदज्ञान या स्वरूप प्रतिष्ठ होने पर केवल ज्ञान की ही सर्वातिशायी स्थिति संभव है, वहाँ की पार्यन्तिक दशा में भक्ति का स्थान नहीं है, पर आगमिक अद्वयवाद में ज्ञान के बाद भी भक्ति की स्थिति कही गई है । वस्तुतः यहाँ चिदंश शिव एवं आनन्दांश शक्ति के समरस रूप की स्थिति के कारण ज्ञान और भक्ति का सामञ्जस्य संभव है, शांकर अद्वैतवाद में नहीं । यद्यपि भक्तिमात्र के लिए द्वैत की अपेक्षा है, पर ज्ञानोत्तराभक्ति के लिए अपेक्षित द्वैत कल्पित है । यह साध्य भक्ति है और इस पराभक्ति के फलस्वरूप अद्वैत में भी कल्पित द्वैत की तरंगें उठती रहती हैं, जिससे भक्ति की स्थिति संभव हो जाती है । फलतः यहाँ ज्ञान और भक्ति का पार्थक्य समाप्त हो जाता है—"ज्ञानहिं भगतिहि नहि कछु अंतर" की स्थिति आ जाती है ।

इस प्रकार दोनों ही वादों में सूक्ष्म विचार के फलस्वरूप अनेकविध अंतर स्पष्ट किये जा सकते हैं । हाँ, एक तथ्य इस प्रसंग में अवश्य ध्येय है कि जब हम अंतर दिखाने की दिशा में वैचारिक कदम बढ़ाते हैं तो वह विश्लेषणात्मक दिशा ही कही जायगी । संश्लेष की दृष्टि से इन अंतरों को भूमिका, भेद से समझाया जा सकता है और विश्लेष की दृष्टि से केवल पार्थक्य या अंतर कहा जा सकता है । शंकराचार्य की वैयक्तिक साधना और तत्संबद्ध वाङ्मय को देखा जाय तो आगमिक अद्वयवादी विशेषताएँ भी उनमें उपलब्ध होंगी, पर जहाँ तक उनका दार्शनिक पक्ष है संश्लेषतः भूमिका-भेद की दृष्टि से या विश्लेषतः स्पष्ट रूप से इन भेदक तत्त्वों की ओर संकेत किया जा सकता है ।

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# ब्रह्मसूत्रों का बादरायणैककर्तृकत्व

डा० रामकृष्ण आचार्य*

**१—ब्रह्मसूत्रकर्तृत्व के विषय में प्रचलित विवाद**—यह तथ्य सुविदित है कि ब्रह्मसूत्रकर्तृत्व के विषय में पर्याप्त विवाद प्रचलित है। परम्परागत मान्यता के अनुसार वही पराशरपुत्रवेदव्यास कृष्णद्वैपायन ब्रह्मसूत्रकार माने जाते हैं जिनके विषय में यह प्रसिद्धि है कि उन्होंने वेदों का व्यसन अर्थात् ऋगादि मन्त्रों का ऋग्वेद आदि के रूप में पृथक्-पृथक् संकलन तथा महाभारत का प्रणयन किया। ब्रह्मसूत्र-भाष्यकारों एवं उनके व्याख्याकारों में से दो-एक को छोड़कर प्रायः सभी ने वेदव्यास कृष्णद्वैपायन को ही ब्रह्मसूत्रों का रचयिता माना है।[1] इसके अतिरिक्त, आचार्य मध्व ने जो अपने ब्रह्मसूत्र-भाष्य में स्कन्द-पुराण के नाम से एक ऐसा वचन उद्धृत किया है जिसमें पराशरपुत्र कृष्ण (कृष्णद्वैपायन) को ब्रह्मसूत्र-प्रणेता कहा गया है,[2] उससे सूचित होता है कि सम्भवतः पुराण भी ब्रह्मसूत्रों को पराशरपुत्र वेदव्यास कृष्णद्वैपायन की कृति मानने के पक्ष में हैं। साथ ही, स्वामी दयानन्द ने भी इसी परम्परागत मान्यता का अनुगमन किया है।[3] इस परम्परागत मान्यता के सम्बन्ध में इतना और कह देना आवश्यक है कि इसके अनुसार सभी ब्रह्मसूत्रों को अपने वर्तमान रूप में एक ही कर्त्ता—वेदव्यास कृष्णद्वैपायन—की कृति माना जाता है और इन्हीं का एक दूसरा नाम "बादरायण" बताया जाता है।

यद्यपि कुछ आधुनिक विद्वान् भी उक्त परम्परागत मान्यता का ही समर्थन करते हैं,[4] किन्तु आधुनिक विद्वज्जगत् का बहुमत इस मान्यता को अविकल रूप में स्वीकार

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* अध्यक्ष—संस्कृत-विभाग, राजा बलवन्तसिंह कालेज, आगरा।

१. वाचस्पति मिश्र—भामती, उपोद्घात, श्लोक ५; आचार्य रामानुज—श्री-भाष्य, मंगलाचरण, श्लोक २; श्रीनिवासाचार्य—निम्बार्कभाष्य-वेदान्तकौस्तुभव्याख्या सू० १।१।१; आचार्य मध्व—ब्रह्मसूत्रमध्वभाष्य, सू० १।१।१, उपोद्घात, आचार्य वल्लभ—अणुभाष्य, सू० २।३।२९।

२. "अवतीर्णो महायोगी सत्यवत्यां पराशरात्।.......कृष्णो द्वादशधा चैव पुनस्तस्यार्थवित्तये। चकार ब्रह्मसूत्राणि तेषां सूत्रत्वमञ्जसा।" (स्कन्दपुराण के नाम से ब्रह्मसूत्र-मध्वभाष्य के उपोद्घात में उद्धृत)।

३. ऋगवेदादिभाष्यभूमिका, पृष्ठ ३८, ४९, २१२, ३१४।

४. श्रीभगवद्दत्त—वैदिक कोष, प्रथम भाग, भूमिका, पृ० २५ तथा उसमें

करने के लिए प्रस्तुत नहीं है। विभिन्न विद्वानों ने इस मान्यता के विपरीत जो विभिन्न मत प्रस्तुत किए हैं, उन्हें संक्षेप में निम्न रूप से प्रदर्शित किया जा सकता है—

१——वर्तमान सभी ब्रह्मसूत्र एक ही कर्त्ता की कृति नहीं है, अपितु विभिन्न आचार्यों ने इनकी रचना में समय-समय पर योग दिया है।[1]

२—आचार्य बादरायण ने ब्रह्मसूत्रों की रचना की है, किन्तु वे पराशरपुत्र वेदव्यास कृष्णाद्वैपायन से भिन्न व्यक्ति हैं।[2]

उक्त प्रकार से परम्परागत मान्यता और अन्य आधुनिक मान्यताओं के बीच में परस्पर विवाद के निम्न विषय हो जाते हैं :—

१——वर्तमान ब्रह्मसूत्र एक ही कर्त्ता की कृति हैं या अनेक कर्त्ताओं की ?

२——यदि ब्रह्मसूत्र एक ही कर्त्ता की कृति हैं तो वह कर्त्ता कौन है——आचार्य बादरायण या अन्य कोई ?

३——यदि ब्रह्मसूत्रप्रणेता आचार्य बादरायण हैं, तो वे वेदव्यास कृष्णाद्वैपायन से अभिन्न व्यक्ति हैं या भिन्न ?

प्रस्तुत लेख में इनमें से प्रथम दो के विषय में ही कुछ प्रकाश डालने का प्रयास किया जावेगा।

२—**ब्रह्मसूत्रों का एककर्तृत्व**——ब्रह्मसूत्र विभिन्न कर्त्ताओं की कृति हैं, इस मत के प्रस्ताव करने वाले प्रमुखतः प्रोफेसर डाउसन डा० और वैलवलकर हैं। जहाँ तक ज्ञात है, सर्वप्रथम डाउसन का इस तथ्य की ओर ध्यान गया कि ब्रह्मसूत्रों (सं० १।१।१३-१।३।४४) में भिन्न-भिन्न उपनिषदों के वाक्यों का व्यवधान होने पर भी प्रत्येक उपनिषद् के वाक्यों को उसी क्रम से मीमांसा के लिए लिया गया है, जिस क्रम से वे अपने-अपने आकर उपनिषदों में प्राप्त होते हैं और भिन्न-भिन्न उपनिषदों के वाक्य परस्पर इस प्रकार संग्रथित हैं कि संग्रथन का कारण जहाँ-तहाँ स्पष्ट है।[3]

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निर्दिष्ट पं० अभयकुमार गुह का मत; स्वामी वीरेश्वरानन्द——ब्रह्मसूत्र, प्रस्तावना, पृ० ८।

१. प्रो० डाउसन—सिस्टम आफ दी वेदान्त, पृ० १२२; दी फिलासफी आफ उपनिषदस्, पृ० २८-२९। डा० बेलवलकर—मल्टीपिल आथरशिप आफ दी वेदान्त सूत्राज् (इंडियन फिलासाफीकल रिव्यू, वाल्यूम २, १९१८-१९, पृ० १४१-१५३)।

२. डा० एन० के० दत्ता—दी वेदान्त, पृ० ७०; श्री सी० वी० वैद्य (दी भगवद्गीता, ए फ्रेश एप्रोच [डा० पी० एम० मोदी], पृ० ५१६-१७ में उद्धृत इनका मत)।

३. यद्यपि इस तथ्य का उल्लेख डा० बेलवलकर ने भी अपने एक लेख "मल्टीपिल् आथरशिप आफ दी वेदान्तसूत्रास्" में किया है, किन्तु इससे पूर्व ही प्रो० डाउसन अपने "सिस्टम आफ दी वेदान्त" आदि ग्रन्थों में इसे प्रकाशित कर चुके थे; अतः इसके सर्वप्रथम प्रकाशन का श्रेय प्रो० डाउसन को ही है।

ब्रह्मसूत्रों के समन्वयाध्याय में मीमांस्य वाक्यों के उक्त क्रम और साथ ही उक्त सूत्रों (१।१।१३-१।३।४४) में छान्दोग्योपनिषद् के सर्वाधिक वाक्यों की मीमांसा देखकर उन्होने यह संकेत प्राप्त किया कि उक्त उपनिषद् पर आधारित एक मौलिक सूत्र-ग्रन्थ ब्रह्मसूत्रकार को प्राप्त था, उसमें ही सम्भवतः बाद में अन्य उपनिषदों के वाक्यों को बीच-बीच में मीमांस्य रूप में जोड़ दिया गया है और उनके जोड़ने के समय साथ ही यह ध्यान रक्खा गया है कि मौलिक क्रम सुरक्षित रहे।[1]

प्रो० डाउसन द्वारा प्राप्त उक्त संकेत की तथ्यप्रतिकूलता अन्यत्र विस्तार के साथ प्रदर्शित की जा चुकी है,[2] अतः उस पर यहाँ पुनः विचार करने की आवश्यकता प्रतीत नहीं होती। यहाँ इतना कहना पर्याप्त है कि जहाँ तक उक्त प्रोफेसर महोदय के द्वारा प्रदर्शित ब्रह्मसूत्रों के समन्वयाध्याय में मीमांस्य उपनिषद् वाक्यों के उक्त क्रम का सम्बन्ध है, वह ठीक है; किन्तु मीमांसा के लिए परिगृहीत छान्दोग्योपनिषद् के वाक्यों की सर्वाधिक संख्या देखकर उन्होंने जो यह संकेत प्राप्त किया है कि उक्त उपनिषद् पर आधारित एक मौलिक सूत्र-ग्रन्थ ब्रह्मसूत्रकार को प्राप्त था, उसमें ही उन्होंने संभवतः बाद में अन्य उपनिषदों के वाक्यों की मीमांसा को बीच-बीच में जोड़ दिया है, वह तथ्यानुकूल प्रतीत नहीं होता। जैसा कि समन्वयपरक सूत्रों में गृहीत उपनिषदों को देखने से स्पष्ट है, ब्रह्मसूत्रकार ने उनके प्रायः सभी मीमांसनीय प्रकरणों की मीमांसा निरवशेष रूप से प्रस्तुत कर दी है। उन्होंने ऐसा नहीं किया कि छान्दोग्य के तो सभी प्रकरण ले लिए हों और अन्य उपनिषदों के मीमांसनीय प्रकरणों को छोड़ दिया हो, किन्तु जब बृहदारण्यक को छोड़कर अन्य कठ, प्रश्न, मुण्डक और तैत्तिरीय आदि लघुकाय उपनिषदों में छान्दोग्य के बराबर ब्रह्मपरक प्रकरण हैं ही नहीं, तो सूत्रों में उनके मीमांस्य वाक्यों की संख्या छान्दोग्य के वाक्यों के समान कैसे हो सकती है? एकमात्र बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् ही ऐसा है, जो परिमाण में छान्दोग्य के समान है, किन्तु उक्त उपनिषद् को देखने से स्पष्ट है कि उसके भी किसी मीमांसनीय ब्रह्मपरक प्रकरण को अमीमांसित नहीं छोड़ा गया है। ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक प्रकरणों की दृष्टि से बृहदारण्यक के केवल तृतीय एवं चतुर्थ अध्याय ही प्रमुख हैं और ब्रह्मसूत्रों में इन दोनों अध्यायों के सभी मीमांसनीय प्रकरणों की मीमांसा प्रत्यक्षतः कर दी गई है[3] जिसमें कि उसका सम्पूर्ण ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक प्रतिपाद्य आ जाता है। उसके अन्य अध्यायों में पहले तो ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक प्रकरण ही कम हैं, और जो हैं भी, वे या तो उसके मीमांसित प्रकरणों में ही आ जाते हैं या अन्य उपनिषदों के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक विस्तृत और साथ ही सदृश प्रकरणों की मीमांसा के साथ ही

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१. प्रो० डाउसन—फिलासाफी आफ दी उपनिषदस्, पृ० २८, २९।

२. ब्रह्मसूत्रों के वैष्णव भाष्यों का तुलनात्मक अध्ययन, पृ० १३७-१४० (डा० रामकृष्ण आचार्य)

३. ब्रह्मसूत्र १।२।१८-२०; १।३।१०-१२; १।४।११-१३; १।४।१९-२२.

मीमांसित हो जाते हैं। जहाँ तक छान्दोग्य के क्रम को अपनाने का सम्बन्ध है, उसमें मीमांस्य वाक्यों की अधिकता होने के कारण उसके क्रम को मुख्य रूप से अपनाया गया है और उसके वाक्यों के प्रतिपाद्यविषय के प्रसंग से अन्य उपनिषदों के वाक्यों की मीमांसा कर दी गई है।

अस्तु ! इस प्रकार स्पष्ट है कि समन्वय-सूत्रों में प्रस्तुत मीमांसा मौलिक रूप से एक ही सूत्रकार के द्वारा की गई है, उसमें किसी संयोजन या परिवर्धन का संकेत प्राप्त नहीं होता और फलतः प्रो० डाउसन द्वारा प्राप्त यह संकेत कि पूर्वप्राप्त मौलिक सूत्रग्रन्थ में सूत्रकार ने बाद में कुछ संयोजन किया, तथ्यसंगत प्रतीत नहीं होता।

डा० बेलवलकर ने प्रो० डाउसन द्वारा प्राप्त उक्त तथ्य के अतिरिक्त अन्य तथ्यों के आधार पर भी ब्रह्मसूत्रों के बहुकर्तृकत्व की संभावना की है, अतः उन पर भी विचार करना आवश्यक प्रतीत होता है। उन्होंने ब्रह्मसूत्रों के तर्कपाद में प्रस्तुत परमत-निराकरण को देखते हुए यह विचार प्रकट किया है कि ब्रह्मसूत्रों के समान एक मीमांसा-ग्रन्थ से यही संभावना की जा सकती है कि उसमें मौलिक रूप से प्रत्यक्ष-विधानात्मक पद्धति पर श्रुतियों की मीमांसा की गई होगी और इसी पद्धति पर स्वसिद्धान्त-स्थापन किया गया होगा और परमत-निराकरण संभवतः ब्रह्मसूत्रों की प्रवृत्ति या उनके मौलिक उद्देश्य के अनुकूल नहीं। इस प्रकार उन्होंने अपना झुकाव यह मानने की ओर प्रदर्शित किया है कि तर्कपादीय परमत-निराकरण ब्रह्मसूत्रों का मौलिक भाग नहीं, अपितु बाद में जोड़ा हुआ भाग है।[१]

उक्त तथ्य के आधार पर डा० बेलवलकर द्वारा व्यक्त उक्त सम्भावना का भी अनौचित्य अन्यत्र प्रदर्शित किया जा चुका है।[२] यहाँ इतना कहना पर्याप्त होगा कि यह संभावना वस्तुस्थिति के अनुकूल नहीं, क्योंकि, जैसा कि ब्रह्मसूत्रों को देखने से स्पष्ट है, उनकी मौलिक प्रवृत्ति ही मुख्यतया निराकरणात्मक है। चाहे उनके द्वारा प्रस्तुत श्रुतिमीमांसा पर ध्यान दिया जावे और चाहे उनके द्वारा किए हुए स्वसिद्धान्त-स्थापन पर, सर्वत्र सूत्रों में निराकरणात्मक प्रवृत्ति का ही दर्शन होता है और फलतः तर्कपादीय परमतनिराकरण भी ब्रह्मसूत्रों की प्रवृत्ति या मौलिक उद्देश्य के प्रतिकूल नहीं, अपितु सर्वथा अनुकूल है।

डा० बेलवलकर ने ब्रह्मसूत्रों के बहुकर्तृकत्व की संभावना की पुष्टि में दो अन्य आधार प्रस्तुत किए हैं। उनमें एक तो यह है कि इन सूत्रों के द्वितीय अध्याय के तृतीय पाद के प्रारम्भ में सू० २।३।१४ तक भूतों की सृष्टि एवं प्रलय पर विचार

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१. डा० बेलवलकर—ब्रह्मसूत्राज् आफ बादरायण (सू० २।२।१) तथा उनका लेख—'आथरशिप आफ दी वेदान्त-सूत्रास् ( इंडियन फिलासाफीकल रिव्यू, वाल्यूम २, १९१८-१९, पृ० १४१-१५३ )।

२. ब्रह्मसूत्रों के वैष्णव भाष्यों का तुलनात्मक अध्ययन, पृष्ठ ७-८ (डा० रामकृष्ण आचार्य)।

कर परवर्ती सूत्र 'अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी०' ( २।३।१५ ) में बुद्धि और मन की सृष्टि का विषय उठाया गया है जिससे यह संभावना होने लगती है कि अब आगे सूत्रकार इन्द्रियों की सृष्टि आदि के विषय पर विचार करेंगे, किन्तु ऐसा न होकर पाद की समाप्ति तक जीवस्वरूपनिरूपण का विषय चलता है और फिर चतुर्थ पाद का प्रारम्भ 'तथा प्राणाः' ( सू० २।४।१ ) के रूप में इन्द्रियों की उत्पत्ति के विषय के प्रस्तावन के साथ होता है, जो कि उक्त सूत्र के 'तथा' शब्द को देखते हुए कुछ उचित प्रतीत नहीं होता, क्योंकि इस शब्द के द्वारा अव्यवहित रूप से पूर्व में प्रतिपादित जीवनित्यत्व का स्वभावतः अतिदेश मानने के कारण उक्त सूत्र के द्वारा इन्द्रियनित्यत्व का प्रतिपादन होगा जो कि सूत्रकार के सिद्धान्त के अनुकूल प्रतीत नहीं होता और इसीलिये प्रायः सभी प्रमुख भाष्यकारों को 'तथा' शब्द के द्वारा अव्यवहित रूप से पूर्व में प्रतिपादित जीव-नित्यत्व के साथ अतिदेश न मान कर उससे भी पूर्व में व्यवहित रूप से प्रतिपादित महाभूतों की उत्पत्ति के साथ अतिदेश मानना पड़ा है, जो कि अस्वाभाविक है। इस तथ्य के आधार पर डा० बेलवलकर ने यह संभावना प्रकट की है कि 'अन्तरा-विज्ञानमनसी०' ( सू० २।३।१५ ) और 'तथा प्राणाः' ( सू० २।४।१ ) के बीच के सूत्रों ( २।३।१६-५३ ) में जो जीवस्वरूप-निरूपण प्राप्त होता है वह ब्रह्मसूत्रों का मौलिक भाग न होकर बाद में मिलाया हुआ भाग है।[१]

डॉ० बेलवलकर की उक्त संभावना के प्रसंग में सर्वप्रथम विचारणीय बात यह है कि जब सूत्रकार ने आकाश आदि भूतों और इन्द्रियों की उत्पत्ति पर विचार किया है, तो क्या वे जीव के सम्बन्ध में भी यह विचार नहीं कर सकते कि उसकी भी उत्पत्ति होती है या नहीं और उसका स्वरूप एवं परिमाण आदि क्या है ? कहने की आवश्यकता नहीं कि जीव की उत्पत्ति और उसके स्वरूप पर विचार करना एक ऐसा प्रमुख विषय है कि जिसकी उपेक्षा सूत्रकार कथमपि कर ही नहीं सकते थे। फलतः यह अनिवार्यतः मानना होगा कि भूतों और इन्द्रियों की उत्पत्ति पर विचार करनेवाले सूत्रकार ने जीव की उत्पत्ति पर भी विचार किया है। जहाँ तक इस बात का सम्बन्ध है कि 'अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी०' (सू० २।३।१५) के द्वारा बुद्धि और मन की सृष्टि का विषय उठाने के बाद प्रसंगप्राप्त इन्द्रियों की उत्पत्ति की चर्चा न कर जीवोत्पत्ति का विषय प्रस्तुत कर दिया गया है और उसके निरूपण के बाद 'तथा प्राणाः' (सू० २।४।१) के द्वारा जो इन्द्रियों की उत्पत्ति का विषय प्रस्तुत किया गया है, उसका सम्बन्ध पूर्वातिदेशक 'तथा' शब्द के आधार पर पूर्वप्रतिपादित जीव-नित्यत्व-प्रतिपादन के साथ होना चाहिए जो कि नहीं हो पाता और अस्वाभाविक रूप से उसका सम्बन्ध व्यवहित भूतोत्पत्ति-प्रतिपादन के साथ मानना पड़ता है, तो इस विषय में इतना कहना पर्याप्त है कि यतः पूर्वोक्त प्रकार से सूत्रकार जीवस्वरूपनिरूपण को तो छोड़ ही नहीं सकते, अतः यदि उक्त सूत्रों (२।३।१४ एवं २।४।१) का उक्तरूप

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१. मल्टीपिल् आथरशिप आफ दी वेदान्त-सूत्रास्।

प्रतिपाद्य ही माना जाता है तो उससे अधिक से अधिक इतना ही सिद्ध हो सकता है कि सूत्रकार ने जीव-स्वरूप-निरूपण-परक सूत्रों की रचना तो की है, किन्तु बाद में संभवतः किसी ने उनका मौलिक क्रम या स्थान बदल दिया है। किन्तु जब इस तथ्य पर ध्यान जाता है कि चाहे तो यह माना जावे कि किसी ने सूत्रकार द्वारा मौलिक रूप से प्रणीत जीवस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्रों का मौलिक स्थान बदल दिया और चाहे यह भी मान लिया जावे कि सूत्रकार के बाद किसी ने इन सूत्रों को स्वयं बनाकर मौलिक सूत्रपाठ में मिला दिया, दोनों ही स्थितियों में यह प्रश्न खड़ा ही रहता है कि सूत्रों के मौलिक क्रम को बदलने वाला या अपने बनाए सूत्रों को सूत्रपाठ में मिलाने वाला क्या यह नहीं समझ सकता था कि जब इन सूत्रों को स्वतन्त्र स्थान दिया जा सकता है तो फिर इन्हें किसी अन्य विषय के प्रस्तावन और समापन के बीच में ही क्यों रक्खा जावे ? केवल सूत्रों के मौलिक स्थान को बदलने से तो किसी उद्देश्य की पूर्ति ही नहीं होती थी, जहाँ वे थे, वहीं रह सकते थे, परिशेषतः यदि नवीन रूप से प्रणीत सूत्रों को मिलाना ही था तो यदि 'अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी०' (सू० २।३।१५) में बुद्धि और मन की सृष्टि का विषय प्रस्तुत माना जाता है, तो इसके साथ इन्द्रियों की भी उत्पत्ति के विषय की समाप्ति होने के बाद भी वे मिलाए जा सकते थे, वहाँ मिलाने में क्या बाधा हो सकती थी ? वस्तुतः 'अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी०' (सू० २।३।१५) और 'तथा प्राणाः' (सू० २।४।१) के प्रतिपाद्य को उक्त रूप में पहले से मानकर, उसके आधार पर जीवस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्रों को प्रक्षिप्त संभावित करने की अपेक्षा इनको मौलिक मानकर उक्त दो सूत्रों के ही प्रतिपाद्य को समझने का प्रयत्न करना अधिक उचित होगा। वस्तुतः 'अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी०' (सू० २।३।१५) के द्वारा बुद्धि और मन की सृष्टि के रूप में किसी नवीन विषय का प्रस्तावन नहीं किया गया है, अपितु, जैसा कि इस सूत्र के 'क्रमेण' और 'इति चेन्नाविशेषात्' अंशों से ही स्पष्ट है, इसके द्वारा अपने पूर्ववर्ती सूत्र 'विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च' (२।३।१४) में प्रतिपादित विषय के ही प्रसंग से सृष्टि या प्रलय के क्रम के विषय में शंका उठाकर उसका समाधान मात्र किया गया है और परवर्ती सूत्र (२।३।१६) के द्वारा भी पूर्वप्रस्तुत विषय का ही उपसंहार किया गया है, न कि जीवोत्पत्ति के विषय का प्रस्तावन, जैसा कि कुछ भाष्यकार मानते हैं।[१] इस प्रकार सूत्र २।३।१५ में बुद्धि और मन की सृष्टि के प्रतिपादन का कोई स्वतन्त्र विषय प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया जो कि यह माना जावे कि इसी प्रतिपादन का अंग 'तथा प्राणाः' (सू० २।४।१) है, अपितु इसके विपरीत सू० २।३।१५), जैसा कि इसके स्वरूप से स्पष्ट है, सू० २।४।१ से सम्बद्ध न होकर अपने पूर्ववर्ती सूत्रों के ही प्रतिपादन से सम्बद्ध है और वह प्रतिपाद्य सू० २।३।१६ में पूर्णतया समाप्त हो जाता है और फिर स्वतन्त्र रूप से 'नात्माऽश्रुतेः' (सू० २।३।१७) के द्वारा जीवोत्पत्ति का विषय प्रस्तुत होता है जो कि पाद की समाप्ति तक चलता है। बाद में 'तथा प्राणाः'

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१. आचार्य शंकर-ब्रह्मसूत्र-शांकरभाष्य, सू० २।३।१६।

(सू० २।४।१) के द्वारा स्वतन्त्र रूप से इन्द्रियों की उत्पत्ति का विषय प्रस्तुत होता है। अतः सूत्र २।४।१ से अव्यवहित रूप से पूर्व में जीव के नित्यत्व का प्रतिपादन किया गया है, अतः स्पष्ट है कि इस सूत्र के पूर्वातिदेशक 'तथा' शब्द से उसी के साथ अतिदेश करते हुए इसके द्वारा इन्द्रियनित्यत्वप्रतिपादक पूर्वपक्ष को प्रस्तुत किया गया है, और परवर्ती सूत्रों (२।४।२-४) के द्वारा उस पूर्वपक्ष का निराकरण कर इन्द्रियों की भी उत्पत्ति का प्रतिपादन किया गया है।

उक्त प्रकार से स्पष्ट है कि उक्त जीवस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्र (२।३।१६-५३) प्रक्षिप्त न होकर मौलिक सूत्रपाठ के ही सुसम्बद्ध अंग हैं।

डा० बेलवलकर ने उक्त जीवस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्रों के अतिरिक्त, तृतीय अध्याय के द्वितीय पाद के अन्तिम ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्रों (३।२।११-४१) को भी इस आधार पर प्रक्षिप्त सम्भावित किया है कि ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपण समुचित रीति से प्रारम्भ में ही उस स्थान पर होना चाहिए, जहाँ कि ब्रह्म का लक्षण देने का प्रयत्न किया गया है, इसका जीव की स्वप्न एवं सुषुप्ति आदि दशाओं के बाद रहना तार्किक दृष्टि से अत्यन्त आक्षेप के योग्य है और इसलिए संभव है कि जब सूत्रों में उक्त जीव-स्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्र (२।३।१६-५३) जोड़े गए, तभी ये ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणपरक सूत्र (३।२।११-४१) भी जोड़ दिए गए हैं।

डा० बेलवलकर की यह सम्भावना भी उचित प्रतीत नहीं होती। सूत्रकार ने ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपण प्रथम अध्याय में ही तत्प्रतिपादक उपनिषद्-वाक्यों की मीमांसा के माध्यम से कर दिया है और यहाँ वह विषय मुख्य रूप से नहीं लिया गया, अपितु, जैसा कि इस निरूपण के पूर्ववर्ती जीवदशानिरूपणपरक सूत्रों (३।२।१-१०) और साथ ही इसके प्रस्तावक सूत्र 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिंगं सर्वत्र हि' (३।२।११) से स्पष्ट है, इस प्रसंग से आया है कि जिस प्रकार बद्धावस्थ जीव में दोष आ जाते हैं, क्या उसी प्रकार जड़चेतनात्मक जगत् में स्थित परतत्व ब्रह्म में भी दोष आते हैं और इस प्रसंग-प्राप्त आशङ्का का निराकरण करने के लिए ही 'न स्थानतोऽपि०' (सू० ३।२।११) के द्वारा इस रूप में समाधान प्रस्तुत किया गया है कि परतत्व स्वरूपतः तो निर्दोष है ही, "स्थानतः" अर्थात् जड़चेतनात्मक जगत् में स्थित होने पर भी उसमें जीव के समान दोष नहीं आते, क्योंकि वह सर्वत्र श्रुतियों में उभयलिंग अर्थात् विश्वरूप होते हुए भी विश्वातीत या विश्व के दोषों से अस्पृश्य बताया गया है। इसी समाधान के प्रसंग में ही परतत्व के स्वरूप का निरूपण यहाँ स्वभावतः आ गया है। इसके अतिरिक्त, ब्रह्मसूत्रों का प्रारम्भ उनके जिज्ञास्य जगत्कारण ब्रह्म की जिज्ञासा से हुआ है, अतः जगत्कारण ब्रह्म के स्वरूप का ही वर्णन वहाँ किया जा सकता था और वह वहाँ सूत्रकार ने उसे जगत्कारण बताते हुए और उसी में विभिन्न श्रुतिवाक्यों का समन्वय करते हुए कर दिया। किन्तु केवल 'परतत्व', जो कि जीवों का प्राप्य होने पर भी सूत्रकार के अनुसार जगत् का अभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानकारण न होने के कारण जिज्ञास्य नहीं, अतः

उसके मुख्य स्वरूप पर प्रारम्भ में ही प्रकाश नहीं डाला जा सकता था, अतः सूत्रकार ने वहाँ ऐसा नहीं किया। यहाँ यह बताने के लिए कि परतत्व निर्दोष होने के कारण जीवों का प्राप्य है, उसके स्वरूप पर इस रूप में यहाँ प्रसंगतः प्रकाश डालना पड़ा है, जिससे सभी स्थितियों में उसकी निर्दोषता स्पष्ट हो सके। इस प्रकार उक्त दृष्टियों से यहाँ परतत्वनिरूपण पूर्णतया सुसंगत एवं पूर्वापरप्रसंग से सुसम्बद्ध है और फलतः यह स्पष्ट है कि वह मौलिक सूत्रपाठ का ही अंश है, प्रक्षिप्त नहीं।

वस्तुतः ब्रह्मसूत्रों का प्रत्येक विषय मौलिक रूप से एक-दूसरे से परस्पर घनिष्ठतया सम्बद्ध है और फलतः इस प्रकार की मान्यताओं में कोई सार प्रतीत नहीं होता कि वर्तमान ब्रह्मसूत्रों के मौलिक अंश में विभिन्न कर्त्ताओं के द्वारा विभिन्न भाग समय-समय पर संयोजित किए जाते रहे हैं, और अन्त में किसी ने उनका वर्तमान रूप में सम्पादन कर दिया है। वर्तमान ब्रह्मसूत्र अपने उपलब्ध रूप में एक ही कर्त्ता के पूर्णरूप से सुसम्बद्ध मौलिक कृति हैं। परम्परा भी यही मानती है और ब्रह्मसूत्रों के अध्ययन से भी इसी की पुष्टि होती है। इतनी बात अवश्य है कि विभिन्न भाष्यों में प्राप्त सूत्रपाठ में कुछ सूत्रों के न्यूनाधिक्य एवं कुछ सूत्रों के पाठभेद की समस्या अवश्य उपस्थित हो गई है, किन्तु, जैसा कि स्वयं डा० बेलवलकर ने कहा है, इससे ब्रह्मसूत्रों का बहुकर्तृकत्व नहीं माना जा सकता, क्योंकि एक ही कर्त्ता की किसी भी कृति में विभिन्न कारणों से कुछ पाठभेद हो जावे तो भले ही यह विवाद बना रहे कि अमुक स्थल का मौलिक पाठ क्या है, किन्तु वह कृति तो एक ही कर्त्ता की कृति मानी जावेगी।

**३—ब्रह्मसूत्रों का बादरायणकर्तृकत्व**—उक्त प्रकार से यह सुनिश्चित हो जाने के बाद कि ब्रह्मसूत्र अपने वर्तमान समग्र रूप में एक ही कर्त्ता की कृति हैं, अब यह प्रश्न उपस्थित होता है कि इनका वह एक कर्त्ता या रचयिता कौन है? परम्परागत मान्यता के अनुसार इनके रचयिता बादरायण माने जाते हैं और आधुनिक विद्वानों का भी बहुमत बादरायण को ही ब्रह्मसूत्रकार मानता है। इस प्रकार यद्यपि इस विषय में कोई विवाद नहीं रह जाता कि आचार्य बादरायण ने ब्रह्मसूत्रों की रचना की है, किन्तु फिर भी इस आधार पर कि सूत्रों में बादरायण के मतों का उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यास किया गया है, इस सम्भावना के लिए, जैसा कि कुछ विद्वानों का मत है,[1] अवसर बना रहता है कि बादरायण से परवर्ती किसी अन्य आचार्य ने ब्रह्मसूत्रों की रचना की और विभिन्न विषयों के निरूपण में उसने जिस प्रकार यथाप्रसंग अपने से पूर्ववर्ती आश्मरथ्य, बादरि, काशकृत्स्न, जैमिनि आदि आचार्यों के मतों का उपन्यास उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ किया है, उसी प्रकार उसने अपने पूर्ववर्ती बादरायण के भी मत का उपन्यास उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ किया है।

सामान्य रूप से देखने पर उक्त संभावना आपाततः उचित प्रतीत होती है, किन्तु वस्तुस्थिति पर ध्यान देने पर वह मान्य प्रतीत नहीं होती। इस विषय में सर्वप्रथम

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१. डा० बेलवलकर : (मल्टीपिल आथरशिप आफ दी वेदान्त सूत्रास्)।

यह ध्यातव्य है कि प्राचीन सूत्र-ग्रन्थों की यह भी एक मान्य शैली रही है कि सूत्रकार किसी विवादास्पद विषय के निरूपण में विभिन्न पूर्ववर्ती या समकालीन आचार्यों के नामनिर्देश के साथ उनके मतों का उपन्यास करते हुए अन्त में अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने सिद्धान्त को उपस्थित करते रहे हैं और उसी शैली का अनुसरण कर यहाँ भी ब्रह्मसूत्रकार बादरायण ने स्वनामनिर्देश के साथ अपने मत का उपन्यास किया है। उदाहरण के लिए, आचार्य शाण्डिल्य ने अपने भक्तिसूत्र में भक्ति के स्वरूप का निरूपण करते हुए 'तामैश्वर्यपरां काश्यपः परत्वात्' (सू० २९), तथा 'आत्मैकपरां बादरायणः' (सू० ३०) के द्वारा आचार्य काश्यप और बादरायण के मतों का उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यास कर अन्त में 'उभयपरां शाण्डिल्यः शब्दोपपत्तिभ्याम्' (सू० ३१) के द्वारा अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने मत का उपन्यास किया है। आचार्य नारद ने अपने भक्तिसूत्र में 'तल्लक्षणानि वाच्यन्ते नानामतभेदात्' (सूत्र० १५) के द्वारा भक्ति के लक्षण के सम्बन्ध में विभिन्न मतों का प्रस्तावन करते हुए 'पूजादिष्वनुराग इति पाराशर्यः' (सू० १६), 'कथादिष्विति गर्गः' (सू० १७), एवं 'आत्मरत्यविरोधेनेति शाण्डिल्यः' (सू० १८) के द्वारा पाराशर्य, गर्ग और शाण्डिल्य के मतों को उपन्यस्त कर अन्त में, 'नारदस्तु तदर्पिताखिलाचारता तद्विस्मरणे परमव्याकुलतेति' (सू० १९) के रूप में अपने मत का उपन्यास किया है। आचार्य कौटिल्य या कौटल्य ने अपने अर्थशास्त्र में अनेक स्थलों पर 'तमेव हि प्रत्यावृत्तौ ग्रसत इति आचार्याः' (७।४।२१) आदि के रूप में अपने से भिन्न आचार्यों के मतों का उपस्थापन कर अन्त में 'नेति कौटल्यः' (७।४।२२) आदि के रूप में अपने नामनिर्देश के साथ अपने सिद्धान्तभूत मत को प्रस्तुत किया है। इसी प्रकार आचार्य जैमिनि ने अपने मीमांसा-सूत्रों में अनेक स्थलों पर 'द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु बादरिः' (३।१।३) आदि के रूप में अपने से भिन्न बादरि आदि आचार्यों के मतों को उपस्थित कर अन्त में 'कर्माण्यपि जैमिनिः फलार्थत्वात्' (३।१।४) आदि के रूप में अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने सिद्धान्तभूत मत को प्रस्तुत किया है। वस्तुतः, जिस प्रकार आधुनिक काल के लेखक अपने ग्रन्थ के साथ अपना नाम स्वयं लिख देते हैं, उस प्रकार उस समय में तो कोई ऐसी परिपाटी नहीं थी। उस समय तो उपरिप्रदर्शित प्रकार से ही सूत्रकार अपने सूत्रों में अपना नाम-निर्देश करने का अवसर पाते थे।

अब यहाँ पर यह प्रश्न किया जा सकता है कि जब ब्रह्मसूत्रों में अन्य आचार्यों के भी नाम का निर्देश है, तो बादरायण को ही ब्रह्मसूत्रकार क्यों माना जावे, अन्य आचार्यों में से ही किसी को क्यों न माना जावे ? इस प्रश्न का समाधान भी इस रूप में किया जा सकता है कि जिस प्रकार पूर्वोक्त शाण्डिल्य आदि आचार्यों ने अन्य आचार्यों के मतों को पूर्व में उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ प्रस्तुत कर अन्त में अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने मत को सिद्धान्त रूप में प्रस्तुत किया है, उसी प्रकार ब्रह्मसूत्रकार बादरायण ने भी अन्य आचार्यों के नाम-निर्देश के साथ उनके मतों का पूर्व में उपन्यास कर अन्त में अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने मत का उपन्यास किया है। उस समय के

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सूत्रकार जिस शैली में अपने मत का उपन्यास अन्त में करते थे, उसी शैली में ब्रह्मसूत्रकार बादरायण ने भी अपने मत का उपन्यास अन्त में किया है और फलतः जिस प्रकार शाण्डिल्य आदि को तत्तत् सूत्रों का प्रणेता माना जाता है, उसी प्रकार बादरायण को भी ब्रह्मसूत्रों का प्रणेता मानना उचित है।

जैसा कि ब्रह्मसूत्रों को देखने से ज्ञात होता है, उनमें बारह स्थलों (सू० १।२। २४-३२; १।३।२६-३३; १।४।१६-१८; १।४।१९-२२; ३।१।८-११; ३।२।३८-४१; ३।४।१-२५; ३।४।४०; ३।४।४४-४६; ४।३।७-१६; ४।४।५-७; ४।४।१०-१४) पर विभिन्न विषयों के निरूपण के प्रसंग से जैमिनि, बादरि, औडुलोमि, आश्मरथ्य, कार्ष्णाजिनि, आत्रेय, काशकृत्स्न एवं बादरायण, इन आठ आचार्यों के मतों का इनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यास किया गया है। इन स्थलों में से छः स्थलों (सू० १।३। २६-३३; ३।२।३८-४१; ३।४।१-२५; ४।३।७-१६; ४।४।५-७; ४।४।१०-१४) पर अन्य आचार्यों के मतों के साथ बादरायण के मतों को उपन्यस्त करते हुए सर्वत्र बादरायण के मतों को अन्त में सिद्धान्त रूप से प्रस्तुत कर विषय का उपसंहार किया गया है और अन्य आचार्यों के मतों को या तो साक्षात् रूप से निराकृत किया गया है या उनको आंशिक रूप से स्वीकार करते हुए संशोधित या परिष्कृत किया गया है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि इन स्थलों पर जिन आचार्यों—जैमिनि, बादरि एवं औडुलोमि—के मतों को निराकृत या परिष्कृत किया गया है, वे कदापि ब्रह्मसूत्रकार नहीं और फलतः छः अवशिष्ट स्थलों (सू० १।२।२४-३२; १।४।१६-१८; १।४।१९-२२; ३।१।८-११; ३।४।४०; ३।४।४४-४६) में से, जहाँ कि बादरायण के नाम का निर्देश नहीं, अपितु अन्य विभिन्न आचार्यों के मतों को अन्त में रखते हुए विषय का उपसंहार किया गया है, जो तीन स्थलों (सू० १।२।२४-३२; ३।१।८-११; ३।४।४४-४६) पर अन्य आचार्यों के मतों के बाद क्रमशः जैमिनि, बादरि और औडुलोमि के मतों को अन्त में रक्खा गया है, उसका केवल इतना ही तात्पर्य हो सकता है कि यहाँ तत्तत् स्थलों पर अन्य आचार्यों के मतों की अपेक्षा क्रमशः जैमिनि, बादरि एवं औडुलोमि के मत सूत्रकार को अधिक अभीष्ट हैं, उससे यह निष्कर्ष नहीं प्राप्त किया जा सकता कि इन तीनों में से कोई सूत्रकार है। अतः इन स्थलों पर इन तीन आचार्यों के अतिरिक्त अन्य आचार्यों—आश्मरथ्य, कार्ष्णाजिनि और आत्रेय—के मतों को क्रमशः पूर्व में उपन्यस्त कर उनके बाद उक्त जैमिनि आदि तीन आचार्यों के मतों को उपन्यस्त करते हुए इनमें अभिरुचि दिखाई गई है, अतः आश्मरथ्य आदि के सूत्रकारत्व की सम्भावना तो बिलकुल ही नहीं की जा सकती। इसी प्रकार जो अन्य दो स्थलों (सू० १।४।१६-१८, ३।४।४०) पर अन्य किसी आचार्य के नाम-निर्देश के बिना केवल जैमिनि के मत का उपन्यास इनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ किया गया है, उसका केवल इतना ही तात्पर्य है कि यहाँ सूत्रकार अपने प्रतिपाद्य में जैमिनि की भी सहमति प्रदर्शित कर रहे हैं या जैमिनि द्वारा स्वीकृत उपपत्ति से भी अपने प्रतिपाद्य का समर्थन प्रदर्शित कर रहे हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त वैसे भी जो अन्य किसी आचार्य के नाम-निर्देश के बिना केवल जैमिनि के ही नाम का

निर्देश है, उससे इस तथ्य की ही और अधिक पुष्टि होती है कि जैमिनि सूत्रकार नहीं क्योंकि यदि ऐसा होता तो जब किसी अन्य आचार्य का कोई भिन्न मत प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया है, तब फिर जैमिनि अपने मत का उपन्यास अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ क्यों करते ? इस प्रकार उक्त ग्यारह स्थलों पर विभिन्न आचार्यों के मतों को उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यस्त करने के रूपों को देखते हुये छः आचार्यों—जैमिनि, बादरि, औडुलोमि, आश्मरथ्य, कार्ष्णाजिनि, आत्रेय—के सूत्रकारत्व की सम्भावना जहाँ निरस्त हो जाती है वहाँ आचार्य बादरायण के सूत्रकारत्व की पुष्टि होती है ।

अब केवल एक स्थल (सू० १।४।१९-२२) और वहाँ उक्त आचार्यों के अतिरिक्त नामतः निर्दिष्ट एक ही आचार्य—काशकृत्स्न—का विचार अवशिष्ट रह जाता है । इस स्थल पर आश्मरथ्य और औडुलोमि के मतों को उपन्यस्त करने के बाद अन्त में काशकृत्स्न का मत इनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यस्त किया गया है और एकमात्र इसी स्थल पर इनका नाम इस रूप में आया है । इस प्रकार यद्यपि ब्रह्मसूत्रों में काशकृत्स्न की ऐसी स्थिति है कि अन्य आचार्यों के समान न तो कहीं उनके मत का निराकरण या परिष्कार किया गया है और न कहीं उनके मत को पूर्व में प्रस्तुत कर उसके बाद किसी अन्य आचार्य के मत को रक्खा गया है, किन्तु फिर भी उनके सूत्रकारत्व की संभावना इसलिए नहीं की जा सकती कि यदि वे सूत्रकार होते तो जब उन्होंने उक्त एक स्थल पर अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने मत का प्रस्तावन किया ही है, तो फिर पूर्वोक्त अन्य अनेक ऐसे स्थलों (सू० १।३।२६-३३; ३।२।३८-४१ आदि) पर, जहाँ कि बादरायण के नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यस्त मत के द्वारा सिद्धान्त-पक्ष को प्रस्तुत किया गया है, वे अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने मत के द्वारा सिद्धान्त-को प्रस्तुत न कर बादरायण के नाम-निर्देश के साथ इनके मत से उसे क्यों प्रस्तुत करते ? वस्तुतः जिस रूप में और जितनी बहुलता के साथ बादरायण का नाम आया है, उसकी तुलना में उक्त एकमात्र स्थल पर प्रयुक्त काशकृत्स्न का नाम कुछ महत्त्व ही नहीं रखता । फलतः इस स्थल पर जो उनके मत को अन्य आचार्यों के मतों के बाद अन्त में रक्खा गया है, उससे केवल यही तात्पर्य निकलता है कि जिस प्रकार पूर्वोक्त प्रकार से अन्य तीन स्थलों ( सू० १।२।२४-३२ आदि ) पर अन्य आचार्यों के मतों के बाद अन्त में निर्दिष्ट क्रमशः जैमिनि, बादरि एवं औडुलोमि के मत सूत्रकार को अधिक अभीष्ट हैं, उसी प्रकार यहाँ भी अन्त में निर्दिष्ट काशकृत्स्न का मत इससे पूर्व में निर्दिष्ट अन्य आचार्यों के मतों की अपेक्षा सूत्रकार को अधिक अभीष्ट है । वैसे भी, इस स्थल पर सू० १।४।१९ में जो सूत्रकार का प्रतिपादन है, उसके विरोध में सू० १।४।२०-२१ में अन्य आचार्यों के मत प्रस्तुत नहीं किए गए हैं, जो कि यह माना जावे कि सूत्रकार ने सू० १।४।२२ में पुनः अपने मत के प्रतिष्ठापन के लिए अपने नाम—काशकृत्स्न—के साथ उसे प्रस्तुत किया है । यहाँ तो सू० १।४।१९ में किए गए सूत्रकार के प्रतिपाद्य का ही सू० १।४।२०-२२ में निर्दिष्ट तीन आचार्यों के द्वारा स्वीकृत विभिन्न उपपत्तियों से समर्थन किया गया है, जिनमें कि काशकृत्स्न द्वारा स्वीकृत

उपपत्ति सूत्रकार को अधिक अभीष्ट हो सकती है और इसीलिए उसे अन्त में रक्खा गया है।

अस्तु ! उक्त प्रकार से ब्रह्मसूत्रों के उन स्थलों पर, जहाँ कि विभिन्न आचार्यों के मतों को उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उपन्यास किया गया है, उपन्यस्त विभिन्न आचार्यों के मतों के उपन्यास के रूपों को परस्पर तुलनात्मक दृष्टि से देखते हुए यही निष्कर्ष प्राप्त होता है कि इनमें जहाँ बादरायण के मतों को इनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ उसी प्रकार सिद्धान्तरूप में उपन्यस्त किया गया है, जिस प्रकार कि पूर्वोक्त शाण्डिल्य, नारद एवं कौटिल्य आदि सूत्रकार अपने अपने सूत्र-ग्रन्थों में अपने नाम-निर्देश के साथ अपने मतों का उपन्यास सिद्धान्त रूप में करते रहे हैं, वहाँ अन्य आचार्यों के मतों का उपन्यास केवल निराकरण, परिष्कार या स्वप्रतिपाद्य-समर्थन आदि के उद्देश्य से ही किया गया है और इस प्रकार एकमात्र बादरायण ही ब्रह्मसूत्रकार सिद्ध होते हैं।

डा० बेलवलकर ने यह देखते हुए कि पूर्वमीमांसा-सूत्रों में बादरायण के नाम का निर्देश है और ब्रह्मसूत्रों में जैमिनि के नाम का निर्देश है, यह विचार व्यक्त किया है कि जब तक यह न कल्पना की जावे कि जैमिनि और बादरायण केवल समसामयिक ही नहीं थे, अपितु साथ-साथ काम करने वाले ऐसे साथी थे जो कि प्रायः प्रतिदिन अपने-अपने लेखों को मिलाते थे, उक्त पारस्परिक नाम-निर्देशों के तथ्य की व्याख्या करना यह माने बिना कठिन होगी कि या तो इन निर्देशों को सूत्रकारों के शिष्यों ने बाद में मिला दिया या सभी सूत्रों की रचना ही प्रथित सूत्रकारों के द्वारा न होकर उनके शिष्यों के द्वारा ही हुई है।[१]

इस विषय में इतना कहना पर्याप्त होगा कि पूर्वमीमांसा-सूत्रों और ब्रह्मसूत्रों में से किसी एक में दूसरे के उद्धरण नहीं प्राप्त होते हैं, जो कि यह मानना पड़े कि इन सूत्रों के रचयिता अपने लेखों को परस्पर प्रायः प्रतिदिन मिलाते थे। इन सूत्रों में दोनों के रचयिताओं के द्वारा केवल एक दूसरे के मतों का उपन्यास उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ मिलता है, जिससे इतना ही प्रकट होता है कि इनके रचयिता—जैमिनि और बादरायण—समसामयिक थे और दोनों के सिद्धान्त तत्कालीन श्रुति-मीमांसा के क्षेत्र में इतने प्रथित हो गए थे कि ये दोनों भी एक-दूसरे के सिद्धान्तों से पूर्णतया परिचित थे और इसीलिए यह संभव हो सका कि दोनों ने एक दूसरे के मतों का उपन्यास उनके नाम-निर्देश के साथ किया है। फलतः यह कल्पना करने की किंचिन्मात्र भी आवश्यकता नहीं कि इन दोनों सूत्र-ग्रन्थों की रचना प्रथित सूत्रकारों के द्वारा न होकर इनके शिष्यों के द्वारा हुई है या इनके शिष्यों ने इनके नाम-निर्देशक सूत्रों को बाद में मिला दिया है।

इस प्रकार अब यह पुनरावृत्त करने की आवश्यकता नहीं कि ब्रह्मसूत्रों की रचना एकमात्र आचार्य बादरायण ने ही की है अर्थात् ब्रह्मसूत्र बादरायणैककर्तृक हैं। परम्परा-

१. मल्टीपिल आथरशिप आफ दी वेदान्तसूत्रास् (इंडियन फिलासाफीकल रिव्यू, वाल्यूम २, १९१८-१९, पृ० १४१-१५३)।

गत मान्यता का भी इस बात से विरोध नहीं है और आधुनिक विद्वानों की भी प्रायः सर्वसम्मति ऐसा मानती है। इसके अतिरिक्त ब्रह्मसूत्रों के उपलब्ध प्राचीनतम भाष्य के रचयिता आचार्य शंकर का भी इस विषय में स्पष्ट साक्ष्य प्राप्त है। आचार्य शंकर ब्रह्मसूत्रों के अन्तिम सूत्र (४।४।२२) को, जिसमें कि "बादरायण' का नाम-निर्देश नहीं है, प्रस्तावना में कहते हैं, 'नन्वेवं सति सातिशयत्वादन्तवत्वमैश्वर्यस्य स्यात्ततश्चैषामावृत्तिः प्रसज्येतेत्यत उत्तरं भगवान् बादरायणः आचार्यः पठति—।' इस प्रकार उनके कथन से स्पष्ट है कि वे भी ब्रह्मसूत्रों का रचयिता आचार्य बादरायण को मानते हैं।

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# न्यायदर्शने त्रिलोचनमतविमर्शः

डा० किशोरनाथ झा*

नाविदितमेतन्न्यायशास्त्ररसिकाणां यदक्षपाददर्शनानुशीलनपराः विद्वांसः प्राचीनकालादेव बौद्धन्यायचिन्तकैः साकं सारस्वतीं प्रतिस्पर्द्धितां प्रकटीकृत्यैव कमपि विचारमारचयन्तीति। अतएव गौतमदर्शनग्रन्थेषु पूर्वपक्षतया बौद्धमतानि समायान्ति, बलवता प्रमाणनिवहेन खण्डितानि च भवन्ति। तथैव बौद्धदर्शनग्रन्थेष्वपि न्यायसिद्धान्ताः प्रतिपक्षतया सविशेषमामृष्टाः सन्तीति नैव तिरोहितं विद्वल्लोचनेभ्यः। उभयोश्च दर्शनयोर्ग्रन्थानामापाततोऽवलोकनेन सांप्रतमपरिचिताअपि स्वसमयस्य विश्रुताः विद्वांसस्तेषां सिद्धान्ताश्च शेमुषी-जुषां गवेषकाणां मनांसि नितरामाकर्षन्ति। तत्रापि विशेषेण बौद्धजैनदार्शनिकाणां कृतिषु न्यायाचार्याणां सन्दर्भाः बाहुल्येन नामग्राहं समुद्धृताः विद्यन्ते, येषां चर्चापि संप्रदायग्रन्थेषु विरला एव विद्यते, अथवा नास्त्येव सर्वथा। अत्र च निदर्शनं शान्तरक्षिताचार्येणोल्लिखितौ भाविविक्ताविद्धकर्णनामानौ प्राचीनतमनैयायिकाविति।[1] एवं धर्मोत्तरप्रदीपे न्यायविनिश्चयविवरणे च समुल्लिखितो न्यायभाष्यटीकाकृद्विश्वरूपः[2] रुचिटीकाकारोऽध्ययनश्च।[3]

एवं ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलावधुना लुप्तपरिचयानां विशिष्टनैयायिकानां गौतमन्यायप्रस्थानस्य वेदिकास्तम्भरूपेण परिगणना दृश्यते। तद्यथा—

दुर्नीताश्रमवेदिकादृढतर स्तम्भानमून् शङ्कर-
न्यायालङ्करण त्रिलोचनवचस्पत्याह्वयान् हेलया।
उन्मूल्य क्षणभङ्ग एष विहितो यत्पुण्यमाप्तं मया
तेन स्तात् परपारगस्त्रिभुवने ज्ञानश्रियोऽयंजनः ॥[4]

अमुना च पद्येन त्रिलोचनाचार्यः स्वसमयस्य प्रसिद्धतमनैयायिकेषु निजास्पदं रक्षतिस्मेति वयमनुमिनुमः। ऐतिहासिकदृष्ट्या विचारविधौ स्वयं न्यायवार्तिककृदुद्द्योत-

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* सीनियर रिसर्च फेलो (यू० जी० सी०), कामेश्वरसिंह दरभंगा संस्कृत विश्वविद्यालयः, दरभंगा।

१—द्रष्टव्या वादन्यायस्य विपञ्चितार्थाव्याख्या।

२—द्र० धर्मोत्तरप्रदीपः, न्यायविनिश्चयविवरणम्।

३—द्र० न्यायविनिश्चयविवरणम्।

४—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० १५९

करं तात्पर्यटीकाकारंश्च वाचस्पतिश्चान्तरा विद्यमान ग्रासीदिति तर्कयामः। यद्यप्यधुनास्य न कापि कृतिरिहास्माकं समक्षमस्ति तथापि मतान्यस्य निजान्तेवासिनो वाचस्पते-र्ग्रन्थानवलम्ब्याद्यापि जीवन्त्येव। वाचस्पतिस्तुतात्पर्यटीकायां सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षस्य विचारावसरे—"त्रिलोचन गुरून्नीतमार्गानुगमनोन्मुखैः।

यथामानं यथावस्तु व्याख्यातमिदमीदृशम्॥[१]

इत्युक्त्वा स्वयमेव कण्ठतस्तच्छिष्यत्वमङ्गीकरोति। विधिविवेकस्य न्याय-कणिकां व्याख्यां प्रारभमाणेनाप्यनेन मङ्गलाचरणे त्रिलोचनाचार्योऽयमात्मगुरुतया सादरं स्मृतोऽस्ति। तद्यथा—

ग्रज्ञानतिमिरशमनीं परदमनीं न्यायमञ्जरीं रुचिराम्।
प्रसवित्रे प्रभवित्रे विद्यातरवे नमो गुरवे॥[२]

ग्रयमेव हि त्रिलोचनाचार्य इहर्चचितायाः न्यायमञ्जर्याः प्रणेतेत्यत्र बौद्धदार्श-निकः ज्ञानश्रीमित्रोऽपि सुष्ठु साक्ष्यं प्रस्तौति। तदीये क्षणभङ्गाध्यायनाम्नि निबन्धे[३] त्रिलोचनकृतेः न्यायमञ्जरीति पूर्णं नामधेयं समागच्छति। ईश्वरदूषण निबन्धेऽपि "मञ्जर्यां त्रिलोचनस्त्विति"[४] वाक्येनोपक्रम्य पूर्वपक्षतया तन्मतं सविस्तरमुपवर्णयति। ग्रत्र नामैकदेशग्रहणे नामग्रहणमिति लौकिकन्यायमवलम्ब्य बलरामो राम इतिवत् केवलं मञ्जरीपदं न्यायमञ्जर्याः कृते व्यवहृतमस्ति।

रत्नकीर्तिरपि बौद्धाचार्यस्त्रिलोचनममुमुद्धरति। तत्र च रत्नकीर्तिनिबन्धावलेः प्रस्तावनायां विदुषा संपादकेन युक्तिभिरुपपादितं यदिह चर्चिताः न्यायमञ्जरीसंदर्भाः जयन्तभट्टप्रणीतयोपलब्धन्यायमञ्जर्या सह नैव कमपि संबन्धं संरक्षन्त इति।[५] धर्मोत्तर-प्रदीपे दुर्वेकमिश्रस्तु त्रिलोचनस्य न्यायभाष्यटीकामुद्धरति।[६] एवं स्याद्वादरत्नाकरे वादिदेवोऽस्य न्यायप्रकीर्णकं चर्चति।[७] किन्तु दौर्भाग्यादस्माकं नैतस्य कापि रचना सांप्रतमुपलभ्यते। न्यायभाष्यवार्तिकतात्पर्यविवरणपञ्जिकाकारोऽनिरुद्धः बहुषु स्थलेषु वाचस्पतिमिश्रस्य न्यायमञ्जरीकारानुसारित्वं प्रादर्शयत्।

तस्मादिह ज्ञानश्रीमित्रस्य निबन्धावलौ विविधेषु प्रसङ्गेषु पूर्वपक्षतया समागतान्ये-तस्य मतान्येवेह प्रज्ञावतां पुरतः सरलया रीत्या यथामति समुपस्थाप्यन्ते—

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१—द्र० तात्पर्यटीका १।१।४।
२—द्र० विधिविवेकस्य न्यायकणिकाव्याख्यायाः मङ्गलाचरणम्।
३—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० ३६
४—द्र० ,, ,, २३६
५—द्र० रत्नकीर्तिनिबन्धावलिः, प्रस्तावनाभागः।
६—द्र० धर्मोत्तरप्रदीपः
७—द्र० स्याद्वादरत्नाकरः

१—पदार्थानां क्षणिकत्वसिद्धये प्रयत्नशीलाः बौद्धाचार्याः स्थिरवस्तुवादिनो नैयायिकान् प्रति विकल्पद्वयं प्रस्तुवन्ति, उभयोश्च विकल्पयोः युक्तिबलैः खण्डने सति स्वयं तन्मतं सुप्रतिष्ठितं स्यादिति निजमनोरथं सफलयितुं प्रथमं विकल्पस्वरूपं पुरस्कुर्वन्ति—किं स्थिरपदार्थः सर्वाः क्रियाः युगपत्कर्तुं प्रभवति ? अथवा क्रमश इति ? नाद्यः कल्पस्तथासति द्वितीयक्षणे तस्य कृते किमपि कर्तुं नावशिष्यत इति तस्मिन् क्षणेऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वरूपं सल्लक्षणं तत्र न घटत इत्यसत्स्वरूपापत्तिः । नापि द्वितीयः कल्पः, यतोहि सर्वार्थक्रिया समर्थोऽपि काञ्चिदेव क्रियामारभते नान्यामित्यत्र को नियामकः । समर्थस्य कार्यसम्पादनानन्तरमेव विश्रामः बहुलं लोकेऽवलोक्यते ।

यद्युच्यते समर्थोऽपि सहकारिणमपेक्ष्यैव कार्यसम्पादने प्रभुरिति, समर्थस्यापि सहकारिणोऽभावे तत्र विलम्बो भवितुमर्हतीति । अत्रापि पुनः विप्रतिपत्तिरुदेति किमसौ सहकारी किञ्चित्करोति आहोस्विन्नेति ? यदिविधिकोटिस्तदा सहकारिणैव कार्यसंपादनसंभवे किमनेन समर्थेन ? यदि च निषेधकोटिस्तदा सहकारी सर्वथाऽनपेक्ष्य एव स्यादिति समर्थस्य विलम्बो न युज्यते । तस्माद्वस्तुनः स्थैर्यमसंभवम् । सन्मात्रानुबन्धितया तु क्षणिकत्वं सिद्धयति ।

२—अत्र त्रिलोचनाचार्यः बौद्धमतं प्रतिवक्ति यत् पदार्थस्थैर्यवादिनो नैयायिकाः कस्यचिदपि कारणस्य स्वकार्यसम्पादनाय द्विविधं सामर्थ्यमागन्तुकं स्वाभाविकञ्चान्वयव्यतिरेकयोर्बलेनाङ्गीकृत्य द्वाभ्याञ्च सामर्थ्याभ्यां कार्योत्पत्तिमभ्युपगच्छन्ति । अत्रापि स एव सहकारिपदवीं लभते यस्मिन्नागन्तुकं सामर्थ्यमस्ति । यस्मिश्च स्वाभाविकं सामर्थ्यं वर्तते, स एव प्रधानो हेतुरिति स्थिरपदार्थादेव केवलात् कार्यसम्पादने दोषोद्भावनपटुर्बौद्धाचार्यः हेतुसामर्थ्यमेवाज्ञात्वा पदार्थस्य स्थिरसत्तायाः प्रतिविधानमकरोत् मलमिदं त्रिलोचनाचार्यस्य तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धावौदयने ३. २. १४ न्या० सूत्र व्याख्यायामक्षरशश्चर्चितमस्ति । क्रमशः कार्याणामुत्पत्तिस्तु सहकारिणः सन्निधानासन्निधानाभ्यामुपपद्यते । यस्य कार्यस्य सहकारिसन्निधिरस्ति तत्प्रथममुत्पद्यते, यस्य विलम्बेन सहकारिसन्निधिस्तत् पश्चादुत्पत्तिं लभत इति सहकारिवैविध्यात् क्रमशः कार्यनानात्वं सङ्गच्छते । एतदर्थं भावानां क्षणिकत्वं नाङ्गीकर्तव्यम्[१] । अत्र त्रिलोचनाचार्यः क्षणिकवादस्यास्तित्वमेव न संभवतीत्युक्त्वा सम्प्रति तत्रानुपपत्तिं प्रदर्शयति—क्षणवादे पदार्थस्य स्वभावः प्रतिक्षणं भिद्यते नवेति विप्रतिपत्तौ यदि बौद्धाचार्यः निषेधकोटिमवलम्बते तदा तन्मते रूपरसयोरभेदापत्तिः स्यात् । यतोहि पूर्वरूपक्षणः येन स्वभावेनानन्तरक्षणमुत्पादयति तेनैव रसक्षणमप्युत्पादयेदिति रूपरसयोरभेदः । एकस्वभावात् कारणादेकस्वभावकमेव कार्यं भवतीत्यस्य दर्शनात् । यदि चात्र विधिकोटिमभ्युपगच्छेदसौ, तदैकस्य विरुद्धं स्वभावद्वयं प्रसज्येत । रूपजननस्वभावतो रसजननस्वभावस्य सर्वथा

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१—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० २८

F. 27

भेदोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निश्चित इति पदार्थस्य क्षणिकवादसिद्धान्तः किमप्यसाधारण्यं न भजत इति तन्न सङ्गच्छते[१]।

३—बौद्धाचार्यः क्षणिकवादस्य सिद्धये यदि ब्रूयात् यत् क्षेत्रपतितबीजेषु कुर्वद्रूपत्वमङ्कुरजननसामर्थ्यमस्ति कुशूलस्थबीजेषु तु तन्नास्ति। तस्मात् क्षेत्रपतितानि बीजानि सम्यगङ्कुराण्युत्पादयन्ति न कुशूलस्थानीति क्षेत्रपतितकुशूलस्थबीजयोर्भेदोऽवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्य इति क्षणिकत्वं पदार्थानां सिद्ध्यति। क्षणिकत्वं विनोक्तभेदस्यानुपपत्तेः। सहानवस्थानरूपविरोधशालिनौ पदार्थावेकस्मिन्नधिकरणे स्थातुं नैव प्रभवत इति कुशूलस्थ क्षेत्रपतित बीजयोर्यदि भेदं नाभ्युपगच्छेत् तदा कुशूलस्थबीजादप्यङ्कुरमुत्पद्येत, नोत्पद्येत वा क्षेत्रपतितबीजादप्यङ्कुरम्। अतएव भावानां क्षणिकत्वं सर्वथा युक्तिसिद्धमिति। अस्य च निरासाय त्रिलोचनाचार्यः व्यपदिशति यत् क्षेत्रपतितबीजेषु सहकारिसमवधानेनाङ्कुरजनकतां कुशूलस्थ बीजेषु च सहकारिणोऽभावादङ्कुरजनकत्वाभावं वयं कल्पयामः। एतयैव कल्पनया सर्वत्र कार्यं प्रचलतीति तदर्थं क्षेत्रपतितकुशूलस्थबीजयोर्भेदमुपपाद्य तन्निदर्शनेनपदार्थानां क्षणिकत्वस्य प्रसाधनं नैव सङ्गच्छते। सहकारिसमवधानासमवधानरूपकालभेदेनैकत्रापि विरुद्धधर्मयोः समावेशो भवितुमर्हतीति पदार्थानां क्षणिकत्वं न सिद्ध्यति। अमीषाञ्च सहकारिणां सर्वत्र प्रत्यक्षं न भवति किन्तु क्वचित् प्रत्यक्षं भवति। यथा क्षेत्रपतितबीजानां सहकारिणः पृथ्वीपाथस्तेजोवाय्वादीनां। सम्यक् संयोगरूपाः प्रत्यक्षाः। एतेषाञ्चाभावः कुशूलस्थबीजेषु। किन्तु, अविभक्तमातापितृसंयोगादिसामग्री संभवानामेकशरीरावयवानां क्वचिदेव तिलकाः जायन्ते न सर्वत्र सत्यपि त्वङ्मांसादिसाम्येऽन्यावयवेषु। तत्रादृष्टं सहकारिणमवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। एवमेव हि प्रसिद्धकार्यस्य घटस्योत्पादनविधौ प्रधानं कारणं मृत्तिका सहकारिणश्च दण्डचक्रचीवरादयः प्रत्यक्षाः परोक्षाश्चेश्वरेच्छाभोक्तृपुण्यादय इति। तस्मात्सर्वत्र प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षरूपसहकारिणः समवधाना समवधानाभ्यां कार्यं प्रचलितुमर्हतीति क्षणिकत्वं पदार्थानां न सिद्ध्यति[२]। पश्चाद्भवे न्यायाचार्योदयनस्यात्मतत्त्वविवेके—[३] "सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्यलक्षणविरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गेण भेदसिद्धौ तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न, विरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गासिद्धेरित्युक्तौ त्रिलोचनाचार्यस्य निरुक्तकथायाः परोक्षं प्रभावं परिलक्षयामः।

४—न च क्षणिकवादे प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणेन व्याप्तिमुपपादयितुं शक्नोति बौद्धाचार्य इत्यभिप्रायं हृदि निधाय त्रिलोचनाचार्यः कथयति—"कश्चित्सहकारिप्रत्यतः प्रत्ययः, परोक्षश्चेतरः, ततः प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षसहकारिप्रत्ययसाकल्यमसर्वविदा प्रत्यक्षतो न शक्यं

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१—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० ३६

२—द्र० ,, ,, ,, ४६

३—द्र० आत्मतत्त्वविवेकः पृ० २८ [चौखम्बा संस्करणम्]

प्रत्येतुम् । तथा च सति तादृशसहकारिप्रत्ययसाकल्यवतः क्रमयौगपद्यस्यात्यन्तपरोक्षत्वात् तेन व्याप्तं सत्त्वमपि परोक्षमेवेति कथं प्रतिबन्धः प्रत्यक्षेण सिद्धयतीति"।[१]

५—अधुना त्रिलोचनाचार्यः प्रतिसन्धानान्यथानुपपत्त्या क्षणिकवादनिरसनपुरस्सरं पदार्थस्थैर्यं स्थापयति । यद्यपीयं युक्तिः न्यायभाष्यकृता भगवता पक्षिलस्वामिना "तदात्मगुणत्वसद्भावाद प्रतिषेधः" । ३।१।१४।इति न्यायसूत्रव्याख्यायां वैशद्येन प्रादर्शि तथापि तदनुगामितामात्मनि समर्थयन्नसौ त्रिलोचन इमां युक्ति सम्यक्तया चर्चति । तथाहि यमर्थमनुभूतवानहं तमेवैतर्हि स्मरामीति वाक्येनानुभवस्मृत्योरेकाधारता सिद्धयति । यतो हि नान्यदृष्टमन्यः स्मरतीत्युभयवाद्यनुमतम्, क्षणिकवादे त्वनुभवितुः स्मर्त्रा भिन्नतयोक्तवाक्यस्य सङ्गतिरेव न स्यात् । पदार्थस्थैर्यवादे त्वनुभविता स्मृतिसमये संस्कारद्वारयानुभूतपदार्थं स्मर्तुमर्हतीति पदार्थस्य स्थैर्यं सिद्धयति । अनुभूतपदार्थस्य स्मृतिरेव हि प्रतिसंधानं तच्च क्षणिकवादे नोपपद्यते । पदार्थस्य प्रतिक्षणं भिन्नतया येनानुभूतं न स स्मरणसमयेऽस्ति, न च यस्यैवानुभवो विहितः स एव परस्मिन्क्षणे तथा स्वस्वरूपेणावस्थातुं प्रभवति । तस्मात् पदार्थस्थैर्यवाद एवावलम्बनीयः । तथाचोक्तानुपपत्तिर्न भवतीति ।

अपि च स्थिरपदार्थोऽयमात्मा प्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहीतुं शक्यः यतो ह्यहमिति ज्ञानं न संदिग्धं भ्रान्तं वा । नाप्यनुमानात्मकं शाब्दबोधात्मकं वा, किन्तु प्रत्यक्षात्मकम् । अहमित्येतस्मिन् ज्ञाने योऽर्थश्चकास्ति तमेवार्थमधिकृत्य स्मृत्यनुसंधानेच्छादयः प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिभान्ति । तस्मादिहोपसंहर्तुं प्रभवामो वयमिदमुक्त्वा यदनुभवस्मरणयोरेकाधारतयात्मा स्वातन्त्र्येण स्थिरपदार्थः सिद्ध इति न कदापि क्षणिकवादः प्रतिपद्यते ।[२] तत्रानुपपत्तीनां प्रतिपादितत्वात् ।

इदमत्रावधेयम्—बौद्धाचार्यः क्षणिकत्वसिद्धौ तेन वास्तवप्रतिबन्धान्नैरात्म्य-सिद्धिमुपजीवति । अतएव त्रिलोचनाचार्य इहात्मसिद्धिप्रदर्शनं कृत्वा नैरात्म्यवादस्य निरासार्थं यतते । आत्मनः सिद्धौ सत्यां सर्वविषयस्य क्षणिकत्वमनुनातुं क इष्टे । इयञ्च कथा त्रिलोचनाचार्य ईश्वरसाधनावसरे स्वयमपि भङ्ग्या प्रतिपादयति ।[३]

ईश्वरसिद्धिविधौ त्वयं त्रिलोचनाचार्यः धर्मकीर्तबौद्धदार्शनिकस्य युक्तिनिवहं निरस्य प्रमाणतर्काभ्यां स्वमतं परिष्करोति । तथाहि—यादृशाकृतिकस्य वस्तुजातस्य निर्मितिर्लोचनगोचरीभवति तादृशाकृतिकेषु वस्तुषु सकर्तृकत्वनिश्चयोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कर्तुमर्हः । यथा शिल्पिनां मन्दिरनिर्माणकलां वीक्ष्य पुरातनमन्दिरे भग्नदेवालये च सकर्तृकत्वानुमानं सङ्गच्छते । किन्तु यादृशाकृतिकवस्तुनः निर्माणं केनापि न प्रत्यक्षीकृतं, यथा गिरिनदीसमुद्रादेस्तत्र सकर्तृकत्वं न संभवतीति तत्कर्तृतयेश्वरसिद्धिप्रयासो नैयायिकानामसङ्गत इति प्रमाणवार्तिकस्य ।

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१—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० ६६

२—द्र० ,, ,, ७६

३—द्र० ,, ,, २४०

सिद्धं यादृगधिष्ठातृभावाभावानुवृत्तिमत् ।
सन्निवेशादि तद्युक्तं तस्माद्यदनुमीयते ॥

इति कारिकायां प्रतिवादिना धर्मकीर्तिना प्रतिपादितम् । अस्य च निरासार्थं त्रिलोचनो ब्रवीति—घटादिप्रसिद्धकार्येषु तादृशविशेषः कश्चिन्नास्ति यस्याभावं गिरिनदीसमुद्राद्यात्मकेषु कार्येषु प्रसाध्योभयत्र वैलक्षण्यप्रदर्शनद्वारा सकर्तृकत्वस्यैकत्र संभवेऽप्यपरत्र सकर्तृकत्वं न सिद्धिं यास्यतीति । यदि च कर्तृक्रियोपलब्ध्यात्मकं विशेषमभ्युपगच्छेत्तदा अक्रियादर्शिनां कृतबुद्धिहेतुत्वस्वीकारो न संगच्छेत् । कुम्भकारस्य क्रियाकलापमपश्यताऽपिजनेन घटादौ प्रसिद्धकार्येसकर्तृकत्वमनुभूयत इत्यस्यापलापस्तु केनापि कर्तुं न शक्यत इति । नापि कृतकत्वमेव विशेषोऽत्र वक्तुं शक्यः कारण-समवायलक्षणस्याभूतप्रादुर्भावस्य सर्वत्र सुलभतया समुपलब्धेः । तस्माद्घटसमुद्रयोः परस्परं भेदं प्रदर्श्यैकत्र सकर्तृकत्वनिर्णयोऽपरत्र तु तदभावः शक्रेणापि निरूपयितुं न शक्यः । अतएव गिरिनदीसमुद्रादिविलक्षणकार्यकर्तृतयेश्वरस्य साधने नास्ति कश्चित्प्रति-बन्धक इति त्रिलोचनोऽभिप्रैति ।[१]

ईश्वरस्योपपत्त्या तत्र सर्वज्ञत्वसिद्धये त्रिलोचनोऽयं प्रशस्तमतिना मतैक्यं विधाय कर्तरि उपादानोपकरणप्रयोजनसंप्रदानादीनां प्रत्यक्षात्मकं ज्ञानं सम्यगुपपादयति । यथा कुलालः घटस्योपादानं मृत्पिण्डमुपकरणं चक्रादिकं प्रयोजनमुदकाहरणादि संप्रदानञ्च कुटुम्बिनं प्रत्यक्षतो प्रतिपद्यमानः घटं निर्माति । तथेश्वरोऽपि विश्वस्योपादानं परमाणुचतुष्टयं दिक्कालादिकमुपकरणं जीवानामुपभोगलक्षणं प्रयोजनं जीवादिकञ्च संप्रदानं प्रत्यक्षतया जानन् विश्वं विदधातीति, स्वतस्तस्मिन् सर्वज्ञत्वमुपपन्नं भवति । न तदर्थं कश्चिदायासविशेषो नैयायिकानाम् । क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वादित्यनुमानेन साध्यसामान्यस्य सकर्तृकत्वस्य सिद्ध्यैव सर्वज्ञत्वमुपपद्यते । उपादानादिसाक्षात्करण-लक्षणस्य विशेषस्य सकर्तृकात्मकेन साध्येन सह वास्तवसंबन्धस्यापलपितुमशक्यत्वात् । उक्तविशेषस्य त्यागे सति साध्यसामान्यस्यैव त्यागप्रसङ्गादिति ।[२]

यद्यत्र पूर्वपक्षी ब्रूयात् यन्महाभूतघटयोरुत्पत्तौ यदि कश्चिद्विशेषो नास्ति तदा द्व्यणुकादेर्महाभूतारंभकस्यापि कर्ता कुम्भकारः स्यात् न च द्व्यणुकोपादानस्य परमाणोः प्रत्यक्षमसौ कर्तुमर्हतीति कर्तर्युपादानप्रत्यक्षता न सिद्ध्यतीति तदात्र तत्प्रतिविधानार्थ-मिदमस्ति त्रिलोचनस्य वक्तव्यं यत् कर्ता निजयोग्यतानुसारमेव कारणं प्रयुज्य कृतकृत्यो भवति । अतएवान्त्यावयविनोऽङ्गस्य सर्वस्य निर्माणं कुम्भकारो न करोति । क्षित्यादिरिव द्व्यणुकमपि सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने पक्ष एव भवति । तस्मादुक्तदोषानवकाशः[३] । अत्र त्रिलो-चनः निदर्शनविधया बौद्धमतोपयोगं करोति । यथा बौद्धः क्षणिकत्वं प्रसाध्य तत्संबद्धं

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१—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० २३६
२—द्र० ,, ,, २३९
३—द्र० ,, ,, २४०

नैरात्म्यवादमनायासेनोपपादयति तथैव नैयायिकः कार्येषु सकर्तृकत्वं प्रतिपादयन् तत्सं-वद्धं सर्वज्ञत्वमितरबाधसहकारात्मकानुमानरूपाल्पायासेन साधयति। अतएव "यावती-मर्थगतिं साधनं व्याप्नोति तावतीं दूषणमपि। यद्यसौ विशेषो न साधनेन विषयीकृतः, कथमतस्तत्सिद्धिः ? सिद्धयन् वा कथमविषयः, विषयश्चेत् कथं स्वाश्रयां दोषगतिं न स्पृशे-दितितन्निरस्तम्। यतः साधनवादी साधनाधीनां यदि विशेषसिद्धिमभ्युपगच्छेत्, तदै-तत् स्यात्। न च नैयायिकः साधनायत्तां विशेषसिद्धिमुपजीवति। किं तर्हि साध्यसामान्य-प्रतिबन्धाकृष्टस्य विशेषस्य सिद्धिमिति"[१] त्रिलोचनोक्तिः पुष्णाति मदुक्तिमूर्ध्व-निर्दिष्टाम्।

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१—द्र० ज्ञानश्रीमित्रनिबन्धावलिः पृ० २४०

# शांकर वेदान्त में ईश्वरवाद*

डा० योगेश पाण्डेय†

आचार्य शंकर के अभिमत ब्रह्म के निर्गुण एवं निर्विशेष स्वरूप[1] में दो प्रधानभूत आक्षेप उपस्थित होते हैं—एक तो निर्गुण ब्रह्म में शून्यत्व[2] की प्रसक्ति और दूसरा ब्रह्म के जगत्कारणत्व—अंगीकार करने पर ब्रह्म में परिणामधर्मत्वदोष लगने की संभावना। अद्वैत वेदान्त के सामने यही दो प्रमुख समस्याएं हैं, जिनका समाधान ही अद्वैत वेदान्त का आधारस्तम्भ है। आचार्य शंकर ने इन दोनों समस्याओं का पूर्ण समाधान प्रस्तुत किया है और ब्रह्म के—पारमार्थिक निर्गुण स्वरूप को उक्त दोनों दोषों से रक्षित रखा है। ब्रह्म को शून्य स्वभाव मानने पर वह जगत् का कारण नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि असत् शून्य से जगत् की उत्पत्ति नहीं हो सकती। इसी प्रकार निर्विशेष ब्रह्म सविशेष भावापन्न होकर ही जगत् का कारण हो सकता है सविशेषभाव को प्राप्त हुए बिना नहीं। शून्य स्वभाव ब्रह्म सविशेषभाव को नहीं प्राप्त हो सकता। सत्स्वरूप निर्विशेष ब्रह्म ही सविशेषभाव को ग्रहण कर सकता है। ब्रह्म का सगुणभावापन्नत्व ही उसका ईश्वरभाव है। निर्गुण ब्रह्म में सगुणभावापन्नत्व मायाशक्ति द्वारा उपपन्न होता है। यही मायाशक्त्युपहित सगुणब्रह्म शांकर वेदान्त में ईश्वर है।[3] अतः स्वरूप से ईश्वर वस्तुतः निर्विशेष निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही है, उससे भिन्न नहीं है। सगुण भावापन्न ब्रह्म में किस प्रकार निर्गुणत्व का निर्वाह हो सकता है, ऐसी आशंका नहीं करनी चाहिए। परमार्थावस्था में तो ब्रह्म निर्गुण निर्विशेषस्वभाव ही है, व्यवहारा-

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* शांकर वेदान्त से यहाँ तात्पर्य शंकराभिमत वेदान्त है। इसमें ब्रह्मसूत्र, उपनिषदों एवं गीता पर शंकर द्वारा प्रणीत भाष्यों से ही उनके साक्षात् विचारों के जानने का प्रयास किया गया है। शंकर के परवर्ती अनुयायियों का विशेष विचार इसमें सम्मिलित नहीं है। प्रस्तुत लेख में यह दिखाने का प्रयत्न किया गया है कि आचार्य शंकर की दृष्टि में अद्वैत वेदान्त में ईश्वर का महत्त्वपूर्ण स्थान है।

१. समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। न तद्विपरीतम् कूटस्थं च नित्यं ब्रह्म सर्वविक्रियाप्रतिषेधात्।—(ब्र० सू० शां० भा०)

२. आचार्य शंकर की दृष्टि में शून्य शशशृंग के समान असत् है। आजकल कुछ विद्वान् शून्य को भी एक तत्व मानने लगे हैं। किंतु यहाँ पर शंकर के अनुसार ही शून्य का अर्थ ग्रहण किया गया है।

३. The moment we try to link up Māyā with Brahman the latter becomes transformed into ईश्वर and माया denotes the शक्ति or the energy of ईश्वर. ईश्वर however is not any moment affected by his माया.—डा० राधाकृष्णन, (इन्डियन फिलासफी)

वस्था में वही मायाशक्ति से युक्त होकर सविशेष एवं सगुण बन जाता है। निर्गुण एवं सगुण रूप से ब्रह्म की दो भिन्न-भिन्न सत्ताएँ हैं, ऐसा नहीं समझना चाहिए, एक ही परमात्मा में दृष्टिभेद से निर्गुणत्व और सगुणत्व उपपन्न होता है।[1]

कुछ लोग यह आक्षेप करते हैं कि शांकर वेदान्त में ईश्वर का कोई महत्वपूर्ण स्थान नहीं है, क्योंकि वहाँ ईश्वर की परमार्थसत्ता का पूर्णतः निषेध किया गया है। यह आक्षेप निराधार है। परमार्थावस्था में तो "एक अद्वितीय ब्रह्म" ही है, द्वैतप्रपंच का अस्तित्व ही नहीं है। उस अवस्था में कुछ ईशितव्य है ही नहीं जिसके लिए ईशितृत्व की अपेक्षा हो। अतः उस अवस्था में ईशितृ ईशितृत्वभाव उपपन्न नहीं होता और न उपास्य उपासक भाव ही संगत होता है। परमार्थावस्था में निर्विशेष पर ब्रह्म का सविशेषभाव या ईश्वर भाव ही अपेक्षित नहीं है। अतः उस अवस्था में ईश्वरभाव के अनपेक्षित होने से ईश्वर के परमार्थत्व प्रतिषेध द्वारा वस्तुतः निर्विशेष ब्रह्म के ईश्वरभाव या सविशेषभाव का ही प्रतिषेध है, स्वरूपतः ईश्वर के प्रतिषेध में तात्पर्य नहीं है। स्वरूप से तो ईश्वर निर्गुण निरंजन ब्रह्म ही है,[2] वही व्यवहार-दशा में ईशितव्य के अपेक्षित होने से ईश्वरभाव से आपन्न हो जाता है, यह पहले ही कहा जा चुका है। अतः सविशेष और निर्विशेष ब्रह्म में एकत्व की दृष्टि से ईश्वर स्वरूपतः निर्गुण ही है ऐसा ध्यान में रखते हुए निर्गुण ब्रह्म को भी ईश्वर शब्द से कहने या उसे ईश्वर स्वीकार करने में कोई असंगति प्रतीत नहीं होती। इसी बात को ध्यान में रखकर संभवतः आचार्य शंकर ने अपने समस्त भाष्यों में निर्गुण ब्रह्म के अर्थ में ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग अनेकों बार किया है।[3] कभी-कभी वे सविशेष और

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१. सगुण तथा निर्गुण ब्रह्म में किसी प्रकार का भेद नहीं है। वह एक ही सत्ता है परन्तु दृष्टिकोण के भेद से दो नामों से पुकारा जाता है। पारमार्थिक दृष्टि से ब्रह्म निर्गुण है। यह निर्विशेष ब्रह्म माया के द्वारा सविशेष या सगुण-भाव को धारण करता है, तब उसे ईश्वर कहते हैं। अतः वह निर्विशेष ब्रह्म ही संसार की अपेक्षा से ईश्वर है परन्तु निरपेक्षभाव से देखने पर वही ब्रह्म है। निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही—वास्तविक पारमार्थिक सत्ता है, परन्तु व्यवहार तथा उपासना के निमित्त वही सगुण ईश्वर माना जाता है। तत्त्व एक ही है। प्रो० ब० उपाध्याय (भा० द० का इतिहास)।

From two different stand-points ब्रह्मन् may be condi—tioned and unconditioned. वही पृ० ४६८

२. उदाहरणार्थ—सविशेष ब्रह्म या ईश्वर के संकल्प आदि तो औपाधिक ही हैं, स्वरूपतः तो वह निर्गुण ही है—"संकल्पाः कामाश्च शुद्धसत्वोपाधिनिमित्ता ईश्वरस्य चित्रगुवत्। न स्वतो नेति नेति इति प्रत्युक्तत्वात्" छा० उप० भा०

३. द्रष्टव्य, ब्र० सू० भा० उपनिषदों पर भाष्य तथा गीता भाष्य

उदाहरणार्थ—गीता भाष्य में (क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरैक्य) प्रकरण में ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही के अर्थ में है—"अविक्रियस्य च व्योमवत् सर्वगतस्य अमूर्तस्य आत्मनः केनचित् संयोगवियोगानुपपत्तेः सिद्धं क्षेत्रज्ञस्य नित्यं एव ईश्वरत्वम्।" (१३-२)
ब्र० सू० भा० १-४-६ आदि

निर्विशेष ब्रह्म के दोनों रूपों में एकत्व दृष्टि रखते हुए दोनों के प्रतिपादक-शब्दों का एक साथ प्रयोग करते हैं, जिनसे शंकर का अभिप्राय या तो सविशेषपरक होता है या निर्विशेषपरक।[1] इस कथन का समर्थन प्रो० सच्चिदानन्दमूर्ति से भी प्राप्त होता है। वे कहते हैं--'ब्रह्म और ईश्वर दो भिन्न-भिन्न वस्तुएँ नहीं हैं किन्तु एक ही तत्व के दो दृष्टिकोण हैं। अतः ब्रह्म (निर्गुण) बहुत स्थानों में परमेश्वर कहा गया है।[2] इसी सविशेष ब्रह्म या ईश्वर की यह जगत् अभिव्यक्ति है। शांकर वेदान्त में तो जगत् मिथ्या है, यह सिद्धान्त है। अब जगत् का अस्तित्व मानना कहाँ तक उपयुक्त है, यह कथन ठीक नहीं है, क्योंकि जगत् की पारमार्थिक सत्ता का प्रतिषेध है। जगत् की व्यावहारिक सत्ता तो शंकर को मान्य है। यहाँ 'मिथ्या' शब्द पारिभाषिक अर्थ में है, जिसका अर्थ शशशृंगवत् असत् नहीं है। जगत् को मिथ्या कहने का तात्पर्य यहाँ परमार्थ की अपेक्षा से है।[3] जो परमार्थदर्शी है, उसी की दृष्टि में यह जगत् मिथ्या हो सकता है। मिथ्या का अर्थ है आपेक्षिक सत्य।[4] परमार्थ की अनपेक्षा से जगत् को मिथ्या या भ्रम रूप नहीं कहा जा सकता।

व्यवहाररूप में तो जगत् न मिथ्या है न भ्रमरूप है, जिस रूप में वह है, सत्य ही है।[5] प्रो० हिरियन्ना का यह कथन ठीक है कि जिसे एकत्व का साक्षात्कार नहीं हुआ उसे जगत् को मिथ्या मानने का अधिकार नहीं है।[6] यह मिथ्या रूप जगत् निराश्रित नहीं है।[7] ब्रह्म ही इसका अधिष्ठान है, किन्तु निर्विशेषस्वभावात्मक ब्रह्म से इस जगत् का सम्बन्ध स्थापित नहीं हो सकता। यह सम्बन्ध सविशेष ब्रह्म अथवा

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१. बृ० उप० भा० ३-७-२३

२. तस्मात् सर्वभूतैः वैलक्षण्यम् अत्यन्तमेव परमेश्वरस्य सिद्धं निर्विशेषत्वम् एकत्वं च।--गीता० भा० (१३-२७)

Vedanta.

३. सर्वव्यवहाराणामेव प्राक् ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः प्राग्-ब्रह्मात्मताप्रतिबोधात् उपपन्नः सर्वो लौकिको वैदिकश्च-व्यवहारः।

ब्र० सू० भा० २-१-१४

४. एकमेव हि परमार्थसत्यं ब्रह्म। इह पुनर्लोकव्यवहारविषयमापेक्षिकं सत्यम्।

( तैत्ति० उप० भा० )

५. प्राक् सदात्मप्रतिबोधात् स्वविषयेऽपि सर्वं सत्यमेव। छा० उप० भा०

६. आलोचक जब यह कहते हैं कि शंकर के मत से सम्पूर्ण जगत् मिथ्या या आभास है तब उनका इस बात की उपेक्षा करना है कि जगत् का ईश्वर से जो सम्बन्ध है वह उस सम्बन्ध से भिन्न है जो जगत् का जीव से है। निस्सन्देह जगत् ईश्वर के लिए आभास है, परन्तु हमारे लिये जिन्होंने जगत् को अपने से एकता समझी नहीं, यह आभास नहीं है। जब तक हम ऐसा नहीं कर लेते, तब तक हमें जगत् को सत्य ही समझना चाहिए। (भारतीय दर्शन की रूपरेखा पृ० ३७५.)

७. नहिमृगतृष्णिकादयोऽपि निरास्पदा भवन्ति।

ईश्वर के द्वारा ही उपपन्न होता है। इसी प्रकार जगत् के अधिष्ठानभूत परमार्थ रूप परब्रह्म का निरूपण बिना जगत् की व्याख्या के नहीं हो सकता। जगत् स्वरूप की व्याख्या ईश्वर सत्ता के स्वीकार किये बिना नहीं हो सकती। ईश्वर ही इन दोनों निर्गुण ब्रह्म और जगत् का एक प्रकार से मध्यस्थ है।[१] इसका अर्थ यह नहीं है कि निर्गुण ब्रह्म से सगुण ब्रह्म भिन्न है। सविशेष ब्रह्म या ईश्वर जो स्वरूपतः अनौपाधिक रूप में निर्गुण ही है, सविशेष रूप द्वारा ही वह अपने अनौपाधिक निर्गुण रूप तक पहुँचाने में समर्थ होता है। इसी प्रकार वह जगत् के अस्तित्व एवं स्वरूप की सिद्धि में भी नियामक है। यही बात 'अध्यारोपापवादन्याय' से भी स्पष्ट होती।[२]

कुछ समालोचक शंकर वचनों को उद्धृत करते हुए यह प्रमाणित करने का प्रयास करते हैं कि श्रुति प्रतिपादित जगत् की सृष्टि प्रक्रिया में शंकर की वास्तविक रुचि नहीं दिखाई देती——उनकी दृष्टि में सृष्टि अर्थवाद मात्र है।[३] अतः शंकर की दृष्टि में जगत् या सृष्टि का कोई महत्व नहीं है। शंकर के ऐसे वचनों को छिपाने का हमारा यहाँ प्रयास नहीं है। किन्तु इन कथनों से आचार्य शंकर का क्या अभिप्राय है, यही दिखाने का तात्पर्य है। इससे शंकर का आशय यही है कि श्रुति में सृष्टि के प्रतिपादन का प्रयोजन अंतिम नहीं है, किन्तु उसका अन्तिम लक्ष्य "आत्मबोध" है। जगत् की सृष्टि प्रक्रिया में परमार्थविषयिणी बुद्धि न हो यही उनकी उसमें अरुचि का तात्पर्य है न कि सृष्टि-प्रक्रिया के निराकरण में।[४] उनकी दृष्टि में श्रुति का परम उद्देश्य सृष्टि को सृष्टि मात्र दिखाने का नहीं है किन्तु उसके माध्यम से ब्रह्मात्मभाव प्रतिपादन का है। व्यावहारिक दृष्टि से वे जगत् की सृष्टि को स्वीकार करते हैं। वस्तुतः परमार्थ प्राप्ति ही परमपुरुषार्थ है। यही प्रधानरूप से दिखाना शांकर दर्शन का मुख्य प्रयोजन है। यही कारण है कि उनकी दृष्टि प्रधानतया सच्चिदानन्द स्वरूप निर्गुण ब्रह्म के प्रतिपादन पर बल देने में ही गोचरी-भूत होती है।[१] किन्तु इससे उनकी दृष्टि में व्यवहार बिलकुल निर्मूल अथवा महत्वहीन है, यह नहीं समझना चाहिए। अतः व्यावहारिक दृष्टि से सगुण ब्रह्म अथवा ईश्वर और जगत् दोनों ही आचार्य की दृष्टि में

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१. He is the intermediate principle between the ब्रह्मन् and the empirical world——J. N. Sinha. (*H. I. Phil*, P. 1507)

२. उपाधिकृतं मिथ्यारूपमपि अस्तित्वाधिगमाय ज्ञेय धर्मवत् परिकल्प्य उच्यते सर्वतः पाणिपादम् इत्यादि। तथाहि सम्प्रदायविदां वचनम् अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपंच प्रपंच्यते। ——गीता० शा० भा० (३-१३)

३. अत्रात्माऽवबोधमात्रविवक्षितत्वात् सर्वोऽयमर्थवादः (ऐत० उप० भा०—२—१)

४. न चैयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः अविद्याकल्पितनामरूपव्यवहारगोचरत्वात् ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनपरत्वाच्च। —(ब्र० सू० शा० २-१-३३)

अत्यन्त महत्वपूर्ण हैं। यही कारण है कि आचार्य ने ब्रह्मसूत्र भाष्य में वैनाशिक बौद्धों के मतों का खंडन कर जगत् के स्थिर अस्तित्व को प्रबल तर्कों द्वारा स्थापित किया है। यदि आचार्य की जगत् के अस्तित्व मानने में वास्तविक अरुचि होती तो वे उसके अस्तित्व सिद्ध करने का इतना प्रबल प्रयास न करते। वहाँ शंकर ने जगत् का अस्तित्व सिद्धि के द्वारा प्रकारान्तर से ईश्वरवाद की ही प्रतिष्ठा की है। अतः ईश्वर के सम्बन्ध में साक्षात् विचार करने के पहिले यह आवश्यक है कि जगत् के स्वरूप के संबंध में कुछ विचार किया जाय। अनीश्वरवादी स्थूलतया दो भागों में विभक्त किए जा सकते हैं—अनात्मवादी और आत्मवादी। इनमें अनात्मवादी बौद्ध एवं चार्वाक हैं। आत्मवादियों में सांख्य, वैशेषिक, मीमांसक तथा आर्हत आते हैं, जो जगत् के स्वरूप को अनेक चेतन-भोक्तृ संयुक्त स्वीकार करते हैं। अनात्मवादियों में भौतिक चार्वाक यद्यपि जगत् की स्थिर सत्ता स्वीकार करते हैं, तथापि उनके मत में जगत् का स्वरूप नित्य चेतन भोक्ताओं से युक्त नहीं है—प्राणियों में चेतनत्व भौतिक है। बौद्धमतावलम्बी तीनों प्रमुख सम्प्रदाय शून्यवादी, विज्ञानवादी तथा बाह्यार्थवादी अनीश्वरवादी एवं अनात्मवादी हैं, किन्तु उनमें जगत् के अस्तित्व एवं स्वरूप के विषय में महान् मतभेद है। शून्यवादियों के अनुसार यह जगत् शून्यमात्र है। आचार्य शंकर की दृष्टि में शून्यवाद अथवा माध्यमिक पक्ष सर्वथा सर्वप्रमाण प्रतिषिद्ध है। इस पर यह कहा जा सकता है कि जगन्मिथ्यावादी वेदान्ती भी प्रकारान्तर से शून्यत्व ही अंगीकार करते हैं। यह कथन संगत नहीं है, जैसा कि आरम्भ ही में संकेत किया जा चुका है, शून्यत्व और मिथ्यात्व परस्पर विरुद्ध हैं। शून्यत्व शशशृंग की तरह असत् है। जगत् का मिथ्यात्व सद्रूप परमार्थ की अपेक्षा से ही है। मिथ्यात्व से व्यावहारिक अस्तित्व का निषेध नहीं है। जगत् का मूल सत् है। यदि जगत् का मूल सत् न होता तो व्यवहार में जगत् को सत् मानना असंभव था।[2] कार्य का कारण से अनन्यत्व होने से जगत् को भी सत् कहा जा सकता है तथा जगत् में होने वाले सब व्यवहारों का सत्यत्व भी उपपन्न होता है।[3] इसीलिए यह कहा गया है कि स्थावर-जंगमात्मक सब प्रजा सत्कारण वाली है, अपने स्थिति

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१. सर्वधर्मविशेषरहितब्रह्मदर्शनादेव फलसिद्धौ सत्यां यत्राऽफलं श्रूयते ब्रह्मणो जगदाकारपरिणामित्वादि तत्र ब्रह्मदर्शनोपायत्वेनैव विनियुज्यते, नहि परिणामवत्व विज्ञानात् परिणामवत्वमात्मानः फलं स्यादिति वक्तुं युक्तं कूटस्थनित्यत्वान्मोक्षस्य।
—ब्र० सू० भा० (२-१-१४)

२. मूलं चेज्जगतो न स्यात् असदन्वितमेवेदं कार्यं असदित्येवं गृह्येत नत्वेतदस्ति सतसदित्येव गृह्यते। यथा मृदादिकार्यं घटादिमृदाद्यन्वितम्। तस्माज्जगतो मूलमात्मास्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यम्। —कठ० उप० भा० २-३-१३

सन्मूलमेकमेवाद्वितीयं परमार्थ सत्यम्। तदस्य जगतो मूलम्। छा० उप० भा०

३. कार्यस्य कारणादनन्यत्वम्। अतश्च कृत्स्नस्य जगतो ब्रह्मकार्यत्वात् तदन्यत्वाच्च। ब्र० सू० भा० २-१-२० सर्वं च नामरूपादि सदात्मनैव सत्यं विकारजातम्। स्वतस्तु अनृतमेव वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयमित्युक्तत्वात्। अतः सदात्मना सर्व-

काल में इसी सत् पर आश्रित है तथा अन्त में उसी में लीन होने वाली है।[1] शून्यवादी के पक्ष में जगत् का अधिष्ठानभूत सत् स्वीकार्य नहीं है। शंकर कहते हैं कि सर्वप्रमाण प्रसिद्ध इस लोक-व्यवहार का, उसके अधिष्ठानभूत सत् को माने बिना, उसका बाध नहीं किया जा सकता।[2]

विज्ञानवादी एवं बाह्यार्थवादी दोनों ही सम्प्रदाय अपनी-अपनी प्रक्रिया के अनुसार जगत् की सत्ता स्वीकार करते हैं तथापि इन दोनों मतों में जगत् का अस्तित्व क्षणिक ही माना गया है। विज्ञानवादी तो बाह्यार्थ का क्षणिक अस्तित्व भी स्वीकार नहीं करते। इस दृष्टि से इन्हें जगत् के अर्धसत्तावादी ही समझना चाहिए। आचार्य शंकर ने प्रबल तर्कों द्वारा इस मत का निराकरण कर बाह्यार्थ के अस्तित्व को स्थापित किया है। आचार्य कहते हैं कि विज्ञानवादियों का यह तर्क कि बाह्यार्थ के बिना भी ज्ञानवैचित्र्य का अस्तित्व है और यह ज्ञानवैचित्र्य वासनाओं से ही जन्य है, ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि बाह्यार्थ के बिना वासनाओं की सिद्धि संभव नहीं है। दूसरे वासनाएँ संस्कार विशेष ही हैं। संस्कारों के लिए अपने आश्रय की अपेक्षा है। विज्ञानवादी वासनाओं के आश्रयभूत आलय-विज्ञान की कल्पना करते हैं किन्तु आलयविज्ञान के क्षणिक होने से वह वासनाओं के आश्रय बनने में समर्थ नहीं है। इसलिए उसके आधार के लिए कोई चेतन साक्षी अपेक्षित है। आचार्य यहाँ स्पष्टरूप से स्थिर चेतनभोक्तृ संयुक्त जगत् का अस्तित्व सिद्ध करते हैं। साथ ही यह प्रकाश डालते हैं कि संस्कारवान् भोक्ता के नियन्तृत्व के लिए साक्षी चेतन (ईश्वर का अन्तर्यामित्व) की आवश्यकता है। प्राणियों की यह जीवन प्रक्रिया बिना ईश्वर के अस्तित्व से, भौतिक यंत्रवत् चलने में सर्वथा असमर्थ है।

सर्वास्तित्ववादी बौद्ध जगत् के बाह्य एवं आन्तर दोनों का अस्तित्व स्वीकार करते हैं—भूत और भौतिक बाह्य है तथा चित्त और चैत्त आन्तर। इनके मत में बाह्य समुदाय परमाणु समुदायरूप ही है। आन्तर समुदाय भी रूप विज्ञानादि पंचस्कन्धरूप है, जो सर्वव्यवहारों का निर्वाहक है। आचार्य शंकर कहते हैं कि यह उक्त परमाणुओं एवं

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व्यवहाराणां सर्वविकाराणां च सत्यत्वम् सतोऽन्यत्वे चानृतत्वमिति। छा० उप० भा०, पृ० ६५३

१. सन्मूलाः——सत्कारणाः——स्थावरजंगमलक्षणाः सर्वाप्रजाः। न केवलं सन्मूला एव इदानीमपि स्थिति काले सदायतनाः। सदाश्रयाएव नहि मृदमनाश्रित्यघटादेः सत्वं स्थितिर्वास्ति। अन्ते च सत्प्रतिष्ठाः सदेव प्रतिष्ठालयः यासां ताः। छा० उप० भा० पृ० ६५३

२. नह्ययं सर्वप्रमाणप्रसिद्धो लोकव्यवहारोऽन्यत् तत्वमनधिगम्य शक्यते अपह्नोतुम्। ब्र० सू० भा० २-२-३१

स्कंधों का संघात होना संभव नहीं है क्योंकि वे अचेतन हैं। दूसरे इनके मत में क्षणिक विज्ञान से अन्य कोई स्थिर चेतन जीव अथवा ईश्वर संघात के निमित्त स्वीकृत नहीं है, अतः ईश्वर के बिना परमाणु और स्कन्ध स्वयमेव संघात के प्रवर्तक नहीं हो सकते।[1] वस्तुतः संघातसिद्धि के लिए जीव और ईश्वर दोनों ही अपेक्षित हैं। चेतन भोक्ताओं के स्वीकार करने पर भी ईश्वर के बिना संघातसिद्धि उपपन्न नहीं हो सकती। यही बात शंकर ने चेतन भोक्ताओं को मानने वाले अनीश्वरवादी वैशेषिकों के प्रति कही है।[2]

इस प्रकार इन बौद्ध साम्प्रदायिकों के अभिमत जगत् के अस्तित्व एवं स्वरूप विषयक मतों का शंकर के द्वारा किये गये खण्डन का मूल्यांकन निम्नलिखित हो सकता है--

१--जगत् की स्थिर सत्ता है।

२--इसका स्वरूप चेतन भोक्ताओं से युक्त है।

३--जगत् के नियन्तृत्व तथा कारणत्व के लिए ईश्वर अपेक्षित है।

इसी के द्वारा जगत् स्वरूप को भौतिक चेतनों से युक्त माननेवाले चार्वाकों के मत का भी खण्डन समझना चाहिए।

अब हम नित्य चेतन भोक्ताओं से युक्त जगत् स्वरूप को माननेवाले अनीश्वरवादी सांख्य, वैशेषिक, आर्हत आदि मतों पर आते हैं। सांख्य मत के अनुसार प्रकृति ही जगत् का कारण है। आचार्य शंकर ने सांख्यीय प्रकृतिवाद का खण्डन कर ईश्वरवाद की स्थापना की है। अचेतन प्रकृति जगत् का कारण नहीं हो सकती। क्योंकि उसमें प्रवृत्ति की सामर्थ्य नहीं है। यदि कहो कि अचेतन क्षीरादि में प्रवृत्ति स्वाभाविक होती है उसी प्रकार यहाँ भी प्रवृत्ति संभव है। यह कथन ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि अचेतन में प्रवृत्ति चेतनाधीन होती है। शंकर यहाँ श्रुति प्रमाणों के आधार पर अचेतन पदार्थों में भी ईश्वर का अन्तर्यामित्व प्रदर्शित करते हैं।[3]

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१. तस्मिन्नुभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदायेऽभिप्रेयमाणे--समुदायाप्राप्तिः समुदायिकानामचेतनत्वात्--अन्यस्य च कस्यचित् चेतनस्य भोक्तुः प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुरनभ्युपगमात्--निरपेक्षप्रवृत्त्यभ्युपगमे च प्रवृत्त्यनुपरमप्रसंगात्।

ब्र० सू० भा० २-२-१८

२. तच्च नित्येष्वणुष्वभ्युपगम्यमानेष्वाश्रयाश्रयिभूतेषु च भोक्तृषु सत्सु न संभवतीत्युक्तं वैशेषिकपरीक्षायाम् किमंग पुनः क्षणिकेष्वप्यणुषु भोक्तृरहितेष्वाश्रयाश्रयिशून्येषु वाभ्युपगम्यमानेषु सम्भवेत्।

ब्र० सू० भा० २-२-१९

३. योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् या ऽपोऽन्तरो यमयति। इत्यादि ब्र० उप० ३-७-४ एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासेन गार्गि प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ति। (ब्र० उप० ३-८-९)

इत्येवं जातीयकं (शास्त्रम्) समस्तस्य लोकपरिस्पन्दितस्येश्वराधिष्ठितां श्रावयति। ब्र० सू० भा०

आगे शंकर कहते हैं कि सांख्याभिमत साम्यावस्थापन्न प्रकृति अथवा प्रधान के प्रवर्तकत्व एवं निवर्तकत्व में उदासीन-स्वभाव पुरुष नियामक नहीं हो सकता। यदि कहो कि उदासीन पुरुष अयस्कान्त की तरह सन्निधिमात्र से अचेतन-प्रधान को प्रवृत्त करेगा तो यह ठीक नहीं है। क्योंकि नित्य सन्निधान के होने से निरन्तर प्रवृत्ति का प्रसंग आ जायगा। प्रधान और पुरुष के मध्य में कोई सम्बन्ध का स्थापित करने वाला न होने से दोनों का सम्बन्ध उपपन्न नहीं हो सकेगा। इसी प्रकार कर्म भी प्रधान के प्रवर्तकत्वादि में नियामक नहीं हो सकता। अतः सर्वथा अनपेक्ष प्रधान जगत् का कारण नहीं हो सकता। वेदान्त में तो ईश्वर सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमान् माना गया है। अतः उसमें प्रवर्तकत्व एवं निवर्तकत्व दोनों उपपन्न हो सकते हैं।[1] यहाँ सांख्यानुयायियों की ओर से यह तर्क प्रस्तुत किया जा सकता है कि वेदान्त में भी तो आत्मा नित्य शुद्ध बुद्ध मुक्त स्वभाव मानने पर उसमें प्रवृत्ति की अनुपपत्ति है और प्रवृत्ति के साहित्य से उसमें प्रवर्तकत्व संभव नहीं है। इसका समाधान करते हुए आचार्य कहते हैं कि परमार्थ दृष्टि से निर्गुण निरंजन स्वभाव प्रवृत्तिरहित ईश्वर में भी प्रवर्तकत्व संभव है।[2] इसी प्रकार परमार्थभूत ब्रह्म के अद्वितीय होने पर भी व्यवहार में प्रवर्त्य का अभाव नहीं होता और प्रवर्त्य के सद्भाव में ईश्वर में प्रवर्तकत्व अनुपपन्न नहीं होता। अतः सर्वज्ञ चेतन ही जगत् का कारण हो सकता है अचेतन नहीं।[3]

इस प्रकार प्रकृतिवाद के खण्डन द्वारा शंकर का अभिमत यही है कि स्वतंत्र अचेतन प्रकृति जगत् का कारण नहीं बन सकती। चेतनाधीन होकर ही वह कारण बन सकती है। इसका अर्थ है ईश्वर कारणवाद की स्थापना।

वैशेषिकों के मत में परमाणुओं से जगत् की उत्पत्ति मानी गई है। उनके अनुसार सर्गकाल में वायवीय अणुओं में अदृष्टापेक्ष कर्म उत्पन्न होता है। उस कर्म के द्वारा दूसरे अणुओं में संयोजन होता है और फिर उसके द्वारा क्रमशः सृष्टि होती है।[4]

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१. ईश्वरस्य तु सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वशक्तित्वान्महामायत्वाच्च प्रवृत्यप्रवृत्ती न विरुद्ध्येते। वही २-२-४।

२. एवं प्रवृत्तिरहितोऽपीश्वरः सर्वगतः सर्वात्मा सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिश्च सन् सर्वं प्रवर्तयेदित्युपपन्नम्।

ब्र० सू० भा० २-२-२

३. एकत्वात् प्रवर्त्यभावे प्रवर्तकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् न अविद्यापत्युपस्थापित नामरूपमायावेशवशेन·········तस्मात् संभवति प्रवृत्तिः सर्वज्ञकारणत्वे न त्वचेतनकारणत्वे। वही २–२–२

४. सर्गकाले च वायवीपु अणुपु अदृष्टापेक्ष कर्म उत्पद्यते तत्कर्म स्वाश्रयमणुं अण्वन्तरेण संयुनक्ति, ततो द्वयणुकादिक्रमेण वायुरुत्पद्यते, एवं यमग्निः, एवमापः एवं पृथिवी एवमेव शरीरं सेन्द्रियमिति। एवं सर्वमिदं जगदणुभ्यः सम्भवति। ब्र० सू० भा० २–२–१

आचार्य की दृष्टि में यह मत ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि अदृष्टनिमित्तक कर्म अणुओं में उत्पन्न नहीं हो सकता क्योंकि अदृष्ट अचेतन है।

इसी परमाणुवाद के निराकरण से आर्हत मत का भी खण्डन हो जाता है जो यह मानते हैं कि पुद्गल संज्ञक अणुओं से संघात उत्पन्न होता है। अचेतन परमाणु-वाद के खण्डन से शंकर का वही ध्येय है जो प्रकृतिवाद के खण्डन से है।

ऊपर के विवेचन से स्पष्ट हो चुका है कि जगत् का (बाह्याभ्यन्तरसहित) अस्तित्व स्थिर है क्षणिक नहीं है और उसका कारण सर्वज्ञ चेतन अथवा ईश्वर है। अचेतन प्रधान परमाणु आदि कारण नहीं है। किन्तु अभी हमें जगत् और उसके कारण का कुछ और अधिक विशेष स्वरूप जानना अपेक्षित है। इन दोनों का स्पष्ट स्वरूप ब्रह्मसूत्रकार के "जन्माद्यस्ययतः" सूत्र पर शंकर द्वारा की गई व्याख्या में अवगत होता है। इस सूत्र से जगत् की उत्पत्ति, स्थिति एवं लय तीन अवस्थाएँ सूचित होती हैं।[1] जगत्कारण इन तीनों अवस्थाओं से संबंधित रहता है। आचार्य ने इस सूत्र की व्याख्या में जगत् के विलक्षण स्वरूप को विशेषरूप से स्पष्ट किया है, जिससे उसके कारणभूत ईश्वरस्वरूप की महत्ता और भी बढ़ जाती है। क्योंकि विलक्षण कार्य का कारण भी विलक्षण ही हो सकता है। जगत् के स्वरूप के विषय में वे कहते हैं--

> अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य, अनेककर्तृभोक्तृ-
> संयुक्तस्य, प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य,
> अचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य – (ब्र० सू० भा० २–१–१)

यहाँ जगत् के स्वरूप निष्पादक नामरूप-- आदि चार विशेषण-पद हैं, जिनके द्वारा जगत् का सर्वांगीण स्वरूप सामने आ जाता है। इन जगत्स्वरूप निष्पादक चार विशेषणों द्वारा क्रमशः आचार्य शंकर का अभिप्राय इस प्रकार संगृहीत किया जा सकता है--

(१) यह जगत् नामरूपों से व्याकृत अवस्था में है और कारण मूलक है-- अकारण नहीं है। यह नामरूपों से अव्याकृत अवस्था में अपने कारण में लीन रहता है।

(२) यह जगत् अनेक कर्तृभोक्तृस्वरूप चेतन जीवों से युक्त है।

(३) यह चेतनाचेतनात्मक जगत् सर्वथा व्यवस्थित है।

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१. इसी आशय का प्रतिपादक वचन छान्दो० उप० ३–१४ में मिलता है।— "तज्जलान्" जिसकी व्याख्या शंकर इस प्रकार करते हैं--"तज्जलानिति, तस्माद-ब्रह्मणो जातं तेजोऽबन्नादिक्रमेण सर्वम् अतस्तज्जम्, तथा तेनैव जननक्रमेण प्रतिलोम तया तस्मिन्नेव ब्रह्मणि लीयते तदात्मतया श्लिष्यत इतितल्लम्। तथा तस्मिन्नेव स्थिति कालेऽनिति प्राणिति चेष्टत इति। एवं ब्रह्मात्मतया त्रिषु कालेष्वविशिष्टं-तद्व्यतिरेकेणा-ग्रहणात्।"

(४) इन उपर्युक्त विशेषणों से विशिष्ट इस जगत् की रचना के स्वरूप का वैलक्षण्य यह चतुर्थ विशेषण "अचिन्त्य-रचनारूपस्य" प्रकट करता है।

यद्यपि सूत्र की व्याख्या में ही जैसा कि पहले कहा जा चुका है, जगत् के कारण ईश्वर के स्वरूपबोधक पृथक् विशेषण दिए गए हैं,[1] तथापि उपर्युक्त जगत्स्वरूप के निष्पादक चारों विशेषण पद भी जगत् कारण ईश्वर के स्वरूप को लक्षित कराते हैं। यथा प्रथम विशेषण "नामरूपाभ्यां जगत्" यह सूचित करता है कि जगत् का कारण चेतन ही हो सकता है अचेतन नहीं।[2] किन्तु यहाँ चेतन से तात्पर्य सर्वज्ञ ही है, क्योंकि नामरूप का व्याकर्ता अन्यत्र सर्वज्ञ ही कहा गया है।[3] अल्पज्ञ चेतन जीव जगत् का कारण नहीं हो सकता, क्योंकि इसका अन्तर्भाव कार्यभूत जगत् में ही है। यह जगत् चेतन जीवों से युक्त है यह "अनेक कर्तृभोक्तृसंयुक्तस्य" पद से कहा गया है। संसारी भोक्ता जीव से भिन्न सर्वज्ञ चेतन ही जगत् का कारण है। यह बात तृतीय विशेषणप "प्रतिनियतदेशकालनिमित्तक्रियाफलाश्रयस्य" से पूर्णतः स्पष्ट हो जाती है। इस जगत् में प्राणियों के कर्मफल आदि सब प्रकार की व्यवस्था देखी जाती है। इससे यह सूचित होता है कि इस व्यवस्था का कोई सर्वज्ञ शासक अवश्य होगा। चतुर्थ विशेषणपद "अचिन्त्यरचनारूपस्य" से जगत् कारण सर्वशक्तिमान् ही हो सकता है, सूचित होता है। इस प्रकार जगत् के इन विशेषणपदों से जगत् के स्वरूप के साथ-साथ उसके कारण ईश्वरस्वरूप का भी बोध हो जाता है। इससे सिद्ध है कि यथोक्त विशेषण विशिष्ट जगत् का यथोक्त विशेषण विशिष्ट ईश्वर ही कारण है। यदि यह जगत् अव्यवस्थित-रूपवाला क्षणिक एवं भौतिक चेतनयुक्त होता तो ऐसे चेतन सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमान् ईश्वर की आवश्यकता न होती। किन्तु जगत् ऐसा नहीं है। अतः उक्त विशेषण विशिष्ट ईश्वर अवश्य है। इसी प्रकार शंकर ने केन उप० में वर्णित यक्षो-पाख्यान के भाष्य में ईश्वर की महत्ता प्रदर्शित की है। यहाँ भी विविध प्राणियों से युक्त इस जगत् का कारण एवं नियन्ता ईश्वर सिद्ध किया गया है।[4] अनीश्वर-

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१. "यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणात्"

२. यत् खलु नाम्ना रूपेण च व्याक्रियते तच्चेतनकर्तृकं दृष्टं यथा घटादि। विवादास्पदाध्यासितं च जगन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतं तस्माच्चेतनकर्तृकं संभाव्यते। चेतनो हि बुद्धावालिख्य नामरूपे घट इति नाम्नारूपेण च कम्बुग्रीवादिना बाह्यं घटं निष्पादयति। भामती।

३. "नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि।" उप०

४. यदिदं जगद्देवगन्धर्वयक्षरक्षः पितृपिशाचादिलक्षणं द्युवियत्पृथिव्यादित्य-चन्द्रग्रहनक्षत्रविचित्रं, विविधप्राण्युपभोगयोग्यस्थानसाधनसम्बन्धि तदत्यन्तकुशलशिल्पि-भिरपि दुर्निर्माणम्—केन उप०—३ वाक्य भाष्य, देशकालनिमित्तानुरूपनियतप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ति-क्रममेतद्भोक्तृ-कर्मविभागज्ञ प्रयत्नपूर्वकं भवितुमर्हति.......वही।

वादी कर्मवादियों के इस मत का कि जगत् की उत्पत्ति कर्म से हो सकती है, निराकरण किया गया है।[१]

"जन्माद्यस्ययतः" सूत्र की व्याख्या से यह भी सूचित हो जाता है कि जगत् का यह कारण अभिन्न निमित्तोपादान है। अन्यत्र तो स्पष्ट रूप से ईश्वर को जगत् का अभिन्न निमित्तोपादान कहा ही गया है।[२]

अब हम यहाँ प्रसंगवश अन्य ईश्वरवादी दार्शनिकों के सम्बन्ध में विचार करेंगे जो सभी जगत् को अनेक चेतन संयुक्त व्यवस्थित रूप तो मानते हैं किन्तु वे ईश्वर को जगत् का केवल निमित्तकारण स्वीकार करते हैं। आचार्य शंकर ने उनके ईश्वर विषयक मत का केवल इसी पक्ष को लेकर खण्डन किया है। कुछ सांख्य[३] मतावलम्बी यह मानते हैं कि प्रधान और पुरुष का अधिष्ठाता केवल निमित्तकारण ईश्वर है। माहेश्वर मत में भी पशुपति ईश्वर का केवल निमित्त कारणत्व अंगीकृत है। इसी प्रकार कुछ परमाणुवादी[४] वैशेषिक आदि हैं जो अपनी प्रक्रिया के अनुसार ईश्वर को निमित्त कारण मानते हैं। उपर्युक्त प्रथम मत का निर्देश करते हुए शंकर कहते हैं कि ईश्वर प्रधान और पुरुष के अधिष्ठातृत्वरूप से जगत् का कारण नहीं हो सकता, क्योंकि इससे ईश्वर में रागादि दोष की प्रसक्ति होगी। यदि यह कहा जाय कि ईश्वर कर्मापेक्षित होकर प्राणियों में हीनादि भेद करता है, अतः उसमें रागादि दोष न होंगे तो यह कथन ठीक नहीं है, क्योंकि कर्म और ईश्वर में प्रवर्त्य और प्रवर्तयितृत्व असंभव है। विना किसी संबंध के प्रधान और पुरुष का अधिष्ठाता ईश्वर नहीं हो सकता। यहाँ ईश्वर तो पुरुषविशेष ही है अतः पुरुष के उदासीन होने से उसमें प्रवर्तकत्व अनुपपन्न है।

भागवत सिद्धान्त में यद्यपि ईश्वर निमित्तोपादान उभयात्मक कारण स्वीकृत है तथापि उनके मत में यह दोष है कि उसमें वासुदेव संज्ञक परमात्मा से संकर्षण संज्ञक जीव की उत्पत्ति मानी गई है। यह समीचीन नहीं है क्योंकि इससे अनित्यादि दोषों की प्रसक्ति होगी। इस पर हम आगे विवेचन करेंगे। अतः इन ईश्वर-

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१. कर्मण एवेति चेत् न, परतंत्रस्य निमित्तमात्रत्वात्—वही।

२. चेतनं ब्रह्म जगत्कारणं प्रकृतिश्च—ब्र० सू० भा० २–१–३७

२. उपादानकारणं च ब्रह्माभ्युपगन्तव्यं निमित्तकारणं च।
ब्र० सू० भा० १–४–७

३. शंकर यहाँ सांख्य से सेश्वर सांख्य का संकेत करते हैं। इसके पहले वे निरीश्वर सांख्य के प्रधानवाद का खण्डन कर चुके हैं।

४. इसके पहले शंकर निरीश्वरवादी वैशेषिकों के अचेतन परमाणुवाद का खण्डन कर चुके हैं। यहाँ वे सेश्वर वैशेषिकों के ईश्वर के निमित्त कारण-वाद का खण्डन करते हैं।

वादियों का ईश्वरविषयक मत समीचौन नहीं है। केवल निमित्त कारणवाद पक्ष में न तो ईश्वर का प्रधान और पुरुष के अधिष्ठातृत्व रूप से जगत्कारणत्व उपपन्न है और न कर्म और ईश्वर में प्रवर्त्य और प्रयर्तयितृत्व उपपन्न हो सकता है। पुरुष विशेष ईश्वर है, ऐसे ईश्वर के स्वरूप में तो प्रवर्तकत्व ही उपपन्न नहीं हो सकता। ब्रह्मवादियों के पक्ष में ऐसी कठिनाई नहीं है। क्योंकि वहाँ तो माया और ब्रह्म का "अनिर्वाच्यतादात्म्यलक्षणसम्वन्ध" उपपन्न है।[१] इस प्रकार इन ईश्वर-वादियों के निमित्तकारणत्वादि पक्ष[२] के खण्डन द्वारा शंकर यही दिखाना चाहते हैं कि अद्वैतवाद के अनुसार ईश्वर का स्वरूप माने बिना सच्चे अर्थ में ईश्वरत्व उपपन्न नहीं हो सकता। वस्तुतः ईश्वर को केवल निमित्तकारण मानने से वह सर्वशक्तिमान नहीं हो सकता। उपादानवस्तु की सत्ता उससे भिन्न रहने से वह सीमित हो जायगा और उसका सर्वज्ञत्व भी अक्षुण्ण नहीं रह सकेगा।

शंकर सिद्धान्तित ईश्वर में पूर्ण सर्वज्ञत्व और पूर्ण सर्वशक्तिमत्व उपपन्न हो जाता है। उसे समस्त जगत् आदि का सामान्यरूप से ज्ञान रहता है अतः वह सर्वज्ञ है। वह सर्ववित् है क्योंकि उसे विशेषरूप से ज्ञान रहता है।[३] सर्वशक्तिमान् होने से उसे जगत्सृष्टि के लिए वस्त्वन्तर की अपेक्षा नहीं रहती।[४] ऐसे सर्वज्ञत्वादि-विशिष्ट ईश्वर के लिए तो इस जगत् की सृष्टि लीलामात्र है।[५] परमेश्वर आप्तकाम है। इसमें उसका कोई अपना प्रयोजन नहीं है। अतः उसमें स्वभाव से ही यह लीला-रूपाप्रवृत्ति होती है[६]। किन्तु इससे यह न समझना चाहिए कि वह जगत् की सृष्टि

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१. ब्र० सू० भा०।

२. यहाँ पर यह आपत्ति उठाई जा सकती है कि शंकर निरीश्वर सांख्य तथा निरीश्वर परमाणुवादियों के क्रमशः प्रकृतिवाद एवं परमाणुवाद के खण्डन में ईश्वर को जगत् का केवल निमित्तकारण स्वीकार करते हुए दिखाई देते हैं। किन्तु इससे यह निष्कर्ष न निकालना चाहिए कि उनका तात्पर्य वहाँ केवल निमित्तकारणवाद स्वीकार करना है। निरीश्वर-वादियों के अचेतन कारणवाद के खण्डन द्वारा पहले वे ईश्वरवाद की स्थापना करना चाहते हैं। निमित्त कारण मात्र ईश्वर को वहीं दिखाना अपेक्षित था फिर यहाँ ईश्वरवादियों के केवल निमित्त कारणवाद का खण्डन कर अभिन्ननिमित्तो-पादान कारण दिखाना अभीष्ट है।

३. सामान्येन जानाति इति सर्वज्ञः। विशेषेण वेत्ति इति सर्ववित्। मुण्डक उप० भा० २–१

४. जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयकृत असंसारी सर्वज्ञः, सर्वशक्तिः सर्ववित् सर्वमिदं जगत् स्वतोऽन्यद् वस्त्वन्तरमनुपादैव आकाशादिक्रमेणसृष्ट्वा—ऐतरेये उप० भा०

५. परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव (इयंसृष्टिः) केवलम्, अपरिमितशक्तित्वात्। ब्र० सू० भा० २–१–३३।

६. ईश्वरस्याऽनपेक्ष्य किंचित् प्रयोजनान्तरं स्वभावादेव लीलारूपा प्रवृत्तिः। वही २–१–३३

उन्मत्त की तरह करता है क्योंकि सर्वज्ञ होने से ऐसी संभावना नहीं की जा सकती ।[1] यहाँ यह प्रश्न उठना स्वाभाविक है कि ऐसा ईश्वर जगत् का रचयिता है तो वह ऐसी विषमा सृष्टि से वैषम्य एवं नैर्घृण्य, दोष का भागी क्यों बनता है । इसके समाधान में शंकर कहते हैं कि ये दोष ईश्वर पर नहीं लग सकते । क्योंकि वह प्राणियों के धर्म और अधर्म की अपेक्षा से सृष्टि करता है । यदि वह निरपेक्ष होकर सृष्टि करता तो ये दोनों दोष लगते । यह विषमा सृष्टि प्राणियों के धर्माधर्मापेक्षा से है अतः इसमें ईश्वर का क्या अपराध है ।[2] यदि यह कहा जाय कि सृष्टि के आदि में तो कर्म नहीं था तो फिर उसकी अपेक्षा से विषमासृष्टि कैसे ? यह ठीक नहीं है क्योंकि संसार अनादि है[3] । जगत् के अन्तर्गत आनेवाले जीव भी अनादि हैं । यदि यह संसार सादि हो तो उसके आकस्मिक प्रादुर्भाव से मुक्तों का भी संसार में आने का प्रसंग और सुखदुःखादि वैषम्य के निर्निमित्त होने से अकृत पाप और पुण्य की प्रसक्ति होगी । ईश्वर जीव और जगत् को उत्पन्न नहीं करता किन्तु अभिव्यक्त करता है । यहाँ जगत् स्रष्टा का अर्थ है अव्याकृत नामरूपों को व्याकृत करने वाला[4] और सृष्टि का अर्थ है अव्याकृत नामरूपों का व्याकृत होना । नामरूप से व्याकृत यह जगत् कारणावस्था में नामरूपों से अव्याकृत था । जगत् की यह प्रागवस्था बीजशक्तिरूपा है[5] जो परमेश्वर से पराधीन है स्वतंत्र नहीं है । यह अविद्यात्मिका बीजशक्ति ईश्वर की शक्ति है जो, कहीं अव्यक्त कहीं माया अथवा कहीं प्रकृति शब्द से कही गई है । इस शक्ति के बिना ईश्वर जगत्सृष्टि में प्रवृत्त नहीं हो सकता । संसार प्रपंच के बीजभूत अविद्याकल्पितअनिर्वचनीय ये नामरूप ईश्वर के आत्मभूत जैसे हैं[6] । यद्यदि शक्ति और

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१. नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वासृष्टिश्रुतेः सर्वज्ञत्वश्रुतेश्च । वही २–१–३३

२. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये नेश्वरस्य प्रसज्येते । कस्मात् । सापेक्षत्वात् । यदि हि निरपेक्षः केवल ईश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते स्यातामेतौ दोषौ वैषम्यं नैर्घृण्यं च, न तु निरपेक्षस्य निर्मातृत्वमस्ति, सापेक्षो हीश्वरो विषमां सृष्टिं निर्मिमीते ।………… प्राणिधर्मापेक्षा विषमा सृष्टिरिति नायमीश्वरस्यापराधः । वही २–१–३४

३. अनादित्वात् संसारस्य । वही २–१–३७

गीता० भा० १३–१९

आदिमत्वे हि संसारस्याऽकस्मादुदभूतेर्मुक्तानामपि पुनः संसारोद्भूतिप्रसंगः । अकृताभ्यागमप्रसंगश्च । सुखदुःखादि वैषम्यस्य निर्निमित्तत्वात् । ब्र० सू० भा० २–१–३६

४. अविद्यात्मकनामरूपबीजव्याकरणापेक्षत्वात्-सर्वज्ञत्वस्य । वही २–१–१४

५. जगदिदमनभिव्यक्त नामरूपं बीजात्मकं प्रागवस्थम् । ब्र० सू० भा०

६. परमेश्वराधीनात्वियं…………प्रागवस्था जगतोऽभ्युपगम्यते न स्वतन्त्रा । ……………न हि तया बिना परमेश्वरस्य स्रष्टृत्वं सिद्ध्यति, शक्तिरहितस्य तस्य प्रवृत्यनुपपत्तेः ।……अविद्यात्मिका हि बीजशक्तिः अव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या परमेश्वराश्रया मायामयी महासुषुप्तिः, यस्यां स्वरूपप्रतिबोधरहिताः शेरते संसारिणोजीवाः । वही १–४–३

शक्तिमान् में अभेद रहता है[१] तथापि संसार के बीजभूत नामरूपों को ही ईश्वर नहीं समझना चाहिए, उनसे सर्वज्ञ ईश्वर भिन्न है।[२] ईश्वर नामरूपों से विलक्षण तथा उनसे अस्पृष्ट है, तब भी वह नामरूपों का व्याकर्ता है।[३] जगत् की नामरूपों से अव्याकृत तथा व्याकृत दोनों अवस्थाओं में ईश्वर का नियन्तृत्व सिद्ध है।[४] प्रलयावस्था में जब यह जगत् अपने कारण ईश्वर में लीन रहता है तब उसमें विविध प्राणियों का कर्मसांकर्य नहीं होने पाता।[५] सृष्टि होने पर प्राणियों को पुनः अपने प्राक्तन शुभाशुभ कर्मसंस्कारों के अनुसार विभिन्न योनियों में जन्म ग्रहण करना पड़ता है और जन्म मरण का यह चक्र उनमें निरन्तर चलता रहता है। वे प्राणी अपने शुभाशुभ कर्मों के अनुसार ही सुख-दुःख के भोक्ता होते हैं। किन्तु यह ध्यान रखना चाहिये कि कर्म जो स्वतः जड़ है, सीधे फल प्रदान करने में समर्थ नहीं है, अतः ईश्वर ही प्राणियों के शुभाशुभ कर्मों के फल प्रदान करने में समर्थ हैं क्योंकि उसे उनके कर्मों का पूर्ण ज्ञान रहता है।[६] ईश्वर कर्माध्यक्ष, सर्वान्तर्यामी, सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा तथा साक्षी कहा गया है। ईश्वर साक्षित्व रूप-सत्ता-मात्र से भोक्ता और भोग्य दोनों का प्रेरक है। इसका प्रेरकत्व केवल दर्शन मात्र है। अतः सत्ता मात्र से सब भूतों के अन्तःकरणों का प्रेरक होने के कारण वह सबका साक्षी है। उसकी सर्वत्र सत्ता होने से ही वह सर्वान्तर्यामी कहा गया है। समस्त प्राणियों में प्रविष्ट होकर उनका नियन्तृत्व करता है।[७]

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१. गीता भा०

२. पारमेश्वर्याः शक्तेः समस्त जगत्विधायिन्या·········न स्वतंत्रा काचित् प्रकृतिः। सैव दैवीशक्तिरव्याकृतनामरूपा नामरूपयोः प्रागवस्था। वही १–४–९

सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्याऽऽत्मभूत इवाऽविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वचनीये संसारप्रपंचस्य बीजरूपे सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिश्च·········ताभ्यामन्यः सर्वज्ञः ईश्वरः। वही २–१–१४

३. यदित्येतद् ब्रह्म नामरूपविलक्षणं नामरूपाभ्यामस्पृष्टं तथापि तयोर्निवोढा। छा० उप० भा० ८–१४–१

४. तदुभयं परस्पर संयुक्तं कार्यकारणात्मकं विश्वं विभर्ति ईश्वरः। श्वेत० उप० भा०

५. ब्र० सू० भा० २–३–५०

६. कर्तृकर्मफलविभागज्ञः (केन उप० वा० भा० खं० ३)
सर्वस्य सर्वक्रियाफलप्रत्ययसाक्षी (वही खं० ३)
सर्वजन्तुबुद्धिकर्मफलविभागसाक्षी (वही खं० ३)

आत्मसंस्थस्य प्रत्यगात्मनः ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञस्य सर्वक्रियाफलसंयोजयितुः प्राणिनाम् (वही पद० भा० खं० ३)

७. सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा (वही वा० भा० खंड ३)

एक एवेश्वरश्चात्मा सर्वभूतानां नित्यमुक्तोऽभ्युपगम्यते। (वही वा० भा० खं० ३)
कर्माध्यक्षात्·········साक्षिणश्चेत् चितुरीश्वरात्। ब्र० सू० भा० २–३–४२

प्राणियों की जाग्रत् स्वप्न सुषुप्ति तीनों अवस्थाओं में ईश्वर का साक्षित्व वा अधिष्ठातृत्व अव्यभिचरित रूप से रहता है,[1] क्योंकि जैसा पहले कहा जा चुका है, वह तो उनकी आत्मा ही है। ईश्वर प्राणियों के हृदय में स्थित होकर उन्हें अपनी माया से भ्रमित कर रहा है।[2] जीव ईश्वर की माया से मोहित होकर ही जीवभाव की अवस्था में है जिसके कारण वह अपनी आत्मा ईश्वर को नहीं जानता। यहाँ यह प्रश्न उठता है कि जब ईश्वर ही जीवों का पूर्णतः प्रेरक और नियन्ता है तो फिर उनमें कर्मकर्तृत्व स्वातंत्र्य कैसे सुरक्षित रह सकता है और वे अपने शुभाशुभ कर्मों के अनुसार सुख-दुःख के भोक्ता किस प्रकार माने जा सकते हैं। यद्यपि ईश्वर जीवकृत धर्माधर्म के वैषम्य से अपेक्षित होकर ही उनके अनुरूप विषम फलों को प्रदान करता है[3] तथापि जीव का कर्तृत्व ईश्वर पराधीन होने के कारण उसका कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष व ही उपपन्न नहीं है। इसका समाधान करते हुए आचार्य शंकर कहते हैं कि इसमें कोई दोष नहीं है। जीव का कर्तृत्व ईश्वर के पराधीन होने पर भी कर्म का कर्ता तो जीव ही है, कर्म करते हुए उस जीव को ईश्वर करवाता है। दूसरी बात यह भी है कि जीव द्वारा कृत पूर्व प्रयत्न की अपेक्षा से ही ईश्वर इस समय उससे कर्म करवाता है इसी तरह इससे किए गये पूर्वतरप्रयत्न की अपेक्षा से उसने पहले प्रवृत्त किया था। संसार के अनादि होने से इसमें कोई दोष नहीं है[4] वस्तुतः जीव का कर्तृत्व ईश्वर-परायत्त केवल इसी दृष्टि से समझना चाहिए कि ईश्वर उसे दोनों प्रकार के शुभाशुभ कर्मों के साधन एवं सामर्थ्य प्रस्तुत करता है[5]––किन्तु इससे जीव का स्वतन्त्र कर्तृत्व बाधित नहीं होता। उन

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प्रेरयिता ह्यसावुभयोः भोग्यभोक्त्रोः नित्यसाक्षित्व सत्तामात्रेण। दर्शनमात्रं हि तस्य प्रेरयितृत्वम् मुण्ड उप० भा० ३–१

सर्वेक्षितृ हि तत् सर्वभूतकरणप्रयोक्तृत्वात्। केन उप० पद० खं० ३ )

एषोऽन्तर्यामी अनुप्रविश्य सर्वेषां भूतानां नियन्ताप्येष एव। मा० उप० भा० ७

१. तस्य सर्वेश्वरत्वात्सर्वास्ववस्थास्वपि अधिष्ठातृ त्वोपपत्तेः। ब्र० सू० भा० ३–२–४

२. गीताभाष्य १८–६१

३. जीवकृतधर्माधर्मवैषम्यापेक्ष एव तत्तत्फलानि विषमं विभजते। ब्र० सू० भा० २–३–४२

४. ननु कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षत्वमेव जीवस्य परायेत्त कर्तृत्वे नौपपद्यते नैष दोषः। परायत्तेऽपि हि कर्तृत्वे करोत्येव जीवः कुर्वन्तं हि तं ईश्वरः कारयति। अपि च पूर्व प्रयत्नमपेक्ष्येदानीं कारयति पूर्वतरं च प्रयत्नमपेक्ष्य पूर्वमकारयत इति अनादित्वात् संसारस्य अनवद्यम्। ब्र० सू० भा० २–३–४७

५. य एष साधु कर्म कारयति इत्यादि श्रुतिवचनों का भी यही तात्पर्य समझना चाहिए।

शुभादि कर्मों के करने में जीव स्वतन्त्र है। ईश्वर संसार की माया से संस्पृष्ट नहीं होता। जगत् कारण ईश्वर जगत् की उत्पत्ति स्थिति लय तीनों अवस्थाओं में उसके धर्मों से न तो संस्पृष्ट होता है और न वह समस्त प्राणियों की आत्मा होने पर भी जीवों के दुःखादि से लिप्त होता है।[1]

जैसा कि पहले कहा जा चुका है कि जीव जगत् का कारण नहीं हो सकता, यहाँ अचेतनकारणवादी की ओर से संभाव्य इस आशंका का कि यदि ईश्वर ही समस्त जीवों के आत्मरूप से शरीर में अनुप्रविष्ट है तो जीव को ईश्वर से भिन्न न होने से जीव को स्रष्टा मानने से उसमें हिताकरणादि दोष प्रसक्त होंगे क्योंकि संसार में जीव अपने को दुखी क्यों बनाएगा। शंकर इसका निराकरण करते हुए कहते हैं कि जीव जगत् का स्रष्टा नहीं हो सकता। जगत् स्रष्टा तो सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमान्, नित्य शुद्धयुक्त स्वभाव ईश्वर है। उसमें हिताकरणादि दोष नहीं लग सकते क्योंकि उसके लिए न तो कुछ हितकरणीय है और न अहित परिहरणीय है। उसमें न ज्ञान का प्रतिबन्ध है और न शक्ति का ही प्रतिबन्ध है। किंतु जीव ऐसा नहीं है। अतः जीव और ईश्वर में महान् भेद है।[2] यह ठीक है कि परमार्थतः जीव और ईश्वर में अभेद है[3] और यह भेद औपाधिक ही है। दोनों की उपाधि में भेद है। जीव की उपाधि हीनोपाधि है जिसके कारण वह अल्पज्ञ, अल्पशक्ति शुभाशुभ कर्मों के अनुसार सुख दुःख का भोक्ता संसारी एवं शासित है। ईश्वर की विशुद्ध सत्त्वोपाधि है, जिसके कारण वह सर्वज्ञ सर्वशक्तिमान् एवं सर्वनियन्ता है। ईश्वर के सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्व आदि धर्म औपाधिक ही हैं। परमार्थतः ईश्वर निर्गुणस्वभाव होने पर भी वह अपनी माया-शक्ति उपाधि से युक्त होकर ही सृष्ट्यादि कर्म में प्रवृत्त होता है। किन्तु यह न भूलना चाहिए कि ईश्वर अपनी उपाधि-मायाशक्ति के कभी भी पराधीन नहीं होता। ईश्वर मायावी होने पर भी माया उसके सदैव नियन्त्रण में रहती है—वह कभी भी माया से लिप्त नहीं होता। शंकर की दृष्टि में, ईश्वर मायाशक्तिमत् होने पर भी नित्यशुद्धमुक्त

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१. यथा, स्वयं प्रसारितया मायया मायावी त्रिस्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृश्यते अवस्तुत्वात्, एवं परमात्माऽपि संसारमायया न संस्पृश्यत इति। ब्र० सू० भा० २–१–९

यथा चोदशरावादिकम्पनात् तद्गते सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बे कम्पमानेऽपि न तद्वान्-सूर्यः कम्पते, एवमविद्योप्रत्युपस्थापिते बुद्ध्याद्युपहिते जीवाख्येऽशे दुःखायमानेऽपि न तद्वानीश्वरो दुःखायते। वही २–३–४६

२. यत् सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं शरीरादधिकमन्यत् तत्स्वयं जगतः स्रष्टृ ब्रूमः। न तस्मिन् हिताकरणादयो दोषो प्रसज्यन्ते, न हि तस्य हितं किंचित् कर्त्तव्यमस्ति अहितं वा परिहर्तव्यम्, नित्यमुक्तस्वभावत्वात् न च तस्य ज्ञान-प्रतिबन्धः शक्तिप्रतिबन्धो वा क्वचिदप्यस्ति, सर्वज्ञत्वात् सर्वशक्तित्वाच्च शारीरस्त्वनेवं-विधः नतु तं वयं जगतः स्रष्टारं ब्रूमः।

३. परमावतिस्तु परमात्मविज्ञानात्मनो भेदाभावात्। ब्र० सू० भा० १-४-१

स्वभाव है। किन्तु संसारी जीव ऐसा नहीं है। वह सदैव अनादि माया के वश में रहता है। ईश्वर औपाधिक होने पर भी अपनी उपाधि का स्वामी है किन्तु जीव अपनी उपाधि का दास है। शंकर की दृष्टि में यद्यपि जीव का जीवत्व और ईश्वर का ईश्वरत्व दोनों औपाधिक हैं, तथापि दोनों में अत्यन्त भेद है। जीव का औपाधिक जीवत्व मिथ्या ज्ञानजनित भ्रान्तिरूप है, किंतु ईश्वर का औपाधिक ईश्वरत्व ईश्वर के भ्रान्ति से जन्य नहीं है। जीव अपने जीवत्व से संसारी बनता है किन्तु ईश्वर अपने ईश्वरत्व से संसार धर्मों से स्पृष्ट नहीं होता। औपाधिक ईश्वर का जो सम्बन्ध निर्गुण ब्रह्म का है ठीक वैसा ही औपाधिक जीव का निर्गुण ब्रह्म से नहीं है। जीवदशा में जीव परमात्मा का आभासमात्र है किन्तु औपाधिक अवस्था में भी ईश्वर साक्षात् ब्रह्म या आत्मा ही है। इस आभासरूप जीव का जीवत्व मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तक ही है। अतः जीवबुद्ध्यादि में परिकल्पित आत्म-सम्बन्ध मात्र है। जब तक जीव शरीरेन्द्रियादि में आत्मबुद्धि रखता है, तभी तक जीव का जीवत्व तथा संसारित्व रहता है। किन्तु ज्योंही जीव शरीरेन्द्रियादि से आत्मबुद्धि हटा कर अपनी आत्मा ईश्वर को जान लेता है, त्यों ही उसका जीवत्व एवं संसारित्व नष्ट हो जाता है। और इस प्रकार आत्मरूप ईश्वर के अतिरिक्त जीव की भिन्न सत्ता नहीं रह जाती। शंकर की दृष्टि में "जीवेश्वरैक्य" अथवा "जीवब्रह्मैक्य" का तात्पर्य जीव के जीवत्वापनयन द्वारा आत्मभूत ईश्वर का साक्षात्कार कर लेना मात्र है। इसी स्थिति में यह कहा जा सकता है कि जीव परमार्थतः आत्मारूप ईश्वर या ब्रह्म ही है।[1] अतः शंकर की दृष्टि में सोपाधिक जीव और सोपाधिक ईश्वर दोनों में उनको क्रमशः निकृष्ट उपाधियों का ही भेद नहीं है अपितु दोनों में सूक्ष्म भेद है—प्रथम दूसरे का आभासमात्र है और दूसरा साक्षात् ब्रह्म या आत्मा ही है। इस तथ्य को आचार्य शंकर अपने साक्षात् शब्दों द्वारा घोषित करते हैं—"यावदेव चाऽयं बुद्ध्युपाधिसम्बन्धस्तावज्जीवस्य जीवत्वं संसारित्वं च। परमार्थतस्तु न जीवो नाम बुद्ध्यादिसम्बन्धपरिकल्पित स्वरूपव्यतिरेकेण अस्ति। नहि नित्यमुक्तस्वरूपात् सर्वज्ञात् ईश्वरात् अन्यः चेतनो धातुर्द्वितीयो वेदान्तार्थनिरुपणायामुपलभ्यते।" "नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा, श्रोता मन्ता विज्ञाता (ब्र० ३-७-२३) नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ, श्रोतृ ( मन्तृ विज्ञातृ ) छा०-६-८-७ तत्वमसि (छा० ६-६-६) अहं ब्रह्मास्मि (बृ० १-४-७) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। ब्र० सू० भा० (२-३-३०)"

यहाँ स्पष्टरूप से शंकर ईश्वर को पारमार्थिक सत्य मानते हुए दिखाई देते हैं।

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१. आत्मेत्येव परमेश्वरः प्रतिपत्तव्यः। तथाहि परमेश्वर प्रक्रियायां जाबाला आत्मत्वेनैवेतमुपगच्छन्ति "त्वं वा अहमस्मि भगवो देवतेऽहं वै त्वमसि भगवो देवते इति। तथाऽन्येऽपि अहं ब्रह्मास्मि इत्येवमादय आत्मत्वोपगमा द्रष्टव्याः। ग्राह्यन्ति चात्मत्वेनैवेश्वरं वेदान्तवाक्यानि" एष त आत्मा सर्वान्तरः (बृ० ३-४-१) एष त आत्माऽन्तर्याम्यमृतः (बृ० ३-४-७) तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्वमसि (छा० ६-८-७) इत्येवमादीनि। ब्र० सू० भा० (४-१-३)

अन्यत्र भी उनके ऐसे वचन मिलते हैं ।[1] यह नहीं कहा जा सकता कि वे यहाँ ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग निर्गुण ब्रह्म के ही अर्थ में कर रहे हैं, क्योंकि ईश्वर शब्द औपाधिक सर्वज्ञात् विशेषणपद के साथ प्रयुक्त है। किन्तु इससे यह भी तात्पर्य नहीं लगाया जा सकता है कि शंकर ईश्वर के सविशेष या औपाधिक रूप को पारमार्थिक कहना चाहते हैं अतः यहाँ यही निर्धारण संगत जान पड़ता है कि शंकर की ईश्वर के सविशेष और निर्विशेष रूपों में अभेद दृष्टि है—उनकी दृष्टि में ईश्वर और निर्गुण ब्रह्म में तात्विक भेद नहीं है। संभवतः वे इसी अभेद दृष्टि से कहते हैं कि ईश्वर के अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी द्वितीय की सत्ता नहीं है। किन्तु जीव की स्थिति इससे भिन्न है वह तो बुद्ध्युपाधि सम्बन्ध से परिकल्पित मात्र है। परमार्थतः तो वह ईश्वर ही है—ईश्वर से भिन्न उसकी सत्ता नहीं है। इससे भी अधिक महत्त्वपूर्ण शंकर द्वारा प्रयुक्त "अद्वैतेश्वर" पद है, जो पूर्णतः निर्गुण ब्रह्म का बोधक है।[2] यहाँ ईश्वर शब्द किसी सर्वज्ञादि औपाधिक विशेषण के साथ प्रयुक्त नहीं है। शंकर के इन वचनों से स्पष्टतः प्रमाणित हो जाता है कि उनकी दृष्टि में ईश्वर के पारमार्थिकत्व का निषेध नहीं है किन्तु ईश्वर के औपाधिक धर्मों का ही पारमार्थिकत्व निषेध है। यहाँ आचार्य स्पष्ट रूप से घोषित करते हैं कि जब संसारी जीव संसारित्व या जीवत्व के अपोहन द्वारा आत्मस्वरूप "अद्वैतेश्वर भाव" को प्राप्त हो जाता है तब उस अवस्था में द्वैत के अभाव में ईश्वर की अपहतपाप्यत्वादि औपाधिक धर्म मिथ्या व्यवस्थित हो जाते हैं। किन्तु कतिपय परवर्ती वेदान्तियों की दृष्टि जीव की भाँति ईश्वर को भी माया की कठपुतली बनाने में दिखाई देती है। पंचदशीकार के इस कथन का कि जीव और ईश्वर दोनों ही मायारूपी कामधेनु के वत्स हैं, यही आशय झलकता है। भले ही लेखक का इससे अभिप्राय दोनों की सौपाधिकता मात्र इंगित करना हो।

यद्यपि उपर्युक्त विवेचन से यह स्पष्ट हो चुका है कि शंकर की दृष्टि में जीव और ईश्वर में केवल स्थूल औपाधिक ही भेद नहीं है किन्तु सूक्ष्म भेद भी है[3] तथापि यहाँ इस सन्वम्ध में कुछ पुनरावृत्ति द्वारा पुनः स्पष्ट कर देना अनावश्यक नहीं है। इस कथन से अद्वैत वेदान्त में सिद्धान्तित "जीवब्रह्मैक्य" अथवा "जीवेश्वरैक्य" में कोई विरोध नहीं समझना चाहिए। जीव और ब्रह्म अथवा आत्मा या ईश्वर का तादात्म्य जीवरूप से नहीं होता किन्तु जीवत्व के अपनयन द्वारा होता है।

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१. प्रतिषिध्यत एव तु परमार्थतः सर्वज्ञात् परमेश्वरादन्यो द्रष्टा श्रोता वा "नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा" (बृ० ३-७-२३) इत्यादिना। ब्र० सू० भा० (३-१-१७)

२. संसारिणः संसारित्वापोहनेनेश्वरात्मत्वं प्रतिपादयिषमिति एवं च सति अद्वैतेश्वरस्यऽपहतपाप्मत्वादि गुणता....मिथ्येति व्यवतिष्ठते। ब्र० सू० भा० (४-१-३)।

३. परमेश्वरस्तु अविद्याकल्पिताच्छारीरात् कर्तुर्भोक्तुर्विज्ञानात्माख्यादन्यः...। ब्र० सू० भा० (१-१-१७)।

अतः इस ऐक्य का तात्पर्य शंकर की दृष्टि में हुआ एकमात्र 'नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव सर्वज्ञ ईश्वर की ही सत्ता है' इससे भिन्न जीव की सत्ता नहीं है, यह जान लेना है। समस्त भूतों की आत्मा एक ही ईश्वर है जो प्राणियों के हृदय में साक्षीरूप में स्थित है। उसका साक्षित्व सत्तामात्र से स्थित होना है। यही सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ईश्वर साक्षीरूप से सब जीवों का प्रेरक है किन्तु जीव मिथ्याज्ञान के कारण अपने आत्मा साक्षी ईश्वर को नहीं जानता और देहेन्द्रियादि में आत्मबुद्धि रखने के कारण अपनी अलग सत्ता मान लेता है, जिससे वह संसारी बनकर दुःख-सुख का भोक्ता बनता है। जीव परमार्थतः साक्षी ईश्वर ही है अर्थात् साक्षी ईश्वर से भिन्न उसकी अलग सत्ता नहीं है। शंकर की दृष्टि में सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा साक्षी ईश्वर निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही है।[1] इसीलिए वे निर्गुण ब्रह्म की दृष्टि से "जीवेश्वरैक्य" "क्षेत्रज्ञेश्वरैक्य" आदि पदों में ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग करते हैं।

अतः जीव का अपने आत्मस्वरूप साक्षी ईश्वर के साथ एकत्व स्थापित होने से जीव के जीवत्व के अपनयन हो जाने पर ईशितव्य के अभाव में उसके प्रति ईश्वर के नियन्तृत्वादि औपाधिक ईश्वरत्व धर्मों का भी अपनयन हो जाता है। प्रकारान्तर से यह कहा जा सकता है कि मुक्त जीव के प्रति ईशितव्य के अभाव में ईश्वर अपना नियन्तृत्व उस मुक्त जीव से ( उसके शासित न रह जाने से ) हटा लेता है किन्तु अन्य संसारी जीवों के प्रति अब भी वह नियन्तृत्वादि धर्मों से विशिष्ट बना रहता है। किन्तु ईश्वर के नियन्तृत्वादि औपाधिक धर्मों के हट जाने पर भी उसके स्वरूप में कोई अन्तर नहीं पड़ता, क्योंकि वह तो 'नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव' ही है। सौपाधिक अवस्था में भी ईश्वर का यह 'नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वरूप' तिरोहित नहीं होता। इस दृष्टि से उसके सविशेष और निर्विशेष दोनों रूपों में कोई तात्विक भेद नहीं रह जाता। वस्तुतः ईश्वर में शंकर की सदैव निर्गुणत्वदृष्टि रहती है। ईश्वर के सर्वज्ञत्व, सर्वशक्तिमत्वादि औपाधिक विशेषणों के साथ प्रायः वे उसके "नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव" विशेषण का भी प्रयोग करते हैं। आचार्य शंकर ईश्वर को निर्विशेष ब्रह्म से बिलकुल पृथक् नहीं छोड़ देना चाहते अपितु वे उसे उसके निर्गुण स्वरूप तक ले जाना चाहते हैं।

शंकर अपने ब्र० सू० भाष्य में (४-४-१९) बादरायण सूत्र की व्याख्या करते हुए स्पष्ट-रूप से यह तथ्य अंगीकार-करते हैं कि परमेश्वर का केवल सविशेष विकारी ही रूप नहीं है, अपितु उसका नित्य निर्गुण रूप भी है—विकारावर्त्यपि च नित्यमुक्तं पारमेश्वरं रूपं न केवलं विकारमात्र गोचरम्...। तथाह्यस्य द्विरूपां स्थितिमाहाऽऽम्नाये। 'तावानस्य महिमा ततो ज्यायांश्च पुरुषः। पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतन्दिवि' (छा० उप० ३-११-६) इत्येवमादिः। इस प्रकार ईश्वर का सगुण रूप उसके निर्गुण

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१. परवर्ती वेदान्तियों में जीव, साक्षी तथा ईश्वर के स्वरूपों में महान् मतभेद है।

F. 30

रूप से नितान्त पृथक नहीं किया जा सकता। ईश्वर के सगुणरूप में भी निर्गुणत्व रहता है। किन्तु सगुण के उपासक उसके निर्गुण रूप को प्राप्त नहीं करते।[1] यह ध्यान रखना चाहिये कि आचार्य शंकर, जैसा कि पहले भी कहा जा चुका है, प्रायः ईश्वर अथवा परमेश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग ठीक ब्रह्म शब्द के समानान्तर रूप में ही करते हैं। जिस प्रकार ब्रह्म शब्द का प्रयोग उसके सविशेष एवं निर्विशेष दोनों रूपों के लिए होता है, उसी प्रकार आचार्य शंकर ईश्वर या परमेश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग सविशेष तथा निर्विशेष दोनों रूपों के लिए करते हैं। अतः आचार्य की दृष्टि में अपरब्रह्मसविशेष ब्रह्म या सगुण ब्रह्म ही ईश्वर नहीं है, अपितु परब्रह्म निर्विशेषब्रह्म या निर्गुणब्रह्म भी ईश्वर है।[2] शंकर की दृष्टि में ईश्वर का वास्तविक रूप निर्गुण ही है,[3] और इसी रूप में वह सर्वभूतों का आत्मा है जो न तो जीवों के कर्मफलों से लिप्त होता है और न उनके दुःखों से दुखित होता है। ये ईश्वर के निर्गुण रूप की महत्ता बताते हुए कहते हैं—

एवंभूतमपि परमेश्वरं नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वभूतात्मानं निर्गुणं संसारदोष-बीजप्रदाहकारणं मां न अभिजानाति जगत........।

(गीता भा० ७-१२)

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१. न च तन्निर्विकारं रूपमितरालम्बनाः प्राप्नुवन्तीति शक्यं वक्तुं अतत्क्रतुत्वात्तेषाम्। अतश्च यथैव द्विरूपे परमेश्वरे निर्गुणं रूपमनवाप्य सगुण एवाऽवतिष्ठन्ते— (ब्र० सू० भा० ४-४-१९)

२. अपि च यत्र तु निरस्तसर्वविशेष पारमेश्वरं रूपमुपदिश्यते, भवति तत्र शास्त्रम्— "अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम् इत्यादि। सर्वाकारणत्वात् तु विकारधर्मैरपि कैश्चित् विशिष्टः परमेश्वरः उपास्यत्वेन निर्दिश्यत" सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः, सर्वगन्धः सर्वरस, (छा० ३-१४-२) इत्यादिना। ब्र० सू. भा० (१-१-२०)

२. विकारावर्त्यपि च नित्यमुक्तं पारमेश्वरं रूपं, न केवलं विकारमात्रगोचरम्। ब्र० सू० भा०, (४-४-१९) किं पुनः परं ब्रह्म किमपरंमित्युच्यते। यत्राविद्याकृतनामरूपादिविशेषप्रतिषेधात् अस्थूलादि शब्दैर्ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते तत्परम तदैव यत्र नामरूपादि विशेषेण केनचित् विशिष्टमुपासनायोपदिश्यते....इत्यादि शब्दैः तत्परम्। ब्र० सू० भा० (४-३-१४)

३. स्मरन्ति च व्यासादयो यथा जैवेन दुःखेन न परमात्मा दुःखायत इति—

तत्र यः परमात्मा हि स नित्यो निर्गुणः स्मृतः।
न लिप्यते फलैश्चापि पद्मपत्रमिवाम्भसा॥
कर्मात्मात्वपरो योऽसौ सोक्षबन्धैः स युज्यते।
स सप्तदर्शकेनापि राशिना युज्यते पुनः॥

तयोरन्यः पिप्पिलं स्वाद्वत्ति-अनश्नन्नन्योअभिचाकशीति (श्वेत० ४-६) इति

एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा न लिप्यते लोक दुःखेन वाह्यः (कठ० उप० ५-११) इति च।

ब्र० सू० भा० (२-३-४७)

अद्वैत वेदान्त का ईश्वर सच्चे अर्थ में अनन्तगुणों से विशिष्ट एवं अनन्त-शक्तिमत् है। वह जिन जगत्कारण सर्वज्ञ, सर्ववित्, सर्वशक्तिमान्, सर्वान्तर्यामी, सर्वभूतात्मा, साक्षी, कर्माध्यक्ष, स्वयंभू, अपहृतपाप्मा, सत्यसंकल्प, सर्वगत, स्वतंत्र, आप्तकाम, महामाय आदि अनेक विशेषणों से कहा गया है, वे सब उसके स्वरूप में पूर्णतः उपपन्न होते हैं।

वस्तुतः वेदान्त के ईश्वर का ऐसा तर्कसंगत स्वरूप जो जगत् का अभिन्न-निमित्तोपादान कारण, जगत् की उत्पत्ति स्थिति लय तीनों अवस्थाओं का आधार, जीवों की जाग्रत् स्वप्न तथा सुषुप्ति तीनों अवस्थाओं में साक्षीरूप से नियामक, जीवों के शुभाशुभ कर्मों का फलप्रदाता, परायत्त जीवों के कर्तृत्व के नियन्ता होने पर भी उन्हें कर्तृत्व स्वातन्त्र्य प्रदान करने में समर्थ, सोपाधिक होने पर भी संसारदोषगन्धों से सर्वथा अस्पृष्ट, सर्वभूतात्मा होने पर भी जीवों के दुखों को स्पर्श न करनेवाला, निरुपाधिक अवस्था में अपने पारमार्थिक निर्गुणरूप में औपाधिक नियन्तृत्वादि धर्मों से रहित होने पर भी परमपुरुषार्थस्वरूप हो, विश्व के अन्य दर्शनों में दुर्लभ है।

ब्रह्मसूत्र-भाष्य में आचार्य शङ्कर द्वारा किए गए ईश्वर के केवल निमित्त कारणवाद पक्ष के खण्डन द्वारा अन्य सभी भारतीय तथा पाश्चात्य दर्शनों में केवल निमित्तकारणवादियों का खण्डन समझना चाहिए। रामानुज के विशिष्टाद्वैत में ईश्वर का अभिन्न निमित्तोपादान कारणत्व स्वीकृत है, किन्तु ईश्वर के विशेषण के रूप में उपादान तत्व को भी पारमार्थिक मानने के कारण उनके ईश्वर का उपादानत्व सच्चे अर्थ में उपपन्न नहीं होता। दूसरे यहाँ जीव की आत्मा ईश्वर को मान लेने पर भी उन दोनों में पारमार्थिक स्वगत भेद बना ही रहता है। अन्य द्वैतवादियों के मत में भी पुरुष या आत्मा को ईश्वर से पारमार्थिक रूप में भिन्न मानने के कारण उनका ईश्वर "सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा" सच्चे अर्थ में नहीं बन सकता।

इसी प्रकार शंकराभिमत ईश्वर सिद्धान्त के द्वारा पाश्चात्यदर्शन के उन ईश्वर-वादी सम्प्रदायों का भी खण्डन हो जाता है जिनके अनुसार ईश्वर जगत् की निर्निमित्त रूप में प्राणियों के धर्माधर्म अपेक्षा के बिना सृष्टि करता है। अवश्य पाश्चात्य दर्शन में स्पिनोज़ा का ईश्वर (द्रव्य) अद्वैतरूप निर्गुण एवं निराकार है जो संसार में दृष्टिगोचर होने वाले परिणामों से विकृत नहीं होता। अतः स्पिनोज़ा का ईश्वरवाद शंकर के विवर्तवाद से कुछ मिलता-जुलता है[१]। किन्तु तर्क की कसौटी से कसने पर वह शंकर सिद्धान्त के पूर्णतः समकक्ष नहीं ठहराता। वहाँ न तो निर्गुण ईश्वर और

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१. डा० रमाकान्त त्रिपाठी (रीडर, दर्शनविभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय) ने Spinoza in the light of Vedanta नामक अपने विद्वत्तापूर्ण ग्रंथ में स्पिनोजा का शंकर के साथ साम्य स्थापित करने का स्तुत्य प्रयास किया है।

जगत् से सम्बन्ध स्थापित करने के लिये माया शक्ति ही स्वीकृत है[1] और न जीवों के कर्तृत्व में स्वातन्त्र्य ही सुरक्षित रह सका है।[2] प्रो० टी० आर० वी० मूर्ति भी स्पिनोजा और शङ्कर के पूर्ण साम्य में असहमत जान पड़ते हैं।[3] पाश्चात्य दर्शन जगत् में क्रान्तिकारी कान्ट का भी दर्शन ईश्वर को प्राप्त करने में असमर्थ ही रह गया। जबकि शांकरदर्शन का सर्वभूतात्मा ईश्वर अनुभवगम्य है। प्रो० भी० ला० आत्रेय अपने "शंकराचार्य का मायावाद" नामक निबन्ध में शङ्कर की मायावाद की प्रशंसा करते हुए कहते हैं कि "इसके आगे कोई दर्शन नहीं जाता। यही सिद्धान्त मनुष्य के लिए अन्तिमतम सिद्धान्त है।" प्रकारान्तर से यह कथन शंकर के ईश्वरवाद के लिए भी लागू होता है, जिसका घनिष्ठ सम्बन्ध मायावाद से है।

अतः इस कथन में कोई अत्युक्ति न होगी कि शांकर सिद्धान्त में प्रतिष्ठित ईश्वरवाद के समक्ष विश्व की इतर समस्त ईश्वरकल्पनाएँ निष्प्रभ हो जाती हैं। आचार्य शंकर इस सम्बन्ध में स्वयं कहते हैं—

"एवमन्यास्वपिवेदवाह्यस्येश्वरकल्पनासु
यथासम्भवमसामंजस्यं योजनीयम्।" ब्र० सू० भा०
२-२-३८

अब हम ईश्वर के इस पहलू पर विचार करेंगे कि व्यावहारिक जीवन में ईश्वर का क्या महत्त्व है? ईश्वर जगत् का कारण एवं नियन्ता हो, सर्वज्ञ एवं सर्व-शक्तिमान हो, प्राणियों के धर्मानुसार फल का प्रदाता हो, किन्तु यदि वह हमारे जीवन में दुःख का साथी नहीं है, हमारी अभीष्ट कामनाओं की वह पूर्ति नहीं करता तो ऐसे गुणविशिष्ट ईश्वर से हमें क्या लाभ? जब वह हमारे शुभाशुभ कर्मों के अनुसार ही शुभ या अशुभ फल देता है तो हमें ईश्वर के मानने पर भी अपने कर्मों के अनुरूप ही फल भोगना पड़ेगा। हमें उसके मानने या न मानने में कोई फरक नहीं पड़ता। ईश्वर तो न्यायी है। ईश्वर शुभ कर्म करने वाले नास्तिक को भी शुभ फल अवश्य ही प्रदान करेगा। ठीक है, ईश्वर को न मानने से ईश्वर का कुछ नहीं बिगड़ता किन्तु उसके विपरीत उसे न माननेवाले का ही अनर्थ हो सकता है। मनुष्य निरन्तर शुभ कर्मों में प्रवृत्त नहीं हो पाता। अपने अनादि प्राक्तन संस्कारों के वशीभूत होकर वह अशुभ कर्म न चाहने पर भी विवश होकर उनमें प्रवृत्त होता है। मनुष्य की इन्द्रियाँ स्वभावतः बलवान् होती हैं। मन स्वतः चंचल है अतः मन इन्द्रियों के वशीभूत होकर अशुभ कर्मों में प्रवृत्त होता है। इस प्रकार वह अपने भावी दुःख वृक्ष का बीज बोता है।

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१. प्रो० चन्द्रधर शर्मा—पाश्चात्यदर्शन
२. प्रो० देवराज—पाश्चात्यदर्शन का इतिहास
३. द्रष्टव्य—प्रस्तावना "स्पिनोजा।"

किन्तु जो ईश्वर-भक्त है, उसे ईश्वर सत्कर्म में प्रेरित करता है। ईश्वरोपासना से मनुष्य जितेन्द्रिय बन जाता है—उसके मन का चांचल्य दूर हो जाता है। अनीश्वरवादी तो कभी-कभी अपने दुःखमय जीवन से दुखित होकर आत्मघात कर लेता है। किन्तु ईश्वर-वादी दुख से उद्विग्न होकर ऐसा जघन्य कार्य नहीं कर सकता। उसे ईश्वरोपासना से महान् आपत्ति में शान्ति तथा जीवन में उदात्त कर्मों के सम्पादन एवं उदात्त चरित्र निर्माण में अपूर्व प्रेरणा प्राप्त होती है। ईश्वरभक्त का जीवन मंगलमय बन जाता है। ईश्वर हमारी गहन आपत्ति में तथा अभीष्ट कामनाओं की पूर्ति में सहायक होता है। प्रथम दृष्टि से गीतोक्त ईश्वरभक्त "आर्त" है जो दुःख में उसके निवारणार्थ ईश्वर की उपासना करता है और द्वितीय दृष्टि से वह "अर्थार्थी" है जो अपने जीवन के अभ्युदय के लिए उसका उपासक होता है।

अब प्रश्न है कि क्या द्वैतवादियों का केवल निमित्त कारण ईश्वर, ईश्वर के सविशेषरूप को पारमार्थिक माननेवालों का ईश्वर, तथा अन्य विश्व में विविध प्रकार के ईश्वर के स्वरूप को माननेवाले ईश्वरवादियों का ईश्वर, हमारे दुःख और अभ्युदय-पूर्ति में सहायक तथा सदनुष्ठान का प्रेरक नहीं हो सकता? इसका उत्तर नकारात्मक नहीं है। इन सभी ईश्वरवादियों का ईश्वर उपर्युक्त सभी अवस्थाओं में सहायक हो सकता है। उसकी उपासना से दैनिक जीवन में भी शान्त्यादि प्राप्त हो सकती है। गीता का यह वचन भी कि ये "यथा मां प्रपद्यन्ते तांस्तथैव भजाम्यहम्" इस तथ्य की पुष्टि करता है।

किन्तु यदि उपासक अपने उपास्य ईश्वर को यह जान लेता है कि इससे बढ़कर अन्य कोई सर्वज्ञत्वादि अनन्त गुणों वाला एवं अनन्तशक्तिमान् नहीं है तब उस उपासक की भक्ति एवं श्रद्धा अपने उस अनन्तशक्ति अनन्तगुणवाले उपास्य के प्रति और भी अधिक बढ़ जाती है। इसके साथ ही वह उपास्य देव सर्वशक्तिमान् आदि गुणों से युक्त भी होना चाहिए तभी वह अपने उपासक के दुख निवारणादि में समर्थ हो सकता है। अतः अभीष्ट सिद्धि के लिए उपासक की भक्ति भी सच्ची होनी चाहिए और उपास्य भी सर्वसमर्थ होना चाहिए। किन्तु दोनों में प्रधानता उपास्य ही की है क्योंकि उसी के अनन्त गुणों के कारण उसके प्रति भक्त की भक्ति संवर्धित होती है, और उपासना में तीव्रता आती है।

यद्यपि अन्य ईश्वरवादी भी अपने अपने मतानुसार ईश्वर को सर्वशक्तिमत्वादि अनन्तगुणों से सम्पन्न समझते हैं, तथापि अन्धविश्वास मात्र से ईश्वर सर्वशक्तिम वादि अनन्तगुणों से सम्पन्न नहीं हो सकता। अद्वैत सिद्धान्तित ईश्वर में तो अनन्त शक्ति-मत्वादि धर्म सर्वप्रमाण सिद्ध हैं।

यदि हम थोड़ी देर के लिए यह मान भी लें कि इतर ईश्वरवादियों का ईश्वर भी हमारे दुख-निवारण, सांसारिक अभ्युदय की प्राप्ति तथा दैनिक जीवन में शान्ति प्राप्ति में सहायक हो सकता है, तो भी मानवबुद्धि इतने ही से तो सन्तुष्ट नहीं हो

सकती। मानव एक ऐसी स्थिति में आता है जिसमें न तो वह जीवन के अस्थायी दुख की निवृत्ति से सन्तुष्ट होता है और न सांसारिक भोगों से ही तृप्त होता है। उसके सामने यह समस्या उठती है कि क्या ईश्वर हमारे दुख की आत्यन्तिक दुख निवृत्ति करने एवं शाश्वत शान्ति अथवा सुख प्रदान करने में समर्थ है? इस स्थिति में आकर वह ईश्वर के तात्विक स्वरूप को जानना चाहता है क्योंकि ईश्वर के सच्चे स्वरूप के ज्ञान से ही परमसुख (मोक्ष) संभव है।[1] यही गीतोक्त तीसरे प्रकार का "जिज्ञासु भक्त" है। जब वह ईश्वर के तात्विक स्वरूप को जान लेता है तब वह गीतोक्त "ज्ञानीभक्त" की कोटि में आता है।[2] इस स्थिति में वह ईश्वर के तात्विक स्वरूप के जानने के साथ अपने जीव स्वरूप को भी आपातत: जान लेता है, क्योंकि जीव का आत्मा तो ईश्वर ही है। "ज्ञानी-भक्त" ईश्वर को अपनी आत्मा समझकर उसके साथ तादात्म्य प्राप्त करने का सतत अभ्यास करने लगता है। अतः व्यावहारिक उपयोगिता के साथ-साथ पारमार्थिक उपादेयता की दृष्टि से भी शंकराभिमत ईश्वर का महत्त्वपूर्ण वैशिष्ट्य है। यहाँ ईश्वर अपने अनौपाधिक पारमार्थिक रूप में निःश्रेयस् या परमपुरुषार्थ स्वरूप ही है। इसी परंपुरुषार्थ को प्राप्त कर मानव आत्यन्तिक दुख से निवृत्त होकर शाश्वत् शान्ति लाभ करता है। ईश्वर के इस निर्गुण रूप का साक्षात्कार मात्र ही परम पुरुषार्थ है—"ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः।" ईश्वर सोपाधिक सगुण रूप के माध्यम से ही अपने अनौपाधिक निर्गुण रूप का साक्षात्कार कराने में समर्थ होता है। एक ही ईश्वर अपने सौपाधिक रूप से परम पुरुषार्थ प्राप्त कराने का साधन बनता है तो वही अपने अनौपाधिक निर्गुण रूप से साध्य भी है।

इतरद्वैती ईश्वरवादियों के ईश्वर में भी पारमार्थिक उपादेयता स्वीकार की गई है। वहाँ तो किन्हीं-किन्हीं के मतों में ईश्वर भक्तिः ही साक्षात् निःश्रेयस् का साधन है। किन्तु इनके ईश्वर स्वरूप की तरह इनका मोक्षस्वरूप भी तर्क-संगत नहीं है। जिनके मत में साक्षी ईश्वर से भिन्न जीव ही पारमार्थिक सत्य हैं उनके मोक्ष में द्वैत बना रहता है। द्वैतावस्था में पूर्ण स्वातंत्र्य प्राप्त करना संभव नहीं है। इनका ईश्वर सच्चे अर्थ में न तो सर्वान्तर्यामी ही बन सकता है और न सर्व-भूतात्मा ही। अतः इनके ईश्वर का पूर्णतः पारमार्थिक उपादेयत्व भी सिद्ध नहीं होता।[3]

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१. ततोहीश्वररूपापरिज्ञानात् बन्धस्तत्स्वरूपपरिज्ञानात् तु मोक्षः
ब्र० सू० भा०। ३-२-५

२. साक्षीत्वात्मैव में मतम्—गीता

३. येषां पुनरीश्वरोऽन्य आत्मनः कार्य चान्यत् तेषां भयानिवृत्तिर्भयस्यान्यानिमित्तत्वात्।......एकत्वेपक्षे पुनः सनिमित्तस्य संसारस्य अविद्याकल्पितत्वोद्दोषः। ऐतरे० उप० भाष्य।

इसके विपरीत अद्वैत वेदान्त के ईश्वर का स्वरूप पारमार्थिक उपयोगिता की दृष्टि से भी तर्कसंगत है।

हम पहले यह कह आए हैं कि जब परमार्थाभिलाषी अथवा मुमुक्षु साधक ईश्वर के स्वरूप को तत्वतः जान लेता है तब वह उसके साथ तादात्म्य प्राप्त करने का अभ्यास करने लगता है। किन्तु यह अद्वैत परम पद प्राप्त करना खिलवाड़ नहीं है। अनेक जन्मों के बाद कहीं जीव इसे प्राप्त करने में समर्थ होता है।[१] एक तो इस परमपद के अभिलाषी भी इने-गिने ही होते हैं, जो इस पद की प्राप्ति की साधना में रत रहते हैं दूसरे इसकी साधना में भी बहुत कम लोग सिद्ध होते हैं। यह जान लेने पर भी कि सर्वभूतात्मा साक्षी रूप से मेरे हृदय में स्थित अन्तर्यामी ईश्वर ही मेरी आत्मा है, बन्धन के कारण शुभादिकर्मों के कर्तृत्व में अहंभाव न रखना अथवा कर्मफल में अनासक्ति बुद्धि रखना अथवा कर्मों का पूर्णतः परित्याग करना बड़ा कठिन हो जाता है। अतः साधक के लिये इसकी अपेक्षा सरल साधन यह है कि वह शुभादि कर्मों को करता हुआ उसके फल को ईश्वरार्पण कर दे, जिससे वह कर्म बन्धन में नहीं पड़ेगा। अधिकारी भेद से स्थूलतया ये उपर्युक्त दो मार्ग क्रमशः "ज्ञान मार्ग" तथा "भक्ति मार्ग" कहलाते हैं। किन्तु इससे यह न समझना चाहिए कि ज्ञान मार्ग में भक्ति का बिलकुल महत्त्व नहीं है तथा भक्तिमार्ग में ज्ञान का महत्त्व नहीं है। दोनों में ज्ञान और भक्ति का महत्त्व है। किन्तु प्रधानता की दृष्टि से उनके नाम भिन्न-भिन्न कहे गये हैं। प्रथम मार्ग में ईश्वर के निर्गुणत्वपक्ष की दृष्टि प्रधान है तो द्वितीय में उसके सगुणत्व पक्ष की। प्रथम में अभेद दृष्टि (मैं तो आत्मभूत ईश्वर ही हूँ) प्रधान है। द्वितीय में भेददृष्टि (मैं और मेरा उपास्य ईश्वर पृथक्-पृथक् है) प्रधान रहती है। अभेद-दृष्टि में भी साधनावस्था में आत्मा के साक्षात्कार के पहले जीव और ईश्वर का भेद बना ही रहता है।

यहाँ यह आशंका उपस्थित होती है कि "जीवेश्वरैक्य" का साक्षात्कार होने पर जीवनमुक्त को भी ईश्वर की तरह सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तिमत्वादि धर्मों से सम्पन्न हो जाना चाहिए। किन्तु ऐसी बात नहीं है। यहाँ जीव ईश्वर का तादात्म्य ईश्वर के पारमार्थिक निर्गुण रूप में ही होता है। उसके सविशेष व्यावहारिक रूप के साथ तादात्म्य हो ही नहीं सकता। साधनावस्था में साधक की एक ही ईश्वर के निर्गुणत्व और सगुणत्व पक्षों में जो पहले एकत्व दृष्टि रहती है वह इस रूप में रहती है कि उसका प्रथम पक्ष ही पारमार्थिक है और दूसरा अपारमार्थिक। ईश्वर के पारमार्थिक निर्गुणरूप में तो सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तिमत्वादि धर्म रहते ही नहीं। क्योंकि ज्योंही वह साक्षीरूप से स्थित अपनी आत्मा ईश्वर का साक्षात्कार कर लेता है त्योंही जीव के जीवत्व का अपनयन होने से ईश्वर उसके प्रति अपने सर्वज्ञत्वादि ऐश्वर्य धर्मों को हटा लेता है।[२]

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१. अनेक जन्मसंसिद्धिस्ततो याति परां गतिम्।—गीता

२. तत्वमसीत्येवं जातीयकेन भेदनिर्देशेनाऽभेदः प्रतिबोधितो भवति अपगतं

इस अवस्था में न तो जीव शासित एवं यामक रहता है और न ईश्वर उसके प्रति शासक अथवा नियामक। अन्य बद्ध जीवों के प्रति ईश्वर उसी रूप में नियन्ता बना रहता है। किन्तु जो ईश्वर के सगुणरूप के उपासक हैं, उनके सम्बन्ध में यह प्रश्न उठना स्वाभाविक है कि उन्हें मुक्तावस्था में ईश्वर के सर्वज्ञत्व स्रष्टत्वादि धर्म से युक्त हो जाना चाहिए, किन्तु ऐसी बात नहीं है। सगुणोपासकों की 'सायुज्यमुक्ति' कही गई है जिसमें उन्हें अणिमादि ऐश्वर्य की प्राप्ति हो जाती है परन्तु जगदुत्पत्ति आदि व्यापार के वे अधिकारी नहीं होते।[1] वस्तुतः सायुज्यमुक्ति में पूर्ण स्वातंत्र्य नहीं रहता। अणिमादि ऐश्वर्य भी अंतवान् होता है।[2] इसके अतिरिक्त सगुणोपासकों को अन्य सांसारिक कामनाओं की सिद्धि भी प्राप्त होती है।

इस प्रकार शांकराद्वैत सिद्धान्तित ईश्वर न केवल यंत्रवत् समस्त ब्रह्माण्ड का स्रष्टा, नियन्ता तथा प्राणियों का कर्माध्यक्ष होकर उनके शुभादि कर्मों का फल-प्रदाता है, अपितु वह उनके सदनुष्ठान में प्रेरक भी है। उसका यहाँ जिस प्रकार मानव जीवन की व्यावहारिक उपयोगिता की दृष्टि से महत्त्व है उसी प्रकार पारमार्थिक उपयोगिता से भी महत्त्व है।

फिर भी सर्वज्ञत्वादि गुणों से विशिष्ट ब्रह्म या ईश्वर का यह सगुण रूप हमारे लिये इन्द्रियातीत ही रहता है। अतः साधारण साधक के लिए ऐसे ईश्वर की सगुणोपासना भी बिलकुल सरल नहीं है। इसीलिए श्रुतियाँ ईश्वर की अनेक प्रतीको-पासनाओं का विधान करती हैं। इनमें सबसे महत्त्वपूर्ण ओंकारोपासना मानी जा सकती है। इसमें जगत् कारण ईश्वर को जगत् की स्थूल, सूक्ष्म तथा प्रलय तीन अवस्थाओं का क्रमशः ओंकार के अ, उ, म अक्षरों के साथ समीकृत किया गया है तथा इन सभी अवस्थाओं में ईश्वर को व्याप्त एवं नियन्ता माना गया है। ब्रह्म के निर्गुण-रूप में चतुर्थपाद की कल्पना कर उसे ओंकार के अमात्र-रूप का चतुर्थपाद से तादात्म्य किया गया है। इस प्रकार ओंकार के प्रतीक रूप में ईश्वर का सोपाधिक सगुण रूप तथा अनौपाधिक निर्गुण रूप साधक के सम्मुख उपस्थित हो

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भवति तदा जीवस्य संसारित्व। ब्रह्मणश्च स्रष्टत्वम् समस्तस्य मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितस्य भेद व्यवहारस्य सम्यज् ज्ञानेन बाधितत्वात्। ब्र० सू० भा० (२–१–२२)

१. जगदुत्पत्यादि व्यापारं वर्जयित्वान्यदणिमाद्यात्मकमैश्वर्यं मुक्तानां भवितु-मर्हति, जगद्व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैवेश्वरस्य।····पर एवहीश्वरो जगद्व्यापारेऽधिकृतः। ततः परमेश्वराकूततन्त्रत्वमेवेतरेषामिति व्यवतिष्ठते। ब्र० सू० भा० (४–४–१७)

२. अन्तवत्वमैश्वर्यस्य स्यात्—ब्र० सू० भा० (४–४–२१)

३. यत्रहि निरस्तसर्वविशेषसम्बन्धं परं ब्रह्मात्मत्वेनोपदिश्यते तत्रैकरूपमेव फलं मोक्ष इत्यवगम्यते। यत्रतु गुणविशेष-संबंधं प्रतीकविशेषसम्बन्धं वा ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते तत्र संसारगोचराणि उच्चावचानि फलानि दृश्यन्ते।

ब्र० सू० भा० (१-१-२४)

जाता है। यह उपासना सकाम उपासक तथा निष्काम उपासक दोनों के लिए है। किन्तु इस प्रतीक भूत ओंकार अक्षर में ईश्वर का ऊपर विवेचित रूप (सर्वज्ञत्वादि-विशिष्ट नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव आदि) भावित होना अत्यावश्यक है, तभी ओंकारोपासना फलीभूत हो सकती है। यदि ओंकार-प्रतीक ईश्वर स्वरूप की भावना से भावित नहीं हुआ तो फिर ओंकारोपासना निष्फल होगी। अतः इन प्रतीकोपासनाओं में भी ईश्वर के इन्द्रियातीत स्वरूप ग्रहण करने की कठिनाई पूर्ववत् ही है। किन्तु इससे निराश होने की जरूरत नहीं है। क्योंकि अद्वैत वेदान्त का ईश्वर अपनी विलक्षण शक्ति-योग से अपने भक्तों या साधकों के अनुग्रहार्थ अपने इन्द्रियातीत-स्वरूप को सुगम बनाने में भी समर्थ हो सकता है। ब्र० सू० भाष्य में इस आशंका का कि सर्वाधार एवं सर्वव्यापक आधाररहितस्वमहिमा में प्रतिष्ठित ईश्वर आधेय रूप में तथा प्रदेश विशेष में कैसे स्थित हो सकता है? निराकरण करते हुए शंकर कहते हैं कि सर्वशक्तिमान् ईश्वर के लिए यह सब संभव है।[१] इससे भी अधिक ईश्वर की सर्वभवनसमर्थता का उदाहरण हमें गीता में प्राप्त है जहाँ भगवान् कृष्ण को ईश्वर के अवतार रूप में मानने का आचार्य शंकर द्वारा समर्थन प्राप्त होता है। आचार्य गीता भाष्य के उपोद्घात में कहते हैं—

"स च भगवान् ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिः सदा सम्पन्नः त्रिगुणात्मिकां वैष्णवीं स्वां मायां मूलप्रकृतिं वशीकृत्य अजः अव्ययो भूतानाम् ईश्वरो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावः अपि सन्"—स्वमायया देहवान् इव जात इव च लोकानुग्रहं कुर्वन् इव लक्ष्यते।

इस प्रकार अद्वैताभिमत ईश्वर के सगुणरूप की पूर्णता हमें मानवाकार रूप में प्राप्त होती है। यहाँ ईश्वरावताररूप में यह मानवाकार रूप पौराणिक कपोल-कल्पित मात्र न रहकर दार्शनिक रूप में ढल जाता है। मानवाकार रूप में प्राप्त ईश्वर का सगुण स्वरूप भक्तों एवं उपासकों की उपासना के लिए अत्यन्त सुगम बन जाता

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१. यत्तूक्तं हिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादि रूपश्रवणं परमेश्वरे नोपपद्यत इति, अत्र ब्रूमः—स्यात् परमेश्वरस्याऽपोच्छावशात् मायामयं रूपं साधकानुग्रहार्थम्।

"माया ह्येषा मया सृष्टा यन्मां पश्यसि नारद।
सर्वभूतगुणैर्युक्तं मैवं मां ज्ञातुमर्हसि ॥ इति स्मरणात्

ब्र० सू० भा० (१-१-२०)

सर्वगतस्यापि ब्रह्मण उपासनार्थः प्रदेशविशेषपरिग्रहो न विरुध्यते।··· निष्प्रदेशस्यापि ब्रह्मण उपाधिविशेषसम्बन्धात् प्रदेशविशेषकल्पनोपपत्तेः।

ब्र० सू० भा० (१-१-२४)

स्वमहिमप्रतिष्ठस्यापि आधारविशेषोपदेश उपासनार्थो भविष्यति, सर्वगतत्वात् ब्रह्मणो व्योमवत् सर्वान्तरत्वोपपत्तेः।

ब्र० सू० भा० (१-१-२०)

है। मानवाकार रूप में ईश्वर के स्वरूप की धारणा हमें ऋग्वेद के "पुरुष सूक्त" में ही प्राप्त हो जाती है। यह ध्यान रखना चाहिए कि इस पुरुषसंज्ञक ईश्वर में भी प्रतीक रूप से सविशेष एवं निर्विशेष दोनों रूप दिखाए गए हैं और सविशेष या सगुण-रूप के साथ जगत् का सम्बन्ध स्थापित किया गया है।

अतः शंकराभिमत अद्वैत का ईश्वर सच्चे अर्थ में अनन्तशक्तिमंत् एवं अनन्त-गुणसम्पन्न है, जो न केवल उपासकों के प्रेय एवं श्रेय का निर्वाहक है अपितु वह लोकानुग्रहार्थ अपनी अचिन्त्य शक्ति से मानवादिरूप धारण करने में शक्त भी है। यहाँ यह आरोप लगाया जा सकता है कि अद्वैत में मानवाकार में स्वीकृत ईश्वर भी तो इयत्ता से परिच्छिन्न हो जायगा किन्तु यहाँ ऐसे दोषों का अवकाश नहीं है क्योंकि यह रूप तो अपारमार्थिक ही है। यदि हम इसे पारमार्थिक रूप मानते तो अवश्य यहाँ इयत्तादि दोष की संभावना होती।

यहाँ पुनः इतर ईश्वरवादियों की ओर से यह आपत्ति उठाई जा सकती है कि अद्वैत में स्वीकृत इस प्रकार के अपारमार्थिक ईश्वर से भक्त या उपासक कहाँ तक संतोष प्राप्त कर सकते हैं। यह कथन ठीक नहीं है, क्योंकि जब भक्त मानव विग्रहरूपधारी ईश्वर को तत्व से यह जान लेता है कि उसका पारमार्थिक रूप तो निर्गुण निराकार ही है किन्तु वह अचिन्त्य शक्तियोग से विग्रहवान् बन जाता है तब भक्त की दृष्टि में वह सगुण रूप निर्गुण से भिन्न नहीं रह जाता। इस प्रसंग में यह आक्षेप पुनः उठाया जा सकता है कि शांकर-वेदान्त में ईश्वर का व्यवहारावस्था में महत्त्वपूर्ण स्थान स्वीकार कर लेने पर भी परमार्थ तक ईश्वर को घसीटना तो अद्वैत सिद्धान्त के विलकुल प्रतिकूल है। यहाँ तक कि व्यवहारावस्था में ही ज्ञानमार्गावलम्बी मुमुक्ष अथवा गीतोक्त ज्ञानी भक्त जबकि वह साक्षीभूत ईश्वर को अपनी आत्मा समझकर उसी के साथ अपना तादात्म्य करने का अभ्यास करने लगता है तो उस अवस्था में आत्मभूत ईश्वर के साथ अभेद दृष्टि रखने के कारण उनमें उपास्य उपासक भाव शिथिल हो जाता है। यह ठीक है, किन्तु इससे ईश्वर का महत्त्व नहीं घटता अपितु और अधिक बढ़ जाता है। क्योंकि वह अपने को ईश्वर से भिन्न अपनी सत्ता नहीं समझता। यहाँ महत्त्व तो उसके मिथ्या ज्ञान निमित्तिक देहादि में आत्मभाव अथवा जीवत्व का घटता है। ज्ञानी साधक की ईश्वर के साथ अभेद दृष्टि करने के अभ्यासकाल अथवा साधनावस्था में द्वैत की ही स्थिति में रहती है। इस द्वैतावस्था में पहले की अपेक्षा उपास्य उपासक भाव का महत्व कम हो जाने पर भी अभी वह ईश्वर के ऐश्वर्य से पराधीन ही रहता है परन्तु जब वह साक्षी रूप से स्थित अपनी आत्मा[१] ईश्वर का जो स्वरूपतः निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही है, साक्षात्कार कर लेता है त्योंही ईशितव्य के अभाव में उसके प्रति ईश्वर अपना ईशितृत्व हटा लेता है जिससे उसमें

१. तस्मात् आत्मेत्येवेश्वरे मनो दधीत—ब्र० सू० भा० (४-१-३२)

आरोपित नियन्तृत्वादि धर्म नहीं रह जाते किन्तु[1] उसके स्वरूप में कोई अन्तर नहीं पड़ता। यह बात तो बारम्बार दुहराई गई है।

अद्वैत वेदान्त में तो सविशेष या सगुण ब्रह्म ही पारिभाषिक रूप में ईश्वर माना गया है। आचार्य शंकर भी सगुण ब्रह्म या ईश्वर का पारमार्थिक अस्तित्व नहीं मानते। ठीक है, हमारी दृष्टि में शंकर के इस कथन में कोई विरोध नहीं है। अतः यहाँ शंकर द्वारा सगुण ब्रह्म के पारमार्थिकत्व निषेध में क्या तात्पर्य है, समझ लेना अत्यंत आवश्यक है। शंकर की दृष्टि में सगुण ब्रह्म का अर्थ है सोपाधिक ब्रह्म। निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही माया-शक्ति उपाधि से सोपाधिक बन जाता है। अब हम आपसे पूछते हैं कि सगुण ब्रह्म के पारमार्थिकत्व निषेध में शंकर का तात्पर्य उपाधिसहित ब्रह्म के निषेध में है या केवल उपाधि के निषेध में? प्रथम विकल्प तो हो नहीं सकता क्योंकि यदि ब्रह्म का भी निषेध माना जायगा तो ब्रह्म के पारमार्थिकत्व का भी निषेध हो जायगा। अतः द्वितीय विकल्प ही ठीक है। शंकर का सगुण ब्रह्म के पारमार्थिकत्व निषेध से उपाधि के पारमार्थिकत्व निषेध से ही तात्पर्य है। अतः सोपाधिक ब्रह्म जो जगत्कारणत्व-नियंतृत्वादि में समर्थ होता है उसमें उपाधि के अतिरिक्त निर्गुण ब्रह्म का भी अस्तित्व रहता है। सोपाधिक ब्रह्म केवल उपाधि नहीं है। उससे भिन्न है। यदि सोपाधिक ब्रह्म को केवल उपाधि ही माना जाय तो वह सांख्य की प्रकृतिमात्र रह जायगा। यही सोपाधिक ब्रह्म ईश्वर कहलाता है क्योंकि व्युत्पत्ति के अनुसार इसका अर्थ शासन या नियन्त्रण करने वाला है। निर्गुण ब्रह्म तो शासनादि नहीं कर सकता। सोपाधिक ब्रह्म ही ईश्वर माना जाता है। अतः ईश्वर केवल उपाधि नहीं है, उपाधि से वह भिन्न है। ईश्वर को तत्व से जानने का अर्थ हुआ कि वह अनोपाधिकरूप में निर्गुण निरंजन ही

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१. तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तित्वं च न परमार्थतो विद्ययाऽपास्त सर्वोपाधिस्वरूपे आत्मनि ईशित्रीशितव्य सर्वज्ञत्वादि-व्यवहार उपपद्यते एवं परमार्थवस्थायां सर्वव्यवहाराभाव वदन्ति वेदान्ताः सर्वे। परमार्थवस्थायां ईशित्रीशितव्यादि व्यवहाराभावः प्रदर्श्यते। वे० सू० भा० (२-१-१४)

वस्तुतः निर्गुण ब्रह्म तो किसी शब्द से भी नहीं कहा जा सकता क्योंकि वह तो "अशब्द", "अव्यवहार्य है", किन्तु उस परमतत्व के बोधक आत्मा या ब्रह्म शब्द पारिभाषिक रूप में मान लिए गयेहैं, यद्यपि इन शब्दों की व्युत्पत्ति के अनुसार ईश्वर शब्द की तरह इनसे निर्गुणत्व अर्थ नहीं निकलता। इसी प्रकार गीतोक्त विष्णु, नारायण वासुदेव आदि भी अद्वैतियों की दृष्टि में निर्गुण परम तत्व के बोधक हैं।

"न तु ब्रह्म जातिमत् अतो न सदादि शब्दवाच्यं नाऽपि गुणवद् येन गुण-शब्देन उच्यते निर्गुणत्वात्। न च सम्बन्धि एकत्वात् अद्वयत्वात्, अविषयत्वात्, आत्मत्वात् च न केनचित् शब्देन उच्यते इति युक्तम्।" (गीता भाष्य १३-१२)

शंकर के उत्तरकाल में शंकर के इस प्रमुख सिद्धांत का बहुत दुरुपयोग हुआ और व्यवहार को परमार्थ से बिलकुल पृथक् करने की प्रवृत्ति अपनी चरमसीमा को पहुँच गई।

है, उपाधि के योग से वह ईश्वरत्व व्यापार में समर्थ होता है। इसी अभिप्राय से हमारे इस कथन में कि एक ही ईश्वर अपने पारमार्थिक रूप में निर्गुण है, वही व्यवहारावस्था में सगुण है, अद्वैत सिद्धान्त से कोई विरोध नहीं है।

अब आपत्ति ब्रह्म के पारमार्थिक निर्गुण पहलू के लिए केवल ईश्वर शब्द के प्रयोग पर रह जाती है। जबकि निरस्तोपाधि निर्गुण ब्रह्म में नियन्तृत्वादि ईश्वरत्व धर्म नहीं रह जाते तब उस अवस्था में ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग ही क्यों किया जाय ?

इस सम्बन्ध में जैसा कि पहले भी हम कई बार कह चुके हैं, हमारा तर्क यह है कि नियन्तृत्वादि ईश्वरत्व धर्मों से विशिष्ट सोपाधिक अवस्था में भी ईश्वर "नित्यशुद्ध-बुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव" बना रहता है और यह नित्यशुद्धादि निर्गुणत्व बोधक विशेषण पद सगुण ईश्वर के लिए भी आचार्य शंकर द्वारा बहुशः प्रयुक्त होता है अतः औपाधिक धर्म ईश्वरत्व से रहित निर्गुण ब्रह्म के लिए ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग असंगत नहीं है। ईश्वर से सर्वज्ञत्वादि औपाधिक धर्म हट जाने पर भी नित्यशुद्धादि विशेषण पद तो शेष रह ही जाता है। ईश्वर शब्द के प्रयोग में यह तथ्य निहित रहता है कि ईश्वर जो व्यवहारावस्था में नियन्ता रहता है उसकी पारमार्थिक रूप निर्गुण से पृथक् सत्ता नहीं है। सगुण और निर्गुण में इसी एकत्व दृष्टि से निरस्तोपाधि ब्रह्म के लिए भी ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग अनुपपन्न नहीं है। जैसा कि ऊपर कहा जा चुका है आचार्य शंकर अपने सभी भाष्यों में इसी दृष्टि से निर्गुण ब्रह्म के अर्थ में प्रायः ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग करते हैं।

## उपसंहार

शांकर दर्शन का प्रमुख वैशिष्ट्य व्यवहार तथा परमार्थ में पूर्ण सामंजस्य स्थापन करना है और इस सामंजस्य का मुख्य आधार इसका ईश्वरवाद है। 'विश्व' का अन्य कोई भी दर्शन व्यवहार तथा परमार्थ का ऐसा व्यवस्थित सामंजस्य स्थापित करने में समर्थ नहीं हो सका। बहुतेरी दार्शनिक बुद्धियाँ या तो व्यवहार जगत् तक ही क्रीड़ा करती रह गईं और यदि कुछ दार्शनिकों ने परमार्थ तक पहुँचने की चेष्टा भी की तो उन्होंने व्यवहार को परमार्थ से बिलकुल पृथक् छोड़ दिया। शांकर दर्शन में व्यवहार परमार्थ से नितान्त भिन्न नहीं है व्यवहार परमार्थ ही की अभिव्यक्ति मात्र है। यहाँ परमार्थ की अपेक्षा से व्यवहार को मिथ्या मानने का अर्थ उसे शशशृंगवत् असत् ठहराना नहीं है। किन्तु इसका तात्पर्य व्यवहार का परमार्थ से भिन्न अस्तित्व नहीं बताना है। व्यवहार परमार्थ पर ही अधिष्ठित है। परमार्थ तक पहुँचने का व्यावहारिक सत्य ही उपायभूत है। परमार्थदर्शी की दृष्टि में जगत् "मिथ्या", "मायामय" "आपेक्षिक सत्य" अथवा "व्यावहारिक सत्य" होने पर भी उसका अद्वैत वेदान्त में अत्यन्त महत्त्व है। एकत्व की दृष्टि से तो परमार्थदर्शी जगत् को भी सत्य कहता है।

जगत् को इन सभी दृष्टियों से देखने पर शांकर वेदान्त में ईश्वर का अत्यन्त महत्त्वपूर्ण स्थान है। ईश्वर यदि एक ओर परमार्थरूप निर्गुण ब्रह्म से सम्बन्धित है तो दूसरी ओर वह कारणात्मना जगत् से सम्बन्धित है। किन्तु इसका अर्थ यह नहीं है कि ईश्वर निर्गुण ब्रह्म से तत्वतः भिन्न है और निर्गुण ब्रह्म तथा ईश्वर दो भिन्न-भिन्न सत्ताएँ हैं। निर्गुण ब्रह्म ही अनिर्वचनीय मायाशक्ति से युक्त होकर सविशेष ब्रह्म बन जाता है और वही जगत् का स्रष्टा, नियन्ता आदि होने के कारण 'ईश्वर' कहा जाता है क्योंकि ईश्वर शब्द का व्युत्पत्तिजन्य अर्थं ही ऐश्वर्यशक्ति से संपन्न स्वामी या शासक है। एक ही निर्गुण परम तत्व को जब व्यावहारिक दृष्टि से देखते है तब वह सर्वज्ञत्व नियन्तृत्वादि ईश्वर धर्मों से युक्त हो जाता है। एक ही तत्व परमार्थ में निर्गुण है और वही व्यवहार में सगुण अथवा ईश्वर है। अतः ईश्वर का निर्गुण परम तत्त्व से सम्बन्ध स्थापित करने का अभिप्राय हुआ सोपाधिक ब्रह्म या ईश्वर को निरस्तोपाधि दृष्टि से देखना। वह सर्वज्ञत्वादि औपाधिक ईश्वरधर्मों से युक्त होने पर भी स्वरूपतः निर्गुण ही बना रहता है उसके परमार्थरूप में कोई अन्तर नहीं पड़ता। अतः ईश्वर स्वरूपतः "निर्गुण ब्रह्म" ही है। प्रकारान्तर से यह कहा जा सकता है कि ईश्वर सर्वज्ञत्वादि औपाधिक धर्मों से युक्त होने पर भी निरस्तोपाधि अवस्था में वह परमार्थतः निर्गुण निरंजन ही है। यद्यपि अद्वैत-वेदान्त में ईश्वर शब्द सामान्यतः सविशेष ब्रह्म या अपर ब्रह्म ही के लिए प्रचलित है और व्युत्पत्ति की दृष्टि से भी संगत है तथापि निर्गुण एवं सगुण में एकत्व की दृष्टि से ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग निर्गुणपरक भी संगत माना जा सकता है। एक ही ईश्वर जो व्यवहारावस्था में औपाधिकरूप में जगत् का नियन्ता आदि है वही अपने निरुपाधिक रूप में परमार्थावस्था में निर्गुण-निरंजन है। इस प्रकार एकत्व की दृष्टि से एक ही ईश्वर में परमार्थावस्था एवं व्यवहारावस्था में क्रमशः निर्गुण तथा सगुण विविध दृष्टि रखना सर्वथा संगत है। आचार्य शंकर प्रधानतया इन दोनों दृष्टियों से ईश्वर शब्द का प्रयोग ब्रह्म के समकक्ष मानकर करते हैं। उनकी दृष्टि में ईश्वर अपने पारमार्थिकरूप में निर्गुण निरंजन ही है। यहाँ तक कि ईश्वर के सविशेषरूप में भी आचार्य की सदैव निर्गुणत्व दृष्टि रहती है। वे ईश्वर के सविशेषरूप में "नित्यशुद्धमुक्त स्वभाव" निर्गुण बोधक पद का प्रयोग करते हैं। अतः ईश्वर के व्यावहारिक सगुण रूप में भी उसका पारमार्थिक रूप तिरोहित नहीं रहता। वह अपने सगुण व्यावहारिक रूप में जगत् का कारण एवं नियन्ता है तो वही अपने पारमार्थिक निर्गुण रूप में प्राणियों का निःश्रेयस्वरूप है। परमार्थ में वह परम सव्य है और वही परमपुरुषार्थ स्वरूप भी है। परमार्थ में वह अद्वैतरूप है जहाँ ईशितव्य और ईशितृ व्यवहार कुछ भी नहीं रह जाता। किन्तु व्यवहारावस्था में ईश्वर का सविशेषरूप भी पारमार्थिकरूप से नितान्त विभक्त होकर नहीं रहता। क्योंकि उसका सविशेष व्यावहारिक रूप भी तो पारमार्थिक निर्गुण रूप पर ही प्रतिष्ठित है। अतः अद्वैत-वेदान्त में ईश्वर की पारमार्थिक सत्ता नहीं है, कथन का तात्पर्य यह नहीं है कि स्वरूपतः ईश्वर पारमार्थिक नहीं है किन्तु इसका आशय

यही है कि ईश्वर परमार्थावस्था में सर्वज्ञत्वादि औपाधिक धर्मों से रहित अपने "नित्य-शुद्धमुक्त स्वभाव" निर्गुणरूप में रहता है। अतः प्रकारान्तर से यह कहा जा सकता है कि ईश्वर स्वरूपतः तो पारमार्थिक ही है, किन्तु इसमें आरोपित सर्वज्ञत्वादि औपाधिक धर्म ही अपारमार्थिक है। यह ठीक है कि परमार्थावस्था में ईश्वर शासक के रूप में नहीं रह जाता, किन्तु इससे ईश्वर की कोई महत्ता नहीं घटती क्योंकि उस अद्वैतावस्था में ईशितव्य के अभाव में ईश्वर के शासन की कोई आवश्यकता ही नहीं है। वह अवस्था तो निरपेक्ष स्वातन्त्र्य की ही अवस्था है। किन्तु व्यवहारावस्था में शासन की नितान्त आवश्यकता है। इसमें ईश्वर अपने सविशेष रूप से ही सर्वज्ञत्व सर्वशक्तिमत्व आदि अनंतगुणों से युक्त होकर व्यावहारिक जगत् का स्रष्टा और नियन्ता बनता है। ईश्वर के बिना इस प्रत्यक्षगोचर जगत् का अस्तित्व ही सिद्ध नहीं हो सकता। जगत् की व्याख्या ईश्वर के द्वारा ही सम्भव है। बाह्यार्थ एवं आभ्यन्तर दोनों रूपों में जगत् की स्थिर सत्ता है। जगत् क्षणिक नहीं है किन्तु स्थिर है। जगत् को व्यावहारिक सत्ता है वह शशश्रृंगवत् असत् नहीं है। चेतनाचेतनात्मक अनादि जगत् का स्वरूप व्यवस्थित है। यह जगत् "अनेक कर्तृभोक्तृ संयुक्त" है। जीव नित्य चेतन है। उनका चेतनत्व न तो क्षणिक है और न भौतिक है। बिना एक अन्तर्यामी नित्य साक्षी कूटस्थ चेतन के इन चेतन जीवों के जीवत्व का निर्वाह असम्भव है। जगत् का अचेतन-संघात रूप भी बिना चेतन के नियन्त्रण के निर्मित नहीं हो सकता। यह व्यवस्थित जगत् निर्मूल नहीं हो सकता। यह जगत् आकस्मिक नहीं है। जगत् का कारण स्वतन्त्र अचेतन प्रकृति नहीं हो सकती। इसका मूल सर्वज्ञ चेतन ही हो सकता है। सर्वज्ञ, सर्व शक्तिमान्, सर्वव्यापक ईश्वर जगत् का अभिन्न निमित्तोपादान कारण है। वह जगत् की अव्याकृत एवं व्याकृत अवस्थाओं का आधार एवं नियन्ता है। सृष्टि का अर्थ अनादि अव्याकृत जगत् का नाम रूपों से व्याकृत होना है। अव्याकृत नाम रूपों का ईश्वर व्याकर्त्ता है। प्रलयावस्था में जगत् अव्याकृत रूप में ईश्वर में लीन रहता है। यह जगत् निर्निमित्त नहीं है। ईश्वर प्राणियों के धर्माधर्म की अपेक्षा से ही विषम सृष्टि करता है। अतः ईश्वर वैषम्य एवं नैर्घृण्य दोष से दूषित नहीं होता। प्राणियों को अपने शुभाशुभ कर्मों के अनुसार ही फल भोगना पड़ता है। किन्तु ईश्वर ही प्राणियों के कर्मों के फल का प्रदाता है। वह कर्माध्यक्ष है; किन्तु कर्मों के कर्तृत्व में जीवों का पूर्णतः स्वातन्त्र्य सुरक्षित है। ईश्वर जगत् से चेतन और अचेतन पदार्थों में अन्तर्यामी रूप से स्थित है। ईश्वर साक्षी के रूप में जीवों का प्रेरक है। ईश्वर ही सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा है, किन्तु जीव अपने आत्मभूत ईश्वर को न जान कर देहेन्द्रियादि में आत्मभाव कर लेता है। जीव का जीवत्व अविद्या निमित्तक है। परमार्थतः जीव साक्षिभूत ईश्वर से भिन्न नहीं है। किन्तु अविद्या से अपने आत्मभूत ईश्वर से वह अपनी भिन्न सत्ता मान लेता है। यही उसके बन्धन का कारण है। जीव और ईश्वर का सविशेषरूप दोनों ही औपाधिक है—किन्तु प्रथम की उपाधि हीन है दूसरे की सत्वप्रधान उत्कृष्ट है।

सौपाधिक अवस्था में भी ईश्वर "नित्य शुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव" है। जीव जाग्रत् स्वप्न तथा सुषुप्ति तीनों ही अवस्थाओं में ईश्वर से नियन्त्रित रहता है। ईश्वर सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा एवं साक्षी होने पर भी वह जीवों के दुःखों से लिप्त नहीं होता। ईश्वर सर्वव्यापक होने पर भी संसार धर्मों से संस्पृष्ट नहीं होता। प्रलयावस्था में न तो विभिन्न जीवों का सांकर्य होने पाता है और न उनमें बीजभूत कर्म संस्कारों का व्यतिकर होने पाता है। इस प्रकार से ईश्वर के ईश्वरत्व और उसकी अचिन्त्य शक्ति का विलक्षणत्व सिद्ध होता है। शंकराभिमत ईश्वरवाद अनात्मवादी निरीश्वरवादियों के प्रति जगत् को अनेक चेतन कर्तृभोक्तृ संयुक्त सिद्ध करते हुये ईश्वर की अनिवार्यता सिद्ध करता है और आत्मवादी निरीश्वरवादियों के प्रति चेतनाचेतनात्मक व्यवस्थित जगत् के अस्तित्व के लिए ईश्वर की अनिवार्यता प्रदान करता है। इसी प्रकार वह अन्य ईश्वर-वादियों की ईश्वर-कल्पनाओं में अनुपपन्नता दिखाते हुए अद्वैत सिद्धान्तित ईश्वर स्वरूप की सर्वथा उपपन्नता सिद्ध करता है।

अद्वैत वेदान्त में ईश्वर सच्चे अर्थ में "सर्वज्ञ," 'सर्वशक्तिमान,' 'सर्वान्तर्यामी,' 'सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा' है। ईश्वर सर्वाधार एवं सर्वव्यापक होते हुए भी अपने साधकों के अनुग्रहार्थ अपनी अचिन्त्य एवं अनन्त ऐश्वर्यशक्ति से सर्वभावेन-समर्थ है—यहाँ तक कि वह एक देश स्थित सुगम मानवादि रूप धारण करने में भी समर्थ है। यहां ईश्वर का स्वरूप न केवल उसके जगत्कारणत्व जगन्नियन्तृत्वादि दृष्टियों से ही तर्कसंगत है अपितु मानव-जीवन में उपयोगिता की दृष्टि से भी उसके स्वरूप का अत्यन्त महत्त्व है। यह जिस प्रकार व्यवहारावस्था में अपने अनन्त ऐश्वर्यशक्ति से सम्पन्न होकर अपने यथाधिकारी साधकों के प्रति प्रेयःप्रद एवं श्रेयस् का साधन है उसी प्रकार वह अपने पारमार्थिक निर्गुण निरंजन रूप में साक्षात् श्रेयः-स्वरूप होने से श्रेयःप्रद भी है।

इस प्रकार शांकर वेदान्त में जो ईश्वर व्यवहारावस्था में अनन्त ऐश्वर्यशक्ति से युक्त होकर "ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वम्" है, वही अपने पारमार्थिक रूप में निर्गुण निरंजन सच्चिदानन्द स्वरूप "एकमेवाद्वितीयम्" है। वस्तुतः शांकर वेदान्त का ईश्वरवाद ब्रह्मवाद अथवा अद्वैतेश्वरवाद है।

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# मिथिला तथा तंत्र : एक टिप्पणी

श्रीमन्नारायण द्विवेदी

मिथिला जनपद मीमांसा, न्याय, वेदान्त तथा स्मृति साहित्य में अपने अपूर्व योगदान के लिए प्रसिद्ध है। प्राच्य-विद्या के अनुरागी विद्वानों का ध्यान इसके गवेषणात्मक अनुशीलन की ओर आकृष्ट हुआ है और इस क्षेत्र में महत्त्वपूर्ण कार्य भी हुआ है। इसी प्रकार मिथिला जनपद तांत्रिक विचारधारा से भी व्यापक रूप से प्रभावित रहा है और वहाँ तंत्र साहित्य की रचना हुई है जिसके सम्यक् मूल्याङ्कन की अपेक्षा है।

प्रेसिडेंसी कालेज, कलकत्ता के अवकाशप्राप्त प्रोफेसर चिन्ताहरण चक्रवर्ती के तांत्रिक साहित्य तथा विचारधारा से सम्बद्ध कतिपय शोध-प्रबन्ध विभिन्न शोध पत्रिकाओं में प्रकाशित हो चुके हैं और तांत्रिक साहित्य के अनुशीलन में उन्होंने वर्षों तक अध्यवसाय किया है। कलकत्ता के पुन्थी पुस्तक' नामक संस्थान ने तांत्रिक साहित्य से सम्बद्ध उनकी एक पुस्तक 'तन्त्राज़ स्टडीज़ आन देयर रेलिजन एण्ड लिटरेचर' का प्रकाशन किया है जिसमें उनके अधिकांश प्रकाशित शोध निबन्धों का संग्रह है। यद्यपि प्रोफेसर चक्रवर्ती ने इस पुस्तक के प्रकाशन में अपना उद्देश्य विषय की एक सामान्य रूपरेखा तांत्रिक वाङ्मय तथा बंगाल में उसके उपयोग के संदर्भ में प्रस्तुत करना मात्र अभिव्यक्त किया है और इसे भूमिका रूप में मानकर व्यापक अध्ययन की पीठिका स्वीकार किया है, फिर भी उनके ग्रन्थ के कतिपय अभावों की ओर ध्यान जाता है जिसकी ओर विद्वानों का ध्यानाकर्षण अपेक्षित प्रतीत होता है।

तंत्र साहित्य का परिचय प्राप्त करने वाले अध्येताओं के लिए पुस्तक उपयोगी है। ग्रन्थकार ने क्रमशः द्वादश अध्यायों में तांत्रिक साधना का उद्देश्य, तांत्रिकमत की प्राचीनता, तंत्रों का युग एवं लेखक, अन्य शास्त्रों में तंत्र का स्थान, तांत्रिक क्रियाओं का आदर्श, तंत्रों का प्रादुर्भाव-प्रक्रिया एवं काल, विभिन्न तांत्रिक मत, तांत्रिक साहित्य, तांत्रिक लेखक एवं उनकी रचनायें, तांत्रिक पूजा पद्धति, तांत्रिक देव परिवार, बंगाल में काली-पूजन, बंगाल में दुर्गा सम्प्रदाय तथा दुर्गापूजन आदि विषयों का उपयोगी अनुशीलन किया है।

तंत्रों के प्रादुर्भाव का विवेचन करते हुए लेखक ने उस प्रचलित संदर्भ को उद्धृत किया है जिसमें तंत्र के बंगाल में प्रकाश, मिथिला में प्राबल्य, महाराष्ट्र में क्वचित् उपलब्धि तथा गुजरात में समाप्ति का उल्लेख है—

गौड़े प्रकाशिता विद्या मैथिलैः प्रबलीकृता ।
क्वचित् क्वचिन्महाराष्ट्रे गुर्जरे प्रलयंगता ।।

यह विचारणीय विषय है कि लेखक का ध्यान अपने सम्पूर्ण ग्रन्थ में मिथिला के तांत्रिक साहित्य तथा विचारधारा के अनुशीलन की ओर आकृष्ट नहीं है, जब वह तंत्र विद्या के मिथिला में प्रबलीकृत रूप को स्वीकृत करता है । ग्रन्थकार ने (Tantric Authors and thier work) 'तांत्रिक लेखक एवं उनकी रचनायें' नामक अध्याय में मिथिला के तांत्रिकों का कोई उल्लेख नहीं किया जबकि उसने बंगाल, महाराष्ट्र, कश्मीर, वाराणसी, नेपाल आदि के तांत्रिक कृतिकारों की चर्चा की है । लेखक की मिथिला की तांत्रिक कृतियों एवं विचारधारा से उदासीनता का कारण स्पष्ट नहीं हो पाता है । सम्प्रति मिथिला में तांत्रिक विचारधारा की प्रधानता एवं एतद्विषयक सम्भार पर विचार करना अपेक्षित है ।

मिथिला में साम्प्रदायिकता का अभाव है । वहाँ के निवासी क्रमशः शिव शक्ति एवं विष्णु के उपासक हैं । उनके ललाट पट्ट पर भस्म की तीन समानान्तर रेखायें शिवोपासक, चन्दन की खड़ी रेखायें विष्णु उपासक तथा रोली की बिन्दु शक्ति उपासक होने की प्रतीक हैं । शिव मुक्ति प्रदायक एवं शक्ति सिद्धिदायक हैं । मिथिला में ऐसे शक्तिउपासक साधकों का नाम आदर से स्मरण किया जाता है जिनको सिद्धियाँ सुलभ थीं । देवादित्यवर्धमान, मदन उपाध्याय, धीरेन्द्र उपाध्याय, गोकुलनाथ उपाध्याय एवं राजर्षि मिथिलेश रमेश्वरसिंह का नाम ऐसे साधकों में अग्रणी बताया जाता है ।

तंत्रधारी, तंत्रनाथ, शक्तिनाथ, खड्गधारी, ताराचरण, आद्याचरण सदृश नाम मिथिला जनपद में अधिक लोकप्रिय हैं और यह शाक्त भावना की प्रधानता का बोध कराने वाले हैं । पटादि उत्सव जिसमें कुमारी कन्याओं को खीर खिलाने की परम्परा है, यहाँ प्रचलित है। दशहरे पर दुर्गा की मृत्तिका मूर्ति की पूजा तथा मातृका पूजा यहाँ अत्यन्त लोकप्रिय है । 'गोसाउनिक गीत' जो दुर्गा से सम्बन्धित हैं यहाँ के लोककण्ठ में व्यापक रूप से निवास करते हैं । मत्स्य का भोग एवं देवी पर चढ़ाये गये अन्य भोग के ग्रहण की व्यापक परम्परा यहाँ है । बालकों को पाठारम्भ के समय पढ़ाया जाने वाला छन्द देवी स्मरण से सम्बन्धित है—

"सा ते भवतु सुप्रीता देवी शिखरवासिनी
उग्रेण तपसा लब्धो यथा पशुपतिः पतिः ।।"

मिथिला के लोकाचार में प्रचलित 'ऐपन' यन्त्र तांत्रिक भित्ति रखते हैं । मिथिलाक्षरों के विकास को तांत्रिक यंत्रों से सम्बद्ध बतलाया जाता है । कामधेनु तंत्र एवं वर्णोधार तंत्र की पृष्ठभूमि में मिथिलाक्षरों का विवेचन उसकी तांत्रिक प्रभावान्विति का सूचक है ।

मिथिला से शक्ति में सम्बन्धित कतिपय पीठ अत्यन्त प्रसिद्ध हैं । उच्चैठ, जनकपुर, चामुण्डास्थान एवं उग्रतारा स्थल सिद्धपीठ है । तारा, नील-सरस्वती, त्रिपुर-

सुन्दरी शीतला एवं तारानाथ शाक्त परम्परा के देव परिवार के अंग हैं। महिषी (वनगाँव महिषी जिसे मण्डन का जन्मस्थान होने का गौरव प्राप्त है) एक प्रसिद्ध तांत्रिक केन्द्र समझा जाता है। ताराकुण्ड, ताराकंचुकी कुण्ड, वशिष्ठ कुण्ड, गौतम कुण्ड, अक्षोभ्य कुण्ड, मानसरोवर कुण्ड आदि यहाँ के कुण्ड एवं तीर्थस्थल हैं जिनके चीनाचार तंत्र में वर्णित होने का उल्लेख किया गया है जिसकी एक हस्तलिखित प्रति राज लाइब्रेरी दरभंगा में संरक्षित है––

वशिष्ठकुण्डं पापघ्नं कुण्डं च गौतमाभिधां
अक्षोभ्य कुण्डं सकलं चैतज्जाम्यदिशिस्मिता––
तत् समीपे महेशजि सरोमानस संज्ञकम्
माहिष्मत्यश्चमहात्म शृणु सादिववरानने
वशिष्ठं समन्विता तारणी चीन देशतः।
नारिम्येन जटाशक्ति तथा नील सरस्वती ॥
अक्षोभ्य गरुणायुक्ता स्थापिता यत्र सुन्दरी ॥

शाक्तपीठों की स्थापना के सम्बन्ध में प्रचलित है कि सती की आँखें महिषी में गिरी थीं और तब से यह मिथिला में तांत्रिक पूजा का महान् केन्द्र बन गया। परम्परानुसार यह कहा जाता है कि वशिष्ठ ने यहाँ चीन से शक्ति को लाकर प्रतिष्ठित किया था, जो एक महान् जंगल और असुरों का निवासस्थान था। कुछ लोग इसे महिषासुर की राजधानी बतलाते हैं और उसी के नाम पर इसे 'महिषी' संज्ञा देते हैं। रानी पद्मावती जो खाण्डवाल कुल की अधिपति महाराज नरेन्द्रसिंह की पत्नी थीं, यहीं की थीं। फलतः वर्तमान मन्दिर उन्हीं के द्वारा निर्मित हुआ, ऐसा कहा जाता है।

देवी माहात्म्य में प्रतिपादित शक्ति सम्बन्धित यह अभिमत यहाँ प्रचलितप्राय है कि––शिव की शक्ति मुख, यम की शक्ति बालों, विष्णु शक्ति भुजाओं, चन्द्र शक्ति वक्षस्थल, इन्द्र तेज एवं वरुण गति उनके पैर एवं जंघों में सन्निविष्ट है। महिषी की नील सरस्वती की पहचान तांत्रिक देवी महानील सरस्वती के रूप में करने की चेष्टा की गई है। क्योंकि गया के नयपाल के शिलालेखों में 'उरुनील पद्मा' का उल्लेख सुलभ है।

डा० दिनेशचन्द्र सरकार ने अपने शाक्तपीठ नामक ग्रन्थ में 'त्रिशांतायाम वामपादो भ्रमरी भैरवेश्वर' का पाठ-भेद––'तीरोत्रयाम वाम पाद स्वभारी भैरवो-द माह' देकर तिरहुत का शाक्तपीठ रूप में उल्लेख किया है––'मैथिलायाम वामदेशे उग्रेदवी मन्दोदरी ॥' मैथिल विद्वान् डा० उपेन्द्र ठाकुर ने महिषी के प्रसिद्ध शाक्तपीठ होने का उल्लेख किया है। कुब्जिका तंत्र में महिष्मती के सिद्ध पीठ होने का उल्लेख भी उन्होंने इसी प्रसङ्ग में किया है––

कमला विमला चैवा तथा महिष्मती पुरी
वाराही त्रिपुरा चैव वाग्मनी नील वाहिनी ॥

मिथिला में तारा, भवादित्य एवं वाणेश्वर के त्रिकोणयंत्र पर स्थिति के कारण भी डा० ठाकुर ने महिषी के तांत्रिक केन्द्र की महत्ता स्वीकृत की है। उन्होंने इस सम्बन्ध में प्रचलित सर्वाधिक लोकप्रिय गीत का भी उल्लेख किया है--

भवा भवादिता देवना महेश
वनगाँ [वनगाँव] दुर्गा मिटे कलेश
बलेरी मधुरी वाणी दुर्गा ।।

जयमंगलगढ़ की ऐतिहासिकता पर विचार करते हुए डा० उपेन्द्र ठाकुर ने इसके प्राचीन शक्तिपीठ होने का विवेचन किया है। बंगाल एवं नेपाल के साधकों का भी यह आकर्षण केन्द्र था और पाल काल में तो यह स्थान प्रसिद्ध शाक्तपीठ के रूप में प्रख्यात था। मैथिल दार्शनिक तथा अन्य ग्रन्थों यथा मिथिला माहात्म्य, ब्रह्मवैवर्त पुराण, देवीभागवत, एवं प्राणतोषिणी में उसके उल्लेख की चर्चा की गई है। विश्वास किया जाता है कि भगवान् शिव ने त्रिपुर राक्षस का वध करने के अनन्तर अपना पीठ यहाँ स्थापित किया था। तांत्रिक साधना का दक्षिणाचार एवं वामाचार मैथिल जन-जीवन में समान रूप से व्यापक प्रतीत होता है। नाना प्रकार के अभिचारों में मैथिल लोगों की अद्भुत आस्था प्रतीत होती है। काली, तारा, भुवनेश्वरी की आराधना यहाँ प्रमुख रूप से होती है। शक्ति के दश महाविद्या रूप की उपासना की प्रधानता का उल्लेख तंत्रकौमुदीकार देवनाथ ठक्कुर ने विश्वसार तंत्र से उल्लिखित किया है--

काली, तारा, महादुर्गा त्वरिता छिन्न मस्तका
वाग्वादिनी चान्नपूर्णा तथा महिषमर्दिनी
कामाख्यावासिनी बाला, मातंगी चण्डिका तथा
इत्याद्याः सकला विद्याः कलौ पूर्णं फलप्रदाः ।।

देवनाथ ठक्कुर ने तंत्र कौमुदी में एक अन्य परम्परा की ओर संकेत करते हुए 'सप्तविंशतिर्महाविद्याः' का उल्लेख भी किया है जिसकी ओर चिन्ताहरण चक्रवर्ती का भी ध्यान आकृष्ट हुआ है।

प्रोफेसर चक्रवर्ती ने मिथिला जनपद में प्रचलित शाक्त विचारधारा के इन संदर्भों को प्रसङ्गतः ग्रहण नहीं किया है। सम्भव है बंगाल के संदर्भ में अपने अध्ययन की सीमा के कारण उन्होंने यह किया हो किन्तु तांत्रिक साहित्य और उसकी विशेषताओं के प्रसङ्ग में मिथिला के तांत्रिक साहित्य की सूचना न देना--उनके पूर्वाग्रहपूर्ण दृष्टिकोण अथवा सूचना न होने का परिचायक माना जाय? रीवाँ-नरेश महाराज रघुराजसिंह की तांत्रिक रचनाओं पर उनका ध्यान आकृष्ट हो सका है जो मूलतः एक भक्त थे, किन्तु मिथिला की प्रामाणिक तांत्रिक रचनाओं की ओर ध्यान न देना सम्यक् नहीं प्रतीत होता है। क्योंकि मिथिला में संस्कृत के अनेक तंत्र ग्रन्थों की रचना हुई है।

प्रो० दिनेशचन्द्र भट्टाचार्य ने विद्यापति के तांत्रिक ग्रन्थ 'आगमद्वैत निर्णय' का उल्लेख सर गंगानाथ झा शोध संस्थान के शोध पत्र में प्रकाशित अपने एक लेख में किया है। 'आगमद्वैत निर्णय'—जिसका संरक्षण कलकत्ता संस्कृत कालेज में हुआ है—विद्यापति की रचना है जिसमें ग्रन्थकार ने गोविन्द चरणों की अभ्यर्थना की है।

नत्वा गोविन्दचरणौ श्रीमान् विद्यापतिः कृती।
तनोति विदुषां प्रीत्यै स्वागमै द्वैतिनिर्णयम् ॥

ग्रन्थ पुष्पिका से पूजा, पुरश्चरण आदि विषय स्पष्ट होते हैं। ग्रन्थकार ने आगम मार्ग को अपना पैतृक पन्थ बतलाया है—"इत्यस्माकं पैत्रिक पन्थाः।" प्रो० भट्टाचार्य ने भविष्य पुराण से विद्यापति सम्बन्धी कुछ अंश उद्धृत किये हैं जिससे भी मिथिला में आगम परम्परा की व्यापकता का बोध होता है।

आगमभूषण द्विजः कश्चित्षडंग वेद पारगः
वीरभाव समापन्नो वामाचार रतः सदा ॥
आद्या देव्याः स्थापनं च करिष्यति हिममंदिरे।
उचित ग्राम लोकानां सदा कल्याणकारिणी ॥

इस लेख पर अपना विचार प्रस्तुत करते हुए प्रोफेसर रमानाथ झा ने सर गंगा नाथ झा अनुसन्धान संस्थान के ही शोधपत्रिका में अपना 'तांत्रिक विद्यापति' शीर्षक लेख प्रकाशित कराया है जिसमें मिथिला के विभिन्न विद्यापति नामधारी कवि एवं विद्वानों की चर्चा करते हुए उन्होंने "आगमद्वैत निर्णय" के लेखक विद्यापति को महामहोपाध्याय गोविन्द ठक्कुर का दूसरा पुत्र सिद्ध किया है।

महामहोपाध्याय गोविन्द ठक्कुर घोसउत शाखा के वत्सगोत्रीय मैथिल ब्राह्मण थे। वे तंत्र साहित्य के विद्वान् थे। उनकी लिखी दो रचनायें काव्यप्रकाशदीपिका एवं पूजाप्रदीप उपलब्ध हैं। पूजाप्रदीप एक तांत्रिक ग्रन्थ है जिसकी हस्तलिखित प्रतियाँ शोध संस्थानों एवं व्यक्तिगत संग्रहों में संरक्षित हैं। पूजाप्रदीप तंत्र का एक अत्यन्त विशिष्ट ग्रन्थ है जिसका प्रकाशन अपेक्षित है। इसकी एक प्रति प्रो० रमानाथ झा के व्यक्तिगत संग्रह में भी है। महामहोपाध्याय गोविन्द ठक्कुर मैथिल विद्वान् थे किन्तु राज्याश्रय के लिये उन्हें उत्कल जाना पड़ा था, इसका भी प्रमाण उपलब्ध है। ओइनवार वंश के नृपति लक्ष्मीनाथ कंसनारायण के निधन के अनन्तर (१५२६ ई०) सम्भवतः गोविन्द ठक्कुर को भवानन्दपट्टनायक का आश्रय प्राप्त करना पड़ा। भवानन्द-राय को प्रसिद्ध रामानन्द राय के पिता रूप में निरूपित करने की चेष्टा की गई है जो उड़ीसा के अधिपति गजपति रुद्रदेव के प्रधान मंत्री थे।

महामहोपाध्याय गोविन्द ठक्कुर के ८ पुत्र माने जाते हैं, जो न्याय एवं तंत्र के उच्चकोटि के विद्वान् थे। इनके पाँचवें पुत्र आगमाचार्य तर्कपंचानन देवनाथ

उपाध्याय थे जिन्होंने तन्त्र-मन्त्र, स्मृति, सिद्धान्त, अधिकरण, काल, काव्य कौमुदी की रचना की है। देवनाथ ठक्कुर ने अपने ग्रन्थों में अपने पूर्व पुरुषों को सादर स्मृत किया है। वंश के पूर्व पुरुष रविकर को 'सकलागमज्ञः' तथा पिता गोविन्द ठक्कुर को 'सकल तंत्र सरोज सूर्य' कहा है। मन्त्र कौमुदी की प्रस्तावना में उन्होंने अपने पूर्व-पुरुषों रविकर, केशव, गोविन्द को सादर स्मरण किया है।

योऽभूत्पुरा रविकरः सकलागमज्ञ
स्तस्यात्मजो बुधिकरोऽतस्य च केशवस्तु
तस्यात्मजः सकलतन्त्रसरोजभास्वान्
गोविन्द एष भुवने विदितश्चकास्ति ॥

अपने पूज्य पिता गोविन्द द्वारा नाना शास्त्रों में अधीत् होने का उल्लेख स्वतः देवनाथ ने बार-बार किया है। वे अपने पिता के पाण्डित्य से अनुप्राणित थे तथा उनकी कृतियों पर पिता की अद्वितीय विद्वत्ता की छाप स्पष्ट है।

श्रीगोविन्दतनूद्भवेन सकलं तस्मादधीत्यागमं
सिद्धान्तं सरहास्यमस्य बहुशो विज्ञाययत्नादरात
विस्तारेषु समर्थताविरहिणां सिद्धयार्थिना प्रीतये
मन्त्राणामयमत्र साधनविधिः संक्षेपतः कथ्यते ॥

देवनाथ ठक्कुर की तांत्रिक रचनायें मन्त्रकौमुदी एवं तन्त्रकौमुदी हैं। मन्त्रकौमुदी नामक ग्रन्थ का सम्पादन प्रोफेसर रमानाथ झा ने किया है और उसका प्रकाशन मिथिला संस्कृत रिसर्च इन्स्टीट्यूट, दरभंगा द्वारा हुआ है। तंत्रकौमुदी का सम्पादन भी उन्होंने ही किया है और वह शीघ्र प्रकाशित होने वाला है। देवनाथ का जन्मकाल श्री झा ने १४९० स्वीकार किया है तथा तन्त्रकौमुदी की रचना उनके द्वारा ७५ वर्ष की अवस्था में १५६४ में सम्पन्न हुआ माना है। तन्त्रकौमुदी के समापन के एक छन्द से देवनाथ के समसामयिक उनके एक आश्रयदाता के सम्बन्ध में भी जानकारी मिलती है।

मीमांसा-स्मृति-तर्क-तन्त्र-कवितालङ्कार-कोषागम
ज्योतिर्वेदपुराणभारतमतिर्यस्तर्कपंचाननः
देवोऽसौ कमतेश्वरः क्षितिपतिस्तं देवनाथं चिरात्
संप्राप्य स्वयमादरेण विदधे विद्वन्मुदे कौमुदीम् ॥

ग्रन्थ की पुष्पिका में महाराजाधिराज श्री मल्लदेव का स्पष्ट उल्लेख है। पं० झा ने मंत्रकौमुदी की भूमिका में इस तथ्य का उल्लेख किया है कि औइनवार वंश के वैभव की समाप्ति पर देवनाथ ने मिथिला छोड़ कर कमत (कूच-विहार) के अधिपति

का राज्याश्रय प्राप्त किया था। उन्होंने अपने ग्रन्थों में श्रीमल्लदेव का अधिकाधिक उल्लेख किया है।

तन्त्रकौमुदी के एक छन्द में देवनाथ ने अपने एक दूसरे आश्रयदाता गजपति गोवि ददेव का उल्लेख किया है।

राजा गोविन्द देवो गजपतिरक्षितिस्वर्णसिंहासनार्द्धं
दत्वा मुद्राः सहस्राण्यपि नवदश वाचारुपट्टाम्बराणि
अर्वागर्वानिमेकं करिवरमयां दुर्लभं भूपतीनां
पल्यङ्कनिष्कलङ्कमणि मुकुटवांतर्कपंचाननेषु।

इस गजपति गोविन्द के सम्बन्ध में श्री रमानाथ झा ने अपना अभिमत प्रगट किया है। लगता है देवनाथ ने दूसरे नृपति गजपति गोविन्द देव के राज्याश्रय का उपभोग किया था किन्तु यह कहना कठिन है कि यह गजपति कौन था।

प्रो० दिनेशचन्द्र भट्टाचार्य ने भी अपने ग्रन्थ 'हिस्ट्री आफ नव्य न्याय इन मिथिला' में देवनाथ के संदर्भ में इस राजवंश की पहचान प्रतिष्ठापित करने योग्य कहा है। भारतीय विद्या में प्रकाशित अपने लेख "पूजा प्रदीप आफ गोविन्द ठक्कुर" में एम० एस० भट्ट ने इस राजवंश पर प्रकाश डालने की चेष्टा की है। उन्होंने गजपति गोविन्ददेव की पहचान गोविन्द विद्याधर के रूप में (१५४८-१५५०) किया है और उन्हें गजपति प्रतापरुद्र के (१५३८ ई०) अनन्तर उत्कल का शासक भी सिद्ध किया है। इस प्रकार पूजा प्रदीप के निर्माता गोविन्द ठक्कुर तथा उनके पंचम पुत्र ने मंत्रकौमुदी कार देवनाथ को उत्कल के गजपति वंश के राज्याश्रय में होना सिद्ध करने की चेष्टा की है।

मैथिल तांत्रिक परम्परा का एक अन्य प्रसिद्ध ग्रन्थ 'ताराभक्तिसुधार्णव' है जिसकी रचना १७वीं शताब्दी में नरसिंह ठक्कुर ने अनेक तन्त्र ग्रन्थों का उपयोग कर की थी। गायकवाड़ ओरियण्टल सिरीज बड़ौदा तथा तांत्रिक टेक्स्ट सिरीज़ कलकत्ता में इस ग्रन्थ का प्रकाशन हुआ है। दुर्भाग्यवश अभी भी यह ग्रन्थ अपूर्ण एवं अशुद्ध प्रकाशित रूप में ही सुलभ है। तांत्रिक-टेक्स्ट सिरीज़, कलकत्ता से प्रकाशित 'तारा-भक्ति सुधार्णव' की भूमिका में श्री पंचानन भट्टाचार्य ने नरसिंह ठक्कुर का समय १६६८ ई० माना है और उन्हें उनकी रचना पद्धति से निर्णय सिन्धु (रचनाकाल १६१२ ई०) के लेखक कमलाकर भट्ट के बाद का होना सिद्ध किया है किन्तु रचनागत विशेषताओं की ओर उन्होंने कोई संकेत नहीं किया है। इस ग्रन्थ की कतिपय हस्तलिखित प्रतियों का पता शोधभाण्डारों यथा मिथिला, नेपाल वीर पुस्तकालय तथा रायल एशियाटिक सोसाइटी, बंगाल की खोज रिपोर्टों से लगता है। नेपाल वीर पुस्तकालय में ही इस ग्रन्थ की १२ हस्तलिखित प्रतियाँ उपलब्ध हैं जो तांत्रिक साहित्य में इस ग्रन्थ की लोकप्रियता का स्पष्ट परिचायक है। ग्रन्थ के १५ तरंगों में

समाप्त होने का उल्लेख है किन्तु तान्त्रिक टेक्स्ट सिरीज में केवल ११ तरंग ही प्रकाशित हैं। ग्रन्थ की प्रस्तावना से ज्ञात होता है कि नरसिंह गदाधर के शिष्य थे और नाना तंत्र ग्रन्थों में निष्णात थे--

नाना तन्त्राणि विज्ञाय गदाधर गुरोर्मुखात् ।
करोति नरसिंहोऽयं ताराभक्तिसुधार्णवम् ।।

ग्रन्थकार ने तान्त्रिक साधना से सम्बद्ध विभिन्न विषयों पर अनेक तांत्रिक ग्रन्थों के संदर्भ में व्यापक विचार किया है जो अत्यन्त महत्त्वपूर्ण एवं उपयोगी है।

विद्वदुपाध्याय रचित 'तारिणी-पारिजात' मैथिल तंत्र परम्परा की एक अन्य विशिष्ट रचना है जिसका सम्पादन श्री रमानाथ झा ने किया है। वाराणसेय संस्कृत विश्वविद्यालय सरस्वती भवन ग्रन्थमाला में इसका प्रकाशन हुआ है। तारिणी पारिजातकार द्वारा नरसिंह ठक्कुर का उल्लेख हुआ है अतः भूमिका भाग में श्री झा ने इनका समय १७वीं शताब्दी अनुमित किया है। मैथिल ब्राह्मण प्रायः शक्ति के उपासक हैं और तारादेवी की उपासना इस जनपद में अपना विशिष्ट महत्त्व रखती है। ग्रन्थकार ने शिष्ट साधकों के तुष्ट्यर्थ तंत्र वचनों का चिन्तन कर इसका लेखन अपना उद्दिष्ट बतलाया है।

सम्प्रदायध्वना तन्त्रवचनानि विचिन्वता—
शिष्टसाधकतुष्ट्यर्थं लिख्यते तारिणीक्रमः ।।

मिथिला के कतिपय आधुनिक विद्वानों ने भी तंत्र साहित्य की दृष्टि से महत्त्वपूर्ण कार्य किया है। मिथिलेश रमेश्वरसिंह के समकालीन राजपण्डित राजनाथ मिश्र ने तन्त्राह्निक में तांत्रिक मत सम्बन्धी विविध ग्रन्थों का उपयोग किया है। उन्होंने तान्त्रिक साधना की साधारण विधि के अतिरिक्त श्यामार्चन चन्द्रिका, तारार्चन चन्द्रिका, भुवनेश्वरी सपर्याविधि तथा त्रिपुरसुन्दरी प्रकरण का उपबृंहण किया। तारार्चन चन्द्रिका के प्रारम्भ में उन्होंने लिखा है—

कर्पूरगौरहरिदम्बरडम्बरस्य
वक्षःस्थले निजतनोरभिवीक्ष्यविम्बम्
शंका वृताक्षि गलिता विरलाश्रुपाता-
त्संबोधिता नगसुता हसिता वतान्नः ।।

मैथिल तांत्रिकों के दर्शन तथा साहित्य सम्बन्धी सैकड़ों ग्रन्थ अमुद्रित रूप में व्यक्तिगत संग्रहों में भरे पड़े हैं और नष्ट हो रहे हैं। फिर तंत्र तो अभी तक गोपनीय समझा जाता रहा और उसके सम्यक प्रकाशन का कोई प्रश्न ही सम्मुख नहीं रहा। यदि व्यापक सर्वेक्षण की व्यवस्था हो तो महत्त्वपूर्ण तांत्रिक ग्रन्थ मैथिल परम्परा के

उपलब्ध हो सकते हैं। मैथिल तांत्रिकों के ग्रन्थों के मूल्याङ्कन की ओर किसी मैथिल विद्वान् का भी यथेष्ट ध्यान नहीं गया है। महामहोपाध्याय डा० उमेश मिश्र ने महाकाल संहिता के सम्पादन के संदर्भ में कतिपय मैथिल परम्परा के छोटे-बड़े तांत्रिक ग्रन्थों का संग्रह किया था किन्तु इन ग्रन्थों का आलोचनात्मक मूल्याङ्कन कर प्रकाशित नहीं करा पाये और विद्वद्जगत् उनकी गवेषणा से वंचित रह गया। दूसरे विद्वान् पं० रमानाथ झा ने मैथिल परम्परा के तीन तांत्रिक ग्रन्थों मन्त्रकौमुदी, तंत्रकौमुदी तथा तारिणी पारिजात का सम्पादन किया है, किन्तु सम्प्रति वह मैथिलों की सांस्कृतिक एवं सामाजिक व्यवस्था के अनुशीलन में जुटे हैं। मैथिल तांत्रिक ग्रन्थों की गम्भीर गवेषणा फलप्रद हो सकती है और विद्वानों को इस साहित्य का विशिष्ट एवं व्यापक सर्वेक्षण तथा अनुशीलन करना चाहिए।

शोध भाण्डागारों के खोज रिपोर्टों से भी मैथिल परम्परा के तान्त्रिक ग्रन्थों पर प्रकाश पड़ सकता है। इस दृष्टि से नेपाल वीर पुस्तकालय का संग्रहालय महत्त्वपूर्ण केन्द्र है। देवनाथ ठक्कुर कृत तन्त्रकौमुदी की सात प्रतियों, नरसिंह कृत तारा भक्ति सुधार्णव की १२ प्रतियों, विद्यापति कृत दुर्गा भक्ति तरंगिणी की ५ प्रतियों का विवरण वहाँ के सूचीपत्र में उपलब्ध होता है।

कई अन्य महत्त्वपूर्ण तांत्रिक कृतियों की सूचना भी यहाँ से सुलभ है। गोविन्दतत्त्वनिर्णय नामक एक तांत्रिक ग्रन्थ का इस विवरण से पता चलता है। शुभङ्कर ठक्कुर कृत हस्तमुक्तावली को विविध आचारों से सम्बद्ध रचना माना जाता है और उसे नृत्य विषय का उपयोगी ग्रन्थ स्वीकार किया जाता है। नेपाल वीर पुस्तकालय में संरक्षित तांत्रिक कृतियों के विवरण में शुभङ्कर कृत 'नृत्येश्वरीरहस्य तंत्रम्', 'नृत्येश्वरी रहस्यम्', 'हस्त मुक्तावली' की कतिपय हस्तलिखित प्रतियों का उल्लेख है जिसके अनुशीलन से मैथिल तांत्रिक परम्परा पर व्यापक प्रभाव पड़ सकता है।

इस प्रकार मिथिला जनपद का तांत्रिक कृतियों के निर्माण में अपना महत्त्वपूर्ण योगदान सिद्धप्राय है। मैथिल ब्राह्मणों तथा सामान्य जनजीवन पर शाक्त विचारधारा का प्रभूत प्रभाव परिलक्षित होता है। तांत्रिक साहित्य के व्यापक सर्वेक्षण एवं अनुशीलन में मिथिला के योगदान को कथमपि विस्मृत नहीं किया जा सकता। मैथिल विद्वानों का ध्यान अपने पूर्वजों की इस महान् धरोहर के प्रति आकृष्ट होना चाहिए और मैथिल स्मृतियों, न्याय, मीमांसा कृतियों के सदृश मैथिल तांत्रिक ग्रन्थों के सम्बन्ध में भी गम्भीर गवेषणा सम्पादित करनी चाहिए।

## संदर्भ-संकेत

१. द तन्त्राज स्टडी आन देयर रेलिजन एण्ड लिटरेचर—प्रो० चिन्ताहरण चक्रवर्ती, पुन्थीपुस्तक, कलकत्ता
२. हिस्ट्री आफ मैथिली लिटरेचर—डा० जयकान्त मिश्र, प्रयाग

३. कवि-रहस्य––हिन्दुस्तानी अकादमी, प्रयाग
४. स्टडीज इन जैनिज्म एण्ड बुद्धिज्म इन मिथिला––डा० उपेन्द्र ठाकुर, दरभंगा
५. दी जनरल आफ गंगानाथ झा रिसर्च इन्स्टीट्यूट, भाग ६ प्रयाग
६. दी जनरल आफ गंगानाथ झा रिसर्च इंस्टीट्यूट, प्रयाग, भाग ८
७. मंत्र कौमुदी––देवनाथकृत––सं० प्रो० रमानाथ झा, दरभंगा
८. हिस्ट्री आफ नव्यन्याय इन मिथिला––प्रो० दिनेशचन्द्र भट्टाचार्य, मिथिला संस्कृत रिसर्च इंस्टीट्यूट, दरभंगा
९. भारतीय विद्या (अंग्रेजी) भाग ३१, बम्बई
१०. ताराभक्ति सुधार्णव—नरसिंह ठक्कुर कृत, तांत्रिक टेक्स्ट सिरीज
११. तारणी पारिजात––विद्वदुपाध्याय, सरस्वतीभवन ग्रन्थमाला, वाराणसी
१२. तन्त्राह्निक––राजनाथ मिश्र, दरभंगा
१३. महाकाल संहिता––सं० डा० उमेश मिश्र, (प्रकाशन क्रम में) सर गंगानाथ झा शोध संस्थान, प्रयाग
१४. वीर पुस्तकालय––बृहत्सूचीपत्रम, भाग ४, तंत्र नैपाल

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## SECTION III

# LAW

## (DHARMAŚĀSTRA)

# "MOTHER-IN-LAW V. DAUGHTER-IN-LAW" A TRANSLATION OF THE ANONYMOUS *ŚVAŚRŪ-SNUṢĀ-DHANA-SAṂVĀDA*

By J. Duncan M. Derrett*

The late Dr. Umesha Mishra was very much interested in *dharma-śāstra,* and there is reason to suspect that his ability as a translator of works in that *śāstra* was somewhat higher than that of his great teacher Ganganatha Jha himself. Dr. Umesha Mishra's contributions to our knowledge of the *śāstra* are very considerable and should not be overlooked in the course of encomia of his philosophical work. In tribute to his memory I am happy to supply here a translation of a work which I published in the recent volume of the Adyar Library Bulletin presented to Professor V. Raghavan, and I am glad to acknowledge the help I have had from Pandit K. Parameśvara Aithāl in settling the text (which even so, as will be seen below, was not entirely free from error), and the help I received from Professor T. Burrow with the translation of a very difficult paragraph involving the use of a *mīmāṃsā* argument.

Even so simple and everyday a problem as to how a man's property is to be enjoyed by his relations after his death is one which seems to baffle the legal reformers of the modern world. The basic reason, I suppose, is that quite a number of difierent methods will work, and that there is no intrinsic advantage in any. When the British started to administer Hindu law and gave it a certainty it had not previously had was a period which turned out to be critical for Hindu legal history, and the way chosen to make family property available (to use no more precise word) for the survivors when their chief earner died was one of the signs of that new method's vitality and decision. When the Hindu law was reformed in 1956 was yet another critical period, and the curious way in which property of a male was, under the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act of that year, split (if he died intestate or even partially intestate) between a host of relations competing in Class I of that Schedule, astonished many observers. Previously the heirs were ranged in series, a grotesquely long and involved series; now the

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tendency is for relatives to succeed by groups. It is difficult to say what change in social conditions has called for that particular amendment of the ancient law. If Parliament had given the whole estate to the surviving spouse and left the other relatives to bargain with her, that might have been a more modern, and perhaps a more feasible solution.

If we go back to the early nineteenth century we can see some traces of discussions of this problem. Up to the present we have not had a *śāstrī's* opinion in full. We have had only poor reports of early cases, some pandits' replies in very brief terms, and a very interesting Travancore case[1]—and that was all. Recently a *śāstrī's* opinion was rediscovered under the quaint title *Svaśrū-snuṣā-dhana-saṁvāda*. Anyone who wishes to peruse the original will find it (subject to the minor amendments to be noted below) in the Adyar Library Bulletin (otherwise *Brahma-vidyā*), 1968, pp. 538—553. There the citations have been located and the material is accompanied with some comments. It would have been possible to write a little history of the Hindu law, especially the experiences at the hands of the British, around this little text. But there is no point in doing this, seeing that what is really important is the learned *śāstrī's* method, outlook, and recommendations.

The text belongs, so far as we can tell, to about 1815. It could conceivably be a little later. The British methods of administering justice are reflected in the concern for the actual case in hand, and the reference to a Bengal work (which was not available until the beginning of the nineteenth century in the Madras Presidency) makes it plain that the new role of the *śāstra* was already established. There is no sign that the parties to the dispute were actually litigating in a British court. They could have been members of the Tanjore Maharaja's encourage, and might have agreed to submit their problem for the court *śāstrī's* decision. Our work is not a pandit's answer to a problem posed as such by any Zillah court or the High Court, because its tone and the lack of final decisive quality are inconsistent with such a production. And as we can see it was intended to be a substantive contribution to (the then) modern *dharmaśāstra* studies, tricked out, as it is, with little verses, and other embellishments.

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1. *Ramal Koopoo Ammal* v. *Ammani Rukmani Ammal* (1887) 5 Trav. L. R. 45, Full Bench, is so much better in quality than the leading case in British India, viz. *Peddamuttu Viramani* v. *Appu Rau* (1864) 2 M.H.C.R. 117.

The translation which follows is intended to interest and amuse students of the vicissitudes of Hindu law, as a warning to those who would too hastily take the hammer once again to the personal law, and as proof that the *śāstrī-s* of 150 years ago were not the rigid obscurantists they are sometimes imagined to have been. They used their archaic techniques, but by no means always in order to achieve entirely predictable ends. The author (who, as so often, remains anonymous) had his *Mitākṣarā,* his *Vyavahāra-mayūkha* (because of the Maratha element in Tanjore?), and his *Smṛti-candrikā* in front of him: but as we can see he did not merely copy what they said, and regarded himself as quite free to offer a new solution. His concern to keep within reach of customary practices is important, especially when we remember how Mr. Nelson, not so long after this period, argued that the population of Madras, by and large, was innocent of knowledge of the *śāstra* and by no means apt to be subjected to it. I think our Madrassi author's attitute to custom is interesting, and could conceivably be utilised even today.[2]

"A Debate about Property between a Mother-in-law and her Daughter-in-law"

Obeisance to Lord Gañeśa!

The Lord Nṛsiṃha's compassion has filled my vision with its essence and I have attained from it an everlastingly spotless composure of mind. I pay homage to my teachers and, according to my humble opinion, set out here what will enlighten the darkness of the dispute about property between a mother-in-law and her daughter-in-law.[1]

A particular problem in the chapter of law called "Dāya-

2. It is interesting that Dr. A. C. Burnell, who was a judge in the Madras Presidency and a well-known (if somewhat eccentric) author on Hindu-law matters, made the following comment on our present work in his catalogue of the library in which it is preserved in three copies: "This is a curious example (almost the only one I know) of a Hindu decision on a point of law" (*A Classified Index to the Sanskrit MSS. in the Palace at Tanjore,* London, 1880, p. 143). He may not have read the work very attentively. It is not a decision, but an elaborate *vyavasthā,* what in Europe would be called a *sententia,* or "opinion". It was entitled to the greatest respect, but was not a decision, which last lay always within the jurisdiction of the judge, and the judge alone. In so far as this present work is a *vyavasthā* it is not different in kind from the large number of *vyavasthā-s* which we possess in full or in cummary.

vibhāga" (Partition of Heritage) is handled here: for it unfortunately happened that a man died separated and unreunited—[2]

—and there survive his mother and his childless widow who is in need of property, and a great dispute broke out between the two of them due to a desire for gain.[3]

This must be resolved by good men who are skilled in the way of the world and in the *śāstra* (*kuśalair loka-śāstrayoḥ*).[4]

For the present we must discuss certain texts which are well known to support the argument on behalf of the daughter-in-law.[5]

L. 1. Yājñavalkya says who shall be the heirs in the absence of the twelve types of sons commencing with the *aurasa* (II. 135-6):

"The wife, the daughters also, the two parents and likewise the brothers, their sons, members of the *gotra*, a *bandhu*, a pupil, and fellow students, in the absence of the previous of these each successively is entitled to the estate of a sonless man who has gone to heaven. This is the law in all *varṇa-s*.

Vṛddha Manu likewise:

"Sonless, preserving the bed of her husband, firm in her vow (of chastity), the wife alone shall give his *piṇḍa* and take his entire share."

Bṛhaspati likewise (really Viṣṇu XVII. 4—7):

"The property of a sonless man goes to his wife. In her absence to his daughter. In her absence to the father. In his absence to the mother."

Kātyāyana likewise (v. 926):

"The wife is successor to her husband if she is free from misconduct. But in her absence the daughter, provided she be unmarried."

In another *smṛti* (Kāty. 927):

"(The heirs) of a sonless man are proclaimed to be his wife born in the family (*kula-jā*), or even his daughters; in their absence the father, brothers, and brothers' sons."

Bṛhaspati likewise says (XXVI. 94):

> "Even when there are members of the family, such as the father and full brothers, it is the wife of a deceased sonless man takes his share."

From these and other texts it is understood that even in the presence of the deceased's mother the widow alone takes the property. So indeed it is said in the *Mitākṣarā* (II. i, 39, Colebrooke's trans.), "therefore the married wife, provided she is chaste, takes the entire property of an unmarried sonless man who has died, and that is the conclusion." And in the *Candrikā* (Setlur, p. 275: XI. 1, 3 ff), it is concluded that the widow alone takes the estate, relying upon the text of Bṛhaspati (XXVI. 92) which says,

> "In the tradition and the system of the smṛti and in the custom of the world the wife has been declared by the wise to be a half of the body, equal in the fruit of that which is auspicious and that which is inauspicious"—

a text which clarifies the propinquity of the wife in comparison with all others on account of her connection with her husband in point of serving him in "seen" and in "unseen" contexts; and also upon the text of Prajāpati,[2a] which says,

> "A wife who dies before her husband takes away his *agnihotra;* but when her husband predeceases she takes his property if she is faithful to him: this is eternal *dharma.*"

And in the Mayūkha these same texts are cited and the same conclusion is arrived at, namely that the chaste widow takes the estate. The same is the case with the work of Varadarāja. Consequently this much is certain, after reviewing the opinions of many digest-writers, that the wife alone takes the estate of a son who is unreunited and separated.

However, it appears from the following text of Nārada (XVI. 25-6) —

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2a. Really Bṛhaspati (G. O. Ser.). XXVI. 95. It is the *Smṛti-candrikā* which attributes it to Prajāpati.

"If among brothers one childless should die or become a wandering ascetic, the others should divide his property, excepting the *strīdhana*."

"And they must provide a maintenance for his women until they die, if they keep the bed of their husband. In the case of others they must cut that off."

—that even in the presence of the wife the brothers take the estate but the wives take only maintenance. Likewise one gathers from the text of Manu (IX. 195), "The father shou'd take the estate of a sonless man, or even his brothers," that the estate belongs to the father or the brothers. Lekewise there is another text of Manu (IX. 217)—

"The mother should obtain the dāya of a chi'dless son, and if the mother has died the mother of the father should take the property."

which teaches us that the mother has the first right to the inheritance and in her absence the paternal grandmother. Likewise Kātyāyana says,[3]

"Assets go to the brother when a sonless man goes to heaven, in his absence the two parents may take it, or the senior wife,"

from which it appears that the brothers, the parents, and the senior wife in order are entit!ed to the property. There is a verse of Kātyāyana,

"When a separated man dies the father should take his assets in the absence of a son, or the brother, or the mother or the mother of his father, in order."

This shows that the property is inherited in order by father, brother, mother, and paternal grandmother.

2. Therefore, since a number of texts are repugnant to it, how can one establish the proposition we have already propounded? One

3. The *Mitākṣarā* attributes this prose passage to Śaṅkha. It does not seem to belong to Kātyāyana?

might hazard the proposition that property should be recognised optionally in favour of whichever of the two, the wife or the brothers, might happen to have possession (or not as the case may be) of the estate, relying upon the texts of both sorts! But this would be wrong, because such an option would be subject to the eight faults,[4] and because in a matter of mere fact there can be no alternative.

3. One might suggest that, though property is no action, property may well be subject to an option by way of the fact that there is an option whether or not to make a partition, which has the form of an action of a mental character giving rise to property, just as the greater part of its effect lies in possession of the assets. But this is not true, for property is created by birth and therefore it cannot be produced by partition. Consequently we cannot have recourse to an option (i.e. the conflict between the texts cannot be side-stepped): It is necessary to state some resolution of the difficulty.

4. What pronouncement can we make? We should commence by stating the resolution which previous teachers offered. Thus:— the next "The wife, the daughters also..." relates to the wife of a brother who was divided and unreunited; but the text "If among brothers" relates to one amongst a number of brothers who are undivided or reunited.[5] Thus Bṛhaspati says (XXVI. 99):

> "Whatever divided asset of any kind, even pledges or other various assets are traditionally known, these, excluding immovables, the wife, whose husband has died, should take."

The author of the *Candrikā* says that this in the clearest manner shows that the wife takes the assets of a divided brother, while the brothers and the rest take the assets of an undivided brother. The word "divided" is intended to imply also the assets of one who is unreunited. Similarly the text "Among brothers" relates to undivided or reunited brothers; and the case before us relates to a

4. The eight faults of a *vikalpa* (option) are that one accepts one to the exclusion of the other, accepts the other whilst denying what one has already accepted, and so forth (see Ganganath Jha, *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā in its Sources*, 1st edn., 1942 pp. 353 ff.).

5. This is the solution adopted originally in Anglo-Hindu law, modified as a result of the Second Shivagunga case.

brother who was divided and unreunited. The text of Yājñavalkya makes it clear that in the absence of each preceding claimant each succeeding claimant takes the assets, and in that text the wife has the first place: consequently the *prima facie* view must be that while the wife is present she alone is entitled to take the estate, and not the deceased's mother.

II. 1. We proceed to our conclusion.

Such being the situation we make a statement—may the learned listen to it removing envy and all partiality afar off![6]

Is it true that when two texts are in conflict an authority settling the matter is necessary?[6] When it was uncertain which of the cups was to be used first among those dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, etc., which are mentioned in that section of the *Śrauta-sūtra,* an authority was available to make it certain which was to be used first. Just as in the sentence (*Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra* XII. 14. 1-2), "If the Some (—sacrifice) has the Rathantara as its Sāma he should take first the cups dedicated to Indra-Vāyu; if it has the Bṛhat as its Sāma he should take first those dedicated to Śukra; if it has both as its Sāma he should first take the *manthi*-vessels first," if there is some qualification (*anubandha*), this can be, but not otherwise. If when the whole of that section is carefully examined no such statement is obtained, then there should be the difficulty of having to supply something as in the statement, "If the sacrificer has no desire he should pour out the water with a cup, if he is desirous of cattle he should pour it with the milking-pot."[7] But in this section (of the *śāstra*) such a statement (i.e. such a text) does exist, as Kātyāyana says (v. 923):

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6. For the translation of this paragraph I am indebted to Prof. T. Burrow (as noted above).

7. This text requires to be supplemented, but it is not clear to me exactly why. It is a paraphrase of *Āpastamba-śrauta-sūtra* I. 16.3, and it may be that the supplementation is included in the paraphrase. The general point is that many rules which appear at first sight to be straightforward options are in fact parallel rules, because a condition has to be imported (as was not necessary in the case of the immediately previous quotation which was complete with its conditions), under which, if the condition was present one rule would apply, but if not then the other. Our author's point is that we cannot read the texts without the condition which is stated in another *smṛti* in the same chapter of the law.

"She should enjoy the share allotted to her, devoted to obedience to her senior; but if she does not perform obedience he should order food and raiment for her."

And this is explained in the Candrikā and the Mayūkha. The "senior" is the father-in-law, etc., and she may enjoy her share at his pleasure. Otherwise she has maintenance, that is the meaning. "Share allotted," we have to understand that she takes it, because the words "he should order food and raiment" have laid down an allotment of trifiling assets sufficient to secure her mere subsistence. How little this amounts to is explained by Nārada:

"Yearly the faithful wife whose husband is dead should take 34 *āḍhaka-s* and 40 *paṇa-s*."

"*Āḍhaka*" means a heap of grain amounting to 192 handfuls, the *paṇa* is the *kārṣāpaṇa*. In a certain region this is current in place of eightieth part of a current *niṣka;* therefore where the *paṇa* is not current the eightieth part of a current *niṣka* is taken in lieu of it. Thus the Mayūkha says as follows:—The text of Kātyāyana is quoted,

"When her lord has gone to heaven the woman takes maintenance, where he was undivided, and she takes a share of the assets until her death."

Then he says that the word "undivided" implies also reunited, and the word "and" must be taken in the sense of "or." Thus there are two alternatives. The conclusion adopted by Madana (see *Madanaratna-pradīpa,* ed. Kane, p. 362) is quoted, which explains these alternatives as follows: the gift of a share applies to the wedded wife, but the awarding of maintenance applies to kept concubines. The author (Nīlakaṇṭha) then considers the basis of this conclusion and rejects the latter, and himself gives the correct conclusion, basing it upon the text "She should enjoy the share..." Thus his conclusion is that a wife may take the estate provided certain conditions are fulfilled, and not otherwise; and these are (1) that she is devoted to obedience to her seniors, namely her mother-in-law and father-in-law and so on, (ii) that she has their permission, (iii) that she is chaste; and (iv) that she desires to inherit.

However it may be objected that this conclusion, depending as it does upon obedience to the mother—or father-in-law, or its

absence, or upon her desire, or its absence, is improper. The reason alleged is that in the books written under the name of Mādhava, in the *Candrikā,* the *Mayūkha,* the *Mitākṣarā,* and the work of Varadarāja a conclusion has been propounded upon the footing that the texts "Whatever divided asset of any kind," "If among brothers ..." and so on, when carefully considered, relate solely to the alternatives of a divided or undivided decendent, and that one must conclude accordingly. But this objection cannot be accepted, because the point being based, as it is, upon texts there is no room for deciding the question by human ingenuity, and because of the unanimity which we find amongst the digest-writers.

2. In order that all the texts should speak with one voice, and that all texts should be in harmony, the wife who is qualified with every one of these qualifications may take the estate but not a wife who is lacking in any single one of them! Indeed that is so! This is what is actually accepted by the authors of the *Candrikā* and the *Mayūkha,* and others. The following is what is said in the work of Varadarāja (p. 450), though in another section:

> "2,000 *paṇa-s* must be given to the woman as *dāya* out of the assets, and whatever was given to her by her husband she may obtain at her option."

This is a text of Vyāsa. It is explained as saying that where nothing was given by the husband the widow may take 2,000 *paṇa-s,* but not more. Thus where at the time of his death the husband gave *all* his property to his wife she has a right in all the property. Otherwise, the author's intention emerges, one should give her 2,000 *paṇa-s.*

3. Therefore in this instant case there is no possible way in which the daughter-in-law can be entitled to all the property, even though she be equipped with the various qualities of being the devoted widow of a divided and unreunited man, (i) because a daughter-in-law can inherit only when she is obedient to her mother-in-law as every secular and śāstric consideration confirms, her mother-in-law being her "senior", and competition with her mother-in-law in that case would be a hare's horn (i.e. "mare's nest"), and because (ii) at the time of his death her late husband did not convey his share to her. In the second rank stands the daughter: but there is no daughter in our instant case. In the third rank stands the mother. It is more correct to give her the whole share, and so let us make an end of the discussion!

Let the learned, who are oceans of compassion pay attention: there is a distinction to be noticed in this context which has the approval of all.[7]

4. Your violent objection to the mother's inheriting—in this case is it to her taking *all* the property, or is it only to her taking a mother's share? If the latter one must point out that that alternative is not in question because no mother's share has been set aside for her according to the rule established in several texts of Yājña-valkya and other, that—

"If he makes the shares equal his wives must be made equal sharers (Yājñ. II. 115); and

"After the death of the father, if the brothers divide the property the mother too should take a share" (Yājñ. II. 123), such a share would be available at a partition whether in the father's lifetime or after his death.

5. You may object that though the mother's share is established under the *śāstra,* the mother has no property in such a share because no share was given to her at the partition. That might well be true, if property were to be produced by partition. However, it is not, but it ought to arise from birth, according to the text of Gautama (see *Mitākṣarā* I. i. 23), "Ownership in wealth is taken by birth alone, so the teachers say."

6. You may object that property cannot arise from birth, since it is non-secular,[8] like the sacrificial post and the *āhavanīya* fire though they be qualified by a combination of numerous seen and unseen "perfections" (*saṁskāra-s*) such as the felling of the timber, carpentry, and the fire-laying ceremony. For it is not by birth alone that the *khadira* or other wood or the ignited fire acquires the character of being a sacrificial post or an *āhavanīya.* Nevertheless even prior to the completion of the series of the "perfections" one finds the wooden object and the ignited fire called by the actual names of "sacrificial post" and "*āhavanīya*". Consequently the śāstric writers are in the habit of dealing with matters on the footing that these things bear the names appropriate to that perfection, because the completed series of perfections is the real cause of the currency of those names. Gautama indeed (see *Mitākṣarā* I. i. 8, 12) says "An owner is by inheritance, purchase, partition, occupation, and finding; for a Brahmin acquisition is an additional mode, for

the Kṣatriya conquest, and wages for the Vaiśya and Śūdra." He shows that property is ascertainable only from the *śāstra,* and therefore makes it abundantly clear that property is non-secular. Moreover, if property were established by worldly knowledge, like gold and silver,[9] there could never be any doubt as to whether something was this man's or another's.

7. If one claims "therefore property is non-secular, and so how could it be obtained by birth" we state the answer, that it is solely secular.[8]

> Because it is the cause of actions which serve secular purposes, like rice, barley, etc., the capacity to achieve cooking, etc., arises from the function of being ignited, and not from the fire's unseen function: and consequently there is no embarrassment left.[9]
>
> For that which achieves purchases and so forth[10] is the nature of gold as one's own, consequently one must insist that property is secular only.[10]
>
> When there is a doubt about purchase and so on[11] which have property as their cause there is a doubt about property—therefore property is obtained by birth and is not produced by partition.[11]
>
> Therefore, when a partition does not take place property is not destroyed, and so the mother's share survives, and that option certainly remains valid.[12]

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8. The MS. actually reads *alaukikatvāt,* which was in error transcribed and printed at p. 548 as *laukikatvāt.*

9. This seems to be a misunderstanding of the *Mitākṣarā's* argument, which seems to have that even in the world a science is needed for the identification of metals—one does not rely upon mere appearances. See *Mitākṣarā* (Colebrooke's trans.) I. i. 8, and Derrett, *Religion, Law and the State in India* (London, 1968), 142.

10. The MS. reads *kriyādīn,* i.e. "actions", 'transactions", etc. But apparently this is a corruption for *krayādīn,* "purchases", etc.

11. See the remark in the last footnote.

12. This is the *Mitākṣarā* position, ably argued in that book on the basis of the fundamental argument that property is not ascertained solely from the Śāstra (which does not list "birth" in the basic texts) and with the aid of the collateral argument that one partitions what is already one's own. The mother's right by her re-birth at her marriage (infers our present author) is not extinguished by any partition ignoring her rights.

III. 1. Now the wife's right in any ritual characterised by the relinquishment of assets is established in the section (of the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra-s*) which commences (VI. 1. 6. 3), "On account of the use of the particular gender, only men are entitled—so says Aitiśāyana...." The text which says "The wife, the son and the slave (have no property)" (Manu VIII. 416) is directed only to their want of independence.[13] However, your first alternative does not arise, because the mother does not wish to possess herself of the entire estate.

2. Although it is understood from the *Candrikā*, the *Mayūkha*, and others, with reference to the text of Kātyāyana, "She should enjoy the share allotted to her, that the mother is entitled to the whole estate when the daughter-in-law is excluded from entitlement to the whole property by reason of her not being obedient to her mother-in-law and father-in-law; nevertheless, whether because public opinion would blame her, or for some other reason the mother does not want the whole estate, but only her own share—and that is why the first alternative does not arise.

3. Nor does the second arise, because there is no authority for excluding the mother from her share.[13a]

4. There is no basis for suspecting that her share has perished either because her son enjoyed it, or because he has died subsequently, for there would be no end to the inconvenience which would result if it could be supposed that when one person's clothes or ornaments are merely enjoyed by another through affection or other-

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The popular notion that property: arises at partition for the first time, when the taker was previously a non-managing member of a joint family, is based on the common notion that one has property only when one can do absolutely as one likes with the asset in question--and manifestly in a joint family only he who keeps the keys has independence with regard to the money in the chest. The concept arises in Madhātithi's comment on Manu V. 10 (Jha's translation p. 136)—a comment on which, in fact, Vijñāneśvara's argument in the *Mitākṣarā* is actually based historically.

13. The Mīmāṃsā establishes that the wife has a right of property in her husband's wealth for religious purposes. The text of Manu often relied upon to prove that the wife has no property in her husband's lifetime, in fact means only that she is dependant. So the *Mitākṣarā* II. i. 16, and also Jīmūtavāhana in his *Dāyabhāga*, I. i. 16.

13a. You cannot object to her taking a share, because the mother is entitled to a share (a partition having occurred) according to the *śāstra*.

wise they thereupon become the latter's property! This is what the Saṁgrahakāra says in the *Candrikā*:

> "A man is not owner of that which happens to be in his hand: surely the property of one man may be in the hands of another through theft or other means!"

The word "other" implies affection. The author goes on to say "therefore ownership is according to the *śāstra* and not derived from enjoyment"—indeed saying that property is to be ascertained only from the *śāstra*, yet he does not contend that it is produced by partition and so does not conflict with what was said before. For the author of the book is certain that property is not capable of being produced by partition, nor would it be proper for the share to be lost because her son died. Such an idea would conflict both with actual usage and with the *śāstra*. Therefore there is no means whereby the mother's share can be annulled.

5. You may object that there seems to be a custom *not* to give mothers their shares. No. Such a custom would have no authority, because it is repugnant to the *smṛti*.

6. It may be objected that the *śāstra* dealing with litigation is, like that of grammar, founded upon popular custom, and that it cannot be authoritative in any context where it is opposed to custom, especially where it offends against people's livelihoods. But this is incorrect, because the *śāstra* is, in that book, founded upon majority customs, and the custom of a single locality cannot have that degree of authority.

7. Nor is the authority of a custom determined with reference to distinctions between localities, for that would conflict with the principle first mentioned.[14]

8. One may well ask why this mother's share, which is established according to popular practice and the *śāstra* has not been

14. The text says *prāthamika-nyāya-virodhāt*, the meaning of which is not entirely clear to me. Apparently our author says that if the opposition to *smṛti* comes from the side of customs, on the ground that after all *smṛti* itself is founded on custom, the effect would be that *smṛti* would never have any authority more than its local coincidence with custom would allow—which would remove the authority of *smṛti* totally in these secular (*vyavahāra*) contexts.

furnished at the time of the partition! We suppose it happened (i) because of the mother's abundant affection for her son (or sons), or (ii) because (at that time) she did not want a share, or (iii) because the family followed the custom of low people (*pāmarāṇa-s*). The *śāstra-s* recognise that a share may not be taken where she is not desirous of having one. A text says (Yājñ. II. 116),

> "To one who is able and does not desire (a share) something may be given and his separation can be effected."

And so, now, her son having died, while she herself *is* desirous of a share it is impossible to annul her rights whether from the point of view of popular usage or the *śāstra*.

IV. 1. Nor would it be so absurd for her to have a share equal to a son out of the estate which was owned by the sons of her co-wife and her own son (jointly), on the alleged ground that would be less than a half-share in the property owned by her own son (alone). There is no harm in this if it is what she wants. And, on the facts of the case, there is no evidence that she wants this at all.[15]

2. There is no question of setting aside the partition which took place originally, because the sons of her co-wife are members of her own family and are responsible for the welfare of the line. Therefore she wants to please them and does not want to insist on her rights (*tad-anujighṛkṣayā anicchāyā upapatteś ca*).

V. 1. Therefore in respect of the disputed property the mother-in-law is owner by reason of her being the mother of the deceased male owned and the daughter-in-law is owner by reason of her having been his wife. According to the maxim, "It should

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15. What seems to have happened was this: a partition took place between her son, B3, and the sons of her (deceased) co-wife, Bi and B2. Since there were three sons the property was divided into thirds. In the Tamil country the mother's share is generally ignored. Had she had her rights under the Benares school of Hindu law she would have shared equally with the sons, and taken one -fourth of the whole. Now she is entitled to (so we are told) one half of the deceased son's share, i.e. one-sixth of the whole. Thus she claims less than her due. What harm is there in that, our author asks? We cannot take the view that either she asks for her rights upto the limit, or she must keep quiet!

be equal where revelation is silent,"[16] both of them should take equal shares, a proposition in which the customs of all localities and all the *śāstra-s* are agreed.

2. Now Manu says (IX. 217):

> "The mother should obtain the *dāya* of her son who left no issue, but after the death of the mother the father's mother should take the property."

And this is explained in (Rāghvānanda's) *Manvartha-candrikā*: "He has mentioned the mother's property in the case of a son who died without issue: 'who left no issue'. The mother should take because as between the two parents the mother is more worthy, due to her having carried him in the womb and nourished him. But if the mother is dead the father's mother should take the estate." After giving this explanation he doubts whether there is a conflict between this explanation and the texts of Yājñavalkya and Viṣṇu which we have already cited; he shows how there is no conflict in the explanation provided in the commentary made by the commentator on the *Manu-smṛti* called Kullūka, viz. "the mother and the father should both take, sharing the property between them;" nevertheless he is not satisfied with the result and reveals another method of removing the difficulty with his own suggestion, which is as follows: "The member of the disjoined couple, mother and father, arises even in a case where the wife is involved.[17] Therefore when all three are present the triad is entitled to the property, for there is no choice between those who are (equally) associated (with each other) in the absence of another (i.e. the deceased's son)."

VI. 1. Now the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* reveals the sin involved in not delivering the share which the *śāstra* has prescribed.[18] "He

16. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. 5, 1330-1, 1350. *Mitākṣarā* on Yājñavalkya II. 265.

17. This curious way of putting it conceals the meaning, which is that Manu has singled out the mother in his anomalous way because he has a competition with the wife in mind. All these texts give different claimants the right of claim when no son survives: hence all should share!

18. This interesting quotation from the *Brāhmaṇa* is used by the *Mitākṣarā* in a different connection (I. ix. 6-7) along with a commentary which Colebrooke does not translate quite adequately. It is a commentary or explanation which agrees substantially with that of Mādhava, and one wonders whether

who extrudes a sharer from his share destroys him or if he does not destroy him he destroys his son or he destroys his son's son." The meaning of this is explained by Vidyāraṇya (i.e. Mādhavācārya) in his *Vedārthaprakāśikā*: "He who, i.e. the man who, extrudes, i.e. cuts off, a sharer, i.e. a person entitled to a share, from his share, i.e. from his own share, he is destroyed. Him, i.e. the extruder, he destroys, i.e. ruins. If he does not ruin him he ruins his son or son's son—that is what is meant.

2. Consequently that argument which claims an equal share in the inheritance for both claimants, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, is the better. This is the answer which the learned ought to consider with their subtle percipience. This is how the matter should be dealt with.

> After considering the *dharmaśāstra-s* and extracting their essence attentively, this is the conclusion which is plainly reported for the delight of the good.[13]

Thus the explanation of the equal sharing of the property between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is finished.

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they used a common source. The point is that the extruder or usurper is destroyed, infected with sin, by the deprived person, and if the wrongdoer himself is not affected his descendant will be. Thus it is spiritually dangerous to usurp the shares of others.

# STATE OF CRIMINAL LAW IN MANUSMṚTI

*By* R. S. Betai*

## *Introduction*

In the Manusmṛti, we have no clear cut division of the sociological topics into three, *Ācāra, Vyavahāra* and *Prāyaścittam,* as we have it in the Smṛti known after Yājñavalkya. Simi'arly prominence is not given to the topic of *vyavahāra* as we have it in the Smṛti of Nārada. Still however, the topics on court-law are treated in two very long separate Adhyāyas 8th and the 9th and the total number of verses in these two Adhyāyas is 756; far larger than the number of verses in the *Vyavahāra* Adhyāya of the Yājñavalkya Smṛti, where the total number of verses is just less than half, 307. Both Manu and Yājñavalkya have allotted more verses to Civil Law than Criminal Law. There is also a tendency to give greater or lesser importance to one or the other title, probably due to advance in the sphere of law and the increasing or lessening importance of one or the other title, greater systematisation, a tendency to become more liberal and the gradual lessening of the importance of the moral and social side of Law that Manu has conceived. Both Manu and Yājñavalkya give eighteen titles of Law, but the names differ here and there a little. The following is a comparative list:—

| *Manusmṛti* | *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* |
|---|---|
| (१) ऋणादान | (१) ऋणादान |
| (२) निक्षेप | (२) दायविभाग |
| (३) अस्वामिविक्रय | (३) सीमाविवाद |
| (४) संभूय समुत्थान | (४) स्वामिपालायपाद |
| (५) दत्तस्यानपकर्म | (५) अस्वामिविक्रय |
| (६) वेतनस्य अदानम् | (६) दत्ताप्रदानिक |
| (७) संविद: व्यतिक्रम: | (७) क्रीतानुशय |
| (८) क्रयविक्रयानुशय | (८) अभ्युपेत्याशुश्रूषा |
| (९) स्वामिपालविवाद | (९) संविद्व्यतिक्रम |

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| | |
|---|---|
| (१०) सीमाविवाद | (१०) वेतनादान |
| (११) दण्डपारुष्य | (११) द्यूतसमाह्वय |
| (१२) वाक्पारुष्य | (१२) वाक्पारुष्य |
| (१३) स्तेय | (१३) दण्डपारुष्य |
| (१४) साहस | (१४) साहस |
| (१५) स्त्रीसंग्रहण | (१५) विक्रीयासम्प्रदानम् । |
| (१७) स्त्रीपुंधर्म | (१७) स्तेय |
| (१७) दायभाग | (१७) स्त्रीसंग्रहण |
| (१८) द्यूतमाह्वय | (१८) प्रकीर्णक |

The order in which the titles are discussed in the two Smṛtis is as above and it is clear that neither of the two separates the eighteen titles into Civil and Criminal, even though both are conscious of the positive distinction between the two. Both lay down far more severe punishments for criminal offences, both expect speed in the disposal of criminal titles, the competence of witnesses is not very much stressed in case of the criminal titles, Manu stresses the importance of finding out of truth in Criminal offence all the more and so on. Still, except for *Dāya,* Manu has kept the Civil and Criminal titles separately and he specifically mentions criminal titles as *Kaṇṭakasodhana.*[1] The last eight in Manu enumerate the Criminal titles except for *Dāya,* which is a purely Civil Title. The first ten in Yājñavalkya are Civil, the next four are criminal, the next two are important criminal titles and the last, the miscellaneous contains most of the minor criminal offences. It is not clear either in Manu or in Yājñavalkya why they take to a certain order and the order in either case is not scientific, there is probably no scientific vision at the root.

In Manu again, it is interesting that there are some probable reasons of a marked distinction between the two. Manu has often laid down jail, fine and similar punishments for civil offences also. To illustrate, he even punishes a plaintiff who raises a false plaint, a witness who gives false evidence, he lays down punishment of fine for persons who do not pay in time their debts and do not pay inspite of warning, in case of the second title of *Aswāmivikraya,* he wants to punish persons who false'y dispose of or sell the property deposited with them. Similar are the punishments laid down for

1. M.S. 9. 253.

*Samvidvyatikrama,* and so tn. Still, he is very much less severe in these and the criminal intentions only as included in the Civil titles are punished. He is therefore clearly conscious of the clear distinction between the two, though he has not specifically named the two or either, even though, as we have already seen, he knows the word *Kaṇṭakasodhana.* He again seems to believe that there shou'd of necessity be harsh punishments in those plaints in which physical and mental injury to a person is involved as also the self-respect and protection of men and women. Here, he is prepared to accept even women and children as witnesses, incompetent witnesses, witnesses even without testing their legal status and competence.[2] This is inspite of the fact that he looks upon women as incompetent witnesses[3] and permits them as witnesses only when the plaint in question involves a woman,[4] he takes old men and children as useless witnesses and therefore unreliable.[5] and so on. The offences in question are all what we call criminal offences to-day. They are separately mentioned with reference to examining competence of witnesses in verse 8. 72 :—

साहसेषु च सर्वेपु स्तेयसंग्रहणेपुच।
वाग्दण्डयोश्च पारुष्ये न परीक्षेत साक्षिण:॥

"The competence of the witnesses shall not be examined in case of all *Sāhasas,* theft, crimes regarding women and Defamation and Assault."

There are again, a few more things to be noted before we now proceed to study the outstanding traits of the treatment of Criminal Law in the Manusmṛti. We will study these as follows:—

### *Ideal at the Root of Law*

Manu states that the king or in his absense, a Brāhmaṇa judge shall try cases and give judgment.[6] Manu all the while expects the king to resort to eternal traditional Law.[7] Established tradition

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2. M.S. 8. 72.
3. M.S. 8. 68, 77.
4. M.S. 8. 68.
5. M.S. 8. 71.
6. M.S. 1 and 9.
7. M.S. 8. 8.

F. 36

thus is a very important factor in Manu's Law. The court in which the king takes his seat with three learned Brāhmaṇas who are experts in the interpretation of Law and therefore who constantly guide the king or the judge, is known as the court of the four-faced Lord Brahman.[8] This will naturally establish that when the king is sitting in person as a judge, there is finality and there can be no appeal against his verdict. Truth shall always prevail in court, Dharma and Satya shall ever be victorious and grievous sin falls on the king, the *Sabhyas* and the *Sabhāsadas* if truth and Dharma fail in a court of law.[9] It is primarily necessary for any one who enters a court to speak truth and therefore if one does not intend to reveal truth, he shall not enter a court of law.[10] It is the prime duty of the king and his assistants in court to see that in their court, only truth prevails. Then only are they free from spiritual debt. It is expected to be ever the care of the king and all who enter the court that only truth is discovered and that too under proper legal methods. Details of these legal methods are given by Manu in several verses. Manu has laid down strict qualifications of witnesses who are competent[11] to give evidence and being practical again, he has laid down that the competence of witnesses shall be strictly examined and that they shall be given a strict vow of truth and also that they will be informed of the spiritual consequences of speaking falsehood.[12] When he refuses to stress the importance of examining the competence of witnesses in criminal pleas and wants to welcome anyone as a witness,[13] we see his anxiety to find out truth and he is fully conscious of the difficulty of finding out truth in criminal cases, involving as they do so, many factors. These are the most important statements with reference to the importance of truth in a court of law. Manu lays down as the first ideal of court-proceedings the finding out of truth at all costs. He has gone to the extent of stating that there shall be a re-trial in a case where it is found later that truth has not won.[14] Manu has written so many verses on the great importance of truth just to stress this ideal as none else does.

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8. M.S. 8. 11
9. M.S. 8. 14, 15, 16, 16, 17, 18, 19.
10. M.S. 8. 13.
11. M.S. 8. 62.
12. M.S. 8. 74 and onward.
13. M.S. 8. 72.
14. M.S. 8. 117.

The next important stress is on justice for its sake, as a matter of Dharma. Justice is very important merely as justice because only justice is expected of an ideal king, only justice will create confidence in the king and his royal power. That is precisely the reason why justice is known as *Dharma,* as a duty and righteousness.[15] The dignity of Justice conceived as Dharma is inviolable and consequences of failure of justice are very grave for all including the king.[16] The seat of judgment is so glorious that normally it is expected to inspire the person sitting on it to find out only truth and justice. This also stresses the importance of law in the governance of the subjects by the king.

We can also find clear indications of the fact that to Manu, justice is important as a matter of morality, both social and individual. If an individual violates the certain fixed moral standards inherited from conventions, it is bound to affect social morality. Thus, so many minor and major individual lapses come under individual morality. Thus, if a man has sex relations with a spinster or a widow, may be for a very short time or only occasionally, there is punishment for either.[17] The king is positively asked to keep all individuals within moral limits.[18] When Manu prohibits *Dyūta* and *Āhvaya,*[19] Gambling and Betting even if they do not affect society, the illegality of the two is necessary for the sake of individual morals. The social side of it is of course there, when very harsh punishments are laid down for Rape and Adultery and both men and women offenders are expected to suffer.[20] The terms Rape and Adultery are very clear, and their definition is glaringly different from what we get in the Indian Penal Code. All cases of connection with a maiden, willing or unwilling, come under Rape and in case of unwillingness of woman there are lighter punishments or no punishment for the woman while the man in question is severely punished. All cases of connection with a married woman whether willing or unwilling, are cases of adultery. But, when the woman in question is also to suffer harsh punishment according to

15. M.S. 8. 16, 17 and onwards.
16. As in F. N. 15.
17. M.S. 8. 368.
18. Spread over Adhyāyas 7 and 8.
19. M.S. 9. 224.
20. M.S. 9. 371 and 372.

Manu, it is clear that adultery is not merely *Vyabhicāra* of the marital rights of the husband, but also it has a moral side, individual and social both. Instances can be multiplied, but suffice here to state that to Manu, Law is an integral part of the preservation of individual and social morality, which will ultimately keep the social standards high.

Protection of individual and social safety both physical and mental as also protection of the safety of property is naturally stressed as an important purpose of criminal Law and legal provisions thereof by Manu. Thus, he states that 'The wives of all the four castes deserve the best protection,'[21] 'the king is to look after the safety of the property of minors,'[22] 'the king shall always protect his subjects from his corrupt sevants,'[23] 'punishment of death is ordained for stealing valuable and rare metals like gold etc.'[24] and so on point to this aspect of Law Criminal.

That law is for vengence on the offending party so that the offending party get their due revenge, a provision of law found in almost all countries in the world is found in the criminal law of Manu also. That clearly explains the harsh and ruthless punishments and also the punishment of the mutilation of limbs and also the insistence that

येन केनचिदंगेन हिंस्याच्चेच्छ्रेष्ठमन्त्यजः ।
छेत्तव्यं तत्तदेवास्य तन्मनोरनुशासनम् ।।[25]

"It is the ordinance of Manu that in case of the offender that limb by which he commits violence on the body of the person of the higher caste, shall suffer the mutilation of the same limb." The verses that follow (8. 280 to 283) give the deails of these. Again the punishment of mutilation of limb is ordained in case of all the castes except the Brahmana. This punishment creates a sort of satisfaction on the part of the offended party and this conduces to creating a sort of social environment in which there will be better-

21. M.S. 8. 359.
22. M.S. 8. 27.
23. M.S. 7. 123.
24. M.S. 8. 323.
25. M.S. 8. 334 and 8. 279.

ment of individual and social morals. This provision is thus important.

Thus, the purposes of criminal trials and punishments as per the views of Manu are, (i) Preservation of Truth, (ii) Preservation of Dharma, (iii) Justice for its own sake, (iv) Protection of individual and social morality, (v) Protection of and safety of individuals and society, physically and in otherways, (vi) The necessary satisfaction of revenge to be had to the offended party. Of all these to Manu, Preservation of truth and Dharma are most important probably because the other purposes are naturally to follow. Thus in Manu, a court of Law becomes a sacred place where pure justice followed by truth shall be dispensed.[26] Finding out truth at all costs and dispensing justice accordingly are thus the two principal ideals of a court of Law. Manu's very great emphasis on this is very clear. When again he describes the moral and spiritual advantages and disadvantages, of this, it is this anxiety that is working at its root.[27] To Manu thus, law and justice are divine missions and truth is at its basis. He very much anxiously stresses that no offence Civil or Criminal shall escape the eyes of Law, represented by the sceptre that symbolises Royal Power. The King's sceptre has a black colour and red open eyes. Manu states,

यत्र श्यामो लोहिताक्षो दण्डश्चरति पापहा।
प्रजास्तत्र न मुह्यन्ति नेता चेत्साधु पश्यति।[28]

That kingdom in which the Sceptre, black in colour and having red eyes moves all the while destroying sins, the subjects in this state are not deluded, the condition being that the king shall distinguish between right and wrong correctly."

The black colour of the sceptre represents the extreme impartiality of the kingly power in all matters including those of Law. It is to suggest that only inpartiality can be had from the person who wields this sceptre. The ample proof of this is that in the opinion of Manu even the relatives of the king including his sons are punishable if they have committed an offence.[29] The red colour

26. M.S. 8. 11, 14, 18, 19, etc.

27. M.S. 8. 19, 110, 128 etc.

28. M.S. 7. 25.

29. M.S. 8. 335. Vide also Kir. 1.

of the eyes suggests strictness and firmness in the implementation of Law and the dispensation of jutice as it also suggests full security to the law-abiding from the offenders in whose case the sceptre is alert. The eyes of this sceptre are wide open and this represents the fact that no offence of any kind shall escape law and trial and royal power. Even the crimes committed in secret shall be exposed. That is the main reason why Manu states that—

दण्ड : शास्ति प्रजाः सर्वाः दण्ड एवाभिरक्षति ।
दण्डः सुप्तेषु जागर्तिदण्डं धर्मं विदुर्बुधाः ।[30]

"*Daṇḍa* rules over all subjects and at the same time protects them. *Daṇḍa* is awake when the subjects are asleep. *Daṇḍa* is therefore called *Dharma*."

Yet one more thing shall be noted in the understanding of the theory of Law and punishment in Manu. It is that as in everything else, so in Law, prevention of offence is better than cure after an offence is already committed. Royal power and Royal Law shall be so very alert that the subjects fear it and through fear most of the crimes are averted.[31] If the wielder of this *Daṇḍa* is an able hand and a man with fore-sight, he will wield it well and the result will be that most of the offences will be averted as it happened in the kingdom of Duṣyanta[32] and Duryodhana.[33] The description of the power of *Daṇḍa* in the seventh Adhyāya is just with reference to this.[34] Manu, as a good student of psychology knows that no law will be obeyed if it fails to create fear in the heart of the probable offenders and confidence in the heart of law-avoiding citizens. That is the reason why he states that

सर्वो दण्डजितो लोको दुर्लभो हि शुचिर्नरः ।
दण्डस्य हि भयात्सर्वं जगद्भोगाय कल्पते ।[35]

"The whole world with all individuals is under the spell of *Daṇḍa* because it is difficult to come across a man perfectly pure. That is the reason why the world enjoys all its joys under the spell of the

30. M.S. 7. 18.
31 M.S. 7. 20, 22, 24 etc.
32. Śākuntalam 5.
33. Kir. 1.
34. M.S. 7. 14 to 32.
35. M.S. 7. 22.

fear of *Daṇḍa*." He naturally wants to avert crime even before it is committed.

Punishments are thus, first of all, preventive in Manu. The punishments are corrective also in so far as for the future, criminals are bound to take a lesson. Punishments are the social revenge for the criminal acts committed against some other individuals or against the whole society in fact. This is to keep the social order in tact society free and safe as far as possible from offenders and to keep the individual and social moral fabric high. The punishments are also protective and as such will create a keen sense of safety and protection in the heart of law-abiding citizens and a severe fright in the heart of likely offenders and ultimately a confidence will be created in the hearts of the subjects about the power of kingship and state and they will naturally feel secure physically, mentally and emotionally. The rather severe punishments and small corrective punishments even for minor offences have thus a specific all-sided purpose in view. Society, comprising of mutually dependent individuals must remain high in culture, morals decency, nobility, progress, safety and health, and that explains the peculiar nature of these punishments. To Manu, the punishments that he lays down are not harsh or inhuman, or even if they are harsh, they are a necessity. This is because no man on earth is perfectly pure or perfect and Manu is also inclined that there will be certain persons in the society who are habitually offenders and they might not be corrected inspite of all efforts. Very harsh punishments must be laid down for such habitual offenders who are beyond any correction.[36] With his supreme faith in the ultimate goodness of man and with full faith in the inherent potentialities of man and with his universal sympathy for man and with his unique optimism, Manu grants the fact that there are some persons in the society who are under the full control of the *Tamas* and since such men are beyond correction, and also since no man is perfect on earth and as a result all are prone to commit offences, harsh punishments must of necessity be laid down. This does not mean that Manu is revengeful on offenders. In fact he has sympathy for them as will be clear from the fact that in certain offences he gives an opportunity to the offender to improve. He states that—

वाग्दण्डं प्रथमं कुर्याद्धिग्दण्डं तदनन्तरम् ।
तृतीयं धनदण्डं तु वधदण्डमतः परम् ॥

36. For a similar idea, Vide Salmond.

37. M.S. 8. 129.

*Punishments and Penances*

"To suffer punishment is to pay a debt due to the Law that has been violated. Guilt plus punishment is innocence." (Salmond)[38]

The view of the Hindu Jurists, of Manu in particular, is worth a comparison with the above statement of Salmond. Even though Manu has not, consciously and specifically laid down any reformatory Theory and he sincerely believes in very harsh punishments, he knows that suffering punishment is essential not only for the revenge of the society or for upholding social morals but also for the ultimate good of the criminal, because, if he suffers punishment for his offence, he becomes pure. The author of he Smṛti therefore states that

राजा स्तेनेन गन्तव्यो मुक्तकेशेन धावता।
आचक्षाणेन तत्स्तेयमेवंकर्मास्मि शाधि माम्।
स्कन्धेनादाय मुसलं लगुडं वापि खादिरम्।
शक्तिं चोभयतस्तीक्ष्णामायसं दण्डमेव वा॥ [9]

"The thief, with his hair untied should approach the king running and should narrate the case of theft and state 'I have done this, save me." "He should lift a *Musala* on his shoulder or some sharp weapon or a weapon of iron and he shall approach the king."

With this submission, the king shall be approached and then it is left to the king either to punish him or to free him. The thief shall be free from the guilt only when he is either punished by the king or freed,[40] and of course the king will not fail to punish him if he so deserves. This naturally means what a serious offence it will be to run away after theft and similar offences. Manu goes to the extent of stating that if a king punishes the criminal and he is sentenced to death, he will go to *Svarga* on suffering that punishment.[41] This all establishes the fact that to Manu, suffering of the punishment by the criminal is unavoidably necessary. Actually punishment is to reform him. Hindu jurists also opine that expiation or penances wash away sin."[42] But when B. S. Singh makes

38. Jurisprudence, p. 119.
39. M.S. 8. 314 and 315.
40. M.S. 8. 316.
41. M.S. 8. 318. Also M.S. 11. 100.
42. B. S. Sinha in 'Principles of Criminal Law,' p. 33.

this statement, it should not be forgotten that for the criminals who have offended the society through offence to some individual and have violated established Law, penances or expiations are no option to the legal punishments that they were invariably to suffer. First, the legal puishments were to be suffered and then will follow the penances to purify the mind and heart of the offender and to make him repent as also to make him take a firm vow never to repeat the crime and suffer sin. The famous verse of Manu in this regard is—

प्रायो माम तपः प्रोक्तं चित्तं निश्चयमुच्यते।
तपोनिश्चयसंयुक्तं प्रायश्चित्तं विदुर्बुधाः ॥[43]

"*Prāyas* is a *Tapas* and *Cittam* means determination. *Prāyaścittam* is that which consists of mental suffering for what has already been committed and decision (not to repeat the crime in life).

Of course, on very serious offences where the offender has to suffer capital punishment, no *Prāyaścitta* in this life is possible, though he may be made to repent for what he has done. Then, in that case, he will be pure and will not repeat the offence in his next life. Here also an attempt is made to create an atmosphere in which these offenders were asked and advised to repent and undergo penances just with the idea that they may be got back to the social fold, they might not be forsaken and required to live like outcastes after undergoing punishment. The state in which the hero of Le Miserables of Victor Hugo was placed after he was freed from jail is an ample proof of the probable grave results of the life of the criminals. Manu knows that society might not accept them in their fold or if they had committed serious offences. He therefore in his own way lays down these expiations accompanied by repentance so that it is an advantage to the offender and the society feels no hesitation in taking back the man in its fold. This is the sort of reformatory Theory of Manu. He so contrives that the offender suffers due punishment, he then is repentant, the purity and status of the society are kept intact and at the same time the offender is brought back to the social fold as a better man, as a man who in all probability will not repeat his offence. On one side thus Manu lays down very harsh punishments and establishes the full necessity of the offender undergoing the same and on the other side he so tries

43. M.S. 11. 47a.

to contrive that society should not multiply in habitual criminals. This is of course the best that Manu could think of under the conditions he was placed in. Important fact to be but noted is that Manu is fully conscious of the necessity of rehabilitation of the criminals and their due dignity. He knows that reformation of the criminals is a grave necessity in the interest of the criminal as also in the interest of the Society as a whole. This is the best that he could think of as a remedy of the very serious problem. In the modern days we might not agree with this as method and feel that it fails to do anything substantial in so far as it is solely dependent upon the human appeal to the criminal's heart and punishment remains as it is. On the other side it is an appeal to the society to permit his due place to the man in the society and this too he might find difficult to obtain. We get no proofs of how the criminals were treated in jail and whether they had a chance to improve and so on. Thus, penances and expiations coupled with punishment might no doubt obtain a few criminals as better citizens, but this will not possibly apply to all and definitely not to habitual criminals. We accept Manu's sincerity in the matter and also accept that he was conscious of the after effects of the life of the criminal on the individual and the society and that he wanted no group of habitual criminals and that he also wanted that all offenders should repent and become better men and better citizens.

B. S. Sinha states "The Hindu Law books clearly show that the chief purpose for which punishment is awarded is the protection and maintenance of the individual's interests in the society by deterring the evil-minded persons." Manu says, "First, let him punish by gentle admonition, afterwards by harsh reproof, thirdly by deprivation of property, after that by corporeal pain. But even when by corporal punishment he cannot restrain such offenders, let him apply to them all the four modes with vigour."[44] After all the discussion that we have so far, it is clear to understand that this is true only of minor offences, in which even if minor punishments are not awarded, the ends of law would be well served by admonition, reproof etc. We have also seen above that "Protection and maintenance of the individual's interests in the society"[45] is only one of the many purposes of punishment as laid down by Manu.

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44. 'Principles of Criminal Law,' p. 34.

45. Vide verses spread over Adh. 8.

*Are Punishments Primitive?*

It is alleged by many that the punishments laid down by Manu are rather too harsh, heartless and ruthless and as such we could have found these in a primitive society only. Yājñavalkya and Nārada more or less follow Manu even though their vehemence has lessened and is gradually lessening further, because they were in all probability against these too harsh punishments and yet they had not the courage to go against the verdict of Manu since Manu was accepted as the final authority on law in their days and as the first authority. It is too well-known that in the list of legal authorites enumerated in the Yājñavalkya Smṛti, Manu is accepted as the first.[46] Some would even feel that these very harsh punishments would not reform the criminals and every man who commits some offence would become a soul lost to the society. Criminals get no chance or atmosphere of improvement. Some modern jurists are against the death penalty, which is laid down in case of several offences by Manu. 'Eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth' is the common rule as we will be able to derive from verse 8.334.[47] Verse 8.279[48] and the verses that follow drive at the same even though the latter are with reference to the offences committed by a Sudra on the members of the higher castes.

Before we give a hurried conclusion or some view like this, before we make a sweeping remark on the basis of a verse from here or a verse from there without reference to the context, we must make a note of certain very important points.

From the details of how a plea is to be admitted,[49] how the judges shall work,[50] what shall be the procedure in case of criminal

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46. Y.S. 1. 4 and 5.
47. The verse is येंन येन यथांगेन स्तेनो नृषु विचेष्टते।
तत्तदेव हस्तेस्य प्रत्यादेशाय पार्थिवः॥
48. The verse is येन केनचिदंगेन हिंस्याच्चेच्छ्रेष्ठमन्त्यजः।
छेत्तव्यं तत्तदेवास्य तन्मनोरनुशासनम्॥
Also Y.S. 2. 215. N.S.
49. 8. 2 to 8.
50. 8. 9 to 26.

offences,[51] who are the witnesses,[52] how are they to be examined,[53] what are the other modes of proof,[54] and what is the relative value of each as we have seen above and also from the details that we will find in each title and the details of punishments and the reason and convention at their root, we will come to the conclusion that Manu's criminal Law is well-developed, mature and having a long convention and established usage at its root. It is clear that law has developed far and wide. His anxiety for the prevalence and finding out of truth, his keenness to preserve the individual and social morality and as a result the social fabric and high morals, his theory of punishment that is not merely retributive or expiatory but also deterrent and reformistic etc. shows that Manu's ideas on law, criminal dealings and consequent punishments, are clear and quite advanced. The society of the days of Manu is highly cultured, complex, advanced and even rational. His stress on penances and the reasons thereof[55] also supports our contention.

Now the question that we have to deal with is this. When Manu lays down very harsh punishments even for some offences conceived of as minor in the present day, what is his view? His first and clear view is that prevention is better than cure. If a king expects that there shall be as few offences as possible, punishments laid down should be so very severe that they should normally prevent offenders from committing any offences as far as possible. His next anxiety, in case of the actual offences is that the wrong done to a member of society by one should necessarily be avenged and should be avenged according to the seriousness of the crime in question. We have not to give our opinion about the seriousness or otherwise of the crime from our own modern angle of vision but from the point of view of Manu. To illustrate, if Manu lays down the penalty of death for an offender who has stolen precious metals like gold,[56] the offence in question is very grave in so far as gold was a rare thing and valued very highly in his society. This will therefore on one side set an example for other likely offenders and also create confidence in law in the hearts of all and on the other side,

51. M.S. 8. 72 to 78.

52. M.S. 8. 61 to 71.

53. M.S. 8. 79 to 117.

54. M.S. 8. 52, 60. Also Y.S. 2. 22. N.S. 1.

55. Vide my chapter on 'Criminal Law in Manu'

56. M.S. 8. 323.

the social fabric and morality will continue to be of a high standard and healthy. If Manu were to be told in case of the death penalties that he has laid down that 'no one has a right to take another's life,' he would naturally retort in the same words 'no one has a right to take another's life' and this time apply the words to the person offended. It might also be agreed that severe physical punishments may prevent more or less permanently some crimes in some cases. It is too well-known that in Saudi-Arabia to-day, mutilation of limbs and similar very harsh punishments are laid down for offences of theft, the theory of social revenge is predominant. But the result is that instances of cases of theft are very few in that society. On the other side, jurists have accepted that the number of crimes and their repetition have not decreased in the societies where punishments are made less harsh and the death penalty has been ousted.[57] Of course it may also be argued that there is an economic side of the question and very often man might commit a theft through sheer necessity. The reply to this is that Manu is not unconscious of this and therefore he has laid down that it is the prime duty of the king to make his subjects happy and secure,[58] and also that when punishments are levied, the position of the offender shall also be one of the factors.[59] One more thing to be noted is that Manu sincerely and honestly believes that even if man is essentially and basically good and even though he has extreme faith in the ultimate goodness of man, he honestly believes that in any society some men are bound to be habitual criminals and offenders and they are almost incorrigible. He has laid down expiations and repentances for them, but that is the only thing he finds possible. And, with all the human sympathy that has arisen to-day, the question whether or

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57. Vide in this connection "The confinement, the deprivation of social intercuourse and other sort of subjection to rigid discipline will never allow him to develop his character. The possibly to reform the criminal in the atmosphere of suppression seems too remote. This theory also fails in case of the habitual and professional criminals who cannot be reformed. Oppenheimer criticises this theory in the following words, "It robs punishment of its siting. The criminal is looked upon as an object of pity, not of hatred and punishment becomes the work of charity." B. S. Sinha in Principles of Criminal Law, p. 37.

58. Looking to their welfare and security and keeping all in their proper order of castes and their professions, proteting all against bribery and corruption, ever seeing that Brahmins and others do not starve in the kingdom, seeing also that all get their due bread and living, etc. are some of the details. But this is a sociological topic and again it would require a separate chapter.

59. M.S. 8. 388, 391 etc. Also Y.S. 2. 26. etc.

not there are some men who are habitual criminals and a grave danger to society remains unsolved. Society and its individuals must be saved from them and if that is to be done, the penalty of death and mutilation of limbs and harsh punishments have no alternative. To-day, India leans towards making the punishments less harsh and even towards the abolition of death penalty, but it is too well-known that most of the cases of murder and adultery and rape are not proved in our courts and the number of crimes is increasing day by day. To Manu, an ideal is not good and worth attaining to for its own sake, he accepts only those ideals which are for the ultimate good of mankind.

With all this, the climax comes in that Manu is anxious (i) not to allow criminals to become habitual, and (ii) not to allow them to become socially unsettled, uprooted and outcastes after they have undergone the fixed punishments. That explains as we have noted Manu's insistence on the punishments being followed by penances and real repentance. Manu therefore does not stick to one particular theory or view because in his analysis of society and its needs, he finds various views necessary for the ultimate good both of the individual and the society. And as he tries to lay down all these views in their proper order, Manu finds no alternative to harsh punishments and also to not permitting minor offences like the sex contact between a spinster and a man or that between a man and a widow to go without punishment. Modern law has done nothing better than Manu by lessening the intensity of punishments laying down the sentence of death only as a rare one and even talking of doing away with the penalty of death. It will be accepted by almost all modern jurists that fear of law and punishments has more or less disappeared from the minds of offenders and the result is not only multiplication of offences but also constant repetition of these and every time poverty and acute necessity is not the reason. The problem should be dealt with scientifically, and with reason and with the proper understanding of the nature of man and not merely from a sentimental point of view and with too much of a talk on humanity, which surely the ancient Jurist Manu did not lack in.

*Punishments vary according to caste*

A peculiar trait of the Laws and the legal punishments of Manu is that punishments vary according to caste and of all, the Brāhmaṇa

caste has got so many concessions in and escapes from punishments and their intensity. On the other side, very much more severe punishments are laid down for criminal offences against the Brāhmaṇas. If we were to refer to the various references, he has referred to the predominance of Brāhmaṇa judges[60] and Brāhmaṇa advisers of the judge who interpret Law for him;[61] calling of a Brāhmaṇa as a witness in a court of law as little as possible[62] and when he is called, treating him with special privileges; taking for granted that a Brāhmaṇa will invariably speak truth and so the witness being told only 'speak' if he is a Brāhmaṇa;[63] and so on. If the Brahmin has committed a murder or some hienous offence and mutilation of limbs or death is the penalty, he is not to be killed but to be banished with all his wealth intact;[64] if a Brāhmaṇa has committed a criminal offence on a person of the lower caste the punishment of fine etc. are much less and they grow lesser with every lower caste;[65] if a Sūdra has offended a member of the higher caste his punishment grows more severe with the higher status of the caste of the offended position.[66] Again, when a Brahmin comes across some hidden wea'th, he is not expected to give a share to the king[67] while if a king himself comes across such wealth he gives half of it to the Brāhmaṇas.[68] Murder of a Brahmin is one of the most hienous offences, a *Mahāpātaka*.[69] The Brāhmana has thus no physical punishment and definitely no death sentence and if the crime of the Brāhmaṇa is so severe that it ordains death penalty, his head is to be shaved off[70] and he is to be banished.[71] If a man other than a Brāhmaṇa kidnaps a married woman, he deserved death, evidently thus laying down that for a similar sin, a Brāhmaṇa is not to be killed.[72] If a Brāhmaṇa rapes

60. M.S. 8. 9 and 20.
61. M.S. 8. 1, 11 etc.
62. M.S. 8. 65.
63. M.S. 8. 88, option shown in 8. 113.
64. M.S. 8. 379, 380, 381.
65. In M. S. Vide discussion on *Vakparushya* and *Dandaparushya* in Adh. 8.
66. As in 65.
67. M.S. 8. 37.
68. M.S. 8. 38.
69. M.S. 11. 54.
70. M.S. 8. 379.
71. M.S. 8. 380.
72. M.S. 8. 359.

a Brāhmaṇa girl he is only to pay a fine. A Brāhmaṇa shall not be killed inspite of the severest offences and under no circumstance[73] shall there be a Sudra as a judge.[74] These are some of the outstanding references in which Manu has laid down a favourable treatment for the Brahmin class as a whole and for the learned Brāhmaṇa in particular. This is all in addition to the statement that even sinking financially, a king shall not collect taxes from learned Brāhmaṇas because, if learned Brāhmaṇas starve in the state, the whole state someday will suffer starvation.[75] We have similar specific statements in the Śākuntalam of Kālidāsa, a junior contemporary of Manu which states that—

यदुत्तिष्ठति वर्णेभ्यो नृपाणां क्षयि तत्फलम्।
तपः षड्भागमक्षय्यं ददत्यारण्यका हि नः॥[76]

"The fruit that accrues to the king from other castes is destructive, while the foresters give to the sixth part of their austerites which is indestructib'e." This will naturally suggest to us that in the days of Kālidāsa, even learned Brāhmins must have also been free from any taxation.

At the very first glance, the following facts become clear from the abovementioned statements and it is remarkable that these are being diluted by Yājñavalkya and Nārada[77] and the later writers:—

(i) The society and the state of the days of Manu is dominated by the Brāhmaṇas. Even when the Brāhmaṇas do not rule, they show a society in which they are very prominent in the society and their power is great and feared.

(ii) The Brāhmaṇa class was the uppermost class in so far as most of the education and learning was dominated by the Brāhmaṇas, who were the real custodians of most of the lores in society.

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73. M.S. 8. 380.
74. M.S. 8. 20, 21, 22.
75. M.S. 7. 134.
76. Śākuntalam 2.
77. N.S. 14. 9.

(iii) The learned Brāhmaṇas dominated at the courts of kings and occupied the highest positions in the state and government including those of the ministers and judges.

(iv) All social culture, religion, morality etc. depended upon this class.

(v) The Kshatriya rulers paid their due respect to these Brāhmaṇas and they were dependent upon them for many things.

(vi) The very ideal of the life of the Brāhmaṇa was plain living and high thinking. They materially suffered and gave the best of what they had to society.

(vii) Society as a whole looked with keen respect and a sense of sanctity towards this caste and accepted that the Brāhmaṇas, by their very learning and culture, religion and morality, occupation and status, control and steadiness were the purest of all castes and were therefore the least likely to commit sins. Respect of the Brāhmaṇa as a caste was therefore originally the respect of his learning, culture, religion and morality.

(viii) And actually it happened that most of our writers of Śāstras were Brāhmaṇas and it was natural therefore for them to see that their domination of the society remained intact.

The position continued to remain the same for a considerable time and even when the later Smṛtikaras were not so vehement and emphatic about this very high status and so many concessions to the Brāhmaṇas, these continue to lurk for a considerable time and Manu is followed though perhaps half-heartedly by Yājñavalkya[78] and others.

78. This is evidenced in the brief references about the special position of the Brāhmaṇa and no details and repetitions as found in the manusmṛti. The vehemence is lost and casual references occur. It is clear that the authors have started realising the injustice in this undue special privilege of the Brāhmaṇa class, the learned Brahmins in particular. They accept that the attitude of the king shall be absolutely impartial and equal towards all. Then the special rights are too much. We however add that the society in the days of Manu respected the learning, character, life, culture and leadership of the Brāhmaṇa so sighly that if a Brāhmaṇa ever committed a heinous offence, even if he was not put to death, socially he was as good as dead and so, death was better for him than this extreme humiliation resulting from life plus the shaving off of the head or banishment for the offence committed. But this is a problem to be dealt with by sociology, for which vide my Thesis on 'Interpretation of the Manusmṛti.'

With due respect to Manu and the proclamations that he has laid down, it must be stated that at least in the eyes of Law, these special concessions and privileges cannot be defended. Manu accepts the greatness and absolute impartiality of Law and yet lays down these and this is a contradiction. The learning of the Brāhmaṇa may be regarded in many ways, but surely in a court of Law all must be equal, irrespective of caste and creed and station in life and so on. This would have added lots to his very fine, detailed systematic treatment. Social concessions are different from legal ones and respect and dignity of Law demands absolute equality of all in its eyes.

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*Abbreviations*

Maha. Mahābhārata
Rama. Rāmāyaṇa
M.S. Manusmṛti
Y.S. Yājñavalkyasmṛti
N.S. Nāradasmṛti
Sak. Śākuntalam
Kir. Kirātārjunīyam
Ragh. Raghuvaṁśam

# धर्म के हिन्दू सिद्धांत की उत्पत्ति एवं विकास

डॉ० रणजीत सिंह*

भारतीय विचारधारा एवं जीवन-विधि में धर्म का विशेष महत्त्व रहा है। धर्म शब्द की व्युत्पत्ति संस्कृत-धातु 'dhr धृ' से है जिसका प्रयोग धारण के अर्थ में किया जाता है।[1] ऋग्वेद में धर्म और धर्मन् का उल्लेख मिलता है।[2] परन्तु इस ग्रन्थ में ऋत का विशेष महत्त्व दृष्टिगत होता है, जिसका कालान्तर में धर्म की अवधारणा के विकास में बड़ा योगदान रहा है।

**ऋत—**

ऋग्वेद में प्रयुक्त ऋत के समानार्थक शब्दों का प्रयोग ईरानी धर्मग्रन्थ 'अवेस्ता' में भी मिलता है।[3] डा० लारेन्स मिल्स का मत है "अवेस्ता में अर्श शब्द का प्रयोग ऋत की भाँति सृष्टि सम्बन्धी अपरिवर्तनीय व्यवस्था एवं दैवी नियमों के लिये किया गया है।[4] लुई रेनु का यह विचार है कि आर्यों के भारतवर्ष में प्रवेश के पूर्व ही उनमें ऋत सम्बन्धी विचार विद्यमान थे जिसका प्रमाण अवेस्ता में प्रयुक्त 'अर्श' शब्द है, ठीक प्रतीत होता है"।[5] कतिपय अन्य विद्वानों[6] का मत है कि आदि काल में ऋग्वैदिक ऋत का तात्पर्य प्रकृति में निहित शाश्वत नियमों से था। कालान्तर में यज्ञों से सम्बन्धित नियमों को भी इसके अन्तर्गत स्वीकार किया गया। समय की गति के साथ इसका क्षेत्र व्यापक होता गया और कालान्तर में ऋत में नैतिक नियमों का भी समावेश कर लिया गया।

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१. डा० राधाकृष्णन, द हिन्दू व्यू आव लाइफ, पृ० ५६। जी० एच० मीज महोदय का मत है कि धर्म शब्द की उत्पत्ति संस्कृत शब्द धर से है। जी० एच० मीज, धर्म एण्ड सोसाइटी, पृ० ६। परन्तु संस्कृत साहित्य के धातु-पाठ में यह शब्द नहीं मिलता। धर तो 'धृ' धातु की विकृति मात्र है।

२. वैदिक इण्डेक्स, (हिन्दी संस्करण) भाग १, पृ० ४३७।

३. अवेस्ता, यस्न, ९/६/१।

४. डा० लारेन्स मिल्स द्वारा सम्पादित, अवेस्ता, यस्न, १।

५. लुई रेनु–वैदिक इण्डिया, पृ० ५६।

६. ए० ए० मैकडोनल, हिस्ट्री आव संस्कृत लिटरेचर, पृ० ६७। ब्लूमफील्ड, रिलिजन आव द वेदाज़, पृ० १३५। हिरियान्ना, आउटलाइन्स आव इण्डियन फिलासोफी, पृ० ३३।

ऋग्वेद में ऋत को ब्रह्माण्ड-व्यवस्था से सम्बद्ध एवं प्राकृतिक घटनाओं को सुसंचालित करने वाले एक शाश्वत आधार के रूप में मान्यता दी गयी है। ऐसा विचार मिलता है कि ऋत के पद-चिह्नों में उषायें प्रातःकाल उदित होती हैं, इसी के अनुसार पितरों ने सूर्य को स्वर्ग में स्तम्भित किया है, सूर्य ऋत का भ्राजमान प्रतीक है और वर्ष इसका ही द्वादश अरों वाला चक्र है।[1]

जल और पौधों में अन्तर्निहित तत्त्वाग्नि जिसे जलती हुई अरणियों से मनुष्य के लिये उत्पन्न किया जाता है, ऋतजात होकर ऋत-गर्भ बन जाती है।[2] जल के स्रोत ऋत के अनुसार प्रवहणशील बताये गये हैं।[3] इसमें एक अन्य स्थल पर सूर्य को निरन्तर रहने वाला ऋत का रूप कहा गया है।[4] ऋत, जड़ एवं चेतन सब में परिव्याप्त बताया गया है। ऋत की अखण्डता देश और काल के परे है, दूरी और समय का कोई भी व्यवधान ऋत के नियमों में परिवर्तन नहीं कर सकता है।[5] इससे स्पष्ट रूप से परिलक्षित होता है कि ऋग्वेद में विश्व के अनन्त रूप को एक सूत्र में पिरो देने वाले तत्त्व को ऋत की संज्ञा दी गयी है।

**ऋत का यज्ञ से सम्बन्ध** — ऋग्वेद में ऋत के कारण यज्ञों का सम्पादन होना बतलाया गया है।[6] जिससे सभी की सुरक्षा सम्भव है।[7] यज्ञों में सोमपान करते समय भी ऋत के प्रभाव का वर्णन मिलता है।[8] ऋत के दंड से अग्नि को प्रज्वलित

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१. द्वादशारं नहि तज्जराय वर्वर्ति चक्रं परिद्यामृतस्य। ऋ० वे० १/१६४/११। द्रष्टव्य, ए० बी० कीथ, रिलिजन एण्ड फिलासोफी आव द वेद एण्ड उपनिषद्स, पृ० ८४। ब्लूमफील्ड, रिलिजन आव द वेदाज़, पृ० १२७।

२. ऋग्वेद, १/६८/५।

३. वही, १/२४/३; २/२७/८।

४. वही, ५/६३/१। वही, ५/६३/७। वही, ५/५१/१।

५. डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल, वेद-विद्या, पृ० १८६-१८७।

इस प्रकार के तत्व विश्व की कुछ अन्य प्राचीन सभ्यताओं में प्राप्त होते हैं, किन्तु उनका सम्बन्ध ब्रह्माण्ड-व्यवस्था से न होकर शक्ति के रूप में किया गया था। ऐसा विचार प्राचीन साहित्य में वर्णित ताओ में मिलता है। द्रष्टव्य, ई० डबलयू हापकिन्स एथिक्स आव इंडिया, पृ० ३। प्राचीन हिब्रू जाति में भी प्रचलित तोरा का तात्पर्य केवल देवताओं तक ही सीमित रह गया था। द्रष्टव्य, जी० एच० मोज—धर्म एण्ड सोसाइटी, पृ० ३९। उपर्युक्त ताओ और तोरा का तात्पर्य विश्व को संचालित करने वाले तत्त्व से नहीं था। इसके विपरीत भारत में ऋग्वेदिक ऋत की परिकल्पना में सृष्टि को संचालित करने वाले तत्त्व की भी प्रधानता थी।

६. ऋग्वेद, ६/१५/१४; ७/३५/१५।

७. वही, १०/६७/२।

८. वही, ७/६५/३

करने का वर्णन किया गया है।[१] इससे स्पष्ट है कि ऋत और यज्ञ का विशेष सम्बन्ध था।

यज्ञ से विशेष सम्बन्ध होने के कारण ऋग्वेद में ऋत का सम्बन्ध देवताओं से भी बताया गया है। अग्नि को ऋत का अंश, ऋत से उत्पन्न तथा स्वकार्यों को ऋत के अनुसार करने वाला बताया गया है।[२] अग्नि-विषयक यह धारणा स्वाभाविक एवं सुव्यक्त है कि वह आहुतियों को देवताओं तक ले जाने या देवताओं को आहुतियों तक ले आने का कार्य ऋत की पावन शक्ति से प्रेरित एवं नियमित होकर करते हैं।[३] इससे वरुण को ऋत का देवता[४] तथा स्वामी[५] कहा गया है। सोम को इसका संरक्षक, सहायक और देवताओं को ऋतावन्[६] बताया गया है। मित्र और वरुण ऋत एव प्रकाश के स्वामी हैं; वे ऋत के ही सहारे ऋत को धारण करते हुए कहे गये हैं।[७] ऋतावृध् विशेषण सबसे अधिक उनके तथा अन्य आदित्यों के और फिर सामान्य देवताओं के लिये प्रयुक्त हुआ है।

वरुण ऋत के गोप्ता कहे गये हैं; किन्तु इस विशेषण का प्रयोग अग्नि और सोम के लिये भी किया गया है। प्रमुख रूप से अग्नि के लिये प्रयुक्त ऋतावन विशेषण अनेक बार मित्र और वरुण के लिये भी आया है।[८]

यह भी उल्लेखनीय है कि उषायें न केवल ऋत का अपितु वरुण के भी नियम का पालन करती हैं। आकाश के तारे वरुण के इंगित पर दिन में छिप जाते हैं। नैतिकता के क्षेत्र में भावमय ऋत की अपेक्षा देवगण अधिक महत्त्वशाली हैं। विख्यात यम-यमी-सूक्त के अन्तर्गत मानवजाति की उत्पत्ति के निमित्त अपनी बहन यमी के द्वारा की गयी प्रणय-याचना को अस्वीकार करते हुए यम ने न केवल ऋत का ही, अपितु

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१. वही, ९/७५/२; ७/३४/८।
द्रष्टव्य, ब्लूमफील्ड-रिलिजन आव द वेदाज, पृ० १२८।
द्रष्टव्य, ए० बी० कीथ—रिलिजन एण्ड फिलासोफी आव द वेद एण्ड उपनिषद्स, पृ० ८३।

२. ऋग्वेद, ७/३४/८; ९/७५/२।

३. वही, ३/४/११; ३/६/९।

४. वही, १/१/८; १/८/५।

५. वही, ३/१०/२; १०/११/८।

६. वही, ३/२/१३; ३/५५/१४।

७ ऋग्वेद, १/२३/५।

८ वही, ९/४८/४, गोपऋतस्य विर्भरत्।
वही, ९/७३/८, ऋतस्यगोपा न दभाय सुक्रतु।
वही, ९/९७/२४।
द्रष्टव्य,—ए० ए० मैक्डानल कृत वैदिक माइथालोजी का हिन्दी रूपान्तर वैदिक देवशास्त्र, पृ० ५२।

मित्र एवं वरुण के विधानों का भी नाम लिया है।[1] इस वेद में हमें केवल ऐसे ही स्थल नहीं मिलते जहाँ ऋत एक स्वतन्त्र सत्ता के रूप में प्रतिष्ठित किया गया है, अपितु ऐसे भी स्थल प्राप्त होते हैं, जहाँ पर यह किसी एक देव की सम्पत्ति बनकर सामने आया है। किन्तु जहाँ पर ऋत किसी देवता की विशेष सम्पत्ति या गुण के रूप में प्रतिष्ठित किया गया है, वहाँ देवताओं का महत्व कम और गौण हो जाता है, क्योंकि वे ऋत के रथी, ऋत को बढ़ाने वाले और ऋत के संरक्षक कहे गए हैं[2]। इस अवस्था में उनसे परे ऋत की स्वतंत्र सत्ता सिद्ध हो जाती है किन्तु फिर भी ऋत के साथ अन्य देवताओं और वरुण का सम्बन्ध सदा घनिष्ट एवं व्यक्त बना रहता है।[3] यही कारण है कि देवता ऋतज्ञ (ऋत के ज्ञाता), ऋतद्रष्टा, ऋतप्रेमी तथा ऋतावृध् बताये गये हैं।

**ऋत का नैतिक स्वरूप––**

ऋग्वेद में ऋत का नैतिक स्वरूप भी दृष्टिगोचर होता है। ऋत शब्द विश्व की नैतिक व्यवस्था का भी बोधक है। इसको निषेध एवं यथार्थ कार्य का विधान करने वाला कहा गया है।[4] प्रोफेसर कीथ के अनुसार[5] "ऋत केवल सत्य मात्र नहीं है। सत्य का अर्थ कथन की यथार्थता है। ऋत और सत्य का वर्णन इस वेद में अलग-अलग किया गया है।" इसके विपरीत कतिपय विद्वानों का मत[6] है कि इन दोनों का विवेचन साथ-साथ और पर्यायवाची के रूप में किया गया है।

ऋग्वेद तथा कालान्तर में प्रणीत धार्मिक ग्रंथों में ऋत तथा सत्य का अभिन्न सम्बन्ध बताया गया है। इससे स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि सत्य के लिये ऋत और असत्य के लिये अनृत शब्द का व्यवहार किया गया है। यज्ञार्थं ऋत का प्रयोग अनेक बार

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१ ऋग्वेद, १०/१०/१-१४।

२. ऋ० वे० ३/२/१३।

३. ३/५५/१४।

४. ऋग्वेद, ४/२३/८ : १०/१०४।

५. ए० बी० कीथ, रिलिजन एण्ड फिलासोफी आव वेद एण्ड उपनिषद्स पृ० ४३७।

६. सारस्वती सुषमा, पृ० ९९, म० गिरधर शर्मा चतुर्वेदी का लेख, ऋतं च सत्यं च। ए० बी० ओ० आर० आई०, भाग २२, १९२२, वी० एम० आप्टे का 'ऋतं और सत्यं' नामक लेख।

ब्लूमफील्ड, रिलिजन आव वेदाज, पृ० १२८।

मैक्समूलर, इन्डिया, व्हाट इट कैन टीच अस, पृ० ६०-६१।

हिरियान्ना, आउट लाइन्स आव इन्डियन फिलासोफी, पृ० ३३।

सत्य के अर्थ में किया हुआ मिलता है।[1] बार्थ तथा रगोजिन के अनुसार ऋग्वेद में ऋत और सत्य को सौरजगत का धर्म बताया गया है।[2] स्पष्ट है कि सत्य और ऋत का विशेष सम्बन्ध है और सत्य एक नैतिक गुण है।[3] इससे यह निष्कर्ष निकालना सहज है कि ऋत के सहारे ही सत्यादि कुछ नैतिक गुणों का भी विकास हुआ। अतः यह मानने में कि नैतिकता सत्य के द्वारा विकसित हुई है कोई विशेष हानि नहीं।[4] वैदिक विचारधारा के अनुसार हम जीवन-यज्ञ में अनृत से सत्य की ओर बढ़ते हैं, सत्य को व्रत के रूप में देवता धारण करते हैं।[5]

तैत्तिरीयसंहिता और वाजसनेयिसंहिता में भी ऋत का उल्लेख सत्य के लिए मिलता है।[6] तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मण[7] में बताया गया है कि ऋत सत्य में स्थित रहता है और सत्य ऋत में। शतपथ-ब्राह्मण में कहा गया है कि ऋत ही सत्य है और सत्य ही ऋत है।[8] यहाँ ऋत और सत्य समानार्थक माने गये हैं। कई स्थलों पर सत्य और ऋत का प्रयोग साथ-साथ किया गया है।[9] संहिताओं के पश्चात् ऋत के स्थान पर सत्य का महत्व बढ़ जाता है। उपनिषदों में ऋत के स्थान पर सत्य का विवेचन प्राप्त होता है। बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् में सत्य और धर्म एक दूसरे के परिपूरक बतलाए गये हैं।[10]

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१. ऋग्वेद, १/४३/९, १/१३७/२; ७/४९/३; १०/८/५। तैत्ति० स० ३/३/५, बौध० ध० सू० ३/४/२ ऋतं च सत्यं च। द्रष्टव्य, सारस्वती सुषमा, पृ० ९८-९९ में म० गिरधर शर्मा चतुर्वेदी का लेख—'ऋतं च सत्यं च'।

२. बार्थ ए०, रिलिजन्स आव इंडिया, पृ० ४२, ४३, १७७। रगोजिन, जेड, ए० वैदिक इंडिया, पृ० १४६, १४७।

३. ऋग्वेद, १/१४५/५ : १०/१९०/१।

४. अलबर्ट स्वेटजर, इंडियन थाट एण्ड इट्स डेवलपमेंट, पृ० ४५।
नैतिकता का विकास सत्य से हुआ है। मानव ने निम्नस्तरीय नैतिकता से श्रेष्ठ नैतिकता की ओर बढ़ने का प्रयास किया है, जिसकी उत्पत्ति पड़ोसी या अपने समीप में स्थित व्यक्ति के प्रति दया-भाव के कारण नहीं, अपितु असत्य के प्रति घृणा के दृष्टिकोण से हुई है।

५. डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल, वेद-विद्या पृ० १९७।

६. तै० सं०—३/३/५ वाज० सं०—११/४३।

७. तैत्ति० ब्रा०—ऋतं सत्येऽधायि, सत्यमृते अधायि, ऋतं च मे सत्यं चाभूताम्। ३/७/७/४।

८. श० ब्रा०, एस० बी० ई०, जिल्द ४४, पृ० ४०, ६।४। ४१; ६/७/७/११, ११/२/७/९।

९. एगलिंग, एस० बी० ई० जिल्द ४१, पृ० २२६। ऋग्वेद, १०/१९०/१ पर सायण-भाष्य।

१०. बृ० उ०—१/४/१४।

उपनिषदों के पश्चात् धर्म का महत्व बढ़ने लगा और कालांतर में ऋत की धारणा में समाहित हो गयी ।[१] यही कारण है कि उपनिषदों एवं उनके बाद लिखे गये साहित्य में ऋत का बहुत ही कम उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है ।

**धर्म और धर्मन्**—ऋग्वेद में धर्म और धर्मन् शब्द भी मिलते हैं। वैदिक इण्डेक्स के लेखकों के अनुसार इनमें से प्रथम इस वेद में और दोनों ही बाद में विधान अथवा प्रचलन के लिए व्यवहृत शब्द हैं ।[२]

ऋग्वेद में कहीं-कहीं व्रत[३] और यज्ञ धर्म के लिए प्रयुक्त हुए मिलते हैं। यज्ञ-सम्बन्धी कृत्य पूर्वकाल में धर्म के रूप में थे। धर्म यज्ञ रूप में था। इसलिए देवताओं ने यज्ञ सम्पादित कर धर्म किया था, ऐसा इसी वेद में कहा गया है ।[४]

डा० राजेन्द्र चन्द्र हाजरा तथा डा० पाण्डुरंग वामन काणे के मतानुसार ऋग्वेद में धर्मन् शब्द का प्रयोग प्रायः नपुंसकलिंग में किया गया है जिसका अर्थ पहले तो आदेश[५] और धार्मिक कृत्यों से है किन्तु पुल्लिंग में प्रयोग किये जाने पर इस शब्द को अवधारक के अर्थ में ग्रहण किया जाता है। इसके विपरीत डा० हाजरा का मत है, "पुल्लिग का प्रयोग ऋग्वेद की अपेक्षा बाद की संहिताओं और ब्राह्मणों में अधिक मिलता है।[६] डा० काणे का मत[७] है कि यह शब्द चाहे पुल्लिग में हो या नपुंसक-लिंग में किन्तु इसका प्रयोग अवधाता के अर्थ में किया गया है। ए० बी० कीथ के अनुसार नियम का बोधक शब्द धर्मन् है जिसका अर्थ धारक और धार्य दोनों हैं, ऋत की तरह यह भी सृष्टि के सभी पक्षों के लिए प्रयुक्त होता है। पुरुष-सूक्त में बताया गया है कि देवताओं ने यज्ञ के द्वारा यज्ञ किया और यही प्रथम-आदेश धर्म थे। धर्मन् के ही अनुसार यज्ञाग्नि को प्रज्वलित किया जाता है और धार्मिक नर-नारी अपत्यों के द्वारा अपनी वृद्धि करते हैं।[८]

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१. द्रष्टव्य जी० एच० मीज, धर्म एण्ड सोसाइटी, पृ० ९-११।

२. वैदिक इन्डेक्स, (हिंदी संस्करण), भाग १, पृ० ४३७।

३. ऋग्वेद १/१०१/३, यस्य व्रते वरुणो। वही, १/१३६/५; १/३६/५; व्रता ध्रुवा। वही, २/२८/८; ५/८३/५; १०/१६५/११।

४. वही, १/१६४/४३—तानि धर्माणि प्रथमान्यासन्। वही, १०/९०/१६ यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजन्त।

५. ऋग्वेद, १/१८/१। वही, १०/२१।३।

६. आवर हेरिटेज, जिल्द ७, भाग १, पृ० १६-१७ पर डा० आर० सी० हाजरा का पूर्वोक्त लेख।

७. डा० काणे, हिस्ट्री आफ धर्मशास्त्र, जिल्द १, पृ० १-२।

८. ए० बी० कीथ, रिलीजन एण्ड फिलोसोफी आव द वेद एण्ड उपनिषद्स, पृ० २४६।

ऋवेद में धर्म[1], धर्मणा[2], धर्मणाम्[3] और धर्मणि[4] रूप मिलते हैं।

इसके अतिरिक्त धर्मन्[5], धर्मा[6], धर्माणः[7], धर्माः[8], धर्माणाम्[9], तथा धर्माणि[10] रूप भी हैं। इसी वेद में धर्मऽभि[11] और धर्मेच्छु के लिए धर्मऽवन्ता[12] शब्द भी मिलता है।

ऋग्वेद की भाँति यजुर्वेद में भी धर्म[13], धर्मण[14], धर्मणा[15] और धर्माय[16] रूप प्राप्त होते हैं। अथर्ववेद में भी धर्म का प्रयोग धारण के अर्थ में किया गया है[17]। इस

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१. ऋवेद, ३/१७/१; ३/१७/५; ७/८९/५; १०/५६/३; १०/१४९/३।

२. वही, १/१३४/५; १/१६०/१; २/१३/७; ५/६७/७।
वही, १/५५/३; ८/४३/२४–धर्मणामिम्।

३. वही, १/१/५९; ३।३८।२; ९/९७/२२।

४. वही, १०/१६७/३ तथा ४/५३।३; १०/५०/६; १०/८८/१।

५. ऋवेद, ५/१५/२; ९/७/१; ९,११०/४; १०/२०/२।

६. वही, ९/९७/१२।

७. वही, १०/२१/३।

८. वही, ९/९७/२३।

९. वही, १/१८७/१; १०/९२/२।

१०. वही, १/२२/१८; १/१६४/४३; १/१६४/५०; ३/३/३। वही, ५/२६/६; ९/६४/१; ९/९७/२।

११. वही, ३/६०/६; ५/८१/४;/५२/३।

१२. वही, ९/१०७/२४-मित्रावरुण्वन्ता उत धर्मवन्ता।

इसमें धामन्, धाम और धामानि शब्द भी मिलते हैं जिसका अर्थ निवास-स्थान से ग्रहण किया जाता है। धामन् के लिये ऋग्वेद, ५/२/४ तैत्ति० सं ५/२/३/४ और ए० बी० कीथ, रिलिजन एण्ड फिलासौफी आव द वेदाज एण्ड उपनिषद्स, पृ० ४८७। तथा धाम के लिये, ऋग्वेद, १/५७/३; १/९१/३; १/९५/९; १/१२२/१२; १,१२१/६; ३/७/६; ४/५/४; ६/२/९; ६/६७/९; १०/१०/६ और धामानि के लिये ऋग्वेद–२।३/२; ३/३/१०, ४/५५/२। धामानि मित्रावरुणा युवानुः। ७/६०/३। धामानि दिव्यानि १/१३/१।

१३. यजुर्वेद, सविता धर्म साविषत्। ९/५; १८/३०।

१४. वही, पृथुधर्मणस्पतिराज्यस्य वेतु स्वाहा। १०/२९।

१५. वही, मिनोतु, मित्रावरुणो ध्रुवेण धर्मणा। ५/२७।

१६. वही, धर्माय सभाचर······। ३०/६।

१७. अथर्व वेद, ध्रुवा भूमिं पृथ्वीं धर्मणा धृतम्।

वेद में धर्म[1] धर्मः[2], धर्मणा[3], धर्माणि[4], धर्मम्[5], धर्मऽधृतः[6], धर्मऽभि[7], धर्मऽकृते[8] आदि रूप मिलते हैं। इसमें भी परम्परा से प्राप्त आचार को धर्म बताया गया है। मृतक पति के चिता पर रूढ़ स्त्री के लिये कहा गया है कि वह प्राचीन धर्म का पालन कर रही है।[9] इससे स्पष्ट है कि इस वेद में भी ऋग्वैदिक धर्म की अवधारणा को ही मान्यता प्रदान की गयी थी।

ब्राह्मण ग्रन्थों में धर्म शब्द का प्रयोग धार्मिक अनुष्ठान तथा व्यवहार दोनों के लिये किया गया है। ऐतरेय-ब्राह्मण[10] के अनुसार यज्ञ करना ही धर्म है। यहाँ ऋग्वैदिक विचारधारा का पालन किया गया है। भाष्यकार आचार्य सायण का मत है कि इसमें वर्णित ज्योतिष्टोमादि यज्ञों का तात्पर्य धर्म से है[11]। वार्थ के मतानुसार ब्राह्मणकालीन धर्म भी ऋग्वैदिक यज्ञ-यागादि कार्यों से सम्बन्धित था।[12] किन्तु इन धर्मों में यज्ञ को ही सभी वस्तुओं का उत्पत्ति केन्द्र कहा गया है। यज्ञ प्रकृति सम्बन्धी कार्यों का उत्पत्ति क्षेत्र तथा प्रतीकों की प्रक्रिया का केन्द्र बिन्दु हो गया था।

यागीय कृत्यों को ऋत से सम्बन्धित कर देवताओं को संसार सम्बन्धी भौतिक कार्यों का संरक्षक एवं निरीक्षक स्वीकार किया गया है। वाजसनेयिसंहिता और तैत्तिरीयब्राह्मण में पुरुषमेध वर्णन के प्रसंग में उपहार और देवताओं का विवेचन मिलता है। इनमें सभाचर को धर्म के लिये वलि होते हुये प्रदर्शित किया गया है[13]।

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१. अथर्व० वेद, अचित्या। च। इत। तव। धर्म। ६/५१/३।

२. वही, ११/९/१७: १२/६/१।

३. वही, ६/१३२/१; २ : ३।

४. वही, ५/१/२; ७/५/१।

५. वही १८/३/२।

६. वही, १/२५/१।

७. वही, १८/२/७।

८. वही, २०/६२/५।

९. वही, धर्म पुराणमनुपालयन्ती।१८/३/१।

१०. ऐ० ब्रा०, ३/५ यज्ञेन वै तद् देवा यज्ञमयजन्त···
तानि धर्माणि प्रथमानि आसन्···।

११. ऐ० ब्रा० ३/५ पर सायणभाष्य; यानि ज्योतिष्टोमादीनि कर्मण्य अनुष्ठितानि (तानि) सर्वाणि प्रथमानि धर्माण्यादि-सृष्टि-कालीनानि सुकृतसाधनानि। आवर हेरिटेज, जिल्द ७, भाग १, पृ० १७ पर डा० आर० सी० हाजरा का लेख।

१२. वार्थ० ए०, रिलिजन्स आव इंडिया, पृ० ३७७।

१३. वाजसनेयि सं० ३०/६। तै० ब्रा०, ७/३/४/२/१ धर्मस्य सभाचरम्··· ७/३/४/२/१ पर सायण भाष्य। आवर हेरिटेज, जिल्द ७, भाग १, पृ० १८ पर डॉ० आर० सी० हाजरा का पूर्वोक्त लेख।

ऐतरेय ब्राह्मण में राजा को धर्मरक्षक और धर्माध्यक्ष कहा गया है[१]। शतपथ-ब्राह्मण के अनुसार राजा धर्मज्ञाता, धारणकर्ता तथा धर्म का पालन करानेवाला है।[२] इसमें वरुण देवता को राज-धर्म का नियामक बतलाया गया है।[३] किन्तु राजा धर्म से श्रेष्ठ नहीं है।[४] इन ब्राह्मणों में निरूपित धर्म का तात्पर्य विधि (law) से है।[५] हम पहले देख चुके हैं कि वरुण ऋत के देवता हैं और धर्म तथा ऋत के अन्योन्याश्रित होने के कारण वे धर्म के भी देवता स्वीकार किये जा सकते हैं। ऋत की भावना में सत्यपरक नैतिकता का भी समावेश हम पहले देख चुके हैं। अतएव यहाँ भी हमें नैतिक भावना का आभास प्राप्त होता है।[६]

इससे यह स्पष्ट है कि इन ग्रन्थों के समय में धर्म यज्ञ-यागादि रूप में प्रचलित था। इसके अतिरिक्त धर्म का सम्बन्ध अब राज्य से भी हो गया था।

तैत्तिरीय आरण्यक में सत्य, तपस्, यज्ञ और सम्पूर्ण न्यास के द्वारा अमृतत्व प्राप्त करने का उल्लेख मिलता है।[७] इसी आरण्यक में यह संकेत भी है कि धर्म जगत्-प्रतिष्ठा एवं स्थायित्व का कारण है, सभी कुछ धर्म में स्थित रहता है। इसलिये धर्म को सभी से श्रेष्ठ बताया गया है।[८] इन दोनों गद्यांशों पर सायण ने भाष्य करते हुये यह मत प्रकट किया है कि यहाँ धर्म का तात्पर्य सद्कार्यों तथा दानपरक कार्यों से है। इस प्रकार के कार्यों के अन्तर्गत, कुयें, सरोवर एवं उद्यानादि का निर्माण और आरोपण समाविष्ट हैं, जिनका अपेक्षाकृत अधिक विशद विवेचन परवर्ती पौराणिक साहित्य में प्राप्त होता है। पर सायण की यह व्याख्या धर्म के पूर्ण रूप को नहीं स्पष्ट करती।

धर्म का वैदिक अर्थ प्रायः शीलपरक था। कुछ स्थलों पर शील के शाश्वत

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१. ऐ० ब्रा०, ३८/१। वही, ३९।३....धर्मस्य गोप्ता।

२. श० ब्रा०, ५/४/४/५।

३. वही, ५/३/३/११।

४. वही, ५/४/४/४।

५. डा० यू० एन० घोषाल, ए हिस्ट्री आव हिन्दू पब्लिक लाइफ, भाग १, पृ० ६४।

६. बी के० सरकार, हिन्दू पोलिटिकल इन्सटीच्यूशन्स, पृ० २०८ तथा डा० वी० पी० वर्मा, हिन्दू पोलिटिकल थाट एण्ड इट्स मेटाफिजिकल फाउन्डेशन, पृ० ११०।

७. तै० आ०, १०/६२/१।

८. वही, १०/६३/१।

तै० आ० १०/६२/१, एवं १०/६३/१ पर सायण-भाष्य।

तु० की०—आवर हेरिटेज, जिल्द ७, भाग १, पृ० १९ पर डा० आर० सी० हाजरा का पूर्वोक्त लेख।

आधार को धर्म कहा है, यथा बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् के अनुसार जहाँ से सूर्य उदित होता है और जहाँ अस्त होता है, उसे देवताओं ने धर्म बताया। वही आज है, वही कल। उसने कल्याण रूप धर्म को बताया, धर्म ही राजा का राजा कहा गया है। धर्म के ऊपर कोई अन्य सत्य नहीं है ठीक उसी प्रकार जैसे कोई व्यक्ति राजा की सहायता से किसी को पराभूत कर सकता है वैसे ही धर्म के माध्यम से कोई निर्बल व्यक्ति बलवान को अभिभूत करने की आशा करता है[१]। इन सन्दर्भों में धर्म को शाश्वत नियामक माना गया है जिस पर प्रकृति के व्यापार तथा सामाजिक-कल्याण एवं न्याय आश्रित[२] है।

अन्य उपनिषदों में भी धर्म के नैतिक स्वरूप पर विशेष बल दिया गया है। ईश उपनिषद् में सत्य को धर्म बताते हुये उसके माध्यम से ब्रह्म की प्राप्ति होना बतलाया गया है।[३] तैत्तिरीय उपनिषद् के अनुसार सत्य-भाषण ही धर्म है।[४] श्वेताश्वतर उपनिषद् में धर्म से ब्रह्म प्राप्ति सम्भव बतायी गयी है।[५] छान्दोग्य उपनिषद में[६] धर्म की तीन शाखाओं का उल्लेख मिलता है, यज्ञ, अध्ययन और दान को प्रथम शाखा, तपस्या को द्वितीय, तथा आचार को तृतीय शाखा के अन्तर्गत रखा गया है। इसमें आचार को अधिक महत्त्व दिया गया है।

समाज के विकास के साथ-साथ धर्म के स्वरूप का भी विकास हुआ है। पूर्व वैदिक काल में जैसा कि ऋग्वेद से ज्ञात होता है -- कई कबीलों के होते हुये भी समाज के तीन प्रमुख वर्ग ब्रह्म, क्षत्र और विशः थे।[७] उस समय यज्ञों की पद्धति अपेक्षाकृत सरल थी और जैसा कि यूनानी सभ्यता[८] के आधार पर अनुमान लगाया जा सकता है, उनमें सभी लोग भाग लेते रहे होंगे। पर ब्राह्मण ग्रन्थों में श्रम-विभाजन तथा अन्य कारणों से समाज का चार वर्गों यथा--ब्राह्मण, राजन्य या क्षत्रिय, वैश्य और शूद्र में

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१. बृ० उ०, १/४/१४। द्रष्टव्य, डा० राधाकृष्णन, द प्रिन्सिपल्स उपनिषद्स, पृ० १७०।

२. द्रष्टव्य, डा० गोविन्दचन्द्र पाण्डेय, बौद्धधर्म के विकास का इतिहास पृ० ७०।

३. ईश उ० १/१५।

४. तैत्ति० उ०, १/१५।

५. श्वेत० उ०, ६/६।

६. छा० उ०, ४/१५/५।

७. द्रष्टव्य--जायके० ओ० हर्जेलर, द सोशल थाट आव द ऐन्शेयेण्ट सिविलिजेशन, पृ० १८५।

८. जे० ई० हैरिसन, प्रोलेगोमेना टु द स्टडी आव ग्रीक रिलिजन, पृ० १२।

स्पष्ट वर्गीकरण मिलता है।[१] वर्णों के कर्तव्य और अधिकार स्थिर किये गये एव कालान्तर में ऊँच-नीच की भावना का प्रादुर्भाव हुआ। इस युग में यज्ञों का विधान भी बड़ा जटिल हो गया तथा उनमें प्रायः प्रत्येक दृष्टि से अधिकार विभेद होने लगा।[२]

किन्तु ब्राह्मणग्रन्थों के पश्चात् हमें धर्म के दृष्टिकोण में परिवर्तन के चिह्न मिलते हैं। यज्ञों की परम्परा के विरुद्ध उपनिषदों में एक प्रतिक्रिया प्रारम्भ होती है।[३] मुण्डक उपनिषद्[४] में यज्ञ को ऐसी नौका के सदृश बतलाया गया है जिसमें दृढ़ता नहीं है। इस मनोवृत्ति के परिणामस्वरूप धर्म का यज्ञ से विशिष्ट सम्बन्ध समाप्त होने लगा और धर्म के अन्तर्गत यज्ञ की अपेक्षा नैतिक गुणों पर उपनिषदों में अधिक बल दिया गया है[५] उपनिषदों में धर्म के अन्तर्गत नैतिक गुणों का समावेश एवं विवेचन अपेक्षाकृत सामाजिक स्थिरता एवं शान्ति का परिचायक है[६]।

इसके अतिरिक्त बहुत कुछ सम्भव है कि इन नैतिक गुणों पर विशेष बल देने के मूल में अवैदिक श्रमण-धारा[७] का भी कुछ प्रभाव रहा हो, क्योंकि उस युग में वैदिक और अवैदिक विचारधाराओं का सम्मिश्रण हो रहा था।[८]

सर्वप्रथम उपनिषदों में हमें कर्म एवं पुनर्जन्म के विचार का स्पष्ट उल्लेख मिलता है।[९] कुछ विद्वानों का मत है कि ये सिद्धान्त वैदिक विचारधारा के विकास के साथ ही उत्पन्न हुये। परन्तु कुछ अन्य विद्वान् इन्हें अवैदिक[१०] धारा का प्रभाव मानते हैं और उनका यह मत बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् के अन्तर्साक्ष्य से मेल खाता है।[११]

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१. डा० आर० एस० शर्मा का इकनामिक लाइफ एण्ड आर्गनाइजेशन इन ऐन्शेयण्ट इण्डिया, नामक लेख, स्टडीज इन द कल्चरल हिस्ट्री आव इण्डिया, पृ० ३१; ३४; ३५, पर सम्पादित द्वारा डा० आर० सी० मजूमदार।

२. ओ० एस० टी० जिल्द १, पृ० १६, म्योर।

३. बृ० उ०, १/४/२-३।
छा० उ०, १/१२/५।

४. मुण्डक उपनिषद् द्वारा डा० राधाकृष्णन्, प्रिंसिपल्स उपनिषद्स, पृ० ३५८।

५. द्रष्टव्य—एल० टी० हाबहाउस, मारल्स इन इवाल्यूशन, पृ० ५७-५९।

६. एल० टी० हाबहाउस का भी यह मत है कि "समाज में शान्ति रहने पर इन नैतिक गुणों का स्वाभाविक रूप से विकास होता है। वही, पृ० ५८।

७. डा० गोविन्द्रचन्द्र पाण्डेय, बौद्ध धर्म के विकास का इतिहास पृ० ४ व ९।

८. वही।

९. कठ० उ०, १/१।
वही १/१/५।

१०. डा० जी० सी० पाण्डेय, स्टडीज इन द ओरिजिन्स आव बुद्धिज्म, पृ० २८७-२८७।

११. बृ० उ० १/३/२ व १३।

कर्म एवं मोक्ष के भी आदर्श का स्पष्ट रूप हमें उपनिषदों में मिलता है। पुनर्जन्म के विचारों का भी विशेष प्रभाव धर्म की अवधारणा पर पड़ा। वर्णधर्म को इन विचारों ने एक युक्ति-संगत आधार एवं आदर्श प्रदान किये। कालान्तर में यह धारणा बद्धमूल हो गई कि मनुष्य अपने पूर्वजन्म के कारण ही किसी विशेष वर्ण में जन्म पाता है और निम्न वर्ण का मनुष्य अपने वर्ण के विहित कर्त्तव्यों का पालन करके मृत्यु के पश्चात् उच्चवर्ण में जन्म पा सकता है।[१]

आश्रमधर्म एवं चतुर्वर्ग की अवधारणा के पीछे भी कर्म, पुनर्जन्म एवं मोक्ष सम्बन्धी विचारों का प्रभाव था। आश्रमधर्म की व्यवस्था के अनुसार द्विज को चारों आश्रमों के लिये विहित कार्य-व्यापारों का पालन करते हुये चरम लक्ष्य मोक्ष प्राप्ति की ओर अग्रसर होना चाहिये। चतुराश्रम-व्यवस्था का रूप हमें सूत्रों से मिलने लगता है। चतुर्वर्ग के आदर्श के अनुसार धर्म, अर्थ, काम और मोक्ष मानव जीवन एवं क्रियाओं के लक्ष्य माने गये हैं जिनमें मोक्ष चरम लक्ष्य था।[२] कर्म एवं पुनर्जन्म के सिद्धान्तों के विकास के साथ-साथ यह भावना बलवती होती गयी कि सामान्यतः प्रत्येक सकाम कर्म के फल सांसारिक बन्धन उत्पन्न करते हैं और जन्म-मरण के चक्र में फँसाते हैं। अतः गीता एवं अन्य ग्रन्थों में निष्काम-कर्म[३] का आदर्श प्रस्तुत किया गया है। मोक्ष-प्राप्ति के विभिन्न साधनों को प्रतिपादित करनेवाले अनेक धार्मिक एवं दार्शनिक सम्प्रदायों की उत्पत्ति कालान्तर में हुई। कर्म, पुनर्जन्म एवं मोक्ष सम्बन्धी विचारों का प्रभाव नैतिकता के विकास एवं धर्म के अन्य सभी अन्तर्भूत तत्वों और पहलुओ पर देखा जा सकता है।

गृह्यसूत्रों में भी धर्म का विवेचन मिलता है, किन्तु इनमें संस्कारों और गृह्य यज्ञों की व्याख्या की गई है। उदाहरणस्वरूप शांख्यायन गृह्यसूत्र में ब्राह्मण-भोजन, कन्या लक्षण विवाह, एवं जातकर्म, नामकरण, चूड़ाकर्म आदि संस्कारों की गणना की गयी है।[४] इसी प्रकार पारस्कर गृह्य[५] और मानवगृह्य सूत्रों[६] में भी समस्त संस्कारों, श्राद्ध और तर्पण क्रिया का वर्णन किया गया है। इसके अतिरिक्त इन गृह्यसूत्रों में पंचमहायज्ञों, वृक्षारोपण, जलाशय, गृह एवं कूप के निर्माण आदि नैमित्तिक विधि-विधानों का विवेचन किया गया है।[७]

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१. बृ० उ०, ४/४/२; ४/४/३-५।
२. महा० वन पर्व, २१३/५०–५३।
३. गीता, २/४८।
४. सां० गृ० सू०, अध्याय १, २ व ५।
५. पार० गृ० सू०, अध्याय १, २।
६. मानव गृ० सू०, अध्याय १,२।
७. द वैदिक एज, पृ० ४७४।

हिरण्यकेशी गृह्यसूत्र[1] में त्रिवर्ग (धर्म, अर्थ तथा काम) का उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है। यह विचारणीय है कि गृह्यसूत्रों में चतुर्वर्गों का उल्लेख नहीं मिलता है। गृह्यसूत्रों के वर्ण्य-विषय से यह स्पष्ट प्रतीत होता है कि इनका मुख्य उद्देश्य मानव के लौकिक जीवन को नियमों एवं विधि के माध्यम से सुख तथा शान्तिपूर्ण बनाना था।

कात्यायन, शांख्यायन, बौधायन, आपस्तम्ब आदि श्रौत-सूत्रों में यज्ञों का क्रमबद्ध वर्णन और उनके विविध प्रकारों का विवेचन किया गया है।[2] इनमें श्रौत यज्ञों (हविर्यज्ञों) का विस्तृत विधान मिलता है। यहाँ हमें धर्म का यज्ञ-यागीय पक्ष प्राप्त होता है। श्रौत-सूत्र श्रौतधर्म का तथा गृह्यसूत्र एवं धर्मसूत्र परम्पराओं के ऊपर आधारित धर्म का विवेचन करते हैं।[3]

धर्मसूत्रों में गौतम, आपस्तम्ब, बौधायन विष्णु आदि के धर्मसूत्र प्रमुख हैं जिनमें गौतम धर्मसूत्र सबसे अधिक प्राचीन माना जाता है।[4] इन धर्मसूत्रों की तिथि सातवीं या छठीं सदी ईसा पूर्व से लेकर द्वितीय सदी ईसा पूर्व तक स्वीकार की जाती है।[5] वर्णाश्रमधर्म, राजधर्म, स्त्रीधर्म, जातिधर्म एवं कुल धर्म, प्रायश्चित तथा दाय-भाग इनके वर्ण्य-विषय हैं।[6] इन सूत्रों में यद्यपि श्रेणी, पूग तथा गण धर्म का स्पष्ट उल्लेख नहीं किया गया है।[7] इसके अतिरिक्त इनमें सत्य, अहिंसा तथा श्रद्धा आदि नैतिक सद्गुणों के पालन का भी आदेश मिलता है। गौतमधर्मसूत्र में दया, क्षान्ति, अनसूया, शौच (कायिक एवं भावना सम्बन्धी शुद्धता), मङ्गल (विहित कार्य करना), आकार्पण्य एवं अस्पृहा (दूसरों से सुखयोग की इच्छा न होना) आत्मा के गुण बताये गये हैं। इन गुणों से युक्त व्यक्ति ब्रह्मलोक को प्राप्त करनेवाला कहा गया है, चाहे वह चालीस संस्कारों से रहित ही क्यों न हो? इसके विपरीत व्यक्ति भले ही चालीस संस्कारों से युक्त रहे, किन्तु उपर्युक्त गुणों से रहित हो तब उसे ब्रह्मलोक का अधिकारी नहीं बताया गया है।[8] यहाँ पर भी नैतिक गुणों के पालन पर विशेष बल दिया गया है। वशिष्ठधर्मसूत्र में कहा गया है कि ईर्ष्या, गर्व, अज्ञान, अविश्वास, आत्मप्रशंसा, माया, क्रोध आदि का त्याग सभी आश्रमों के सदस्यों के अनुपालनीय धर्म हैं।[9] इसी धर्मसूत्र

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१. हि० के० गृ० सू०, २/१८/६।
२. कात्या० श्रौ० सू०, अध्याय, १-२६। सां० श्रौ० सू०, अध्याय १, २ व ३।
३. द वैदिक एज, पृ० ४७४।
४. कैम्ब्रिज हिस्ट्री आव इंडिया, जिल्द १, पृ० २०२-२०३।
५. वही, पृ० २०३।
६. गौ० ध० सू० १-२८, बौधायन एवं वशिष्ठ धर्मसूत्र पृ० १-२।
७. गौ० ध० सू० ११/२१।
८. वही ८/२४–२६।
९. वशिष्ठ, ध० सू० १०/३० बौधायन ध० सू० १/१०/६, ३/१/१७।

में धर्म और सत्य के अनुकूल आचरण करने का आदेश मिलता है। इससे स्पष्ट है कि इन धर्मसूत्रों में यज्ञ, यागादिक तथा अन्य धार्मिक कृत्यों की अपेक्षा नैतिक सद्गुणों को अधिक महत्त्वपूर्ण स्वीकार किया गया है।

धर्मसूत्रों में हम वर्णाश्रमधर्म का सर्वप्रथम क्रमबद्ध विवेचन पाते हैं। इनमें धर्म की भावना न्यायिक रूप में भी प्राप्त होती है, जिसका सम्बन्ध मानव के विस्तृत कर्तव्यों से है।[1] इस प्रकार हमें विधि के साथ धर्म का संबंध भी स्पष्ट रूप से सर्वप्रथम इन्हीं ग्रन्थों में प्राप्त होता है। भूमि तथा सम्पत्ति के उत्तराधिकार सम्बन्धी नियमों का विधान हमें सर्वप्रथम इन्हीं ग्रन्थों में प्राप्त होता है। किन्तु यह उल्लेखनीय है कि उत्तराधिकार सम्बन्धी नियमों का क्रमबद्ध विवेचन हमें इनमें नहीं प्राप्त होता है।[2] ऐसा ज्ञात होता है कि वे विभिन्न वर्गों और क्षेत्रों में अलग-अलग रूप में प्रचलित थे। इस विषय में कोई सर्वमान्य नियम नहीं रहे होंगे। सम्पत्ति के विभाजन तथा खोई हुई सम्पत्ति को उसके वास्तविक स्वामी को प्रदान करने के नियम भी मिलते हैं। सूद के दर का उल्लेख किया गया है जो मोटे तौर पर पन्द्रह प्रतिशत बतायी गयी है। वैश्य ही कुसीद कार्य कर सकता था।[3] न्यायिक विधि के अन्तर्गत लेख, साक्षी तथा वास्तविक अधिकार के आधार पर सम्पत्ति का स्वामित्व निश्चित करने की विधि बतायी गयी है।[4] इनके अन्तर्गत नागरिक और न्यायिक विधियों के अतिरिक्त अन्य सामाजिक नियम भी प्राप्त होते हैं।[5]

वैदिक ग्रन्थों में राजा को न्यायिक अधिकार नहीं दिया गया था यद्यपि राजा का सम्बन्ध दंड से था।[6] धर्मसूत्रों में हमें विधि के रूप में धर्म का विवरण मिलता है।[7] इसके पूर्ववर्ती साहित्य में न्यायिक-व्यवस्था तथा प्रचलित विधि के रूप में धर्म के वहुत कम प्रमाण उपलब्ध होते हैं।[8]

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१. गौ० ध० सू०, २८/३६-४०। द वैदिक एज, पृ० ४७५।

२. गौ० ध० सू०, २/३/१०, डा० रामगोपाल, इंडिया आव वैदिक कल्पसूत्राज, पृ० १९६।

३ गौ० ध० सू०, २८/२१-२२, २८/४१। आप० ध० सू०, २/६/१४-१५। वशिष्ठ ध० सू० १७/५३-५४।

४. गौ० ध० सू० १३/२६। वही, १३/३१। वशिष्ठ ध० सू०, १६/२। आप० ध० सू०, २/११/२९/६

५. ए० वी० कीथ, रिलीजन एण्ड फिलासोफी आव द वेद एण्ड उपनिषद्स, पृ० ४७९।

६. स्टडीज इन कल्चरल हिस्ट्री आव इंडिया, पृ० ६५ पर एस० सी० गुप्त का कम्परेटिव व्यु आव ला इन ऐन्शेयेण्ट इंडिया, नामक लेख।

७. वैदिक इण्डेक्स (हिन्दी संस्करण, भाग १, पृ० ४३७)।

८. वही, पृ० ४७३।

धर्मसूत्रों में गौतम धर्मसूत्र का प्रमुख स्थान माना जाता है। जिसके बारहवें अध्याय में वाद-सम्बन्धी नियम मिलते हैं। अन्य धर्मसूत्रों में भी प्रहार और आघात, अपमान, परस्त्री-गमन तथा स्तेय सम्बन्धी वादों के निर्णय के लिए दंड का विधान किया गया है।[1] धर्मसूत्रों में हमें नागरिक या व्यावहारिक तथा आपराधिक विधियों का प्रारंम्भिक रूप मिलता है, परन्तु इन धर्मसूत्रों का स्वरूप आजकल राजसत्ता अथवा धारा-सभाओं द्वारा निर्मित विधि-संहिताओं जैसा नहीं था। वेद, परम्परा-विधि तथा वेदज्ञों के आचारों को ही धर्म का स्रोत बताया गया है। गौतम का कथन है कि समान स्रोतों में विरोध होने पर दोनों में से किसी एक का अपनी इच्छानुसार पालन किया जा सकता है। गौतम धर्मसूत्र[2] से स्पष्ट है कि बहुत कुछ बातों का निश्चय व्यवहार, प्रथा और रीति-रिवाजों के द्वारा ही हो सकता था। विभिन्न वर्गों, परिवारों एवं क्षेत्रों में प्रचलित रीति-रिवाजों को विधि के रूप में स्वीकार किया गया है। कृषकों, व्यापारियों, पशुपालकों तथा कारीगरों को अपने-अपने नियम बनाने के अधिकार को भी मान्यता प्रदान की गई है।[3] यह एक अतीव महत्त्व का विषय है कि धर्मसूत्रों में वर्णभेद के आधार पर दंडविधान करने की व्यवस्था की गयी है।

विधि के समक्ष सभी वर्णों के लिये एक समान दंड-व्यवस्था नहीं थी, यह तथ्य इस साक्ष्य के आधार पर पूर्णरूपेण स्थापित किया जा सकता है। यह उल्लेखनीय है कि इन धर्मसूत्रों में कुछ सामाजिक और धार्मिक कार्यों का भी समावेश किया गया है जो आधुनिक विधि के अन्तर्गत नहीं माने जाते। प्रायश्चित तथा जाति-बहिष्कार दंड के रूप में माने गये हैं। चोरी, मनुष्य-वध तथा पर-स्त्रीगमन इत्यादि जघन्य अपराध स्वीकार किये गये हैं।[4]

आपराधिक विधि (Criminal law) के अन्तर्गत प्रहार एवं आघात मिलता है।[5] चोरी, पर-स्त्रीगमन आदि प्रधान विषय हैं जिनका उल्लेख धर्मसूत्रों में चोरी के लिये कठोर दंडविधान और कभी-कभी मृत्युदंड का भी विधान किया गया है।[6] शारीरिक दंड एवं देश-निष्कासन भी अपराधों के दंडरूप में वर्णित है।

इस काल में पहले की अपेक्षा सामाजिक जीवन का और अधिक विकास हुआ था। गृह्यसूत्रों के व्यवस्था की आधारशिला ग्रामीण जीवन है। परन्तु उत्तरकालीन

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१. एस० बी० ई०—जिल्द २, पृ० २८३ और आगे।

२. गौ० ध० सू०, १/१/४।

३. वही २०/२२। वशिष्ठ ध०, सू०, १/१७।

४. गौ० ध० सू०, ८/१३ : १२/१। आप० ध० सू०, १/९/२५/४-५।

५. गौ० ध० सू० ८/१३।

६. गौ० ध० सू०, २/१/१/१५–१६।
तु० की०, डा० रामगोपाल, इंडिया आव वैदिक कल्पसूत्राज, पृ० १९३।

धर्मसूत्र मानव जीवन के अपेक्षाकृत अधिक व्यापक क्षेत्र से सम्बन्धित है। इनमें पुर और नगर का भी उल्लेख मिलता है। वाणिज्य एवं व्यवसाय के विकास एवं मुद्राओं के प्रचलन के साथ-साथ नगरों और नगर जीवन का प्रगतिशील विकास छठीं शताब्दी ईसा पूर्व में दृष्टिगोचर होता है। इस समय समाज में व्यापारियों एवं कारीगरों के विशिष्ट वर्ग वन गये थे।[१] सम्पूर्ण बौद्ध साहित्य समृद्ध एवं वैभवशाली व्यापारियों के प्रचुर वर्णनों से ओतप्रोत हैं।

गौतम धर्मसूत्र में कहा गया है कि व्यापारी एवं दस्तकार अपने बीच हुए वादों का आपस में ही निर्णय करते थे और राजा के पास नहीं जाते थे।[२] इससे प्रकट होता है कि व्यापारियों और दस्तकारों की संस्थाओं के अपने नियम और परम्परायें थीं जिनको कालान्तर में उनके धर्म के रूप में मान्यता मिल गयी। श्रेणी धर्म का उल्लेख परवर्ती ग्रन्थों में मिलता है। किन्तु इन धर्मसूत्रों में नागरिक जीवन की अपेक्षा ग्रामीण दृष्टिकोण की ही प्रधानता है।[३]

धर्मसूत्रों के लेखकों का भौगोलिक ज्ञान भी इस युग में अधिक विस्तृत प्रतीत होता है। बौधायनधर्मसूत्र में कलिंग, बंग, बिहार आदि का उल्लेख मिलता है।[४] इसके परिणामस्वरूप विभिन्न क्षेत्रों के रीति-रिवाजों और प्रथाओं में विद्यमान विषमता के कारण धर्मसूत्रों में देशधर्म का महत्त्व दृष्टिगत होता है।[५]

यद्यपि चातुर्वर्ण्य-व्यवस्था का सूत्रपात उत्तर वैदिक काल में ही हो गया था और विभिन्न वर्णों के कर्तव्य भी निश्चित हो गये थे किन्तु कुछ समय के पश्चात् यह व्यवस्था पूर्णतः स्थिर हो गयी जिसके फलस्वरूप हमें सूत्रों में वर्ण धर्म का क्रमबद्ध विवेचन मिलता है। पूर्व वैदिककालीन प्रवृत्तिपरक मान्यताओं, अवैदिक श्रमण-विचारधारा तथा उपनिषदों की निवृत्तिपरक धारा के समन्वय के प्रभाव स्वरूप चतुराश्रम-व्यवस्था धर्मसूत्रों के काल में प्रतिष्ठा लाभ ही कर रही थी। आश्रम-धर्म अर्थात् चारों आश्रमों के कर्तव्यों का विवेचन इन ग्रन्थों में मिलता है।

इस युग के विकासशील समाज में अनेक प्रकार की जातियों का अस्तित्व परिलक्षित होता है। धर्मसूत्रों में विभिन्न जातियों का उल्लेख मिलता है जिनके अपने भिन्न-भिन्न नियम एवं रीति-रिवाज रहे होंगे। इसके फलस्वरूप जातिधर्म को भी

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१. जातक ४,८७–८८; जातक, ३५१; जा० ५, ३८४।
२. गौ० ध० सू०, १/२१।
३. हापकिन्स, कैम्ब्रिज हिस्ट्री आव इंडिया, जिल्द १, पृ० २१५।
४. बौ० ध० सू० २९/१, वही पृ० २१६।
५. गौ० ध० सू०, ११/२२।

मान्यता प्रदान की गई ।[१] इन धर्मसूत्रों में त्रिवर्ग (धर्म, अर्थ तथा काम) के साथ-साथ चतुर्वर्ग[२] मोक्ष का आदर्श सामाजिक दृष्टिकोण में परिवर्तन का महत्त्वपूर्ण संकेत है।

विद्वानों के मतानुसार[३] अर्थशास्त्र में नीति सम्बन्धी व्यावहारिक विषयों का विवेचन किया गया है जिसका विशेष सम्बन्ध राजाओं एवं पुरोहितों से था। इस प्रकार की परम्परा[४] पहले से ही चली आ रही थी। कुछ हद तक स्मृतियों में उसी पूर्वकालीन परम्परा से व्यवहार को ग्रहण किया गया है, जिनका दृष्टिकोण अधिक नैतिकतापूर्ण है। अर्थशास्त्र में भी धर्म का उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है। इसमें वर्णाश्रमधर्म आर्य-मर्यादा अर्थात् साधारण धर्म तथा श्रुतिविहित नियमों के द्वारा संसार के सुखी होने का आदर्श मिलता है।[५] कौटिल्य के अर्थशास्त्र में प्रशासकीय विधि पर विशेष बल देते हुये उसका सम्बन्ध राजा और उसकी शक्ति, दंड से बताया गया है। अतएव इसमें राजा के धर्मपरायण होने का आदर्श प्रस्तुत किया गया है क्योंकि वह धर्म का रक्षक है।[६] धर्म की रक्षा करना राजा का परमधर्म कहा गया है।[७]

धर्मसूत्रों में निरूपित धर्म की विशद व्याख्या स्मृतियों में की गई है। स्मृतियों में मनुस्मृति सब में प्राचीन मानी जाती है। इसमें चारों वर्णों के धर्म और आचार आश्रमधर्म, विवाह तथा अन्य संस्कार, पंचमहायज्ञ, श्राद्ध, भक्ष्याभक्ष्य-विचार, द्रव्य-शुद्धि, स्त्री-धर्म, राजधर्म, आपद्धर्म, प्रायश्चित, विधि एवं कर्मों के गुण-दोष आदि का विवेचन मिलता है। इसके अतिरिक्त इसमें देश, जाति, श्रेणी, कुल, गुण और पाखंडियों के धर्मों का भी उल्लेख किया गया है।[८] डा० आर० सी० हाजरा का मत[९] है कि प्राचीन स्मृतियों के वर्ण विषय आचार (जिसमें वर्णाश्रम धर्म आदि समाविष्ट हैं) व्यवहार तथा प्रायश्चित (अशौच) है। याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति[१०] की अपेक्षा वैधानिक विषयों

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१. वही, ११/ २२, देश जाति कुलधर्माश्च‥‥प्रमाणम् ।

२. वही, २९/१ ।

३. आर० पी० कॉंगेले, कौटिल्य अर्थशास्त्र, जिल्द ३, आवर हेरिटेज १२– भाग १ ।

४. आर० पी० कॉंगले, कौटिल्य अर्थशास्त्र, जिल्द ३, पृ० १५ ।

५. व्यवस्थित आर्यमर्यादः कृतवर्णाश्रमस्थितिः । त्रैय्या हि रक्षितो लोकः प्रसीदति न सीदति । कौ० अर्थशास्त्र, १/३/४ ।

६. वही, ३/१; ४/१ ।

७. वही, १/३/३ ।

८. मनु-स्मृति, १/१०७-११८ ।

९. आवर हेरिटेज, जिल्द ७, भाग १, पृ० १६, डा० हाजरा का लेख, सोर्सेज आव धर्म ।

१०. हापकिन्स, कैम्ब्रिज हिस्ट्री आव इंडिया, जिल्द १, पृ० २४९ ।

पर अधिक ध्यान दिया गया है। इसमें पुरुषों की भाँति स्त्रियों को भी दाय-सम्बन्धी अधिकार दिये गये हैं। इसके अतिरिक्त सत्यान्वेषणार्थ कतिपय नवीन शपथों और सत्य परीक्षाओं (Ordeals) का भी उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है।

स्मृतियों में पूर्वकालीन साहित्य में वर्णित नैतिक सद्गुणों का समेकन करके इनको सामासिक, साधारण एवं सामान्यधर्म की संज्ञा प्रदान की गई है।[1]

डा० पांडुरंगवामन काणे के मतानुसार[2] "धर्म-शास्त्रों में धर्म का तात्पर्य किसी सम्प्रदाय अथवा मत से नहीं, अपितु जीवन की विशिष्ट आचार पद्धति से है, जिसके द्वारा मनुष्य वैयक्तिक एवं समाज के सदस्य के रूप में अपने कर्तव्यों का पालन करता हुआ अभीप्सित लक्ष्य को प्राप्त कर सके। स्मृतियों में भी निःश्रेयस धर्म को कहीं-कहीं प्रधानता दी गई है।[3]

विधि रूप में धर्म का विस्तार के साथ क्रमबद्ध विवेचन भी हमें स्मृतियों में प्राप्त होता है। गौतम, आपस्तम्ब, बौधायन और वशिष्ठ के धर्मसूत्रों में व्यवहार के अन्तर्गत बहुत ही कम विषयों का वर्णन किया गया है।[4] किन्तु मनुस्मृति जिसे सबसे अधिक प्राचीन स्मृति ग्रन्थ होने का गौरव प्राप्त है सर्वप्रथम हमें वाद-सम्बन्धी विषयों का अठारह वर्गों के अन्तर्गत क्रमबद्ध विभाजन मिलता है[5]। ये निम्न-लिखित हैं :—

ऋण, अनधिकृत क्रय-विक्रय, साझेदारी या भागिता, दान, उपहार, सेवा-वृत्ति की मजदूरी श्रेणी आदि के प्रति हिंसक कार्य, क्रय-विक्रय संबंधी चरवाहों तथा अन्य वादों, अपशब्द, हिंसा, साहस, स्त्री-संग्रहण, स्तेय, मातृक सम्बन्ध-विभाग, दायाधिकार, तथा द्यूतक्रीड़ा।

जैसा कि हॉपकिन्स महोदय का मत है यहाँ पर नागरिक या व्यवहारिक (civil) और आपराधिक (criminal) विधियों में कोई स्पष्ट विभाजन नहीं किया गया है, परन्तु परवर्ती स्मृतियों में इनमें स्पष्ट विभाजन मिलता है। आपराधिक-

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१. मनु० ६/९२/ याज्ञ० १/२२२।

२. डा० काणे, हिस्ट्री आव धर्मशास्त्र, जिल्द २, भाग १, पृ० ७।

३. आवर हेरिटेज, जिल्द ७, भाग १, पृ० २३-२४ पर डा० आर० सी० हाजरा का पूर्वोक्त लेख।

४. डा० आर० सी० मजूमदार द्वारा सम्पादित, स्टडीज इन द कल्चरल हिस्ट्री ऑव इण्डिया, पृ० ७२ पर, एस० सी० सेनगुप्त का लेख "कम्परेटिव व्यु आव लॉ इन ऐन्शेयेण्ट इंडिया।"

५. मनु० ७/३-७। वही, पृ० ७२-७३। पी० एन० सेन, हिन्दू ज्यूरिस-प्रूडेन्स, पृ० ३२। डा० आर० सी० मजूमदार, द एज आव इम्पीरियल यूनिटी, पृ० ३३७।

विधि के अन्तर्गत उपर्युक्त ग्यारह से पन्द्रह तक और अठारहवां विषय आ सकते हैं। ये अठारहों विषय बहुत ही महत्त्वपूर्ण हैं, क्योंकि इनमें हम विभिन्न प्रकार के वादों के पूर्णतः पृथक् वर्गीकरण का प्रथम प्रयास पाते हैं।[१] नागरिक विधि (civil) के स्वरूप में परवर्ती स्मृतियों में पर्याप्त विकास मिलता है। उदाहरण के लिये व्यापार सम्बन्धी विधियों को लिया जा सकता है। सूत्रों में हम व्यापार सम्बन्धी भागिता का कोई उल्लेख नहीं पाते हैं।[२] किन्तु मनुस्मृति[३] में भागिता का उल्लेख है। यद्यपि मनुस्मृति में भागिता का उल्लेख किया गया है किन्तु उस भागिता का सम्बन्ध व्यापारिक क्षेत्र से न होकर केवल पुरोहितों के मध्य दक्षिणा-ग्रहण करने तक ही सीमित है। याज्ञवल्क्य स्मृति[४] (लगभग १०० से ३०० ई०) में व्यापारियों एवं कृषकों की भागिता का भी समावेश किया गया है। देशी एवं विदेशी व्यापार की उत्तरोत्तर वृद्धि के साथ ही व्यापारियों एवं कारीगरों की भागिता को अनुशासित करने के लिये समाज में नूतन नियमों एवं विधानों की आवश्यकता प्रतीत हुई। निश्चय ही इस आवश्यकता की सम्पूर्ति के लिये परवर्ती स्मृतियों—यथा नारद एवं वृहस्पति में व्यापारियों एवं कुशल कारीगरों के भागिता सम्बन्धी विधानों का विशद वर्णन प्राप्त होता है।[५]

इससे यह स्पष्ट है कि आर्थिक व्यवस्था तथा व्यापार की उन्नति के साथ-साथ इस प्रकार के नियमों में भी विस्तार हुआ। इस बात के सबल साक्ष्य हैं कि दूसरी सदी ईसा पूर्व और द्वितीय सदी ईसवी के मध्य ग्रैकोरोमन साम्राज्य एवं गुप्तकाल में बाइजेन्टाइन साम्राज्य और दक्षिणी-पूर्व एशिया के साथ भारत का व्यापक स्तर पर अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय व्यापारिक सम्बन्ध था। डा० आर० एस० शर्मा का मत है कि 'गुप्तकाल में आर्थिक कार्य करनेवाली सहकारी संस्थाओं का संगठन हो चुका था जिनके क्षेत्र में न्याय तथा शासन-सम्बन्धी कार्य भी समाविष्ट थे[६]।

वस्तुओं के क्रय-विक्रय से सम्बन्धित विधि का स्पष्ट उल्लेख मनु और याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृतियों में मिलता है किन्तु नारद और बृहस्पति स्मृतियों में इन पर विस्तार से विचार किया गया है।[७] नारद (५वीं सदी ई०) प्रथम स्मृतिकार हैं जिन्होंने कुछ

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१. हापकिन्स, कैम्ब्रिज हिस्ट्री आव इंडिया, जिल्द १, पृ० २५१।

२. वही, पृ० २५५-२५६।

३. मनु० ८/२०६-२११।

४. नारद०—बृहस्पति, १०,२१; १६,१।

५. डा० आर० सी० मजूमदार द्वारा सम्पादित, स्टडीज इन द कल्चरल हिस्ट्री आव इंडिया, पृ० ५१ व ६० पर डा० आर० एस० शर्मा का "इकनामिक लाइफ एण्ड आर्गनाइजेशन इन ऐंश्येन्ट इण्डिया" नामक लेख।

६. वही, पृ० ५६।

७. मनु०, ८/२२२। याज्ञ०, २/१७७।

हद तक धर्म के विशुद्ध व्यावहारिक दृष्टिकोण (Pure pragmatic view of Dharm) को प्रस्तुत किया है।[१]

प्रक्रिया विधि—इस विधि का धर्मसूत्रों में बहुत ही कम उल्लेख किया गया है। याज्ञवल्क्य-स्मृति में इसका विस्तृत विवेचन प्राप्त होता है जिसके अन्तर्गत प्रमाण बहस, विभिन्न साक्ष्यों तथा शपथ-ग्रहण करने का विधान प्रस्तुत किया गया है।[२] इसके पूर्वयुगीन ग्रन्थों में इस विधि का अधिक विवेचन प्राप्त होता है। इस विधि का सम्यक् निरूपण बृहस्पति, नारद, कात्यायन और यम आदि की परवर्ती स्मृतियों में विवाद-निर्णय के लिये किया गया है।[३]

स्मृतियों में वादों की सुनवायी के लिये वादी को मौखिक रूप से निवेदन करना पड़ता था। उसके पश्चात् प्रतिवादी को निर्णायक के लिखित आदेश या आह्वान के माध्यम से बुलाया जाता था। मनुस्मृति में वादी द्वारा ही वाद प्रारम्भ करने का नियम बताया गया[४] है। पूर्व कालीन स्मृतियों में केवल प्रत्याभियोगी के पिता तथा सहोदर भ्राता भी उसके लिखित आवेदन को राजा से निवेदन कर सकते थे।[५] स्थगित या विचाराधीन वादों के लिये निवेदन या प्रतिवेदन वर्जित किया गया है।[६] न्यायालय में प्रतिवादी के न उपस्थित होने पर उसे दड का पात्र बताया गया है।[७]

न्यायालय में प्रतिवादी के उपस्थित होने पर वादी द्वारा वाद का पूरा विवरण देने की विधि याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति में निरूपित की गयी है।[८] उचित निर्णय न होने पर वादी को उच्चतर न्यायालय में अपील करने की आज्ञा दी गयी है।[९] वादी और प्रतिवादी के उपस्थित होने पर वादी के निर्णय तथा दंड आदि का विवेचन स्मृतियों में मिलता है।[१०] साक्ष्य-विधि ( Law of cvidence ) और साक्ष्य-विधि में प्रमाणों का उल्लेख गौतम तथा आपस्तम्ब के धर्मसूत्र में सन्दर्भ के रूप में ही मिलता है।[११]

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१. नारद स्मृ०, अध्याय ९।

२. याज्ञ० स्मृ०, २/१।

३. तु० की०, डा० आर० सी० मजूमदार द्वारा सम्पादित, स्टडीज इन द कल्चरल हिस्ट्री ऑव इण्डिया, पृ० ८७-८८ पर एस० सी० सेन गुप्त का "कम्परेटिव व्यू आव ला इन ऐन्शेयेण्ट इंडिया" नामक लेख।

४. मनु० ७/४३।

५ व ६. बृह० स्मृ० १/७१, एस० बी० ई० जिल्द ३५, पृ० २७। नारद स्मृ० १/५५, एस० बी० ई०, जिल्द ३३, पृ० १९।

७. नारद स्मृ० १/४७-५१। एस० बी० ई० जिल्द ३३, पृ० १७।

८. याज्ञ० २/६; २/१२।

९. नारद स्मृ० २/६२।

१०. याज्ञ० स्मृ० २/१०, १८। कात्यायन श्लोक संख्या ४७४, पृ० २०९।

११. श्री एस० सी० सेन गुप्त का पूर्वोक्त लेख, पृ० ७० पर।

इसके अतिरिक्त वृत्त-विधि (Service Law) तथा उपजीव्य विधि (Maintenance Law) का भी विवेचन है। इनमें जाति ही दंड-व्यवस्था का आधार था। पूर्वकालीन धर्मसूत्रों और स्मृतियों में परस्त्रीगमन के अपराध के लिये उच्चवर्ग की तुलना में निम्नवर्ग के व्यक्ति के लिए अधिक कठोर दंड का विधान प्रस्तुत किया गया है। नारद-स्मृति में केवल नपुन्सक की पत्नी के साथ परस्त्रीगमन की स्थिति में दंड-विधान शिथिल कर दिया गया है।[१]

रामायण और महाभारत में भी धर्म का निरूपण है जिनकी तिथि के विषय में मतभेद है। रामायण में धर्म का निरूपण संक्षेप में पात्रों के सम्वादों के द्वारा किया गया है। इसमें हमें धर्म का फलवादी रूप प्राप्त होता है। रामायण में वर्णाश्रम और राजधर्म निरूपित है।[२]

रामायण के अनुसार प्रत्येक परिस्थिति में मनुष्य का स्वधर्म के पालन द्वारा मानव कल्याण करना ही उसका आदर्श बताया गया है।[३] इसमें भी धर्म शब्द का प्रयोग अनेक अर्थों में किया गया है।[४] नैतिक गुणों के पालन पर भी विशेष बल दिया गया है।[५] नियतिवाद की आलोचना करते हुये मनुष्य को स्वयं उसके भाग्य का निर्माता कहा गया है, नियतिवाद के स्थान पर कर्मवाद के सिद्धान्त की स्थापना रामायण में की गई है। लक्ष्मण के व्यक्तित्व में बालमीकि ने यथार्थवादी दृष्टिकोण प्रस्तुत किया है। परम्परानुगत धर्म के पालन का आदर्श हमें यहाँ भी प्राप्त होता है।[६] रामायण में स्त्री,[७] भ्रातृ, पुत्र[८] और मित्र के धर्म[९] का निरूपण किया गया है। इसमें धर्म साक्षात देवता रूप में वर्णित है। राम को शरीरधर्म कहा गया है।[१०]

महाभारत में धर्म-स्वरूप के इस विवेचन के लिये अनेक विचारक उत्तरदायी रहे हैं; जिनमें महर्षि व्यास, युधिष्ठिर, कृष्ण, भीष्म-पितामह एवं अनेक

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१. श्री० एस० सी० सेन गुप्त का पूर्वोक्त लेख, पृ० ८५ पर।

२. रामा० अयो० का०, १०६/१९-२४।

३. डा० वेनजामिन खान, द कान्सेप्ट आव धर्म इन वाल्मीकि रामायण, पृ० ७६।

४. वही, पृ० १००।

५. रामा० कि० का०, १७/१७। वही आर० का० ६५/१०; १६।

६. रामा० अयो० का० २१/३६।

७. डा० काणे, हिस्ट्री आव धर्मशास्त्र, जिल्द १, पृ० १६०।

८. रामा० अयो० का० ९७/३; ६; ८।

९. रामा० यु० का० १/७९।

१०. "रामो विग्रहवान् धर्मः" उद्धृत द्वारा डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल कला और संस्कृति, पृ० १८१।

भृगुवंशीय ऋषियों की गणना की जा सकती है।[१] वास्तव में इसमें इन मनीषियों द्वारा अभिव्यंजित धर्म का एक समन्वित स्वरूप उभर सका है जो न केवल भारत का ही वरन् मानव मात्र का आदर्श होने के लिये स्व पर्याप्त है।

महाभारत का यह मूल वाक्य है––'यतोकृष्णस्ततो धर्मः यतोधर्मस्ततो जयः'। व्यास ने तो यहाँ तक कह डाला है—'उर्ध्वबाहुर्विरौम्येष न च कश्चितच्छृणोति मे, धर्मादर्थश्च कामश्च धर्मं किं न तु सेव्यते।'

महाभारत में धर्म के विभिन्न स्वरूप बताये गये हैं। इसमें राजधर्म, प्रजाधर्म, जातिधर्म और कुलधर्म, वर्णाश्रमधर्म, आपद्धर्म, मोक्षधर्म, स्त्रीधर्म आदि का वर्णन किया गया है।[२] महाभारत में धर्म को मानवमात्र के पूर्ण एवं सर्वाङ्गीण उत्कर्ष का साधन बताया गया है।[३] इसलिये धर्म का एक सापेक्ष स्वरूप इसमें देखने को मिलता है। सम्यक् धर्म वही है जो युग सत्य के अनुकूल एवं उत्कर्षकारी हो। इसीलिये महाभारत में धर्म का स्वरूप गत्यात्मक है।[४] योग्य समय और योग्य स्थान में जो आचरणीय धर्म है वही अयोग्य समय और अनुपयुक्त स्थान में अधर्म बन जाता है।[५] आपत्तिकाल में कभी-कभी अधर्म को ही धर्म का स्वरूप और धर्म को अधर्म का स्वरूप प्राप्त हो जाता है। प्राचीन ग्रन्थों के अनुरूप ही महाभारत में भी आपद्धर्म नाम का एक बड़ा अध्याय है। आपत्तिकाल के आने पर समाज द्वारा लगाये गये सामाजिक, नैतिक आदि बन्धन शिथिल होने वाले बताये गये हैं। आपत्तिकाल में उस व्यवस्था में भी परिवर्तन करना अयुक्त नहीं माना गया। वर्ण-सम्बन्धी परिवर्तन के विचार भी इसमें दृष्टिगोचर होते हैं।

वध के लिये समुद्यत अर्जुन से कर्ण ने कहा था "निःशस्त्र शत्रु का वध करना धर्म नहीं है। इस पर कृष्ण ने 'क्व ते धर्मस्तदागतः' प्रश्न में धर्म की व्याख्या की है और अन्त में बताया है जो इस प्रकार अधर्म करे उसके साथ उसी तरह का व्यवहार

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१. ए० बी० ओ० आर० आई भाग १८ में बी० एस० सुकथंकर का लेख एपिक स्टडीज; डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल, भारत सावित्री, पृ० ८-१४। सुकथंकर, मेमोरियल वाल्यूम, भाग १, पृ० २७८-३३७।

२. डा० वी० एस० सुकथंकर, आन द मीनिङ्ग आव द महाभारत, पृ० ८२।

३. महा० शा० प० १०९ अध्याय।

४. स एव धर्मः सोऽधर्मो देशकाले प्रतिष्ठितः।
का दानमनृत हिंसा धर्मो ह्यावस्थिकः॥ महा० शा० प० ३६/११।

५. महा० अरण्य पर्व २०९।
,, कर्ण पर्व ६९,
शा० प० ३३।

करना ही उसके लिये उचित दंड[1] है। यहाँ धर्म का न्यायपरक स्वरूप प्रतिभासित होता है। एक स्थल पर कहा गया है कि ग्राहार, निद्रा, भय ग्रादि स्वाभाविक ग्राचरण सभी के लिये ग्रावश्यक है। स्वाभाविक प्रवृत्तियों का उचित समाचरण ग्रौर पालन करना ही यहाँ मनुष्य का धर्म बताया गया है। यहाँ धर्म का तात्पर्य मर्यादा या सीमा के ग्रतिक्रमण न करने से है।

डा० वासुदेवशरण ग्रग्रवाल ने तो यहाँ तक कहा है कि जैसे वेदों का सार गायत्री मन्त्र सावित्री है वैसे ही सम्पूर्ण महाभारत का सार धर्म शब्द में है। धर्म की नित्य महिमा बताते हुये ग्रंथ के ग्रन्त में श्लोक है।[2]

न जातु कामान्न भयान्स लोभाद् धर्मत्यजेज्जीवितस्यापि हेतोः।
नित्योधर्मः सुखदुःखे त्वनित्ये, नित्योजीवो, धातुरस्य त्वनित्यः॥

गीता में भी धर्म का सम्यक् निरूपण किया गया है। इसमें वर्ण धर्म, ग्राचार एवं नैतिक गुणों का विवेचन मिलता है।[3] कर्म करना व्यक्ति का धर्म बताया गया है। गीता के ग्रनुसार कर्म के ग्रन्तर्गत वाचिक तथा मानसिक सभी कार्य समाविष्ट हैं।[4] इसमें निष्काम कर्म का ग्रादर्श प्रतिपादित किया गया है जो ग्रनासक्त भाव से धर्माचरण पर बल देता है।[5] गीता में एक स्थल पर बताया गया है कि धर्म की हानि ग्रौर ग्रधर्म की वृद्धि होने पर स्वयं भगवान् साधु पुरुषों के उद्धार, दुष्कर्मियों के नाश तथा धर्म की पुनः स्थापना के लिये युग-युग में जन्म लेते हैं।[6] यहाँ धर्म के महत्त्व को प्रकट करते हुये ईश्वर के ग्रवतार के द्वारा उसकी रक्षा का ग्राशावादी दृष्टिकोण प्रस्तुत किया गया है। इस ग्रादर्श का प्रभाव परवर्ती ग्रन्थों में स्पष्ट रूप से परिलक्षित होता है।

पुराणों में धर्म को सार्वजनीन नैतिक उपदेशों तथा ग्रनुपालनीय ग्राचार के रूप में प्रतिष्ठित करने का प्रयास मिलता है। ब्रह्माण्डपुराण में प्रशासकीय कार्यों के पालन कराने में धर्म का ग्राश्रय ग्रहण किया गया है।[7] मार्कण्डेयपुराण में उल्लेख है कि

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१. महा० शा० प० २९४/२९।

२. डा० वासुदेवशरण ग्रग्रवाल, भारत-सावित्री, भूमिका, पृ० ४। स्वर्गारोहण पर्व, ५/६३ (पूना सं०)। उद्योग पर्व ४०/११-१२ (पूना० सं०)। विशेष, डा० काणे, हिस्ट्री ग्राव धर्मशास्त्र, जिल्द १, पृ० १५९।

३. गीता, १८/४१-४४।

४. वही, ५/८९।

५. वही २/४७।

६. वही ४/७-८।

७. एनसाइक्लोपीडिया ग्राव रिलिजन एण्ड एथिक्स जिल्द १० पृ० ४५३ पर पार्गिटर का "द पुराणाज" नामक लेख। ब्रह्माण्ड पु० ५०/५३-७।

कलियुग में सनातन धर्म नष्टप्राय है।[१] भागवतपुराण में धर्म को चतुष्पाद बताया गया है। इस पुराण में हमें धर्म का महत्व गौ-वृषभ के संवाद से प्राप्त होता है।[२] इसके अतिरिक्त इसमें धर्म की दैवी उत्पत्ति की ओर भी संकेत है। धर्म को ब्रह्मा के वक्षस्थल के दक्षिण-पार्श्व से जनहित के लिए उत्पन्न पाँच वस्तुओं में प्रथम कहा गया है।[३]

पुराणों में धर्म के विविध रूपों और उनकी सूक्ष्मता को स्पष्ट किया गया है। स्मार्त-धर्म को इसी प्रकार समझाने का प्रयास हमें इनमें मिलता है।[४] धर्म का विनिश्चय एवं उसकी परिभाषा करना कठिन कहा गया है। इनमें नैतिक गुणों पर विशेष बल देते हुये उन्हें सनातन धर्म की संज्ञा दी गयी है, जिनमें अद्रोह अलोभ जीवों पर दया, दम, शान्ति, ब्रह्मचर्य, तपस्या, शुद्धता, अक्रोध, क्षमा तथा धैर्य का विशेष उल्लेख मिलता है।[५] इन नैतिक गुणों को और अधिक विस्तार के साथ भागवतपुराण में बताया गया है, जो कि बाद का है।[६]

इस पुराण में नैतिक तथा धार्मिक गुणों की संख्या तीस गिनाई गई है। इस तीस लक्षण वाले धर्म से ही भगवान् संतुष्ट होता है। यह संपूर्ण मानव मात्र का धर्म बताया गया है। ये लक्षण निम्नलिखित हैं :—

सत्य, दया, तप, शौच, तितिक्षा, युक्त विचार, शम, दम, अहिंसा, ब्रह्मचर्य, त्याग, स्वाध्याय, आर्जव, सन्तोष, समद्रक (समदर्शी-भाव), सभी की सेवा, सांसारिक भोगों से शनैः-शनैः निवृत्ति, प्रारब्ध-चिन्तन, मौन, आत्मचिन्तन, अन्न फल आदि को प्राणियों में बाँटकर खाना, प्राणि मात्र में न हो सके तब विशेष कर मनुष्यों में ईश्वर का भाव रखना, हरि-कथा-श्रवण, कीर्तन, स्मरण सेवा (आराध्यदेव की पूजा), भगवान् में दास-सख्य भाव, तथा आत्म-समर्पण।

पद्मपुराण में एक स्थल पर सनातन धर्म का आचार और परम्परा के रूप में वर्णन किया गया है। उसमें उल्लेख मिलता है कि सत्पुरुषों की दृष्टि में सूत जाति

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१. मार्कण्डेय पु० ९।२८-३१।

२. भागवत पु० १/३/९।

३. भागवत पु० १/१६/२०-२६; वी० आर० आर० दीक्षितार, पुराणिक इण्डेक्स, जिल्द २, पृ० १६०-१६१।

४. डा० काणे, हिस्ट्री आव धर्म शास्त्र, जिल्द १, पृ० १६४-१६७।

५. ब्रह्माण्ड पु० पूर्व भाग, २/३०/३३-३८। मत्स्य पु० १४३/२७-३२। वायु पु० पूर्व भाग, ५७।११२-११६।

६. भागवत पु० ७/११/५-१२।

के लिये वंश-परम्परा का पालन करना और इतिहास-पुराण का पाठ करना ही सनातन धर्म है।[१]

सम्प्रदायपरक क्षेत्र में त्रिदेव की भावना का विकास पुराणों में मिलता है। ब्रह्मा, विष्णु और महेश (शिव) को क्रमशः विश्व का स्रष्टा, रक्षक और नाशक मानकर तीनों की समन्वयात्मक एकता का प्रतिपादन किया गया है।[२] पुराणों का एक महत्त्वपूर्ण कार्य यह था कि उन्होंने वैदिक यज्ञों के स्थान पर पूजापद्धति पर बल दिया जिनका अनुष्ठान सभी वर्ण के लोग कर सकते थे। इनमें दीक्षा का महत्त्व का भी प्रतिपादन किया गया। पौराणिक धर्म का दृष्टिकोण उदार होता है। सुनीतिकुमार चटर्जी के मतानुसार[३] पूजा अवैदिक तत्वों के योगदान से प्रचलित हुई थी। पुराणों में पूजा और वैदिक होम का समन्वय मिलता है। पूजा जन सामान्य में अधिक लोकप्रिय था। नदियों, पर्वतों, वनों, और अन्य छोटे-मोटे देवताओं की पूजा का प्रचलन लोक धर्म के रूप में मिलता है।[४]

स्मृतियों के भाष्यों में हमें धर्म के विस्तृत वर्गीकरण का प्रयास मिलता है। मनुस्मृति के भाष्यकार मेधातिथि ने धर्म के वर्गीकरण[५] के पांच प्रकारों को स्वीकार किया है किन्तु अभिचारादि मंत्रों से मृगवध या हिंसा तथा क्रूर जीवहत्या को धर्म नहीं माना है। भाष्यकार ने हिंसायुक्त धार्मिक कृत्यों को मान्यता नहीं दी है। याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति के भाष्यकार विज्ञानेश्वर ने धर्म के वर्गीकरण में ६ प्रकारों को स्वीकार किया है। इसके अतिरिक्त इसमें गर्भावस्था तथा शैशवावस्था से रहित, ब्राह्मण से लेकर चांडाल तक की स्त्रियों के सती होने को उनका साधारण धर्म कहा गया है।[६]

धर्म की अवधारणा पर यहाँ भी सामाजिक परिस्थितियों एवं रीति-रिवाजों का प्रभाव परिलक्षित होता है। सती-प्रथा को जिसे बाणभट्ट तथा मेधातिथि जैसे विद्वानों ने निन्दित माना था उसे विज्ञानेश्वर ने मिताक्षरा में स्त्रियों का साधारण धर्म कहा है। इससे स्पष्ट होता है कि जब वह प्रथा पूर्णतः प्रचलित हो गई, तब बारहवीं सदी ईसवी में उसे धर्म के अन्तर्गत स्वीकार किया गया। लक्ष्मीधर के कृत्यकल्पतरु में दृष्टार्थ तथा अदृष्टार्थ धर्म को बताते हुये धर्म के निःश्रेयस रूप को श्रेष्ठ माना गया है।[७]

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१. पद्म पु० सृ० खं० १/२७-२९।
२. ए० डी० पुसालकर, स्टडीज इन द इपिक एण्ड पुराणाज, पृ० ९।
३. सुनीतिकुमार चटर्जी, द वैदिक एज, पृ० १५९-६०।
४. डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल, प्राचीन भारतीय लोकधर्म, पृ० २२-१८०।
५. मेधातिथि मनु २/२९ पर भाष्य।
६. याज्ञ० स्मृ० १/८६ पर विज्ञा० भा०।
७. लक्ष्मीधर, कृ० क० ब्रह्मचारिकाण्ड, जिल्द १, पृ० ६।

धर्म की व्याख्या करने का प्रयत्न बहुत कम आचार्यों ने किया है। सर्वप्रथम आपस्तम्ब धर्मसूत्र[१] में ही धर्म की व्याख्या का प्रयास दृष्टिगोचर होता है। आपस्तम्ब के अनुसार धर्म और अधर्म सामान्य रूप से नहीं जाने जा सकते। देवता, गन्धर्व और पितरगण यह स्पष्ट रूप से नहीं निर्देश करते हैं कि अमुक वस्तु धर्म और अमुक अधर्म है। परन्तु यह कहा जा सकता है कि धर्म वह कार्य अथवा आचार है जिसकी प्रशंसा शिष्ट जन करते हैं। इसके विपरीत शिष्टों द्वारा निन्दित कर्म ही अधर्म है।

महाभारत में कई स्थलों पर धर्म को धारणात्मक तत्व कहा गया है जो समाज को धारण करने की सामर्थ्य रखता है।[२] धर्म शब्द की व्युत्पत्ति की दृष्टि से भी यही अर्थ निकलता है क्योंकि इसे धृ धातु से निष्पन्न माना गया है। निश्चय ही आपस्तम्ब धर्मसूत्र की अपेक्षा यह परिभाषा अधिक व्यापक है, क्योंकि इसमें सदाचार के साथ ही अन्य विधियों एवं नियमों का समावेश किया गया है।

दर्शन ग्रन्थों में भी धर्म की स्पष्ट परिभाषायें मिलती हैं। जैमिनीसूत्र[३] में हमें धर्म की निम्नलिखित परिभाषा मिलती है—

'चोदनालक्षणार्थोधर्मः'। इसके अनुसार जो अर्थ ( वेद की ) विधि से प्राप्त होता है वही धर्म है। इसलिये धर्म का अर्थ चोदना: विधि अथवा प्रेरणा है। वास्तव में यह धर्म की विधिपरक परिभाषा है! जैमिनिसूत्र के भाष्यकार शबर के अनुसार 'चोदना वह है जिसके द्वारा क्रिया की प्रेरणा होती है' कर्तव्य की प्रेरणा बाहरी स्रोत होती है किन्तु चोदना का एक दूसरा अर्थ भी प्रचलित है आन्तरिक प्रेरणा अथवा क्रिया की प्रवृत्ति प्राय: देखा जाता है कि जिस क्रिया की बाहर से प्रेरणा मिलती है वह हृदय को भी पसन्द आती है। भाष्यकारों का मत है कि शास्त्रों के विधान दु:ख की अपेक्षा सुख उत्पन्न करने में समर्थ हैं।

प्राय: विहित कर्मों से वांछनीय उद्देश्यों की प्राप्ति है।[४] इसमें कार्यों को दो वर्गों तथा ( वैदिक और लौकिक ) में विभाजित किया गया है। वैदिक धार्मिक कार्य तीन रूपों में यथा विहित, निषेधात्मक और विहितात्मक में विभक्त है। विहित कार्यों को याग, होम और दान से सम्बन्धित कहा गया है।[५] यज्ञ करना प्रधान कार्य है

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१. आप० ध० सू० १/२०/६–७।

२. महा० कर्ण पर्व ७२/५८ सा० प० १०९।११।

३. जैमिनि सूत्र १/१/२।

४. डा० राजबली पाण्डेय, भारतीय नीति का विकास, पृ० १११!

५. म० म० गंगानाथ झा, पूर्व मीमांसा इन इट्स सोर्सेज पृ० २२६, मीमांसा बाल प्रकाश।

और यज्ञ सम्बन्धित अन्य कार्य गौण हैं।[१] धर्म का सम्बन्ध उपर्युक्त सभी कार्यों से है। जैमिनिसूत्र के भाष्यकार शबर ने अभिचारादि मंत्रों से तथा श्येन द्वारा स्वर्गादि को प्राप्त कराने में समर्थ क्रियाओं को धर्म के अन्तर्गत नहीं स्वीकार किया है।[२] अान्नम भट्ट के अनुसार मर्यादित अनुष्ठानों के द्वारा प्राप्त अदृश्य शक्ति धर्म है।[३] केशव मिश्र का मत है कि धर्म अपूर्व के रूप में स्थित रहता है।[४] जैमिनि[५] ने व्यवहार को धर्म के अन्तर्गत नहीं माना है। वैशेषिक दर्शन में बताई गयी धर्म की परिभाषा पूर्णतः मुक्त है।

स्वामी शंकराचार्य ने गीता पर भाष्य लिखते समय उपोद्घात में बताया है कि जगत् की स्थिति, प्राणियों को उन्नति और मोक्ष के साक्षात् हेतु को धर्म कहते हैं।[६] धर्म की यह परिभाषा वैशेषिक दर्शन में दी गयी परिभाषा से अधिक व्यापक है। इसमें धर्म के माध्यम से अभ्युदय और निःश्रेयस की प्राप्ति तो बतायी ही गई है, परन्तु साथ ही इसमें धर्म को जगत् की स्थिति का कारण भी कहा गया है।

लक्ष्मीधर ( १२वीं शती० ई० ) की परिभाषा के अनुसार दैनिक जीवन में धर्माचरण के ही धर्म का निश्चय किया जा सकता है। इस प्रकार धर्म का विनिश्चय उसके स्वरूप, दृष्ट-फल, प्रमाण तथा निमित्त आधार पर किया जा सकता है।[७] वास्तव में लक्ष्मीधर ने यहाँ पर धर्म की परिभाषा देने का उतना प्रयास नहीं किया है जितना कि धर्म के साधनों को बताने का। कुछ आधुनिक विद्वानों ने भी धर्म की परिभाषा करने का प्रयास किया है।

डा० भगवानदास[८] के शब्दों में किसी वस्तु के धारण और उसके वास्तविक स्वरूप को स्थिर करने वाले तत्व को धर्म कहते हैं। किसी वस्तु की विशेषता उसके विशेष द्रव्य, आधारभूत गुण एवं आवश्यक स्वभाव को ही धर्म की संज्ञा दी गयी है। यह व्यक्ति के अधिकारों एवं कर्तव्यों का भी साथ-साथ वहन करता है। सामान्यतया धर्म का तात्पर्य स्वाभाविक गुण कर्तव्य, धार्मिक कर्तव्य, सदाचार और विधि से है परन्तु उसमें विशेष रूप से कर्तव्य ही सर्वोपरि है। डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल का

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१. जैनि० पू० सू० ३/१/१।

२. वही १/१/२ पर शबर भाष्य।

३. अान्नम भट्ट, तर्कसंग्रह, विहित कर्म जन्यो धर्मः।

४. केशव मिश्र, न्यायप्रदीप, विश्वकर्मनभाष्य, पृ० १५०।

५. जै० मि० पू० सु० ६।१।१२-१६। ६।७।१-१७।

६. गीता ( उपोद्घात ), १ पर शंकर भाष्य।

७. कृ० क० ब्रह्मचारिकाण्ड, जिल्द १, पृ० ५।

८. डा० भगवान दास, द साइन्स आव सोशल आर्गनाइजेशन, जिल्द १, पृ० ४९-५०।

मत है धर्म उन नियमों की संज्ञा है जिनसे यह सृष्टि प्रक्रिया गतिशील है। धारणाद्धर्मं अर्थात् धारणात्मक तत्व का वाचक शब्द धर्म है।[१]

धर्म का एक परम्परानुगत स्वरूप भी है। धर्मसूत्रों में यह सिद्धांत प्रतिपादित किया गया है कि पूर्वजों द्वारा पालन किये जाने के कारण धर्म अनुपालनीय है। आपस्तम्ब और विष्णु के धर्मसूत्रों में शिष्यों के आचरण का पालन धर्म बतलाया गया है।[२] मनुस्मृति में कहा गया है कि परम्परानुकूल धर्म को तिरस्कृत करने के कारण अनेक समर्थ राजा भी नष्ट हो गये हैं।[३] महाभारत में बताया गया है कि धर्म के विषय में श्रुतियों में विभिन्न सिद्धांत निरूपित हैं ऋषियों में भी मत वैभिन्य है। धर्म जन सामान्य की ज्ञान सीमा के परे है। इसलिये धर्मतत्व की सूक्ष्मता के कारण महापुरुषों द्वारा आचरित मार्ग ही धर्म है। महाभारत में धर्म देवता के रूप में भी वर्णित है। युधिष्ठिर स्वयं धर्मपुत्र और धर्म के अवतार कहे गये हैं। महाभारत में उल्लेख है कि द्रौपदी के चीरहरण के समय साक्षात् धर्म ने वस्त्र पहन कर उसकी मर्यादा की रक्षा की थी।[४] इसी ग्रन्थ में कहा गया है कि धर्मराज युधिष्ठिर ने अपने स्वामिभक्त कुत्ते के लिए स्वर्ग की अपेक्षा नरक वरण किया था। उक्त कथा में कुत्ते को धर्म का प्रतीक बतलाया गया है। इस पर देवराज इन्द्र को आश्चर्य हुआ था। यहाँ धर्म के द्वारा युधिष्ठिर की परीक्षा की गई थी।[५] इसी में कृष्ण के अवतार के रूप में भी धर्म वर्णित है।[६] भागवतपुराण में धर्म चतुर्थ अवतार कहा गया है।[७] इसी पुराण में छल, दम्भ, द्वेष, हिंसा आदि को अधर्म का रूप बताया गया है।[८]

विभिन्न दृष्टिकोण से धर्म की व्यापकता को निम्नरूप में प्रकट किया जा सकता है। तत्वदर्शन के दृष्टिकोण से विचार करने पर धर्म ब्रह्माण्ड-व्यवस्था सम्बन्धी सिद्धान्त (ऋत) के रूप में मिलता है।[९] मनोवैज्ञानिक दृष्टिकोण से जिसके द्वारा

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१. डा० वासुदेवशरण अग्रवाल, वेद-विद्या, पृ० २।

२. आप० ध० सू० २/५/१। विष्णु ध० सू०, ३/२।

३. मनु० ७/४०-४१; १२।१०८। जी० एच० मीज, धर्म एण्ड सोसाइटी, पृ० ११।

४. महा० वन पर्व ३१४/११९।

५. मनु० १/८१। महा० सभा प० ९०/५०।

६. महा० महाप्रस्थानिक पर्व ३/१-२२। वही, सभा प० १३/४८।

७. भागवत पु०, १/३/९; १/१७/३८-३९; ७/१२/१२-१५।

८. जी० एच० मीज, धर्म एण्ड सोसाइटी, पृ० ९-११।

९. राधाकमल मुकर्जी, इंडियन स्कीम आफ लाइफ, पृ० १९। वैशेषिक सूत्र, १/१/३।

इस संसार में सुख-समृद्धि और परलोक में शाश्वत आनन्द मिले, वही धर्म है। वैशेषिक दर्शन में यही बताया गया है।[१]

नैतिक दृष्टिकोण से अहिंसा, सत्य, अस्तेय आदि सद्गुण ही धर्म है। द्वेष, क्रोध तथा लोभ से रहित होकर सभी प्राणियों के हित में लगे रहना भी धर्म माना गया है। इन नैतिक गुणों को सभी वर्ण और जातियों के लिये कहा गया है।[२]

सामाजिक दृष्टिकोण से धर्म वर्णाश्रम-धर्म के अन्तर्गत पुरुषार्थों को प्राप्त करने का नियमावली प्रस्तुत करता है।[३] वैधानिक दृष्टिकोण से धर्मशास्त्रों द्वारा तद्-विषयक सन्दर्भ में प्रतिपादित नियमों को धर्म कहा गया है। इसके साथ ही साथ शिष्टों, ब्राह्मणों और न्याय सभा में बैठने वाले श्रेष्ठ जनों द्वारा प्रतिपादित विचारों को धर्म कहते हैं।[४] भक्तिप्रधान दृष्टिकोण में सभी धर्मों का एक ही लक्ष्य होता है। यहाँ कर्म तथा ज्ञानपरक सभी प्रवृत्तियों का उद्देश्य देवता की ओर अग्रसर होना रहता है। एक विशेष स्तर पर पहुँचने के पश्चात् धर्म का त्याग करने का आदेश भी गीता[५] में मिलता है।

तात्पर्य यह है कि धर्म का अर्थ बहुत व्यापक है। यह मानव जीवन एवं विश्व समाज के आधारभूत सिद्धान्तों का सामूहिक रूप होने के कारण मानव धर्म माना गया है।[६] सामान्य रूप से समस्त क्रिया-कलापों एवं सम्बन्धों में धर्म व्यक्ति समाज और ब्रह्माण्ड व्यवस्था को साथ-साथ सुसंचालित करने वाला नियामक तत्व माना जा सकता है। धर्म के बहिः प्रकाश बहिरंग उतने महत्त्वपूर्ण नहीं हैं जितना कि स्वतः धर्म का सिद्धान्त। धर्म का तात्विक स्वरूप शाश्वत है जो कि उसका अन्तरंग स्वरूप है। पर देश-कालादि के भेद के कारण उसके व्यावहारिक एवं बहिरंग स्वरूप भिन्न-भिन्न हो जाते हैं।

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१. भागवत पु०, ११/१७-२१।

२. मनु० ८/१५, १७; ८/३३५।

३. वही ८/३; १२/१०८।

४. गीता, १८/६६।

५. जी० एच० मीज, धर्म एण्ड सोसाइटी, पृ० १५। राधाकमल मुकर्जी, इंडियन स्कीम आव द लाइफ, पृ० २२।

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### SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION INTO ROMAN

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| अ .......... a | क् .......... k | ढ़् .......... ṛh | ल् .......... l |
| आ .......... ā | ख् .......... kh | ण् .......... ṇ | व् .......... v |
| इ .......... i | ग् .......... g | त् .......... t | श् .......... ś |
| ई .......... ī | घ् .......... gh | थ् .......... th | ष् .......... ṣ |
| उ .......... u | ङ् .......... ṅ | द् .......... d | स् .......... s |
| ऊ .......... ū | च् .......... c | ध् .......... dh | ह् .......... h |
| ऋ .......... ṛ | छ् .......... ch | न् .......... n | क्ष् .......... kṣ |
| लृ .......... ḷ | ज् .......... j | प् .......... p | त्र् .......... tr |
| ए .......... e | झ् .......... jh | फ् .......... ph | ज्ञ् .......... jñ |
| ऐ .......... ai | ञ् .......... ñ | ब् .......... b | ळ् .......... ḻ |
| ओ .......... o | ट् .......... ṭ | भ् .......... bh | अवग्रह .......... |
| औ .......... au | ठ् .......... ṭh | म् .......... m | ॡ .......... ḹ |
| ं .......... ṁ | ड् .......... ḍ | य् .......... y | ॠ .......... ṝ |
| ः .......... ḥ | ढ् .......... ḍh | र् .......... r | |

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